1. This Archedemus, not to be confused with any other from Greek history (e.g., Archedemus of Pelekes, of Athens, or of Tarsus), is known only from the Letters. We are to learn later in this letter that he is serving as letter carrier and go-between for the present epistolary exchange (313d–e), and in later letters we learn of other important roles he played in Plato’s Syracusan drama (319a, 349d). He appears to have been an associate of Archytas (339a–b), himself an important figure in the Letters (see n. 86 to Letter Seven below).

2. Dion of Syracuse (408–354 BCE), a brother-in-law of Dionysius the Elder, is a character of central importance in the Letters. He is the addressee of Letter Four, and his “intimates and comrades”—those who carried the torch of Dion’s political vision after he was assassinated—are the addressees of Letters Seven and Eight. The Letters may be said to revolve around Dion’s ardent hopes of bringing the Syracusan regime into alignment with the principles of Platonic philosophy. For a brief overview of his role in the drama of the Letters, see the summary of Letter Seven presented in the opening section of the introduction.

3. “Statement” translates the first instance in the Letters of the Greek word logos. Logos generally refers in some way to the human capacity for reasoned speech, and can mean “reason,” “speech,” “language,” or “reckoning”—in each case, either as a faculty or as a specific instance of its use, such as the “statement” referred to here—as well as “account,” “argument,” and “definition,” among other things. The word is too common and multifaceted to be rendered consistently throughout; I have used the word “speech” to translate it wherever possible, but also “reason,” “account,” “argument,” “definition,” “word,” and in this case only, “statement.”

4. The meaning here is not very clear. This letter probably belongs to the period of time during which Dion is planning or executing his assault on Syracuse (cf. the reference to “Olympia” at 310d1 with the story Plato tells at 350b6–351e4). “Dion is an exception” suggests that Dionysius does not expect Plato to be able or obligated to restrain Dion.

5. This is the only known mention of Cratistolus. Polyxenus is mentioned again at the end of this letter (314c7) and in Letter Thirteen, where we learn that he was a pupil of the sophist Bryson (360c5).

6. Reading katēgorountōn (“accusing”) with the best manuscripts. Burnet and Souilhé both prefer kakēgorountōn (“speaking ill of”), which differs by only a letter and is suggested as an emendation by a second hand above the line in manuscript O. Souilhé also cites the later manuscripts Z and V as containing his preferred reading, but from my examination he appears to be mistaken in the former case. Neither Burnet nor Souilhé notes that, e.g., the fifteenth-century manuscripts L, e, and f all, like A, give only katēgorountōn, with no suggested emendation.

7. “Practical wisdom” translates the Greek word phronēsis, which is traditionally rendered in English as “prudence.” It is to be distinguished from sophia, “wisdom” as such, i.e., from the primary object of philosophia (“love of wisdom”). My choice of the phrase “practical wisdom” is thus meant to suggest a distinction from “theoretical wisdom.” Yet phronēsis has as its root a word related to “mind” and “thought” (cf. phrēn, phronein). It generally refers to the possession of that knowledge and good sense that enable one to direct private or political affairs successfully toward a given end. Consider Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5–8; and cf. [Plato], Definitions 411d5–7 with 414b5–9; see also Strauss 1952, 148n2.

8. Hiero was tyrant of the Sicilian cities of Gela and Syracuse from 485 and 478 BCE, respectively, until his death in 467 BCE; tradition holds him to have been a lover and patron of the arts, which flourished under his reign (Aelian, Varia historia 4.15, 9.1). He is mentioned again at 336a8 below. His association with Simonides of Ceos (c. 556–468 BCE), the prolific and illustrious lyric poet remembered for his love of gain and pleasure (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1391a8–12; Plutarch, An seni respublica 786b; Aelian, Varia historia 9.1; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 12.5, 14.73; Strauss 2000, 184–85; cf. 50), is memorably portrayed in Xenophon’s Hiero (see also Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.22, with Strauss 2000, 104–5). Pausanias was the leading Spartan general in the Persian Wars of the early fifth century BCE, infamous for treasonously conspiring with the Persians thereafter (Thucydides 1.128–34). Some Simonidean verses are speculated to have been commissioned by Pausanias (Molyneux 1992, 198; Boedeker and Sider 2001, 38–41, 98–104), but there is virtually no extant evidence of any interaction between them outside of the present Platonic suggestion (see Plutarch, Consolatio ad Apollonium 6; Aelian, Varia historia 3.41). Plato’s Socrates twice engages in interpretive discussions of Simonides’s poetry (Republic 331d4–332c3, 335e1–336a7; Protagoras 338e6–347a5; cf. 316d3–9).

9. “Sing the praises of” translates humnein, related to the English “hymn.” This is different from the word translated “sing of” below (311b7), aidousi, related to the English “ode.” Both words can range in meaning from “sing of” to “celebrate,” though humnein gravitates a bit more strongly to the latter meaning. For the relationship between the two, consider Plato, Laws 700a7ff.

10. Periander, tyrant of Corinth from 627 to 585 BCE, was known for being violent, harsh, and lawless (Herodotus 3.48–54). Yet he is also remembered, not only as an effective ruler, but even as a wise man, and he is traditionally included among the legendary “Seven Sages of Greece” (see Diogenes Laertius 1.97–98; cf. Aristotle, Politics 1284a26–36, 1313b22–24, 1315b11–39). Thales of Miletus (c. 624–546 BCE) is often regarded as the first of the pre-Socratic philosophers (Aristotle, Metaphysics 983b17–984a3). In Plato, Thales is described as having been so completely absorbed in theoretical contemplation as to be hopelessly unaware of imminent practical affairs (Theaetetus 174a3–b1; Greater Hippias 281c3–8; cf. Plutarch, Convivium 2), though other reports indicate that he was willing and able to turn his theoretical knowledge toward profitable application (Herodotus 1.74–75, 170; Aristotle, Politics 1259a6–19; but cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1141b2–8). There is no evidence that Periander and Thales ever associated or even met; they are connected only by the tenuous bond of their inclusion among the “Seven Sages.” See also Protagoras 343a1–5.

11. Pericles (c. 495–429 BCE), one of the most influential and celebrated statesmen and generals in Athenian history, oversaw the ascent of Athens’ imperial splendor to its peak during its golden age in the mid-fifth century; see Thucydides’s presentation of Pericles’s speeches and deeds in the first two books of his history of the Peloponnesian War, and cf. Socrates’s discussions of him in Plato, Phaedrus 269a5–270a8, Alcibiades 118b6–119a6 and 124c, Gorgias 515c4–519a7, Meno 94a4–95a1, 319d–320b, and Menexenus passim; for a more comprehensive biography, see Plutarch’s Pericles. Anaxagoras (c. 510–428 BCE), a pre-Socratic philosopher famous for his impious claims about the material nature of the heavenly bodies (Apology of Socrates 26d1–6; Cratylus 409a7–c2), played an important role in the Platonic Socrates’s philosophic development as described in the Phaedo (95e8–99d2). The friendship between Pericles and Anaxagoras appears to have been mutually beneficial. Pericles’s Anaxagorean education made him a shrewder statesman and an abler orator (Plato, Phaedrus 269a5–270a8; Plutarch, Pericles 6, 8.1). In turn, Anaxagoras, who appears rather to have lacked a certain measure of prudence (Plato, Greater Hippias 281b5–283b3; Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.7.6–7), is said to have found support and protection for his theoretical pursuits from the powerful Pericles, especially when he at last came to be tried for impiety by the city of Athens (Plutarch, Pericles 16.5–7, 32; Nicias 23.3). Plutarch draws a direct comparison between Anaxagoras’s education of Pericles and Plato’s of Dion; see Maxims 1, 4; and cf. Nicias 23.2–4 with Dion 24.1–2.

12. The word for “one in power” is dunastēn, so translated because of its relation to dunamis (“power” at 310e5 above). “Wise” translates sophous; see n. 7 above.

Croesus (c. 595–546 BCE), king of Lydia from 560 until, near the end of his life, his armies were defeated by Cyrus, conquered vast territories in Asia Minor and was the possessor of legendary wealth. Solon (c. 638–558 BCE), Athenian poet, lawgiver, and one of the “Seven Sages” along with Thales and Periander, is often credited as the founder of Athenian democracy (see Aristotle, Athenian Constitution 6–14; and cf. Politics 1273b34–1274a21; see also Plutarch, Solon; Diogenes Laertius, s.v.). Cyrus (c. 600–530 BCE), usually styled “Cyrus the Great,” was the conqueror and founder of the vast Persian Empire. Stories of all three are chronicled by Herodotus, whose portrayal of the relationship between Croesus and Cyrus in particular is reimagined by Xenophon in his Education of Cyrus, a philosophical-historical fiction based on the life and rise to power of the Persian monarch. Despite Plato’s suggestion here, no extant sources tell of any meeting between Solon and Cyrus, though Solon’s wisdom is conveyed to Cyrus through Croesus in Herodotus’s telling (1.30–33). In that version, Croesus becomes a political adviser to Cyrus (1.85–90, 154–56; see also 1.46–56; and cf. Xenophon, Education of Cyrus 7.2).

13. Creon was the uncle (and brother-in-law) of Oedipus, the fabled ruler of Thebes, and features prominently in Sophocles’s Theban plays. Tiresias was a blind Theban seer famous from a variety of episodes in Greek mythology and literature (notably, his encounter with Odysseus at Odyssey 11.90–150). For Sophocles’s portrayals of their bitter confrontations, see Antigone 988–1090 and Oedipus Tyrannus 300–462; cf. Euripides, Phoenician Women 834–959. Of these, the Euripidean encounter is the only one ever mentioned by Plato: Socrates likens himself and Alcibiades to Creon and Tiresias, respectively, at the end of Second Alcibiades (151b4–c2).

14. Minos, the legendary Cretan lawgiver, was known in Greek mythology as a son of Zeus (Homer, Iliad 13.449–50, 14.321–22; Odyssey 11.568–71, 19.178–79) and a judge in the underworld (Plato, Apology of Socrates 40e7–41a6; Gorgias 523e6–524a7, 526c1–d2). In Plato, he is presented as having created the Cretan law code with direct guidance from Zeus (Minos 318c4ff.; Laws 624a1–b3; cf. Thucydides 1.4, 8). The only well-preserved story concerning the fabled seer Polyidus is the one connecting him to Minos (Pseudo-Apollodorus, Biblioteca 3.3; Hyginus, Fabulae 136). In this story, Minos compels Polyidus to bring his son back to life, but Polyidus thereafter evades the king’s attempt to compel him to share his art of divination. This story, and others concerning Polyidus, may have been the subject of a number of lost tragedies, such as Sophocles’s Manteis and Euripides’s Polyidus and Bellerophon.

15. Agamemnon and Nestor are among the heroes of Homer’s Iliad, kings of Argos and Pylos, respectively. Agamemnon commanded the entire Achaean army in the siege of Troy; Nestor is portrayed as beyond the age of fighting strength by the time of the Trojan War, valued more for the counsel drawn from his long experience than for his strength or bravery. Yet while Nestor was undoubtedly a persuasive speaker (Plato, Laws 711d6–e7; and cf. Homer, Iliad 1.247–49 with Aristophanes, Clouds 1055–57), he often appears long-winded and vain, and some of his advice proves questionable. Odysseus, king of Ithaca, is another Homeric hero of the Iliad and the protagonist of the Odyssey, which recounts his tortuous journey and eventful arrival home from Troy. He is known above all for his wiliness. Palamedes was a fabled wise man, sometimes identified as the inventor of the alphabet among other things (Hyginus, Fabulae 277; Smith 1867, 92–93). A certain tradition holds that Palamedes exposed the ruse by which Odysseus had hoped to avoid joining in the expedition against Troy (Hyginus, Fabulae 95; Pseudo-Apollodorus, Epitome 3; Philostratus, Heroicus 33–34). Plato and Xenophon both suggest that Palamedes was killed unjustly, comparing his fate to Socrates’s (Plato, Apology 41b1–3; Xenophon, Apology 26; Memorabilia 4.2.33; see also Diogenes Laertius 2.5.44).

There is an ambiguity in Plato’s list regarding these last four characters. While it is natural to think of them as representing two pairs, the use of particles in the Greek strongly suggests a single grouping with Agamemnon as the powerful man and Nestor, Odysseus, and Palamedes as a triad of prudent associates (Harward 1932, 170n6). Odysseus thus comes to sight as another of the Platonic examples whose designation on the list is uncertain. For Odysseus as loyal friend to Agamemnon, see Aeschylus, Agamemnon 841–42. For the relationship of Palamedes to Agamemnon, consider Euripides, Orestes 433 and Plato, Republic 522d1–8. See also Phaedrus 261a7–e5.

16. The stories of the adversarial relationship between Zeus and the Titan Prometheus (whose name means “forethought”) are among the most famous of Greek myth. The most important extant account from antiquity is probably that of Hesiod’s Theogony: Prometheus steals Zeus’s fire to give to man, and Zeus retaliates by chaining him to a rock to have his liver eaten every day by a great bird (507–615; cf. Works and Days 42–105). Prometheus is sometimes represented as giving to man not only fire but some or all of the most useful arts, as, for example, in the famous retelling of the myth of Prometheus by Plato’s Protagoras (Protagoras 320c8–322d5; see also Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 476–506). For contrasting depictions of Prometheus’s motives, consider Aristophanes, Birds 1547 and Plato, Gorgias 523d5–e1. Plato’s Socrates seems to identify himself with Prometheus in a way: see Protagoras 361c2–d6 with Philebus 16b4–17a5 and Phaedo 99d4ff., as well as Strauss 1952, 143n1 in context.

17. I.e., they will be well spoken of.

18. The verb for the act of divining here is manteuontai, just as “divinations” later in the sentence is manteumata—related words appear three more times in the Letters (317e7, 323c4, 340a2–3). There is no etymological connection between these terms and the adjective theios, which appears later in this sentence (“the divine men”), and which in all other cases is the word translated “divine.”

19. Or “more sovereign” (kuriōtera); I have generally tried to use some form of the phrase “sovereign authority” for words related to kurios.

20. The phrase sun theōi eipein is idiomatic, expressing something like the sentiment of “god willing.” But the literal meaning, “to speak with (a) god,” should be emphasized, as meaning “to say things that are consonant with the will/meaning/existence/desire of (a) god”; cf. Protagoras 317b7 in context. The phrase is used twice more in the Letters (320b3, 320c7).

21. The adverbial form of kalos, one of the most important terms in Platonic philosophy. Kalos encompasses a range of meanings not captured by any one English word. Most simply, it means “beautiful” in an aesthetic sense; but the domain of “beautiful” things designated by kalos extends seamlessly beyond the aesthetic to encompass a variety of traits and activities of the human soul, especially those that we generally denote as “noble” in a moral sense. I have used the words “beautiful” and “noble” exclusively to translate words related to kalos.

22. The word for “petty” is phaulōn, which I have generally translated “paltry.”

23. Eusebesteron, “more piously,” is the comparative form of eusebēs, one of several Greek words that may describe the pious, sacred, or religious; this is the first occurrence of any of them in the Letters. Eusebēs in particular carries the sense of pious veneration or duty; it and related words appear twice in this line, and then twice in Letter Seven (325c1, 344d7). Apart from these cases, I will reserve the English words relating to “piety” for forms of hosios. In general, I try to follow the example set and explained by Pangle 1980, 518–19n7.

24. “That this needs to happen” might quite naturally be read as “how this needs to happen,” but what follows leads me to prefer the translation I offer in the text. “Where the just lies,” by which is meant something like “what justice demands,” could also be read as “to what extent it is just.”

25. The word is euagēs, which has more than one possible meaning. As well as “favorable,” the word can mean “clear” or “illuminated,” which would in this context suggest a lack of impediment or obstacle. But it may also mean “unpolluted” or “undefiled” in a religious sense (cf. Laws 956a2), indicating that Plato’s venture was in some way impure. In either case, the sentence conveys that Plato’s mission to Sicily did not meet with success.

26. It is not clear whether the words in braces belong in the text. They appear only as marginal additions or emendations in the best manuscripts. Still, there is good evidence that the text just above was corrupted at some point (311d4–e2—I have rendered those lines according to the correction given in the margins of the manuscripts and accepted by all the editors), and that the transcribers’ marginal corrections are based on older and superior manuscripts no longer extant. Without the bracketed words, the clause would have to read “sending me away somehow.”

27. Pragma, generally “affair” or “matter of concern,” may refer specifically to philosophic problems, as at 341b8ff.; cf. Apology of Socrates 20c4–5; Alcibiades 104d3–5; and see n. 37 below and n. 101 to Letter Seven.

28. Presumably, the philosophic teachings of Plato and his followers. Plato speaks about his philosophic doctrines or conclusions in extraordinarily vague terms throughout this letter, often apparently referring to them simply as “they” or “these things.” See n. 44 below.

29. Or “be reputed” (doxeis).

30. “To admire” is thaumazein, which I have otherwise translated “to be amazed.”

31. “Adornment” translates kosmos, the meaning of which is broad, as suggested by its English descendants “cosmos” (an ordered whole) and “cosmetic” (beautifying, adorning). Words related to kosmos appear twice more in the Letters, at 336a4 and 340e1.

32. It is not possible to know precisely to what this “little sphere” (sphairion) refers. Every scholar addressing this question plausibly suggests that it may be an “orrery,” a model for studying or predicting the apparently erratic motions of the “planets” (including sun and moon) against the smoothly rotating background of the stars. For evidence that Plato thought the motions of the heavenly bodies were regular and calculable, consider Republic 529c7–530c7 and also 616b6–617b7 in light of the interpretation suggested by Bloom (1991, 427–28, 471–72n15), as well as the view of Plato’s Timaeus concerning the prediction of eclipses using “models” (mimēmata) (40c3–d5). But compare the Platonic Socrates’s denigration of knowledge of the “divine sphere” at Philebus 62a2–b4. See also Plutarch, Dion 19.4 and Cicero, De republica 1.14.

33. Or “being perplexed” (aporoumenos); see n. 45 below.

34. The following discussion of “the nature of the first” has received a great deal of attention over the centuries. It is generally assumed, reasonably, that “the first” means the first cause of all things; I have striven for a literal translation throughout, which reflects the cryptic or “enigmatic” manner of Plato’s presentation. The “king of all things,” as Plato will call “the first” he is describing, has been identified by various readers with the cosmic creator of Plato’s Timaeus (28c3, 37c7, 41a7); with nous, said in the Philebus to be “king” of heaven and earth according to the wise (28c7); with “the one who cares for the whole,” referred to as “our king” by Plato’s Athenian Stranger (Laws 904a4–6); with the “idea of the good,” said in the Republic to “rule as king (basileuein) over the intelligible species and place” and through which “both being and substance are attached to” the known things (509b6–8, d2); and, of course, given the triad of which “the king” here forms a part, with one-third of the Holy Trinity by early Christian theologians; see Harward 1932, 172–73, Bury 1929, 400–401, and Morrow 1962, 115–16 for reviews of various interpretations.

35. Regarding this unusual flourish, Harward explains, “Plato has worked into his sentence fragments of a passage in a lost tragedy. . . It is not possible to say whether the word δέλτος [i.e., “writing tablet”] is a part of the quotation; but in any case the word belongs to the poetic coloring” (1932, 171n16). Cf. Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris 755–65; Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407b34–35. Note also that Euripides more than once speaks of the “folds” (or “leaves” or “plates”) of the writing tablet, using forms of the same word Plato here uses to speak of the “folds of sea or earth” (ptuchē) (Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris 727, 760, 794; Iphigenia in Aulis 98, 112).

36. Some notes on the precise wording of this vexed sentence are necessary. In the phrase “that is responsible,” the word “that” translates the demonstrative pronoun ekeino. The same pronoun was translated four Greek words earlier as “him” in the phrase “for the sake of him,” which seems to have led most translators to prefer the reading “he is responsible for all the noble things.” But whereas the first use of the pronoun appears to be in the masculine gender to accord with “the king,” the second is unambiguously in the neuter; and while it is not impossible to refer to a masculine subject with a neuter demonstrative pronoun, this does not seem a likely instance of that. I have therefore translated in the spirit of Post (1925), whose version reads “that fact is the cause of all that is beautiful” (emphasis added). The more typical reading, however, is also possible and should be considered. Also consider Tarrant, who suggests, “the king appears to be neuter!” (1993, 170).

Post’s translation brings out two further points. First, the word I have translated “noble things” is kalōn, which includes also the “beautiful things”; see n. 21 above. Second, “responsible” in my version translates the adjective aition. Originally a legal term meaning “culpable,” aition came to have another prominent meaning without the negative connotation—namely, to be “responsible” for something in the sense of being its “cause”—and hence became an important term in Greek philosophy. Thus translators (including Post) have generally preferred some version of the phrase “he is the cause of all the noble things.” But the reader might take note of the fact that Plato does not use the definite article here—he does not strictly say that “he” (or indeed, “that”) is the cause, but rather says that “he” (or “that”) is responsible for all of tōn kalōn, though admittedly, this may well amount to the same thing. The same word is used a few lines below, again without the definite article, in the phrase “responsible for all evils.”

37. The word pragmateia, translated “trouble” here, can also mean “business” or “concern,” much like its more common relative, pragma; but unlike pragma, pragmateia likely implies an ongoing or long-standing preoccupation. It occurs only once more in the Letters, at 314a7, where I have translated it “diligent activity.” See also n. 101 to Letter Seven.

38. “Firmly” is bebaiōs, the adverbial form of a word I elsewhere translate either “stable” or “steadfast.”

39. Scholars have noted the similarity between the description of Dionysius’s opinion as “not tied down” and the “fugitive slave” metaphor at Meno 97e6–98a3; see, e.g., Harward 1932, 173n21; Bury 1929, 412n2; Souilhé 1931, 9–10n2. Souilhé and Bury also point to Theaetetus 151aff., Socrates’s famous claim to be a midwife of knowledge, as parallel to the mention of “labor pains” earlier in this passage (though, more specifically, reference should be made to 148e7); Symposium 206e1, in context, is of equal significance.

40. There is disagreement among the major manuscripts here, several of which seem to indicate that the text has suffered some corruption. I follow the suggestion of Novotny to read aittousi (“they dart about”), but there are at least two alternatives. The vulgate has aitteis, “you dart about, etc.,” while Burnet suggests aittei soi, “it darts at you, etc.”

41. The word for “imagined thing” is phantazomenon, which could refer, however, to something appearing to the physical senses as well as the appearance of something called up or produced by the imagination. It is in accordance with the former possibility that Post (1925, ad loc.) overtranslates “never getting away from the appearances of things,” clarifying a possible interpretation, however, in doing so; similarly, Harward (1932, ad loc.) has “in the region of the apparent.”

42. Given the context, the Greek here could conceivably be construed as “after hearing about ‘the first’ from me.”

43. “Sent a letter” translates epesteilas, related to epistolē, “letter” or “epistle,” as in the title of the work. Regardless of whether that title was affixed to the Letters by Plato himself or a later editor, the reader may wish to track Plato’s use of these words on account of the Letters’ literary form. There are some difficulties in translation, however, regarding the verbal form epistellō. In many cases, it would be most natural to render this word “write” or “send” (i.e., in the present case, “what you wrote/sent”)—the latter could be especially apt, since technically the verb epistellō need not refer to the transmission of a written message, but could indicate the giving of an order or the sending of a messenger. However, the English “write” is usually reserved for graphō and “send” for pempō, both common Greek words. So that the English reader may be sure of when Plato is using epistellō, then, I have opted to use the phrase “send a letter” for this word wherever possible, even at the cost of some awkward formulations, and have indicated deviations from this principle in footnotes.

44. The meaning of this sentence is particularly unclear because Plato specifies neither what “things” of his Dionysius is “testing” nor who the “others” are whose counterpart “things” are to serve as a point of comparison. Other translators render the sentence intelligible by specifying that Dionysius is testing Plato’s “doctrines” or “principles,” and that he is comparing those to the principles of other “teachers.” This is likely the meaning (see n. 28 above), but I have left my own translation unclear so as to reproduce the bewildering effect of the original. See also n. 4 to Letter Thirteen. Note also that “grow naturally” translates prosphusetai, which literally refers to a biological outgrowth (of any kind); thus Morrow (1962, ad loc.), for example, uses the phrase “take root.” I have tried with my translation to keep the reader in mind of the relation to phusis, the scientific or philosophic word for “nature” (cf. n. 130 to Letter Seven). Elsewhere, I have consistently used some version of the phrase “grow naturally” to translate the related verb phuein, “to grow.”

45. “Perplexities” translates aporiai (just as “perplexing” translates part of aporoumena in the sentence after next). There is something of a play on words in the uses of aporia and emporia in this paragraph. The root word, poros, refers to a means of “passage” through or across an obstacle, often a river or body of water, but can also mean simply “journey.” Aporia, then, is to be without recourse, to have “no way out” of a difficulty, while emporia is merchandise or cargo that is quite literally “imported,” especially by sea. The words “transport” and “cargo” in this paragraph all translate some word related to emporia. The suggestion is that Archedemus’s traveling and transporting, that is, his emporia, will provide the resolution to Dionysius’s aporia.

46. These imperative verbs are in the second person plural; presumably, Plato addresses himself to both Dionysius and Archedemus.

47. The verb for “dispatch” (steilēis) is the root word of epistolai, the title of this work. See n. 43 above.

48. “More inspired” translates enthousiastikōtera, which is from entheos, “divinely inspired,” “having a god within.” In this context, the word may also mean “inspiring.”

49. Marginal notes in the best manuscripts suggest the insertion here of the words “and always/constantly (aei) heard,” which are included in the text of some later manuscripts as well as in the quotation by Eusebius (Praeparatio evangelica 12.7).

50. “Diligent activity” is pragmateia; see n. 37 above.

51. I have generally used words related to “worth” or “worthy” only to translate forms of the Greek word axios (including “unworthily” in the following sentence). The three occurrences of words related to “trustworthy” in this sentence, however, translate forms of the word pistos.

52. Or “most splendid” (enargestata).

53. “Beautiful” might also be “noble” or “fine” (see n. 21 above); “young” might also be “new.”

54. This Lycophron may be the sophist mentioned by Aristotle in, e.g., Politics 1280b8–12; Physics 186b25–32. Polyxenus was mentioned earlier in this letter (310c7).

55. “Conversing” translates to dialechthēnai. This articular infinitive does not appear elsewhere in Plato, but it is of course closely related to the important Platonic theme of “dialectic” (e.g., Republic 533a1ff.).

56. “Method” is hardly more than a transliteration of methodōi, and does not in fact capture the full meaning of the Greek term. Composed of meta- (“with/after”) and hodos (“road,” “path”), the original meaning of the word was something like “pursuit.” More commonly, especially in philosophy, methodos means either the pursuit of a given inquiry or rather the mode in which one conducts such an inquiry; hence the sense of the English “method.” The phrase methodōi tōn logōn in this passage, then, might be translated “mode of inquiry into speeches.”

57. Apparently the noted Locrian-Sicilian physician and teacher of Eudoxus; see Diogenes Laertius 8.86. Not to be confused with the Syracusan historian Philistus (see n. 8 to Letter Three).

58. Plato’s nephew, who became the head of the Academy after Plato’s death; Harward, citing Diogenes Laertius 4.1 and the thirty-fifth Socratic Epistle, notes that “Speusippus suffered from very poor health” (1932, 175n29). He is mentioned again in Letter Thirteen (361e2).

59. The rock quarries at Syracuse were used as prisons; Thucydides describes the miserable hardship of the thousands of Athenians imprisoned there after the failure of the Sicilian Expedition (7.86–87). See also Plutarch, Nicias 28.2; On the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander 2.1.

60. The noun translated “entreaty” here (deēsis) is virtually the same word as the verb translated “begs” just above (deitai).

61. Hegesippus and Ariston are both common Athenian names (Nails 2002, 158)—indeed, Ariston was the name of Plato’s father—but nothing is known either of these men or of the Lysiclides mentioned in the letter’s final sentence.

62. For the last portion of this sentence (after the comma), I follow the suggestion of Burnet, who combines part of the reading from the main text of the best manuscripts, which appears to be corrupt, with part of the emendation offered in the margin of two of them. No available version of the sentence reads very smoothly; the only alternative might be something like “continues always to say something good, and things still better, concerning the things that happened.”