EpilogueBurnham Today

James Burnham died in July 1987. The day after his passing, President Reagan stated, “Nancy and I have learned with deep sadness of the passing of James Burnham. Mr. Burnham, the author of seminal works, like ‘The Managerial Revolution’ and ‘The Suicide of the West,’ and a senior editor of the National Review, was one of those principally responsible for the great intellectual odyssey of our century: the journey away from totalitarian statism and towards the uplifting doctrines of freedom.”¹ Burnham's “intellectual odyssey” from Marxist to staunch anticommunist was not unique. Sidney Hook, Max Eastman, Irving Kristol, Frank Meyer, Will Herberg, and John Dos Passos traveled along similar intellectual paths. What separates Burnham from these figures is his enduring influence. Burnham's ideas played an important role in ending the Cold War, but the end of the Cold War did not end his relevance. In fact, current divides within the Republican Party between neoconservatives and paleoconservatives can partly be interpreted as conflicts between the two James Burnhams; each Burnham has influenced a competing sect with its own philosophy of power.

In the late 1990s, for example, so-called neoconservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan—two students of Burnham's thought—began demanding the ousting of Saddam Hussein by using American force in a piece for the New York Times titled “The Bombing of Iraq Isn’t Enough.”² Fearing Iraqi chemical weapons, the authors maintained that the United States had a responsibility to act—something had to be done. In another article, they declared: “A devastating knockout blow against Saddam Hussein, followed by an American-sponsored effort to rebuild Iraq and put it on a path toward democratic governance, would have a seismic impact on the Arab world—for the better.”³ Contending that displays of American power were necessary in the region, Kristol and Kagan believed that violence could regenerate the Middle East—they optimistically believed that democracy could prevail there.⁴

How would Burnham have reacted to US involvement in the Middle East and later, Ukraine? All we can do is speculate. Burnham did demand an aggressive foreign policy aimed at liberating the people of Eastern Europe. The Struggle for the World, however, explicitly rejects the notion that all nations should follow the US democratic model. And the mature Burnham was not a universalist. As was shown, Burnham did not believe that parts of the non-Western world were even capable of Western-style democracy, at least not yet. Democracy's inability to thrive in Afghanistan would not have surprised him.

Neither would have Russian expansion in Eastern Europe given that Burnham recognized the geopolitical significance of this region, part of “The Heartland.” And he believed that nation-states always pursue their own interests. Whether or not Burnham would have supported giving US aid to the region is difficult to know. Burnham did promote the American national interest, and potential Russian annexation of the Ukraine has not immediately threatened US interests. But no one knows Russia's future aspirations. At least during the Cold War, Burnham had no qualms about giving US aid to those resisting Soviet expansion. The question of whether Burnham would have supported US escapades in foreign parts of the world may be reduced to which Burnham does one champion: the inchoate neocon who believed US force and power could improve the world, or the paleoconservative paragon?

The ideas of the latter are currently more fashionable. Republican presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy posted on X in 2024: “The real divide isn’t black vs. white or even Democrat vs. Republican. It's the managerial class vs. the everyday citizen.”⁵ Bemoaning that Burnham's forecasted managerial revolution has come to fruition, Ramaswamy and other writers have argued that corporate managers—not wealthy stockholders and CEOs—wield the power at American corporations. Examples include Netflix, Amazon, Apple, Disney, and Google, where managers control production (e.g., content produced), and these managers are mostly liberal and sometimes “woke.”⁶ They use their positions to promote liberal values that are antithetical to American national interests. As Burnham had predicted in The Managerial Revolution, those who control the productive forces foist their (liberal) ideology on the people. They shape culture.

Another group of twenty-first-century conservatives have advanced related ideas presented by the more pessimistic Burnham in The Managerial Revolution and The Machiavellians. This Burnham has been called a “hallowed figure” among national conservatives (NatCons) who form Trump's base.⁷ Insisting that globalist elites in Washington, DC, have gained too much power, NatCons believe that the ruling class governs the United States only to promote their own interests, at the expense of the people. NatCons cynically view politics as merely a playground for the globalist elite, and they must be resisted in the name of American democracy.

Trump has encapsulated their demands (at least rhetorically) by pledging to “drain the swamp” or restrict the power of the privileged elite in DC who are not democratically elected and only work to serve their interests. He argued in his inaugural address: “For too long, a small group in our nation's capital has reaped the rewards of government, while the people have borne the cost. Washington flourished, but the people did not share in its wealth. Politicians prospered, but the jobs left and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country.”⁸ Vanity Fair, Washington Post, USA Today, New York Magazine, and the New Yorker all highlighted the “dark” side of this speech. President Trump later insisted that “unelected deep state operatives who defy the voters to push their own secret agendas are truly a threat to democracy itself.”⁹ And the president warned against “the steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people.”¹⁰ Trump has embraced some of the ideas that Burnham inherited from Trotsky: bureaucrats hold the power, even though they are not real representatives of the people. Instead, they pursue their own interests. They are the enemies of democracy.

Trump and his base have decried international governing bodies like the United Nations and the World Health Organization (WHO) because their words allegedly do little to improve the homeland. Trump called the United Nations a “club for people to get together, talk and have a good time.”¹¹ He even threatened to pull the United States from the WHO, insisting that communist China has “total control” over the organization.¹² For the president, the national interest transcends everything. Echoing Burnham, he declared, “We reject the ideology of globalism, and embrace the doctrine of patriotism.”¹³

Trump shares Burnham's domestic worldview that revolves around elites and the ways that they undermine democracy. They are both unorthodox conservatives. Like Burnham, Trump was not part of the religious right, nor did he embrace the free market to the degree that many conservatives do. Geopolitically, Trump, like Burnham, promoted the national interest above any humanitarian impulses or universal organizations. Of course, Trump and those who share his thinking lean toward isolationism. Burnham never did. Even in the post–Cold War era, Burnham probably would have questioned a foreign policy in which the United States did not take a leadership role; he preached internationalism. Like it or not, according to Burnham, “America is a hegemony, and the hegemon has imperial responsibilities.”¹⁴ What about Trump's uncouth style? Attacking, criticizing, and ridiculing others was a hallmark of Burnham writings. It is doubtful he would have faulted a president who did the same, especially against members of the establishment.

Burnham's ideas about power and popular resistance were even displayed during the COVID-19 pandemic, when federal, state, and local governments (political elites with help from the bureaucracy) exercised a virtually unprecedented amount of power against their citizens. Businesses were shuttered, per the recommendation of bureaucratic health officials. Some normal human activities like visiting family and friends or walking on the beach were at best discouraged and at worst became punishable offenses. Even protests (public opposition) in California were banned in April (this was rescinded in early June for protesters on the left who challenged a power structure that they too deemed oppressive). The stated reason for selectively banning protests was humanitarian, or the attempt to limit the spread of COVID-19. Consistent with arguments made in The Machiavellians, some people disagreed on the grounds that the elite are never humanitarian—they seek only to exercise authority. For parts of the American right, COVID-19 restrictions were a naked power grab. What was the best way to curb government force? Fight back with power. This explains the protests against California's governor in more conservative parts of the liberal state. Consistent with Burnham, by resisting, the protesters—at least in their minds—were exercising power against the powerful, a requirement for democracy.

These events reveal Burnham's continued significance, especially among conservatives as a power theorist. For neoconservatives, American power (hard and soft) should be exercised abroad to protect or even promote democracy. For paleoconservatives, consciousness must be raised about the raging power struggle between elites and nonelites—democracy depends on it. The reader can decide which (if either) Burnham deserves support, but his continued importance cannot be denied.