Chapter One: Introduction

Research Context and Objectives

When I envisioned this research project, my aim was twofold: first, to produce a useful research tool to examine the triggers of election violence in Africa; and second, to share this tool with practitioners, election officials, politicians, observers, civil-society activists, and journalists concerned with the promotion of peace and democracy in Africa. Every year, election observation missions generate substantial documentary evidence, which is rarely analysed systematically. This book’s empirical findings result from a qualitative content analysis of data sets extracted from 234 election observation and assessment reports, produced by international and domestic groups, on elections held in sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2011. I have also examined other authoritative sources, including policy reports, monographs, edited volumes, articles from peer-reviewed journals, and newspapers, to deepen my knowledge of the field.

In the face of recurrent episodes of election violence since multiparty elections were widely introduced across sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, practitioners and scholars have drawn attention to this phenomenon, to understand its causes and develop coping mechanisms and prevention strategies (Fischer 2002; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Höglund 2009, 412–27; Bardall 2010, 15–16). As recent groundbreaking research has emphasised, election violence in sub-Saharan Africa is deeply rooted; electoral processes become playgrounds on which competing communal groups and political actors pursue conflicting needs and interests (see, for example, case studies in Bekoe 2012). This book contributes to the relatively scarce but growing literature on electoral violence in Africa by conducting a comprehensive analysis of data sets, to inform policy responses to electoral violence.

Election observation missions and expert teams highlight best practices but also report shortcomings that provoke disputes between contestants. A constructive response to the root causes of election violence requires the promotion of deep conflict-prevention policies, which are beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, this research project investigates immediate triggers of violence that can be deactivated by improving procedures at each stage of the electoral cycle. First, the project intends to shed light on common electoral irregularities and malpractices intended or perceived as partisan and political strategies that may trigger tension, violence, or even full-fledged armed conflict. Second, the project aims to extract lessons to prevent electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, this project assumes that electoral violence can be prevented to a great extent if the electoral process produces a credible outcome reflecting the genuine will of the people.

Conflict Prevention and Election Observation

Election observation has played a pivotal role in support of emerging democracies across the globe since the 1970s. The first reported election observed dates back to 1857. Representatives from France, Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Turkey observed the plebiscite in Moldavia and Wallachia. Election observation became standardised after World War II. The United Nations (UN) monitored elections in South Korea in 1948 and intended to dispatch the UN Commission to Investigate Conditions for Free Elections in Germany, which the UN General Assembly had established in December 1951 (Beigbeder 1994).

Moreover, the decolonisation process gave birth to the so-called first generation of election monitoring missions. The Trusteeship Council observed or supervised thirty plebiscites, referenda, or elections. At the end of the Cold War, election monitoring became an integral part of the so-called wider peacekeeping. Beginning in 1989, UN election missions supervised, organised, or verified electoral processes. Election observation played a crucial role, particularly in first and second elections after a conflict, in terms of building trust among the parties involved in the political process. Kelly (2008) highlights the extent to which election observation has been mainstreamed as an integral part of elections in emerging democracies in the last twenty-five years.1

International observer groups have conceptualised election observation as the gathering of information on the election process and independent analysis of findings (IDEA n.d.; UN 2005a); their mandate is to produce and share knowledge among electoral stakeholders on the electoral process, as a confidence-building measure. Under the auspices of the United Nations, in October 2005 thirty-two organisations, including the Carter Center, the European Union, NDI, and the African Union, among others, endorsed guidelines for international election observations, in the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.2 Thus, the endorsing organisations define the main goals of election observation as follows: to guarantee the integrity, transparency, and accountability of an election process as well as to enhance public confidence in the process and work towards conflict mitigation.

Table 1.1. What is Election Observation? Two Basic Definitions

As the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation states, the findings of international election observation missions provide a factual common point of reference for all persons interested in the elections, including the political competitors. This can be particularly valuable in the context of disputed elections, where impartial and accurate findings can help to mitigate the potential for conflicts. (UN 2005a)

Similarly, the Communication on EU Election Assistance and Observation (2000) identified two interrelated main objectives: “to enhance public confidence in the election and democratic processes, including providing deterrence to fraud and to contribute, where relevant, towards the prevention and resolution of conflict.”

Election observation is used as both a light and deep conflict-prevention measure. Election observers can facilitate light prevention of political conflict in highly contested elections by reducing stakeholders’ mistrust of the integrity of the process and the independence of the election management body (EMB). In this regard, election observers may help to legitimise the process by enhancing its credibility or even by highlighting its weaknesses. Election observation may also promote deep prevention measures because observers make long-term recommendations, based on international principles and best practices, to make electoral processes more inclusive and transparent. In addition, however, and as addressed further below, other deep prevention measures that go beyond election missions are needed to prevent violence, such as structural measures to address root causes of conflict. Light and deep prevention measures are complementary and must be practiced simultaneously to prevent conflicts arising from electoral contests.

International observer groups have developed methodologies for observing all stages of the electoral process, based on the guidelines provided by the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. In this regard, the Declaration states,

International election observation evaluates pre-election, election-day and post-election periods through comprehensive, long-term observation, employing a variety of techniques. As part of these efforts, specialized observation missions may examine limited pre-election or post-election issues and specific processes (such as, delimitation of election districts, voter registration, use of electronic technologies and functioning of electoral complaint mechanisms) (UN 2005a).

Darnolf (2011) has suggested four useful methodology-related variables to assess the credibility of the findings obtained by an international election observation mission. First, the methodology must be comprehensive and cover all components of the electoral cycle; second, the mission must be able to obtain firsthand information through observers deployed in the field; third, these data must be collected in a standardised and structured way; and last but not least, the mission must have qualified personnel and adequate resources to analyse proficiently and accurately all data collected.

International observer missions deploy long-term observers, usually in teams of two, across the country to cover all stages of the electoral process. Observers usually arrive in their respective areas of responsibility at the onset of the election campaign, but in some cases they may be dispatched during the pre-electoral period to observe voter registration. At the central level, a core group of qualified experts who liaise with national electoral stakeholders compile and analyse all relevant field data obtained by long-term observers. On election day, both short- and long-term observers become roaming observers and visit numerous polling stations. International observer missions use sampling instead of total observation because of the costs of dispatching international observers to all polling stations. The percentage of polling stations observed on election day depends on the ratio of observers to polling stations and, thus, can vary from a small percentage to a statistically significant number. Long-term observers stay in the country until the official announcement of results. In some cases, core team members, usually including a legal expert, and some long-term observers remain for several more days to address post-election legal petitions by the judiciary.

In contrast, domestic observation groups struggle financially to cover all stages of the electoral process and tend to focus on election-day observation. They generally deploy stationary observers, who observe opening, polling, and counting in the same location. The number of stationary observers dispatched depends on available resources; in some elections, a network of domestic observer groups deploys stationery observers to all polling stations on election day, if international observer groups or donor agencies provide funding. Despite their financial constraints, domestic observer groups can provide valuable information, due to their in-depth knowledge of the environment in which the electoral process unfolds. In this regard, international observers also play the critical role of empowering local observer groups by speaking out internationally for them, particularly when repressive state policies curtail domestic observers’ freedom of expression.

African Elections: Zero-Sum Games
and the Debate on Neopatrimonialism

While scholars and practitioners debate the strengths and weaknesses of the so-called third wave of democratisation, most studies agree that elections have been instrumental in legitimising the role of hegemonic political parties turned into well-lubricated electioneering engines, while opposition parties lacking incumbents’ support struggle to gain power in competitive elections (Huntington 1991; Bratton and van de Walle 1998; Young 1999; Lindberg 2006; Abbink and Hessling 2000). Client-patron relations are entangled in the sociopolitical networks that control the governance structures of most African countries; politicians often perceive elections as zero-sum games they cannot afford to lose (Bratton and van de Walle 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2004). The concept of neopatrimonialism has been popular among prominent scholars examining African democratic transitions since the 1990s. The state’s control has been described as the ultimate prize for political elites who aspire to appropriate public resources to feed their informal clientelist networks (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 1994). Nevertheless, the concept is often used in a vague way, as a catchall concept to encapsulate everything wrong with African nascent democracies. In this regard, I share Makandawire’s concerns about the dangers of hyphenating neopatrimonialism. He states bluntly,

The attribution of all African ills to neopatrimonialism simply undermines internally driven change by occluding the real problems: corruption, vertical and horizontal inequality, ethnic and gender discrimination, weak state capacity, wrong ideas, political chicanery and the machinations of the many external actors who still seek to exploit Africa in some form or other - all of which could, were there a will to do so, actually be addressed... (2013, 50–51)

Generalisations regarding neopatrimonial states that primarily serve elites’ desires for profit and clientelistic agendas lack an extensive empirical base, and reductive theoretical biases neglect African complexity. For my analysis of election violence, I conceptualise neopatrimonialism as political elites’ use of public resources and informal client-patron networks to gain or maintain access to state power and assets. The root causes of African ills are multilayered, and elites’ struggle for state dominion is intertwined with resource-allocation disputes among communal groups defined by a shared ethnicity, language, religion, territory, cultural background, socioeconomic status, and other characteristics. Thus, we cannot disentangle violent responses to electoral processes from African people’s daily struggle for better living conditions and hopes for transformative policies based on socioeconomic development. Disadvantaged communities facing slow or nonexistent improvements in their living conditions, particularly in rural areas or in the extensive shantytowns around fast-growing African cities, see electoral contests as opportunities to design new policies and allocate additional resources to development. The struggle among political elites for state resources plays out through election campaigns in which politicians pledge to promote social change and eradicate poverty. Yet, unfulfilled electoral agendas trigger undesirable outcomes, such as voter apathy and resentment towards authorities and communal groups perceived as benefitting from lucrative client-patron relations. While it is beyond the scope of this book to analyse in detail the complex root causes of political violence in Africa, peace can hardly be sustainable without improved living conditions for disadvantaged populations.

Political entrepreneurs pursuing their agendas through the use of violence and coercion are barely independent from influential interest groups. Electoral violence in Africa flares up in the context of competition between dominant groups for access to limited state resources. EMBs suffer from institutional weaknesses and dependency on donor funding to hold timely elections, in contrast with political parties’ use of state resources and private donations for campaign purposes. The marketization of politics in Africa is intertwined with the consolidation of hybrid political systems dominated by autarchic leaderships. While societies holding regular elections gradually assimilate, as part of their political culture and praxis, the tenets of electoral democracy, idealistic visions of what democracy should offer––such as equal chances of success for all contestants and accountable, developmental policies––collude with fierce competition among interest groups for state resources (see, for example, Lindberg 2006 and Gyimah-Boadi 1996, 118–132).

What Is Electoral Violence?

Beyond clichés reproduced by international media portraying states in turmoil and African election violence as spontaneous expressions of barely containable hatred, studies on election violence highlight the final nature of coercive strategies used by agents of ruling or opposition parties to secure a favourable election outcome (Teshome 2009; Laakso 2007; Sisk 2008, 5–6; Fischer 2002, 4). Broadly conceptualised, violence implies not only physical force but other “actions or words which are intended to hurt people” (Cambridge Dictionaries Online n.d.). Thus, even when physical force is not used, violent acts seek to influence the outcome of an electoral process through intimidation and other coercive means (Nieburg 1969; Höglund 2009, 412–27).

Adapting a well-known Clausewitzian assertion on war, we can conceptualise electoral violence as the continuation of politics by other means in order to influence electoral outcomes (von Clausewitz 1976; Tilly 2003). Ruling parties use a wide range of resources and regulatory means to ensure favourable election outcomes. Ruthless governments orchestrate campaigns of political repression and intimidation against members or sympathisers of opposition political parties. In a similar vein, opposition parties mobilise their supporters to use violence to influence electoral processes often perceived as biased and unfair. In sum, power holders and agents linked to political parties generally instil violence to influence the outcome of an electoral process, whereas party supporters and disgruntled groups resort to violence when they perceive that political means cannot influence the outcome of an unfair or poorly managed electoral process.

Recent survey-based studies of Nigerian elections conclude that violence can be used to reduce voter turnout in areas where the party perpetrating the violence faces strong competition (Bratton 2008, 621–632; Collier and Vicente 2014, 327–55). Nonetheless, we lack conclusive evidence to prove cause-effect relationships between violent practices and low turnouts at the broader regional level, since election observers do not conduct systematic and comprehensive enquiries about the motivations for low turnout in areas affected by violence prior to or on election days. Election observers are mandated to focus mainly on those who turn out to vote; thus, observation methodology is not currently designed to provide statistically meaningful data on eligible voters who do not participate in the process. For example, in the troublesome presidential elections in Togo in 2005, opposition parties denounced human-rights violations and attacks on their partisans on election day (UN 2005b). However, it was not possible to measure the extent to which intimidation and harassment influenced the election turnout because relevant data were unavailable.

When instances of violence occur between two consecutive election rounds, variations in voter turnout between the rounds may indicate the need to follow through. However, it is rather difficult to establish a relationship between low turnout and violence by looking at the result because intimidatory tactics are often pursued alongside other fraudulent practices. Hence, when political party agents and voters are forcefully prevented from going to their polling stations, those who instigated the violence may capitalise on their desire to rig election results by undertaking ballot stuffing, group voting, ballot snatching, and so forth. For example, in the 2007 presidential election in Sierra Leone, in some areas of the southern and eastern regions where violent incidents and intimidation had been reported in the period between two election rounds, the voter turnout in the runoff was much higher than that in the first round. Ultimately, the electoral commission decided to invalidate the results from 477 polling stations with turnouts higher than 100 percent; as a result, the overall turnout was seven points lower in the runoff than in the first round (EUEOM 2007d).

Can We Prevent Electoral Violence by Reforming
the Electoral System?

While scholars and practitioners have recently debated the role of electoral systems (majoritarian, proportional, or mixed representation) in the consolidation of democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes in sub-Saharan Africa, we lack conclusive evidence that a given electoral system helps to better resolve disputes among stakeholders. Drawing on preliminary data between 1989 and 2001, Lindberg argues that majoritarian systems are more prone to election violence than are proportional representation systems because the latter incentivise cooperation between parties and peaceful coexistence in the long run by giving opposition parties greater representation in parliament (Lindberg 2005, 41–64). However, in contrast to the conceptual framework on election violence defined in this book, Lindberg’s criteria for peaceful elections are stringent, and elections with only sporadic, minor disturbances are not included. By applying such criteria, he inadvertently downplays the extent to which coercion influences African electoral contests. For example, in most countries of the region that uses a proportional electoral system, observers have reported instances of intimidation during the electoral process, leading to partisan clashes or even military coups since 2000.3

Emerging independent states largely inherited the constitutional provisions and electoral systems of their colonial masters (Lijphart 2004, 96–109). Thereafter, governments and parliamentarians, with vested interests in maintaining the electoral system through which they were elected, strengthened path dependency.4 Over half of African countries elect their presidents by absolute majority vote through a two-round system. Fewer than one-third elect them by plurality. Parliaments elect presidents only in a few countries, as presidentialism is the dominant system of governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Actually, the concentration of executive power in the president, which underlies the modalities of presidentialism prevailing across Africa, fosters fierce competition for power and discourages dialogue and cooperation among different political parties. In this regard, no electoral system is immune to electoral violence. Nonetheless, countries such as South Africa or Lesotho that have implemented reforms have greatly improved their track records of electoral violence. On the other hand, in countries where competent authorities have not adopted observers’ recurrent recommendations to reform problematic aspects of the electoral system, such as Nigeria and Zanzibar (Tanzania), controversy and incidents continue to mar elections.

In sum, there is no one-size-fits-all electoral system that can function as a best practice to prevent election violence across Africa because ultimately, it is not the electoral system per se but its implementation: the strategies arising from different systems that contestants pursue to achieve their goals. Each country has developed a distinctive political culture and its own institutional mechanisms to deal with electoral choices. Nonetheless, evidence so far shows that electoral reforms, such as the introduction of mixed electoral formulas or quota systems to enhance the representation of women and minorities, help to minimise the impact of predatory strategies by strong candidates and dominant political parties to achieve power by any means in electoral contests perceived as zero-sum games.

Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned

This book aims to prevent election-related disputes by examining election management bodies’ implementation of electoral procedures. To this end, the book draws on the findings of domestic and international election observation missions in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, this work shows that election violence could be prevented to a great extent by strengthening the capacity of election management bodies to organise credible elections. The findings reviewed above illustrate a wide scope for further research on conflict-prevention strategies at the interplay between root causes and triggers of election violence. In this regard, a policy-oriented research agenda to prevent election violence should strive to overcome simultaneously development challenges and election shortcomings that trigger the use of violence to satisfy political goals. In addition, practitioners in the field of conflict prevention would benefit from further research on the extent to which electoral-system reform may help to mitigate contestants’ opportunities to win elections by any means.