Chapter Eight: Towards Peaceful Elections –
Recommendations

Introduction: Regional Efforts

Election violence can, to some extent, be prevented or mitigated by conducting credible elections and addressing its triggers. In this regard, this chapter examines key international and regional initiatives on standards and best practices for elections developed in the last few years by practitioners, electoral commissions, election observation missions, and international and regional organisations. Ultimately, whether countries adopt and satisfactorily implement guidelines and recommendations depends chiefly on the political will of national governments and parliaments. Furthermore, resources are necessary to conduct costly reforms to strengthen the operational capacity of election management bodies, develop a new voter register, or update the demarcation of constituency boundaries. Nonetheless, the chapter claims that further efforts at the regional level to share best practices could help African states to strengthen their legal frameworks for elections and improve their electoral management practices.

Mainstreaming Standards and Best Practices

To support the consolidation of democratisation processes across Africa and prevent the recurrent use of unconstitutional means to maintain or overtake political power, the African Union began a dialogue among electoral stakeholders to establish a shared normative framework for the management of elections (Kane 2008). As a result, in 2002 the AU agreed and endorsed the African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, which contains provisions for the holding of regular, free, and fair elections under democratic constitutions, conducted by competent, independent, and accountable EMBs, and a system of separation of powers that ensures the independence of the judiciary (AU 2002). The declaration served as a foundation for the adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG) on January 2007 and its entry into effect in 2012.77 The Charter’s main objectives are to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, constitutional order, free and fair elections, gender balance, the independence of the judiciary, transparency, citizens’ participation, freedom of the press, the constitutional change of government, the fight against corruption, policies of regional integration, sustainable development, human security, and cooperation with the international community on democracy, elections, governance, and best practices in the management of elections (AU 2007). In article 19, the ACDEG stipulates that state parties shall invite the AU commission to send missions to observe scheduled elections and to guarantee states’ cooperation to ensure that the missions can undertake their mandate successfully. At the regional level, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have adopted protocols and principles to conduct credible and transparent elections.78

In the aftermath of violent ethnic clashes triggered by the disputed Kenyan elections at the end of 2007, the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government stressed “the need to initiate a collective reflection on the challenges linked to the tension and disputes that often characterise electoral processes in Africa, including the strengthening of the African capacity at national, regional and continental levels to observe and monitor elections” (AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government 2008). As part of the regional efforts to implement this decision, the Panel of the Wise focused in 2008 on election disputes and conflicts and produced a report on strengthening the role of the African Union in the prevention, management, and resolution of election disputes and violent conflicts in Africa. The report underlines the link among electoral violence, weak election management, unlevel playing fields, and the courts’ lack of impartiality in settling electoral disputes. The panel underscores the need to develop an integral long-term approach to the prevention of electoral violence throughout the different stages of the electoral cycle (AU Panel of the Wise 2010). Furthermore, the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, held in Sirte in 2009, requested that the African Union Commission implement the panel’s recommendations and report regularly on steps taken in this respect (AU Assembly 2009). Further research would be welcome to explore the African Union and its members’ progress in following up on the panel’s recommendations in coming years.

International and nongovernmental organisations dealing with election observation in Africa have promoted their own initiatives to examine international standards and best practices for elections. The Carter Center’s Democratic Election Standards project was set up in 2006 to explore benchmarks for democratic elections. The so-called Election Obligations and Standards (EOS) Database has compiled over 200 sources of public international law, to link states’ specific human-rights and democratic obligations derived from these documents to the different stages of the electoral cycle. As the EOS manual underlines, public international law provides the foundation for a set of election standards that election practitioners and observers now widely accept. In this regard, the EOS project rests on the assumption that election-related obligations in international treaties and instruments offer a useful basis for assessing the quality of electoral processes because these obligations are objective, transparent, and states have voluntarily agreed to them (Carter Center 2014).

In addition, the European Commission launched in 2001 the Network for Enhanced Electoral and Democratic Support (NEEDS), to train election observers, improve the methodology of election observation based on best practices, and promote electoral standards. Since 2013, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) of the European Commission launched a new tender, and the programme was renamed Election Observation and Democratic Support (EODS). The project cooperates with international and regional organisations that have endorsed the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, such as the AU in activities to follow up its implementation, and with the Global Network for Domestic Observers to support the dissemination of the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations (EODS Project n.d.). Both the Second Edition of the EU Election Observation Handbook and the Compendium of International Standards for Elections contain useful best practices for implementing the core activities of the election cycle.79

.At the continental level, in recent years the African Union has developed its ability to conduct election observation, both conceptually and in practice. The African Union launches over fifteen missions per year and deploys short- and long-term observers. Its Election Observation Manual published in 2013 provides guidelines for AU election observers on benchmarks for democratic elections, election observation background, scope, mandate, mission, structure, terms of reference, methodology, reporting, codes of conduct, and recommendations to host governments (AU 2013). At the subregional level, Southern Africa has taken a leading role in the continent by promoting several mechanisms to strengthen the capacity of electoral bodies and harmonise best practices. The subregion includes numerous instruments and organisations focusing on election observation and technical assistance since the 1990s. Examples of constructive interstate cooperation in Southern Africa are the publication of Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region and the Election Observation Guide for Members of Parliament by the SADC Parliamentary Forum in 2001; the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PENMO), adopted by EISA and the Electoral Commissions Forum in 2003 after three years of consultations involving over one-hundred electoral stakeholders from all fourteen countries of the subregion; and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections adopted by the SADC Summit in 2004, popularly known as the guidelines (SADC Parliamentary Forum 2001a, 2001b; EISA 2004c; SADC Summit 2004). More recently, efforts have focused on reviewing the guidelines (2013) and developing the SADC elections handbook (Motsamai 2013).

The Core of the Matter: Independent, Impartial,
and Efficient EMBs

The preamble of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance underlines that the “holding of free and fair elections is to be conducted by competent, independent and impartial EMBs.” Furthermore, chapter seven, on democratic elections, reaffirms state parties’ commitment to “establish and strengthen independent and impartial national electoral bodies” (AU 2007). In this regard, EMBs play a central role in the organisation of credible and peaceful elections; as this research project illustrates, concerns regarding EMBs’ independence, impartiality, and efficiency have tainted several electoral processes and triggered election disputes. Initiatives examining electoral reforms, such as the colloquium on African elections sponsored by NDI and others in 2009 or the revised edition of IDEA’s manual on electoral management design, emphasise the need to establish a legal and financial regulatory framework that guarantees electoral bodies’ independence and their members’ integrity through transparent selection procedures. For its part, the African Union Election Observation Manual instructs observers to examine EMBs’ mode of appointment and their funding (AU 2013).

The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) provides an example of an EMB that was publicly scrutinised over election irregularities. As the findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (CIPEV) (the so-called Waki commission) on the 2007 Kenyan polls emphasise, the ECK was perceived as a partisan body, and people’s mistrust of its role in the process contributed to the violence that escalated during the tabulation process and the official announcement of results. A power-sharing agreement brokered by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan put an end to the electoral crisis, and both parties agreed to pass the National Accord and Reconciliation Act. Subsequently, the new constitution adopted by popular vote via referendum in 2010 led to the creation of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in 2011. According to the renewed legal framework, a selection panel designated by the president appointed the IEBC’s chairperson and commissioners; parliament assigned an independent budget that included new procedures for financial accountability; a Code of Conduct was established for IEBC employees to ensure their integrity and professionalism; last but not least, the new constitution entrusted the IEBC to settle electoral disputes and to investigate and prosecute electoral malpractices (Catt et al. 2014). Although electoral stakeholders also raised concerns regarding the IEBC’s role during the general elections held in 2013 (Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice 2013), election management procedures were generally well conducted and disputes resolved peacefully, underscoring the urgency and necessity of the electoral and legal reforms that occurred after 2007 (EUEOM 2013).

Nonetheless, accountability mechanisms help significantly to build the electorate’s confidence in EMBs. Ghana has been able to prevent violent outcomes of heated electoral disputes by applying the principles of judicial review of administrative action to the work of the Electoral Commission. In addition, Ghana has developed a fast-track mechanism for dealing with election complaints, and the country’s constitution establishes that decisions of the Electoral Commission can be challenged through the court system.80 For instance, NPP front-runner Nana Akufo-Addo lodged a presidential election petition to challenge the validity of the election of John Mahama as president of Ghana in 2012 (Commonwealth Observer Group 2013). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition because it was deemed that the extent of irregularities identified could not affect the election results. Nonetheless, the verdict concluded that the petition exposed the need for reforms, such as making the voter register available in a timely manner to the parties, raising the calibre of polling stations’ presiding officers, simplifying documentation of closing and counting procedures, ensuring that the biometric device system to identify voters did not break down, among others (Supreme Court of Ghana 2013). Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan praised the review and claimed that “this transparent and impartial audit of an election by a court sets a precedent for Africa as a whole of which we can be proud” (Oquaye 2012).

Nonetheless, accountability systems can be successful only if established alongside effective transparency mechanisms. Observers and practitioners stress that efficient, regular communication channels should be established to exchange among all stakeholders relevant information on election preparations and voting procedures. To this end, EMBs need to develop a smooth flow of information, top down and bottom up, among the different layers of their structure as well as liaison mechanisms to inform voters, political parties, civil-society organisations, the media, and observers on procedures regarding candidate nomination, voter registration, campaign procedures, and polling and tabulation procedures.

EMBs’ Financial Autonomy

As the findings of this research project underscore, well-resourced EMBs can play a key role in the prevention of election-related conflicts. For instance, revising the delimitation of electoral districts and accounting for updated population data and other relevant factors are usually costly and lengthy exercises that help to build the electorate’s confidence in the process; in contrast, outdated constituency boundaries jeopardise the credibility of election results by distorting the democratic will of the electorate. Likewise, EMBs struggle financially to implement other vital aspects of the electoral process, such as maintaining an accurate voter register or conducting voter-education campaigns, particularly among low-literacy populations in remote rural areas. In this regard, the international community and regional organisations could explore the feasibility of strengthening cooperation programs devoted to building EMBs’ capacity.

In 2007, the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC countries agreed to a set of common principles and guidelines on the independence of EMBs in the SADC region and recommended that their respective governments adjust their legal frameworks accordingly (SADC Electoral Commission Forum 2008a). The forum underscored that financial independence was a prerequisite for electoral bodies to discharge their functions effectively and, to this end, recommended that EMBs have their own separate budget approved by the legislature; while governments should be responsible for ensuring that EMBs are adequately financed, the latter should have discretionary power over the use of funds and procurement of personnel and goods.

EMBs and Dispute Resolution

The AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance stress the role of national mechanisms and competent judicial authorities in addressing election disputes so that individuals and political parties can obtain timely hearings on electoral malpractices, in accordance with domestic laws and the state’s international obligations (AU 2002, section 4, article 6; AU 2007, chapter 7, article 17.2). Furthermore, in a move consistent with this legal framework, the African Union Election Observation Manual points out that observers should assess whether “the legal framework provides mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes arising from the electoral process and whether the mechanisms are accessible and provide for fair hearing of disputes” (AU 2013, 64).

The report of the AU Panel of the Wise on election disputes and political violence underlines that strengthening the capacity of African EMBs to conduct credible elections is the cornerstone of an effective prevention strategy. In this regard, a core task of EMBs is to duly inform all stakeholders of available dispute-resolution mechanisms (NDI et al. 2009b). Election observation reports generally positively appraise the role of party liaison committees (PLCs) or similar conflict-mediation bodies in keeping all stakeholders fully engaged in the process and enhancing cooperation between EMBs and political parties on electoral matters at the national, provincial, and local levels. Originally established by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) of South Africa, PLCs were successfully introduced and the number of formal complaints rapidly decreased, from 1113 in 1999 to 253 in the subsequent South African general elections in 2004 (IDEA 2010; EISA 2010b). Liaison committees enhance dialogue among electoral stakeholders and settle disputes efficiently by avoiding time-consuming and costly court cases. Thus, PLCs promote inclusiveness, transparency, and trust, but their effectiveness depends on the extent to which all stakeholders commit to discuss and solve issues that arise as the process unfolds; to this end, relevant stakeholders need to be actively involved and sessions regularly held at all levels (national, regional, and local).

Candidate Registration: Mainstreaming Best Practices

Incumbents’ attempts to linger in power or thwart the people’s free will to elect candidates of their choice motivate bitter protests and even violent clashes among pro-democracy demonstrators, opposition supporters, and security forces. In recent years, protests against constitutional changes have turned violent in countries such as Cameroon, Senegal, and Burundi. Violent reactions to presidential attempts to extend their terms also reflect people’s frustration stemming from their perception that incumbent presidential candidates would enjoy advantageous resources to win elections again. At the regional level, the Panel of the Wise has acknowledged the problem by stating that violence is caused by the “wilful changing of established rules,” and the African Union has expressed its intention to combat unconstitutional term changes (AU Panel of the Wise 2010, 26). Article 23 of the African Charter states, “State Parties agree that the use of, inter alia, the following illegal means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an unconstitutional change of government and shall draw appropriate sanctions by the Union,” and point five stipulates “Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government” (AU 2007).

However, according to the wording of article 23.5, grounds for issuing sanctions based on whether a constitutional revision reflects an unconstitutional change of government are unclear because the article does not specify what an infringement of the principles of a democratic change of government actually entails. In this regard, the African Union could review article 23 to strengthen the organisation’s capacity to impose sanctions on state members that breach the charter. In addition, the AU could go a step further and recommend advisable benchmarks regarding appropriate presidential term limits.81 Nonetheless, as the Carter Center’s standards manual emphasises, “the credibility of the electoral process is determined to a large degree by the capacity of the state to effectively resolve electoral disputes” (Carter Center 2014, 178). There is a need to strengthen the judicial capacity to resolve disputes over the legality of candidate nominations, independently from political power, to prevent election conflicts. Otherwise, when the public perceives court rulings as biased in favour of the ruling party, the likelihood of conflict escalation is much greater, as illustrated by the escalation of violent protests in Senegal after the constitutional court ruled that President Abdoulaye Wade was eligible to run for a third term in 2012.

As described above, incumbent governments’ efforts to hamper registration thwart democracy and lead to the marginalisation of interest groups that may eventually resort to other means to achieve political power. In this regard, the African Union could also explore the feasibility of providing recommendations to member states on the review of legal frameworks, to mainstream best practices for candidate registration. As the Handbook for European Union Election Observation emphasises, the law should regulate registration procedures and their timetables, which should be clearly set and publicised in advance to ensure that all potential candidates have enough time to register; registration requirements should be reasonable and not discriminatory; and all candidates whose nomination was refused should be duly informed, and they should be able to exercise their right to challenge their disqualification in a timely manner, to ensure that candidates can take part in the process (European Commission 2008). The Carter Center’s Assessment Manual on Election Obligations and Standards specifies a range of unreasonable restrictions on every citizen’s right to be a candidate, including some still in vogue in numerous African countries, such as those based on residency requirements, national origin, naturalised citizenship, age, any criminal conviction, high registration fees, internal displacement, political opinion, or sexual orientation. Regarding unreasonable restrictions, the African Union Election Observation Manual is more vague and indicates only that missions should assess whether nomination procedures exclude “any group, specially women and other minority groups such as persons with disability” and whether nomination fees are exorbitant (AU 2013, 68).

Voter Registration: Technological Challenges

With regard to voter registration, this research project highlights the extent to which producing an accurate voter list remains a challenging endeavour in most African countries. Voter registration is a pillar of electoral integrity because voters who are disenfranchised or given the opportunity to vote more than once jeopardise the credibility of results. Election observation missions emphasise that the introduction of IT-captured biometric data in sub-Saharan Africa has not always improved the quality of voter rolls but, rather, has produced new challenges. As EISA’s comparative perspective on voter registration in Africa indicates, registration needs to be sustainable, i.e., technically and financially viable. In this regard, in the long term a permanent voter register is more sustainable than is developing a new register for each electoral exercise. The Colloquium on African Elections, organised by international agencies in Ghana82 with the participation of electoral stakeholders from across Africa, recommended that states should ensure that their legal frameworks reflect international best practices, including continuous voter registration (NDI et al. 2009a). Nonetheless, not all African countries possess adequate resources and qualified personnel working continually to maintain a permanent voter register.

Defective voter rolls often derive from EMBs’ broader operational challenges to implement their electoral mandates successfully. Setbacks across the region in introducing new technologies to capture and produce reliable voter rolls underscore the need for each country to find solutions adapted to their human and technical capacity. For instance, manual registration methods should not necessarily be discarded, particularly if they offer, for the time being, the optimal solution in a given context to produce an accurate voter roll, including an efficient system to verify eligible voters’ identities (via signature, picture, finger/thumb print, etc.). In this regard, the EISA’s comparative study on voter registration in Africa warns against EMBs purchasing supplier/vendor-driven technology or using high-tech equipment that can be stolen or damaged in a particular context. Ultimately, voter-registration systems’ reliability and integrity depend on EMBs’ capacity to develop adequate in-house technical skills to maintain the systems (UNDP 2013).

In sum, systems must be robust enough in terms of accuracy, integrity, and inclusiveness to face politicisation attempts: they should neither exclude eligible voters nor include ineligible ones. In this regard, producing accurate voter registers in countries unable to track population changes at all times will remain challenging for years to come, particularly in rural areas. Nonetheless, countries such as South Africa and Ghana have been able to produce reasonably accurate voter rolls by gradually integrating new technologies into their actual operational capacity. Thus, both cases illustrate the need to adapt technological progress to the country’s means to capture voter data and maintain an accurate register through which all eligible voters can cast their votes on election day.

Use of State Resources for Campaigning:
A Regional Dimension

As this research project and other recent studies on election violence in sub-Saharan Africa emphasise, incumbents play a key role in triggering election violence by promoting uneven playing fields during election campaigns.83 At the regional level, the African Union has not taken steps to thwart the use of state resources for campaigning, which contrasts with its efforts to condemn, for instance, unconstitutional changes of government. As mentioned above, the OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa does not explicitly address the use of state resources for campaigning, and it refers only to stakeholders’ obligation in democratic elections not to grant favours to voters as a way of influencing election results (AU 2002, section IV, article 9).84

On the other hand, the African Union has devoted more attention to the use of state media during the electoral period. Statistics compiled by election observation missions regarding media coverage of election campaigns show that in many African elections, incumbents take advantage of public media for campaigning purposes. In this regard, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance underlines that State parties shall “ensure fair and equitable access by contesting parties and candidates to state controlled media during elections” (AU 2007, article 17.3). Moreover, the African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa makes clear that individuals or political parties should have full access to the media in order to campaign (AU 2002, section 4, article 5). Regarding the impartiality of public media, the declaration also stipulates that parties or candidates should refrain from constraining their adversaries’ use of public media to relay campaign messages (AU 2002, section 4, article 11).

Neither the declaration nor the charter focuses on the use of private media for campaigning purposes. Yet, widespread evidence from election observation reports and media outlets shows that incumbents and other resourceful candidates resort to private media, particularly radio stations (national or local) but also television channels and newspapers, to propagate news shining a positive light on their policies, to disseminate their campaign messages, or to generate unrestricted coverage of their campaign activities. In this regard, election observers highlight the positive role that independent and well-resourced media supervisory bodies can play to oversee the implementation of media-coverage regulations for campaign activities (Carter Center 2014; European Commission 2008).

In sum, competent authorities in most African states could further regulate both aspects examined in this section, the use of state resources and candidates’ access to public/private media for campaigning. In this regard, the African Union and subregional organisations can be instrumental in making recommendations for member states to harmonise their best practices and regulatory frameworks.

Tackling Illegal Party/Candidate Funding

Most African countries have signed, ratified, or accepted the 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the 2003 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), which demands that state parties adopt legislation proscribing the use of funds acquired through illegal means and incorporate transparency into parties’ funding (AU 2003). Nevertheless, transparency in the funding of political parties and election campaigns remains an area of concern for practitioners (Ohman 2012). According to data collected by IDEA, most sub-Saharan African countries have no bans on corporate donations to political parties or candidates. Although in roughly half of African countries, political parties or candidates are legally bound to report their accounts regarding campaign funding, financial reports are rarely provided, incurring no penalties or sanctions, even if prescribed by law in most cases (IDEA n.d.). IDEA has put forward numerous useful recommendations to address this situation, such as comprehensive reporting requirements for political parties and candidates on their finances, with detailed records that can be audited; imposing small sanctions on political stakeholders who refuse to report their campaign funding, in contravention of the law; or passing legislation to level the playing field, including state funding of opposition parties and enforceable bans on the abuse of state resources (Ohman 2012).

These transparency mechanisms and other decisive measures such as promoting finance ceilings or freezing illegally obtained funds can be effective in certain contexts; however, abusing state resources in winner-take-all contests is often too tempting, and even when anticorruption legislation exists, the challenge is often for rule-of-law officials to be able to enforce it, due to political interference or shortcomings in their capacity to investigate corruption charges. Improvements in tackling illegal party/candidate funding will ineluctably require political will and the consolidation of a democratic culture of power alternation. In this regard, an effective, regional peer-review system could help states to adapt their legislation and procedures to level the financial playing field among electoral contestants.

Regional Efforts To Mainstream Best Practices through the Peer-Review System

This section explores regional efforts to mainstream international best practices through the peer-review system. The experts who participated in the EISA annual symposium in 2009 on preventing and managing violent election-related conflicts in Africa concluded that African governments’ failure to ratify or implement their international commitments hinders not only the prospects of managing elections efficiently but also efforts to prevent violence. In this regard, the symposium acknowledged the role that a full-fledged implementation of the African Peer Review Mechanism could play “to reinforce transparency and accountability in all governance processes” (EISA 2010b). At the sixth summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) held in Abuja in 2003, leaders adopted the Memorandum of Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is a self-monitoring instrument that African states can access voluntarily. To date, thirty-five member states of the African Union have joined the APRM, and seventeen states have conducted their first self-assessment and subsequent peer-review process.85

In June 2014, the Assembly of the African Union, held in Malabo, decided to integrate the APRM into the African Union. The assembly recognised the APRM as an autonomous body within the African Union structures, considering that it remained a voluntary organisation of AU member states (AU Assembly 2014). APRM members commit to be peer-reviewed periodically, but review results are not legally binding and no sanctions are envisaged for reviewed countries that fail to undertake the reviewers’ recommended reforms (Stultz 2007). A panel of eminent Africans, selected according to regional balance by APRM heads of state, leads the review. All parties undertake their own national self-assessment prior to the periodic review process. A team of experts recruited by the APRM Secretariat subsequently reads the report in order to conduct a visiting country review mission (CRM). The mission visits the country and engages in discussions with government representatives. According to the APRM guidelines, if the government shows willingness to address the shortcomings identified by the mission, APRM governments and the donor community are compelled to assist the country under review.

In the area of democracy and political governance, the country review reports assess the following APRM core objectives: to prevent and reduce intrastate and interstate conflicts; to achieve constitutional democracy and the rule of law, to promote and protect economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights; to uphold the separation of powers, including the protection of an independent judiciary and an effective legislature; to ensure accountability and efficiency of public office holders; to fight corruption; and to protect and promote the rights of women, children, young persons, and vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons, refugees, and disabled persons (APRM 2003). In this regard, addressing the triggers of election violence falls under the mandate of the APRM system and completed review processes focused on critical issues for the promotion of democracy and the prevention of election conflicts; these issues include the need to update constituency boundaries, the lack of internal democracies among political parties, and the relationship between electoral violence and ethnic politics (APRM 2006).

The APRM procedure has been questioned in recent years for losing steam, as the number of peer-reviewed countries has proportionally decreased and as reviewed member states make slow progress to implement APRM recommendations. In addition, significant African states such as Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Botswana decided not to join in this voluntary mechanism for various reasons, such as concerns regarding its financial sustainability or reservations regarding the APRM’s role in promoting a donor-driven agenda based on western political and economic principles (EISA 2004a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). A UNDP-managed trust fund supports the work of the APRM Secretariat, which has received two million euros from the European Commission since 2009 (Africa-EU Partnership n.d.). Furthermore, civil-society groups criticised the APRM project from its inception for not being permeable enough to views from below, as an influential group of experts and politicians designed and enacted it (Stultz 2007; de Waal 2002). Nonetheless, in spite of current challenges hampering the APRM process, independent and thorough reviews could be instrumental in mainstreaming best practices in the long term on sensitive electoral matters such as the demarcation of constituency boundaries, campaign regulations, or criteria for candidate nomination. In this regard, the African Union is gradually developing an integrated approach aiming to link more closely the recommendations of APRM reviews with the assessments of AU election observation missions (AUEOM 2015).

Last but not least, electoral practices can be mainstreamed only to some extent because all countries develop unique electoral systems, management bodies, and procedures based on their own institutional histories, political cultures, traditions, social characteristics, and levels of economic development. Thus, prior to promoting electoral reforms, authorities should not only consider the recommendations of election observation missions and peer-review processes but also facilitate inclusive and participatory dialogues with national stakeholders: election management officials, political parties, and civil-society organisations. Stakeholders’ input can help policymakers to assess the pros and cons of potential electoral reforms in a given sociopolitical context, to guarantee that the genuine will of the people is ultimately respected and that mechanisms are in place to resolve election disputes by peaceful means.