Chapter Three: Electoral Management Bodies

Core Challenges Facing EMBs

Disputes over the role of electoral management bodies in electoral preparations and, particularly, their connections to incumbent governments have triggered electoral violence in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya in recent years. This chapter examines core challenges faced by EMBs in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the chapter introduces current efforts to strengthen their institutional autonomy. Although institutional reforms have occurred across Africa and most countries now have independent electoral commissions, in practice political manoeuvring and capacity shortfalls often compromise the commissions’ independence.

The chapter discusses the selection of non-partisan managerial professionals as a key strategy to enhance stakeholders’ confidence in the process and provides evidence of EMBs criticised by political parties and civil-society organisations for not acting impartially. In contrast, in transitional and highly polarised societies, allocating partisan members to the boards of EMBs has proven to be a successful confidence-building measure in the short term. Nonetheless, this chapter shows that in the longer term, the partisan appointment of election officials undermines EMBs’ credibility.

While some African countries have permanent electoral bodies that are respected for their independence, expertise, and professionalism, several cash-strapped African states continue to conceive of elections as an event rather than a cycle. Their EMBs work on an ad hoc basis as they operate only when tasks must be undertaken ahead of elections, and their operations depend on financial support from the donor community to the host government; after elections, these EMBs become quasi-dormant bodies, their regional and local offices are often shut down, and new staff is recruited only when the next election approaches. Ad hoc arrangements hamper institutional memory because lessons learned are not systematically compiled for professional development. In contrast, stronger EMBs possess adequate professional staff members at the regional and national levels who can incorporate lessons learned and build capacity on a permanent basis. In this regard, this chapter indicates EMBs’ financial autonomy as key for the prevention of electoral conflicts because only fully resourced and autonomous EMBs can successfully address all human and technical challenges arising in an electoral process.

Last but not least, the chapter underscores the need to develop fluent communication channels between EMBs and electoral stakeholders, to strengthen stakeholders’ trust in EMBs’ role in the process and to deactivate triggers of election violence. Since 1990, dispute-resolution mechanisms have been institutionalised in most African elections at the national, regional, and local levels. The so-called party liaison committees work as a two-way communication system: EMBs share updated information on election preparations with political parties’ representatives; in turn, the latter can express their election-related concerns. If disputes arise, these platforms can be an adequate forum to negotiate solutions before costly and slower formal dispute-resolution means are pursued at the level of EMBs or the judiciary.

Institutional Autonomy of Electoral Management Bodies

Institutional relationships between EMBs and government institutions vary across Africa (López-Pintor 2000). Nonetheless, regardless of whether EMBs are independent, governmental, or work in cooperation with government bodies (the so-called mixed model30), partisan agendas tend to jeopardise EMBs’ much-needed institutional autonomy. Thus, a major challenge facing the organisation of legitimate and credible elections in Africa is building autonomous EMBs, independent of political parties and fully able to conduct timely, effective electoral preparations. We cannot disentangle the relatively recent formation of current electoral bodies from neopatrimonial struggles among interests groups competing for political and economic power in the context of ongoing globalisation. Hegemonic ruling parties resorting to repression to reduce support for other political forces tend to conduct greater scrutiny of EMBs. As Gazibo (2006a, 630) emphasises, the extent to which EMBs manage to achieve autonomy depends on political differentiation and the existing balance of power among contestants. Permanent EMBs are more prone to generate self-reinforcing dynamics and are less vulnerable to the whims of incumbency.

In recent years, African countries have implemented institutional reforms to improve their electoral management systems. Most sub-Saharan African states have nominally established independent electoral commissions to manage their electoral processes, including francophone countries that follow an EMB mixed model, such as Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali. Most African elections are either managed by an independent institution or supervised by an independent collective body. São Tomé and Príncipe remains the only African country using a purely governmental EMB model. The mixed structure is common in former French colonies in which the body overseeing the elections has regulatory and judicial powers. However, in practice many of these states fall short of ensuring the independence of their EMBs. In particular, in a mixed EMB model, the roles of and relationship between the governmental and independent components are often unclearly defined and a matter of controversy among stakeholders. While the establishment of independent commissions in most African countries indicates political commitment to the autonomy of EMBs, incumbent governments maintain close links with electoral bodies (EISA n.d.a.).

Selection of EMB Managerial Positions

The selection of managerial positions triggers controversies and heated disputes. The president or parliament, upon the president or prime minister’s recommendation, actually appoints the chairpersons, commissioners, or managing directors of many African electoral commissions. Even if the political will exists to select independent figures, the partisanship of appointees often becomes an issue in the public debate.

As research on the psychosocial dimension of conflict indicates, perceptions of mistrust and animosity undermine the likelihood of peacefully resolving electoral disputes (Fetherston 1995; Kelman 1997). Political parties’ lack of trust in the role of electoral authorities conducting electoral preparations is a trigger of election violence. Close links between rulings parties and electoral commissions taint the credibility of electoral processes. EMBs’ integrity has been questioned over the appointment of election officials in countries more severely affected by electoral violence, as the cases described in the following section show. EMB officials become the target of political pressure, intimidation, and even violent attacks when political parties perceive that partisan biases compromise election officials’ independence. In this regard, local electoral staff members are more exposed to harassment and violent assaults.

Table 3.1. Colloquium on African Elections: Best Practices and Cross-Sectorial Collaborations

Case Studies: EMB Independence at Stake

Nigeria

Nigerian governments have been involved in the selection of electoral staff since the colonial period. When General Sani Abacha died in 1998, his successor, Major-General Abdulsalami Abubakar, issued Decree No. 17, which established the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) to organise democratic elections. While the Nigerian people perceived the transition process from military rule as a positive development, the appointment of INEC members was not transparent or independent (Fawolein 2005). Electoral officers were generally selected from the ranks of the senior civil service. Section 154 (1) of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Nigeria enacted on May 1999 empowers the federal president to appoint directly the INEC chairman and twelve federal commissioners, after consulting with the Council of State and with the Senate’s approval. The federal president also appoints the resident electoral commissioners (RECs) and the chief executives at the state level, upon consultation with the Council of State but not subject to the Senate’s confirmation (EUEOM 2003b; EUEOM 2007b). President Olusegun Obasanjo applied Section 154 (1) to appoint members of his People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as federal commissioners, who served during the 2003, 2007, and 2011 presidential elections, while PDP governors nominated RECs from their respective states.31 The commission asked parliament to legislate on the independent appointment of the INEC chairman after the troublesome 2007 and 2011 elections, but so far the PDP-dominated administration and parliament have not undertaken the necessary steps to reform the EMBs.

Zimbabwe

The Electoral Act (section 158) empowers the president to make appointments to electoral institutions. The Registrar-General of Elections, Tobaiwa Mudede, responsible for the administration and conduct of elections since 1980, was long perceived as biased in favour of the ruling Zanu-PF. For example, in the 2000 elections, political parties and civil-society groups expressed concerns about changes leading to the appointment of war veterans as polling staff who, according to observers, induced an atmosphere of intimidation at polling stations (EUEOM 2000). Although reforms to simplify the administrative structure into one body occurred before the 2008 elections, concerns regarding the electoral body’s autonomy remained.32 The president appointed the chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and the six other commissioners from a list of nine nominees submitted by the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.33 Civil-society groups protested that the appointees had close links with the president or the ruling Zanu-PF party. As the electoral process unfolded, observers reported that the ZEC played a subservient role to the Zanu-PF government in critical stages of the process, such as the accreditation of observers, recount procedures, release of results, storage of sensitive materials, and so forth (EISA 2008b, 28).

Kenya

Kenya provides an excellent case study on the extent to which the presidential appointment of election commissioners can instil mistrust and exacerbate tensions. The independence of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) had already been questioned in 2002 because the body relied on district commissioners to disburse commission funds at the district level instead of managing the finances through the offices of the returning officers (Carter Center 2003a). Furthermore, contrary to international best practices, the president was not legally bound to consult any institution or person regarding the selection of ECK commissioners, and they were appointed for renewable five-year terms (Kriegler Commission 2009). Shortly before the troublesome 2007 general elections, the presidential appointment of nineteen (out of twenty-three) new commissioners undermined public confidence in the ECK. President Kibaki acted in line with constitutional provisions but breached the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) agreement by not consulting opposition parties (Karume, n.d.). Mwai Kibaki had actually helped to negotiate in 1997 the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPGG) agreement with Daniel arap Moi, by which parliamentary parties would choose members for appointment to the electoral commission according to their number of sitting members of parliament. Most new commissioners had no experience in election administration and, for obvious reasons, were largely perceived as biased in favour of the ruling party (EUEOM 2008). The ECK ultimately admitted many malpractices in the organisation of the 2007 general elections, including grey areas and challenges to the tabulation of results from many constituencies (BBC 2008). In 2008, as part of collective efforts to address institutional shortcomings, an amendment to the Constitution of Kenya abolished the Electoral Commission of Kenya, which was replaced by the Interim Independent Electoral Commission of Kenya (IIEC). Its chairperson, a judge of the High Court, and a maximum of eight board members, university degree holders, were to be selected through a competitive process by a select parliamentary committee agreed on by the National Assembly and nominated by the president in consultation with the prime minister (EISA n.d.c.).

Cameroon

Since the establishment of multiparty elections, Cameroon has been troubled with electoral violence and disputes between opposition and the ruling party. Over the years, the former single party, Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC), has gradually improved its electoral performance: from only eighty-eight seats achieved in the first multiparty elections in 1992, the RDPC obtained 140 seats in the legislative elections held in 2007 and 147 of 180 seats in 2013. The current president and RDPC founder, Paul Biya, has also gradually managed to consolidate the party’s electoral position, from only 39.9 percent of votes in 1992 to 77.9 percent in 2011 (see ICG n.d., 78; Pommerolle 2008). Following demands from political parties and civil society, in 2006 the government of Cameroon established an electoral commission, the so-called Election Cameroon (ELECAM). Paradoxically, these institutional reform efforts have apparently helped to cement RDPC’s hegemonic position. President Biya’s appointment of the commission’s twelve members at the end of 2008 prompted national and international concerns regarding the new body’s independence, since some appointees were affiliated with the ruling RDPC party. ELECAM was then expanded to eighteen members, including some supposedly non-partisan members. Even so, observers raised concerns over the appointment of former ruling-party members as EMBs officials and demanded greater autonomy for ELECAM to handle the electoral process and any related disputes (Commonwealth Expert Team 2011).

Congo Brazzaville

In 1997, the Congolese government empowered the state administration to manage the electoral process for the sake of peace and stability. Candidates contesting Congo’s 2002 elections highlighted the pervasive role of the Ministry of Interior in the organisation of elections, which adopted roles assigned by law to the electoral commission (OIF 2002b). Opposition parties questioned the impartiality of the EMB, the Commission Nationale d’Organisation des Élections (CONEL), since their party representatives in CONEL had already expressed their support for the incumbent, President Saissou. The opposition parties referred to CONEL as an organe monocolore (OIF 2002b, 10). Although the government claimed that all relevant stakeholders were involved in the process, neither active human-rights NGOs nor opposition members critical of the government were represented in the commission. Nonetheless, the presence of party members and civil-society representatives in CONEL who were sympathetic to the ruling party could be seen as an attempt to legitimise the process. Either way, the existence of parallel narratives by different party members on the neutrality of CONEL undermined the body’s credibility in the eyes of the Congolese people (Collectif des Organisations Non-gouvernementales de Défense des Droits de l’Homme et de Développement Démocratique 2002).

Furthermore, opposition parties withdrew their representatives from CONEL in 2009 because they deemed it biased in favour of the ruling party. Observers found it difficult to distinguish the division of tasks between CONEL and the Ministry of Administration of Territory and Decentralisation in electoral preparations. Lack of transparency in the nomination procedures of CONEL’s president and the role of local administrators, the so-called préfets, in the running of the regional electoral commissions further hampered the electoral body’s autonomy (OIF 2009). Concerns regarding CONEL’s impartiality and the Interior Ministry’s role re-emerged months before the 2012 parliamentary elections. Opposition parties demanded the creation of a new, independent electoral body to replace CONEL. In addition, the AU observer mission recommended strengthening the role of CONEL as an electoral body (AU, ECCAS 2012).

Partisan EMBs: The Way Forward?

The inclusion of party members in the decision-making structures of EMBs helps to dispel concerns about hidden biases. However, undue party influence can seriously hamper the independence of electoral bodies and their decision-making capacity. As the following examples show, the presence of opposition members in EMBs does not necessarily bring more credibility to the process, since ruling-party representatives can tilt the EMBs’ decisions towards government positions. In addition, opposition parties fear that incumbents can buy off their members.

In transitional societies, collective executive boards have been established, including representatives from the main political parties, but as the following case studies illustrate, boards of partisan members are hard to manage. As López-Pintor highlights in a report commissioned by UNDP, when political parties’ vital interests are at stake, a party-based EMB board struggles to make decisions. He concludes that while multiparty EMBs can be an instrumental confidence-building measure in the initial phases of democratic transitions, the depoliticisation of EMBs is more appropriate when the electoral process is consolidated in the long run (López-Pintor 2000). In this regard, the legislative elections held in Indonesia in 1999 provide a good example of a deadlocked election administration. The legal framework established a dual structure: the national election commission, the so-called Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU), was multiparty and responsible for ensuring that election preparations were implemented according to the law. Yet, the Panitia Pemilihan (PPI), the Indonesian Election Committee, was the actual technical body in charge of organising the polls. Many party members in the KPU were also running candidates and voted according to their political allegiances. In practice, both institutions were unable to cooperate and make decisions regarding conflicting regulations on sensitive issues such as the basis for seat allocation. Their disputes hampered transparency and, in the end, undermined voters’ confidence in the process (NDI and Carter Center 1999a, 1999c).

Central African Republic

Since François Bozizé came to power in the Central African Republic (CAR) by the barrel of a gun in 2003, concerns were raised that electoral bodies became his personal tool to rubber-stamp fraudulent election processes. In 2005, the CAR government exerted decisive influence over the Mixed Independent Electoral Commission (CEMI), and opposition candidates were unable to obtain accreditation for their party agents in polling stations (OIF 2005b). In 2008, an amnesty law was passed for those who committed brutalities during the civil war, and an Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) comprising representatives of all entities participating in the so-called all-inclusive political dialogue was established the following year. However, concerns resurfaced regarding EMB bias, and the opposition accused CEI president Binguimalé of being an acquaintance of President Bozizé and making decisions without consulting other members of the CEI national coordination body. Lack of effective communication among CEI representatives further aggravated the situation (EISA 2010c; ICG 2010).

Mozambique

The presence of political parties in the decision-making structures of the Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE) was initially praised as a positive step for peace (Lyons 2004). CNE commissioners for the 1994 and 1999 elections were elected based on proportional representation of political parties according to their share of seats in the Assembly (a total of twelve), and the president selected the thirteenth seat. Over the years, however, observers have pointed out that the politicisation of the EMB and its centralised structure hinder the efficiency of operations, and opposition parties have raised concerns over the EMB’s independence from the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO).

The main opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), accused CNE of conducting fraudulent elections by conducting the tabulation process without transparency (Carter Center 2003b, 2005; EUEOM 2003a, 2005b). To address these shortcomings, a legal reform passed before the 2009 elections provided for the selection of five commissioners from the parties represented in the National Assembly, and eight members, including the chairman, were chosen among civil society. However, while the reform aimed to strengthen CNE’s independence, concerns were raised that the process to select the civil-society members was not transparent and biased in favour of representatives with close links to the ruling party (Manning 2010).

Financial Dependence

EMBs’ dependence on host governments to secure sufficient human and material resources to organise elections thwarts their independence and contributes to social perceptions of institutional weakness. Common organisational problems deriving from managerial flaws and logistical shortcomings include excessive reliance on last-minute planning, delays in disbursement of government funds, poor quality or late arrival of election materials, insufficient training, and improvised solutions to problems.34 Electoral commissions depend heavily on budget support from host governments and on the need to coordinate with state agencies for logistical support. In addition, the international community provides substantial funds to organise elections in financially stricken countries.35

Even permanent electoral commissions depend on government vehicles and state security to organise the distribution and retrieval of electoral materials. Delays in electoral preparations feed social anxiety, and tension grows when elections are postponed, as opposition parties have budgetary constraints and feel that campaign periods that extend longer than originally planned jeopardise their electoral chances. Setbacks in the procedures to accredit party agents and domestic observers also undermine public confidence in electoral authorities. The core of the matter is that African governments tend to conceive of elections as an event rather than a cycle. Even when EMBs have permanent structures in place, the hiring of staff and logistic arrangements occur on an ad hoc basis, and additional tranches of funding from state authorities or the donor community are required to cover the high costs of election preparations. As a result, stakeholders often perceive the process as fragile and open to manipulation by shrewd politicians and partisan election officials.

Communication Systems: Key to Dispute Resolution

EMBs’ ability to provide reliable, timely information to stakeholders and the public on electoral preparations is pivotal for dissipating fears and eradicating rumour mongering. Communication flaws between EMBs and electoral stakeholders, including party representatives, observers, and the wider public, trigger misunderstandings and disputes (NDI 2002). Communication gaps often stem from EMB headquarters’ issuance of late or unclear instructions.36 In recent years, numerous initiatives geared towards improving communication flow between political parties and EMBs have been institutionalised across Africa. Initially established in Southern Africa, the so-called party liaison committees (PLCs) involving election officials, security officers, political parties, and members of civil society have helped to improve dialogue and the flow of information on the electoral process and to resolve electoral disputes. PLCs are established at the national, regional, and local levels.

The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) has developed a model for managing election-related conflicts. EISA helps electoral commissions to build capacity to coordinate conflict-management panels, which generally involve the electoral commission, political parties, security forces, and civil-society organisations. In DRC, EISA trained fifty facilitators who were deployed throughout the country to train approximately 3,000 mediators. These mediators helped to manage election-related conflicts (EISA 2007a).

Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned

Concerns regarding EMBs’ independence from incumbent governments, coupled with operational shortcomings in electoral preparations, put EMBs’ integrity to the test in most electoral processes covered by the reports analysed in this research project. EMBs’ performance correlates to some extent with the country’s level of overall development. African countries with higher levels of development, such as South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Ghana, and São Tomé and Príncipe, possess successful EMBs that have been able to deliver credible and peaceful elections (UNDP n.d.). For example, the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) enjoys considerable confidence among major political parties and other electoral stakeholders. The IEC is perceived as independent from government and receives financial appropriations from parliament. The commission is responsible for maintaining the voter rolls and organising elections. In addition, the IEC conducts research and policy-development activities and develops drafts of bills on electoral matters that they submit to the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs (Gabriel 2009). Observers in areas historically marred by election violence have praised the IEC’s capacity to learn from previous errors and improve its performance. For instance, in the 2009 Kwazulu-Natal election, observers highlighted the IEC’s efficient role, as proven by competing political parties’ acceptance of the results, and noted a substantial decrease in violent incidents (African Alliance for Peace Observer Mission 2009). Likewise, despite some organisational pitfalls, the Electoral Commission of Ghana has developed a permanent structure that includes highly professional personnel who have been able to deliver credible results in extremely close, competitive, tense processes such as the parliamentary and presidential elections held between 2008 and 2009 (EUEOM 2009a).

In contrast, all countries affected by election violence in recent years had election management bodies that stakeholders did not trust and perceived as biased in favour of the ruling party. Many examples in both francophone (e.g., Côte d’Ivoire and Togo) and anglophone (e.g., Kenya and Zimbabwe) Africa illustrate this point. Thus, this chapter’s findings, based on extensive, relevant data from several African countries, underscore the pressing need to reform and strengthen ill-performing and mistrusted EMBs in order to prevent election violence across Africa.37 Badala T. Balule summarises the emerging standards for ensuring EMBs’ independence and impartiality: a legislative framework that guarantees EMBs’ independence from political interference; appointed EMB members should be persons of integrity and high standing in the community and enjoy security of tenure; EMBs should have comprehensive powers over all organisational and supervisory aspects of an election; EMBs should have appropriate, secure, and transparent access to funds; EMBs should report regularly on their activities and maintain consultations with electoral stakeholders (Balule 2008).

While including representatives of political parties in the composition of EMB boards helps to foster stakeholders’ trust in the electoral process and the broader peace-building road map in post-conflict societies, incumbents’ partisan appointment of election officials has the opposite effect in the longer term, tainting the credibility of elections and undermining stakeholders’ confidence in electoral bodies (SADC Parliamentary Forum 2001a). In this regard, the SADC Parliamentary Forum recommends that to ensure the independence of electoral commissions from political parties, a panel of judges or the equivalent should select commission members, upon approval by parliament after consultation with political parties (Mateu 2004, 25).

Chapter Four: Registration of Candidates and Voters

Political Participation and Conflict Prevention

This chapter focuses on critical challenges to political participation and the right to universal suffrage. First, the chapter explores current obstacles to the registration of political parties and candidates. Social perceptions of EMBs’ and other competent registration bodies’ arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of candidates in electoral processes have triggered violent disputes in sub-Saharan Africa during the period examined in this study. Second, the chapter focuses on voter-registration disputes and identifies recurrent problems tainting the accuracy of voter rolls and the credibility of the electoral process as a whole. Outdated or inaccurate voter registers that exclude young people and minority groups or include ineligible voters prompt protests by those who feel disenfranchised or mistrust EMBs. In this respect, the chapter discusses at length the challenges of introducing technological changes to register voters, concerns regarding the politicisation of voter rolls in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, and the role of traditional authorities in voter identification.

Burdens to the Registration of Political
Parties and Candidates

Procedures for the registration of political parties and nomination of candidates are far from homogenous across Africa. Most countries use a combination of registration requirements, such as a minimum number of signatures, a deposit requirement, a minimum number of candidates, and/or their regional distribution. While nomination rules should guarantee all eligible contestants the same chances to become registered candidates, procedures can be applied on a discriminatory basis to exclude political parties and candidates. Discriminatory registration policies carry long-term, undesired consequences since marginalised political actors may eventually organise as rebel movements or terrorist organisations, to achieve their goals by violent means.

Restrictive political parties and candidate-registration rules can curtail democratic participation. Physical attacks and intimidation, perpetrated generally by the incumbent government, may dissuade opposition candidates from registering or may trigger the resignation of registered candidates. In contrast, cumbersome procedures for submitting applications undermine the chances of parties and candidates with less access to information, while incumbent parties often benefit from timely information and accurate, firsthand knowledge of procedural matters.

Although scholars welcome the development that incumbents are now willing to remain in power through institutionalisation rather than the use of force, attempts to overturn constitutional term limits for presidents have triggered political and social discontent. According to Posner and Young’s study on presidential term limits in Africa between 1990 and 2005, nine of eighteen directly elected presidents who faced term limits refused to step down; six of them were able to change constitutional provisions preventing them from running for re-election and won ensuing elections (Posner and Young 2007). A relatively stable country, Senegal experienced riots in January and February 2013, staged through thousands of opposition activities in Senegal’s capital, Dakar, to protest the constitutional council’s decision authorising incumbent president Abhoulaye Wade to run for a third term. Although Wade had established a two-term limit, in December 2011 he reversed his position, arguing that the term limit that began during his first term applied only at the beginning of his second term. In January 2012, the constitutional court declared Wade eligible to contest and simultaneously rejected Youssou N’Dour’s candidacy on the basis that the identity of 4,000 signatures on his petition could not be verified. The ruling triggered demonstrations in Dakar, which were heavily repressed. Violent clashes between the police and protesters left six people dead (Bojang 2012; Wallis 2012; Jeune Afrique 2012a, 2012b).

Incumbents may also use legal strategies, including constitutional or legislative changes and judicial procedures, to disqualify their opponents. Attempts to disqualify presidential opposition candidates have triggered political crises in countries such as Zambia and Côte d’Ivoire. Immediately preceding the 2001 Zambian elections, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) government’s constitutional amendments disqualified former president Kaunda, the opposition candidate of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). In Côte d’Ivoire, according to article 35 of the Ivorian Constitution adopted by referendum in 2000, presidential candidates must be Ivorian by birth, born of a father and a mother who are themselves Ivorian. At the time, this legal provision was used to disqualify current president Alassane Ouattara from the presidential race, and the court ruling triggered a protracted political crisis in the country (see the section below titled “Case Study: Côte d’Ivoire”).

Case Studies: Arbitrary Exclusion of Candidates

Rwanda

Political parties’ registration rules hampered democratic participation, among concerns of political violence and repression before the 2010 presidential elections. Emerging opposition parties, including the Forces Démocratiques Unifiées (FDU) led by Victoire Ingabire and the Parti Démocratique Vert (PDV), could not take part in the electoral process because they were not successfully registered, and the only new party able to register, the Parti Social, decided not to put candidates forward. Ingabire had resided abroad since 1994 and worked to coordinate opposition parties in the Diaspora. In 1997, she joined the Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda (RDR) and, between 2003 and 2006, presided over a coalition of opposition parties, l’Union des Forces Démocratiques Rwandaises (UDFR), including her RDR. In 2006, she took part in the creation of the Forces Democratiques Unifiées (FDU-INKINGI) and was appointed as party president. Her main goal was to build a political alternative to the FPR rule in Rwanda. After sixteen years in exile, Ingabire returned to Rwanda in January 2010 to put herself forward as candidate for the presidential election. She was then placed under house arrest and accused of committing crimes under the 2001 Law on Discrimination and Sectarism. However, Amnesty International sent an observer to her trial and concluded that the state’s attorney provided no evidence to substantiate the accusations against her for inciting violence and promoting ethnic hatred. On 30 October 2012, the High Court declared Victoire Ingabire guilty of two crimes and sentenced her to prison for plotting to undermine the government and constitutional principles and for blatant intent to minimise genocide (OIF 2010a). In 2013, Rwanda’s Supreme Court upheld her conviction and increased her jail term from eight to fifteen years (BBC 2013b).

Zimbabwe: The Case of Roy Bennett

Physical attacks and intimidation perpetrated mainly by the incumbent government dissuade opposition candidates from registering or trigger the resignation of registered candidates. In Zimbabwe, observer groups and human-rights organisations reported alleged intimidation of a white member of parliament. In the parliamentary elections of 2000, a majority of black voters elected Roy Bennett, a white commercial farmer who ran under the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. Although six court orders allowed him to maintain his property, the government evicted him under the land-reform programme. A ZANU-PF-dominated party sentenced Bennett to twelve months of imprisonment with hard labour after he assaulted two Zanu-PF members of parliament. The decision was taken for review to the High Court, which ruled that it could not interfere with parliamentary proceedings protected by the Privileges, Immunities, and Powers of Parliament Act. While in Jail, Bennett submitted his application for nomination, but the nomination court rejected his papers. The Electoral Court nullified the nomination court proceedings, but after the country’s president called the judgment “madness,” the presiding judge suspended his judgment, and Bennett was barred from exercising his right to be voted into office in the parliamentary elections held in 2005.38 In 2004, Amnesty International adopted Roy Bennett as a prisoner of conscience. He was re-arrested in February 2008 and charged with “conspiring to acquire arms with a view to disrupting essential services” and was acquitted by the High Court in Harare in 2010 (Amnesty International 2010).

Disputes Over Voter Registration

Recent conflict-resolution efforts in Africa have focused on settling controversies over the accuracy of the voter register, as political disputes over eligible voters have been at the core of protracted political crises, such as the post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire. An accurate voter register is regarded as the backbone of any credible electoral process, because reliable, updated, and accessible data on voters help to prevent electoral disputes. However, most African countries have not developed accurate civil-registration systems or the capacity to sustain a continuous registration effort to maintain a permanent voter register. Generally, registration in African countries is active, and the roll is established periodically for an electoral contest or a series of events.39 Actually, most African countries conduct periodic registration exercises so that voters can participate in a series of elections, provided they enrol and show a voter card. Nevertheless, post-conflict and poverty-stricken states struggle to complete a reliable voter register prior to local, parliamentary, and presidential electoral contests. Even consolidated EMBs struggle to regularly update voter data, due to demographic changes and poor infrastructure, particularly in rural areas.

Concerns over the accuracy of voter registers undermine political parties’ and civil society’s confidence in EMBs’ role in the process. Generally, local society organisations can shed light on the strengths and weakness of registration.40 However, an incumbent regime’s deliberate manipulation of a voter-registration exercise is certainly hard to prove by third parties, since most observer groups and civil-society organisations cannot afford to follow up the entire registration process, except in some cases.41 Moreover, problematic registrations often occur in remote, rural areas where disenfranchised voters cannot make their voices heard; thus, their grievances remain unaddressed at the central level.42

Voter rolls in Africa include large numbers of deceased voters, double entries, and omissions. The removal of deceased voters from electoral rolls is a challenge that many African countries have not been able to overcome. Allegations or evidence of double entries, i.e., the duplication of names on the voter list, have also affected several elections. Omissions severely taint the credibility of the electoral process by disenfranchising voters, prompting tension between voters and electoral authorities. Recurrent problems in subsequent electoral processes, such as the inclusion of underage individuals or the exclusion of voters turning eighteen in election years, increase the chances of violent contestation because young people are more prone to fight for their rights, compared to other disadvantaged social groups.

Exclusion of Young People

An obvious consequence of authorities’ failure to update voter registers is the exclusion of young people who have reached voting age. In countries such as Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, the exclusion of young people in consecutive elections and authorities’ inability to address the matter effectively have, in part, triggered election violence. In Guinea Bissau, the military junta that staged the coup after the first round of the 2012 presidential elections argued that the elections were flawed because the voter register had excluded many young people. Likewise, in neighbouring Guinea, the introduction of biometric registration posed serious operational challenges and was interrupted by the junta’s violent repression of protesters in September 2009. Six months later, political parties agreed that the register for the first presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2009 would be used. Therefore, all eligible Guineans who had turned eighteen after that date were actually disenfranchised (EUEOM 2010d).

Students and urban youth were excluded from the 2007 electoral process in Lesotho due to technical glitches, while election stakeholders raised concerns that the government and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had enacted a strategy to weaken the opposition by organising elections in a very short time frame (NDI 2007b; EISA 2007b). Young people who had turned eighteen before election day had already been excluded from participating in the local government polls of 2005, when the IEC faced logistical challenges in reaching certain constituencies (Commonwealth Expert Team 2005). Furthermore, time-frame constraints controversially triggered the exclusion of young people in Mauritius in consecutive elections. The 2005 National Assembly elections used the compilation of the 2004 electoral register, and the voter-registration exercise that had occurred in the first two months of 2005 was disregarded because it was due to be released six weeks after the election date. As a result, an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 young people who had turned eighteen since the previous voter update were disenfranchised (EISA 2006a). Likewise, the 2009 update was used for the 2010 National Assembly elections, which disregarded the 2010 update and thus excluded all young people who turned eighteen between January 2009 and May 2010.43

Computerisation of Voter Rolls

Introducing new technologies to capture biometric data can address the challenges described above and pay off in the long run. However, maintaining high-tech equipment is costly, and shortcomings in new systems can weaken public confidence in electoral bodies; people’s expectations are quickly frustrated if the new systems fail to produce reliable data. By and large, African countries that regularly hold peaceful and credible elections are working towards developing reliable voter registers. The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) has developed a system that has proven to be accurate, despite some pitfalls. The quality of its data is based on comparing the registration data with the population data compiled by the Department of Home Affairs.

Table 4.1. Continuous Voter Registration in South Africa: A Success Story?

During apartheid, the Department of Home Affairs (a racially restricted franchise) conducted voter registration. The 1996 Constitution required that universal, national adult suffrage would be exercised based on a common voters’ roll (Ch. 1, S 1 d.). The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) runs a continuous voter-registration system, and voter data can be updated at any time during the electoral cycle. The current system dates back to 1997, when the new electoral commission decided to create a new voter register from scratch. Voters apply for inclusion in the register by filling out an application form. To prevent fraud, the IEC established that the only identity document that can be used to support a registration application is the barcoded green identity document (ID) book issued by the Department of Home Affairs since 1986. A hand-held data-capture machine called zip-zip is used to verify the applicant’s details against the National Population Register by reading the barcode on the South African ID. On election day, zip-zip machines are loaded with the national voters’ roll and scan the barcode stickers on voters’ ID documents, to establish voters’ eligibility at a particular voting station.

The IEC allows continuous registration at its municipal electoral offices (MEOs), but applicants rely heavily on registration drives that are held over two weekends at registration centres in polling stations, to register or update their registration data (mainly, changes of address or electoral district). In addition, the IEC conducts on-site registration for youth in schools, colleges, and universities.

System Strengths

Applicants perceive registration as a quick and easy process. Good quality and accuracy of the voter-registration data are captured and processed. Effective quality-control mechanisms are in place. All voter-registration applications are checked against National Population Register data.

The process is transparent. Political parties and civil-society organisations monitor data collection by providing observers at voter-registration centres. Provisional voter registers are on display in each municipality and at polling stations during registration drives, so that applicants can lodge complaints about registration data.

System Weaknesses

Despite widespread civic-education campaigns, since the system was put in place in 1997 it is estimated that voter registration has not exceeded 80 percent of eligible voters. The requirement to modify registration details in person has hampered the accessibility of continuous registration.

No proof of residential address is required, and no verification occurs. The IEC’s reliance on applicants to lodge complaints has proven to be ineffective for identifying invalid or incorrect addresses (Wall 2006).

Computerisation has increased the reliability of electoral rolls (see, for example, OIF 2002a; Commonwealth Expert Team 2011; EISA 2011, 2005b). However, despite the obvious advantages of digitising the voter register, the transition, if not properly planned and executed, can jeopardise the success of the electoral process. Moreover, computerisation often prompts the mistrust of opposition parties, which may perceive changes as incumbents’ attempt to hide or manipulate voter-registration data.

Electoral authorities confronted with defective computerised voter rolls resort to various voter lists (both digital and manual) on election day and saddle polling staff with the task of identifying eligible voters.44 Inconsistencies expose voters to disenfranchisement, often without due remedy. The safe storage of digital data has also proven to be a challenging aspect of the computerisation process. Strikingly, there seems to be no institutional memory or application of lessons learned. As the section below reveals, the same problems re-emerge in successive elections in the same countries.

Computerisation Challenges: Case Studies

Nigeria

As the most populated country in Africa, Nigeria provides an example.45 The 2001 Electoral Act envisaged the establishment of a permanent national voter register through an electronic database, which the INEC was to compile and regularly update. The exercise was originally to occur during ten days in September 2002, but registration activities lingered throughout election days due to registration officials’ lack of preparation, lack of voter education, a shortage of registration materials, and a range of criminal activities, including the selling of registration materials by political party agents. Completing a computerised register with an estimated sixty-five million eligible Nigerian voters was not an easy task; observers noted that the INEC started the process late, and it was poorly funded and implemented. As a result, by the time the first election was held on 12 April, a compilation of the National Voter Registry was not yet ready for inspection by voters. Omissions in the computerised list led to the INEC’s decision to allow the use of the original manual registration forms as a backup (IRI 2003). Nonetheless, the process was marred by deficiencies, irregularities, abuses, and violence, including widespread underage voting and voter impersonation (EUEOM 2003b). In 2006, to purge the register of double entries, the INEC decided to produce an electronic voter register, using the direct data capture (DDC) method. Yet, the INEC purchased only 33,000 machines for a total of 120,000 polling stations, and voters were to be registered in three phases. Soon, technical challenges marred the use of this technology. DDC batteries proved not to last long in some places and could only be recharged from car batteries, in remote parts of the country where electricity was unavailable. Moreover, some officials were not duly trained, and many voters incorrectly introduced data. There were also allegations that politicians commandeered registration machines. Ultimately, the INEC admitted that it could not eliminate duplications, despite the use of DDC technology; once more, delays in the registration process meant that the claims-and-objections process was too short for voters to verify their data. As a result, on election day domestic and international observers pointed out that many voters were disenfranchised because their names did not appear on the voter register (NDI 2007a; EUEOM 2007b). The same story repeated during the 2011 elections: the new electronic voter register was inaccurate and was completed late; thus, voters could not verify their inclusion on the voter list. While several thousand duplicated entries were removed, many eligible voters were once more disenfranchised on election day (NDI 2011; EUEOM 2011a). Hence, the Nigerian experience clearly shows that incorrect computerisation of registration data seriously compromises the integrity of the electoral process.

Malawi

Computerisation was introduced in Malawi for the first time in the 2004 elections. Initially, the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) claimed the number of voters to be 6,673,023, but this figure was challenged since the estimated population of Malawi at that time was approximately twelve million, and more than half were supposed to be under eighteen years of age. The MEC contracted a South African information-technology (IT) company, Computer Storage Inc., to clean up the register, but inconsistencies remained, including the omission of names and photographs. As a result, the MEC decided to use three core documents to identify eligible voters: the computerised voter roll, the manual voter roll of 1999, and record and transfer cards. This triggered confusion and concerns about manipulation. The Republican Party even filed a court case against the MEC, which resulted in a two-day postponement of the process. However, this short time frame did not allow verification of the voter register, since many registration centres had not yet received the computerised voter roll. This setback possibly led to the disenfranchisement of voters on election day (EISA 2004b; Gloppen et al. 2006). Likewise, in 2009, due to missing and duplicated names on the electronic list, the MEC decided to provide polling staff with the manual voter register, to enable the cross-checking of voters’ data (EISA 2009).

Mozambique

The digitised voter register for the municipal elections in Mozambique in November 2003 was artificially inflated with an estimated one million additional voters. Despite last-minute efforts of the Electoral Administration Technical Secretariat (STAE) to eliminate duplicate entries from the digital register, electoral authorities agreed to hand over three different voter lists to polling staff for voter identification (the handwritten list from 1999, the handwritten complementary update, and the computerised voter list) (Carter Center 2004). The presence of various rolls on election day caused confusion, and parties pointed out data inconsistencies to complain that their supporters had been deliberately excluded from the register (EUEOM 2003a). Ultimately, international observers had no evidence that double entries were actually removed and could not verify this, since the STAE did not provide breakdowns of the national voter register by province, district, and polling station (Carter Center 2005). Likewise, before the 2004 and 2009 general elections, voter lists were only partially purged of double registrations. In 2009, the STAE recognised that 160,000 duplicate names were not removed, along with deceased voters, mentally ill persons, and people sentenced in court (EUEOM 2005b, 2009d).

Politicisation of Voter Registration

In conflict-torn countries, election stakeholders raise concerns about political parties’ attempts to manipulate the voter-registration process in their regional strongholds, to obtain electoral gains. Voter registration has been described as “a perennial area of concern” for institutional peace builders (Reilly 2011; Reilly 2002, 125). The debate over voter eligibility is interconnected with a broader discussion of claims to citizenship and political rights. Since African countries gained independence from their colonial masters, crafty politicians have modified laws in order to deny certain population groups or political candidates of citizenship rights and participation in electoral contests. In this context, citizenship is not only a right but is often used as a trump card by incumbents for electioneering purposes.

Table 4.2. Contested Registration Figures.

Case Study: Côte d’Ivoire

A protracted civil conflict broke out in Côte d’Ivoire over identity politics and regional cleavages. Since Ivoirian independence from France in 1960, the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, ruled the country. Since independence, the exports of cocoa and coffee grew substantially, and President Houphouët-Boigny applied flexible rules to allow migrant workers to settle in the country to satisfy its labour demand. However, in the 1980s, the economic crisis caused by decreasing world prices of the country’s main exports triggered a wave of social discontent and demands for democratisation. Despite controversy over the political participation of non-Ivorians residing in the country, Houphouët-Boigny won the first multiparty elections held in 1990.

He died three years later, amidst political turmoil caused by a severe economic recession, a sharp decline in most Ivorians’ living conditions, and growing animosity towards immigrants. His successor, Henri Konan Bédiee, imposed a restrictive interpretation of Ivorian citizenship that was limited to those whose parents both belonged to one of the so-called autonomous ethnic groups. Bédie’s main challenger was Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a Dioula Muslim from the north of the country who had been prime minister under Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 and had left the government to lead a new opposition party, the Rassemblement des Republicans (RDR). In the meantime, Bédie’s administration modified the electoral law so that any individual running for office in the 1995 polls had to be of Ivorian origin, according to the current parameters, in an attempt to thwart Ouattara’s chances to run for president, as there were rumours that his mother was from Burkina Faso. The new electoral law also restricted Ivorian citizens’ right to vote, according to the new restrictive criteria. Initially, Ouattara was nominated as the RDR presidential candidate, but he eventually turned down the nomination, and opposition parties boycotted the 1995 elections to protest restrictions on candidates’ eligibility. As a result, Bédie was re-elected with 96.44 percent of the vote (Manby 2009).

Nonetheless, Ouattara did not give up his presidential dream; in July 1999, he quit his job as an economist at the International Monetary Fund and announced that he would run in the forthcoming presidential elections. Six months later, General Robert Güei staged a coup and overthrew Bédie, who fled to France. Under Güei’s government, a new constitution, approved in July 2000 through a referendum marred with irregularities, endorsed the restrictive interpretation of citizenship. Subsequently, Güei launched a campaign to identify Dioula citizens and designate them as foreigners. Months later, Güei also fled in the wake of a popular uprising after he had proclaimed himself the winner of the 2000 presidential election, although Laurent Gbagbo had actually obtained the most votes. Subsequently, Gbagbo was proclaimed the president, and opposition leader Ouattara, who had been barred from running through application of the new constitution, called for new elections.46 Both parties failed to find a political solution to the dispute, and hostilities broke out between Ouattara’s followers, mainly Muslim northerners, and Gbagbo’s mostly Christian southern adherents (Manby 2009).

As part of the political negotiations to end the civil war, in 2003 the so-called Linas-Marcoussis agreements included a provision that contravened article 35 of the new constitution and enabled Ouattara’s participation in the election: presidential candidates had to be of Ivorian nationality, which meant that either their father or mother was Ivorian. Both parties initially accepted the settlement, which resulted in the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in the country on 27 February 2004 and the proclamation of the end of the civil war on 4 July. However, the parties did not respect the timelines of the accord, and the conflict dragged on for three years. After two successful rounds of talks between the parties were held in Ouagadougou during 2007, hostilities eventually ended, and the disarmament of militias slowly began.

In the volatile post-conflict Ivorian context, presidential elections were postponed on numerous occasions due to security concerns. Finally, in 2009, the electoral authorities launched a biometric registration, which was carried out by a private French company called SAGEM. Originally planned to last six weeks, the registration took ten months. The process unfolded amidst deep mistrust of the political parties. The voter list was cross-checked with the so-called “historical” files; a white list and a grey list that included contested cases were produced. Yet, the submission of new appeals for the inclusion of names on the white list was not conducted according to established procedures and resulted in violent episodes throughout the country. On 6 September 2010, all parties agreed on a final voter list of 5,725,720 in the so-called Cadre Permanent de Concertation (CPC), and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Côte d’Ivoire, Choi Young-jin, certified the list. At last, the first round of presidential elections could be held on 31 October 2010 (for further information on post-election disputes, see the section “Case Studies: Dealing with Election Violence” in Chapter 7).

Role of Traditional Authorities in Voter Identification

In predominantly rural communities, traditional leaders play a key role in disputes over voter identification and eligibility. In post-conflict Sierra Leone, an election law allowed a community leader or credible witness to identify eligible voters lacking ID documents (Carter Center 2003c). In DRC, mediation units comprising local chiefs and religious authorities, with the support of EISA, helped to prevent conflict by handling disputes over citizenship identification during the registration process for the 2005 referendum, particularly in the Kivus region (EUEOM 2007c). In the referendum on Southern Sudan independence, voters proved eligibility either by presenting an official identity document or through oral testimony provided by so-called concerned chiefs or identifiers, i.e., religious leaders, village sultans or chiefs, or headmasters/mistresses (UN Mission in Sudan 2010).47 The key role of chiefs in identifying rural voters was illustrated by South African chiefs’ threat not to participate in the voter-registration process for the 2000 local government elections. This was a political manoeuvre to pressure the national government to retain traditional leaders’ powers and functions in local government (Oomen 2005, 66–67).

However, chiefs are sometimes perceived as siding with incumbent governments.48 In Cameroon, the state empowers chiefs to carry out local government tasks. For example, chiefs sensitise voters on the need to register, and distribute voters’ cards.49 Observers of the presidential elections held in 2004 raised concerns that voters identified some chiefs as belonging to particular political parties and engaging in partisan activities. The opposition did not perceive administration officials and traditional chiefs involved in the registration process to be impartial, which compromised the process (Commonwealth Observer Group 2004, OIF 2004). Similarly, in Zanzibar the 200 amendment act required that the shehas verify the identity of each registration application ahead of the 2000 general elections, but opposition parties perceived them as loyal to the ruling party, and many people were apparently refused registration simply because the shehas claimed not to know them. There were also concerns about police interference in the process (Commonwealth Observer Group 2001). In the subsequent general elections held in 2005, there were claims that the shehas behaved in a partisan manner when determining people’s eligibility to register, while the domestic observation group Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) reported that over 100 percent of eligible voters had been registered in some constituencies (Commonwealth Observer Group 2005b).

Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned

Unreasonable obstacles to the registration of political parties and candidates challenge the consolidation of electoral democracy in Africa because full enjoyment of electoral rights requires freedom to engage in political activity, individually or through political parties. However, as described above, in some cases the rules have been twisted to benefit incumbents, and cumbersome administrative procedures have hampered contestants’ right to participate in the electoral process. In this regard, measures could be put in place, nationally or regionally, to promote compliance with international best practices: procedures for the registration of political parties and candidates should always follow clearly established and transparent criteria; procedures should be communicated in a timely manner to all stakeholders; assistance upon request should be provided to guarantee that people can register; and applicants should address any procedural shortcomings, in cooperation with competent registration authorities whose work and decisions should be at all times free of governmental or partisan interference.

Nonetheless, voter registration is a cumbersome exercise hampered by technical and financial challenges. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions, and countries need to develop sustainable systems that suit their technical capacity and population characteristics. The relative success of the South African model shows the advantages of building a permanent voter register, as long as a country possesses a reliable civil-registration system to crosscheck data and adequate material and human resources to continually update the voter register.

Several African countries have gradually adopted biometric identification through IT technology for voter-registration purposes. However, high-tech equipment is costly and poses new organisational and logistical challenges. Registration officers need to be well trained and fully resourced to ensure that data captured in the field are properly collected and processed. Otherwise, voter registers contain errors that cannot always be fully amended in the so-called “cleaning operations” prior to publication of the final voter list (Evrensel 2010).

A voter register containing reliable data helps to prevent disputes over voters’ disenfranchisement. In contrast, lists with double registration entries, ineligible voters such as underage or deceased individuals, or that exclude young people weaken the system and increase the chances of violent contestation when people perceive that institutions cannot fulfil their constitutional duty to enfranchise citizens. Disputes between election officials and angry people disenfranchised because their names are not on the voter list triggers tension in polling stations.

Moreover, the politicisation of the voter register in conflict-sensitive countries poses serious challenges to the peaceful resolution of political contests. In this regard, the presence of observers enhances public confidence in the registration process. Electoral management bodies can play a key role in confidence-building measures, such as ensuring public exhibition or disclosure of the voter register to all voters and sufficient time to verify data and issue and distribute voter cards. It is also a widely recommended best practice to establish an appeals procedure so that all unfairly disenfranchised voters can seek a timely remedy and be included in the voter list.