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Trade in War: Economic Cooperation across Enemy Lines: Notes

Trade in War: Economic Cooperation across Enemy Lines
Notes

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Notes

table of contents
  1. Cover
  2. Title Page
  3. Contents
  4. Acknowledgments
  5. Introduction
  6. Chapter 1. Neutral Rights and Trade with the Enemy
  7. Chapter 2. Wartime Trade Theory
  8. Chapter 3. Crimean War (1854–56)
  9. Chapter 4. Britain in World War I
  10. Chapter 5. Germany in World War I
  11. Chapter 6. Britain in World War II
  12. Chapter 7. United States in Post–Cold War Conflicts
  13. Conclusion
  14. Notes
  15. References
  16. Index
  17. A Volume in the Series Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
  18. Copyright

Notes

Introduction

  1. 1.Grieco 1990; Mastanduno 1991; Powell 1991.
  2. 2.Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield and Bronson 1997; Gowa and Mansfield 2004.
  3. 3.Copeland 2014.
  4. 4.Li and Sacko 2002; Long 2008.
  5. 5.Afesorgbor 2019.
  6. 6.Levy and Barbieri 2004. The factors include (1) nature of war; (2) trade in nonstrategic products; (3) fear of relative losses to third parties; (4) bipolarity; (5) desire to maintain trade as political leverage to be used later in the war; (6) concerns about potential domestic constraints stemming from cut trade; (7) a change in ideology toward more liberal free trade; (8) limited wars; (9) civil wars.
  7. 7.Schultz 2015, 137.
  8. 8.That some trade is permitted and officially recorded is fascinating, regardless of the value of that trade.
  9. 9.Bove and Böhmelt 2021.
  10. 10.L. Johnson 1974.
  11. 11.For a similar concern with international political economy (IPE) approaches omitting macroprocesses, see Oatley 2011.
  12. 12.D. Ricardo 1817; Stolper and Samuelson 1941.
  13. 13.Lake 2009; Rickard 2021.
  14. 14.Rogowski 1987.
  15. 15.Hiscox 2001.
  16. 16.Krugman 1980.
  17. 17.Melitz 2003.
  18. 18.I. S. Kim 2017; I. Osgood 2017; I. Osgood 2016.
  19. 19.Gilligan 1997; Goldstein and Gulotty 2014.
  20. 20.I. S. Kim 2017.
  21. 21.Neilson, Pritchard, and Yeung 2014; Brooks 2005.
  22. 22.I. Osgood 2018; Meckling and Hughes 2017.
  23. 23.Baccini, Pinto, and Weymouth 2017.
  24. 24.I. S. Kim et al. 2019.
  25. 25.Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2015.
  26. 26.Milner 1988, 14.
  27. 27.Lipson 1984.
  28. 28.Jervis 1978; Farrell and Newman 2019.
  29. 29.Snidal 1991; Grieco 1988.
  30. 30.Krasner 1991.
  31. 31.For arguments in a similar vein, see Mastanduno 1998; Kirshner 1998.
  32. 32.“Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-10/turkey-blocks-transit-of-goods-sanctioned-by-eu-us-to-russia.
  33. 33.“Why Russian Oil and Gas Matter to the Global Economy,” New York Times, March 9, 2022.
  34. 34.“EU Agrees on Level of Price Caps for Russian Petroleum Products,” Council of the European Union, accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/04/eu-agrees-on-level-of-price-caps-for-russian-petroleum-products/.
  35. 35.Polachek 1980; Morrow 1999; Gartzke 2007; Copeland 2014.
  36. 36.Crescenzi 2003; Dorussen 2006; Glick and Taylor 2010; Goenner 2010.
  37. 37.Brooks 2005.
  38. 38.Mousseau 2019; Friedberg 2005.
  39. 39.Jervis 1989; Lieber and Press 2020.
  40. 40.Pierson 2004; Grzymala-Busse 2011.
  41. 41.Thelen 2000.
  42. 42.Olson 1993; Copeland 2014; Edelstein 2020.
  43. 43.For a few examples from different subjects, see Levy 2011; Kroenig 2011.
  44. 44.Some sanctions episodes are resolved by the threat, not the imposition, of sanctions. However, this is not a relevant comparison for the imposed wartime commercial policy examined here. For the effects of threat of sanctions, see T. Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009; Drezner 2003.
  45. 45.Broadberry and Harrison 2005; Knorr 1975, 141.
  46. 46.Farrell and Newman 2019; Tostensen and Bull 2002, 386; Kirshner 1997, 38.

1. Neutral Rights and Trade with the Enemy

  1. 1.Meijer 2016; D. J. Kim 2017; Skonieczny 2018; Zhu 2000.
  2. 2.Zielinski and Poast 2021.
  3. 3.Higham 1995.
  4. 4.WTO, Trade Topics—Rules of Origin Gateway, accessed December 4, 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_e.htm.
  5. 5.This is not meant to imply that establishing an effective blockade is simple. It just means that if a state manages to establish an effective blockade, that would be a simple method of limiting trade with the enemy.
  6. 6.R. Tucker 2006, 263.
  7. 7.Spaulding 1991.
  8. 8.Vagts 1998; R. Tucker 2006.
  9. 9.Abbenhuis 2013, 4.
  10. 10.Lemnitzer 2013, 1075.
  11. 11.Oppenheim 1912, 2:352.
  12. 12.That was the year the rule was first confirmed by the British prize court. Hosack 1854.
  13. 13.Wold 2020; McCarthy 2013.
  14. 14.Abbenhuis 2013, 4.
  15. 15.Madariaga 1962.
  16. 16.States actively involved in warfare could not join a league of neutrals. Kulsrud 2000.
  17. 17.Griffiths 1971.
  18. 18.Kulsrud 2000, 6–7.
  19. 19.Muller 2009.
  20. 20.French and British reasons for issuing this declaration are explained in chapter 3.
  21. 21.Oppenheim 1912, 2:358–59.
  22. 22.A port is only considered blockaded if the belligerent has the naval strength to enforce the blockade. An effective blockade permits belligerents to confiscate contraband found on all ships.
  23. 23.Osborne 2004.
  24. 24.Attempts to create a universal agreement for states to sign at their leisure had been attempted previously, notably by the United States on neutral rights; however, this was the first success. Lemnitzer 2013, 1068.
  25. 25.Lemnitzer 2013, 1081.
  26. 26.Coogan 1981.
  27. 27.Lemnitzer 2013, 1081.
  28. 28.Lemnitzer 2013.
  29. 29.Tracy 2018, xxvi, 5.
  30. 30.France supported this position, as it looked to US neutrality in its war with Mexico. Abbenhuis 2014, 116.
  31. 31.Abbenhuis 2014, 123.
  32. 32.R. Tucker 2006, 263.
  33. 33.R. Tucker 2006, 263.
  34. 34.L. Davis and Engerman 2006, 12.
  35. 35.Osborne 2004, 37.
  36. 36.Henig 2019.
  37. 37.“The Covenant of the League of Nations,” December 1924, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.
  38. 38.Mulder 2022.
  39. 39.Mulder 2022; Henig 2019.
  40. 40.Antonopoulos 2022.
  41. 41.Tracy 2018, 412.
  42. 42.Thomas and Duncan 1999, 369; Tracy 2018, 4128. Some jurists maintain that neutrality can be compatible with the UN Charter. Clancy 2021.
  43. 43.Norton 1976, 252.
  44. 44.Chadwick 2013, 41.
  45. 45.Norton 1976, 257; Leckow 1988, 630; McNeill 1991, 633.
  46. 46.McNeill 1991, 641.
  47. 47.Tracy 2018, 6; Abbenhuis 2014, 97.
  48. 48.Osborne 2004; Jessup and Deák 1931; Baxter 1928.
  49. 49.Tracy 2018, xv.
  50. 50.Tracy 2018, xvi.
  51. 51.Given the global consequences of such policies, the rationality of engaging privateers might be questioned. However, even if states wanted to prevent the damage, it would have been impossible to commit to a policy of not blockading the enemy—and thereby allowing the resupply of its war effort—especially if the war turned against the belligerent.
  52. 52.Croft 1989; Hickey 1981.
  53. 53.Clark 1928; Ryan 1962; L. Johnson 1970; Leigh 2014.
  54. 54.Wagner 1915.
  55. 55.Tracy 2018, xxvi.
  56. 56.Gholz and Press 2001.
  57. 57.Add. Ms. 43355, April 7, 1854, 141–43, British Library.
  58. 58.Considerations before the Crimean War: “Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 31; considerations before World War I: “The Question of Trading with the Enemy from the Legal and Political Point of View, No. 9,” December 11, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives.
  59. 59.“Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives.
  60. 60.“Blockade Machinery: Memorandum by the Chairman,” April 29, 1926, ATB 31, CAB 47.2, British National Archives.
  61. 61.Keohane 2005.
  62. 62.Mearsheimer 1994.
  63. 63.Tracy 2018, 6.
  64. 64.Abbenhuis 2014, 119.
  65. 65.William H. Steward, quoted in Baxter 1928, 9.
  66. 66.Baxter 1928, 11.
  67. 67.Goldsmith and Posner 1999, 1145.
  68. 68.Goldsmith and Posner 1999, 1146.
  69. 69.Leckow 1988, 633.
  70. 70.Abbenhuis 2013, 4.
  71. 71.Lemnitzer 2013, 1075.
  72. 72.Tracy 2018, 6.
  73. 73.Leckow 1988, 633.
  74. 74.McNeill 1991, 632.
  75. 75.Chadwick 2013, 41.

2. Wartime Trade Theory

  1. 1.Downes 2011.
  2. 2.Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994.
  3. 3.D. Ricardo 1817.
  4. 4.Schelling 1958.
  5. 5.Security externalities are benefits if they accrue to the state itself. If they accrue to the enemy, they are costs to the state—sometimes referred to as negative security externalities. Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994.
  6. 6.D. Ricardo 1817.
  7. 7.Barbieri and Levy 1999.
  8. 8.This is possible if a state derives its income mostly from foreign assistance as opposed to domestic taxation.
  9. 9.Gowa and Mansfield 1993.
  10. 10.The reason for this, no matter how counterintuitive it sounds, was to increase their chances of survival. The quantity of gunpowder within their walls was too high, and even one accident would have leveled the entire town. Dutch bombardment of the fortification—even using the French gunpowder—caused considerably less damage. Rousset 1862, 65.
  11. 11.J. L. Ricardo 1855.
  12. 12.Evan Hoopfer, “Lockheed Martin Gears Up for Increased Production of F-35 in Fort Worth,” Dallas Business Journal, June 7, 2017.
  13. 13.Kleinberg, Robinson, and French 2012; Goenner 2010.
  14. 14.A possible theoretical exception could be perfectly elastic goods, whose demand or supply would disappear with minute changes in price. However, since world markets are not perfectly competitive, this should not present an empirical problem.
  15. 15.Hill 2016.
  16. 16.While the amount of revenue is discounted, the conversion time of money is not. Giving funds to the enemy can be fairly dangerous, as under the right circumstances money can be quickly fungible into military capabilities.
  17. 17.This could be beneficial to the state sitting out the fight, especially if the two opponents have approximately equal military capabilities. Mearsheimer 2001.
  18. 18.Zielinski 2016; Kreps 2018.
  19. 19.This is similar to the typology of war used by Alex Weisiger. However, his work classifies wars after the fact, while this project focuses on the decision-makers’ assumptions about the war before it happens. Weisiger 2013.
  20. 20.Arreguin-Toft 2001.
  21. 21.Glaser and Kaufmann 1998; Jervis 1978.
  22. 22.Mearsheimer 1985.
  23. 23.Freedman 2017; Hamilton and Herwig 2010.
  24. 24.Nolan 2017.
  25. 25.Snyder 1984.
  26. 26.Fearon 1995; Morrow 1989; Powell 2006.
  27. 27.Goemans 2012; Weisiger 2013.
  28. 28.Van Evera 1984.
  29. 29.With the exception of chapter 7, which sometimes requires different assumptions about the length of a long conflict.
  30. 30.R. Osgood 1970; Åkerman 1972; Rosen 1982.
  31. 31.Nolan 2017, 288–91.
  32. 32.Survival is the primary goal of the state in as much as without it no other goal is achievable. Waltz 1979.
  33. 33.While the enemy will, likely, be able to handle the loss of funds in the short term, this is the best a wartime commercial policy can do to contribute to winning the current war.
  34. 34.It took almost four years—from March 1915 through 1919—to starve Germany in World War I. Downes 2011, chap. 3. Likewise, it took almost four years to starve Japan in World War II. Garon 2017; Clary 2000.
  35. 35.Li and Sacko 2002; Long 2008.
  36. 36.Pollins 1989.
  37. 37.C. Davis and Meunier 2011.
  38. 38.Anderson 1961.
  39. 39.Anderson 1967; J. L. Ricardo 1855.
  40. 40.According to the economic interdependence theory, this “mutual dependence” is the most likely case to restrain the start of hostilities in the first place. The theory outlined here suggests that cases of true mutual dependence should have no effect on the likelihood of war between the two states—because mutually dependent trade is the most likely to continue throughout the war.

3. Crimean War (1854–56)

  1. 1.Curtiss 1979, 151.
  2. 2.Badem 2010, 62.
  3. 3.Lambert 2016, 47.
  4. 4.Badem 2010, 62–63.
  5. 5.Skritskiy 2006, 153.
  6. 6.Skritskiy 2006, 153.
  7. 7.Figes 2011, 131.
  8. 8.Figes 2011, 136.
  9. 9.Curtiss 1979, 236; Figes 2011, 146.
  10. 10.Gouttman 1995; Fletcher and Ishchenko 2004.
  11. 11.Skritskiy 2006.
  12. 12.Figes 2011, 106.
  13. 13.Curtiss 1979, 327.
  14. 14.Lambert 2016, 124.
  15. 15.On March 19, 1854, Palmerston presented the cabinet with the following war aims: “the restoration of Poland as of 1772; the union of Finland with the kingdoms of Sweden and Norway instead of with Russia; Austria’s retention of the Danubian Principalities, with a surrender of Lombardy and Venetia; Turkey’s enlargement through the acquisition of the Crimea and Georgia; and the enlargement of Austria and Prussia in a Germany freed from the dominion of the tsar,” from March 19, 1854, PRO 30.22.11C, 267–68, British National Archives.
  16. 16.Figes 2011, 158.
  17. 17.Curtiss 1979, 296.
  18. 18.Figes 2011, 189.
  19. 19.Royle 2014, 175.
  20. 20.Figes 2011, 144.
  21. 21.Figes 2011, 147.
  22. 22.Figes 2011, 192.
  23. 23.Royle 2014, 175; Lambert 2016, 10.
  24. 24.Lambert 2016, 99.
  25. 25.Cowley to Clarendon, May 2, 1854, no. 590, FO 27.1013, British National Archives.
  26. 26.Figes 2011, 196.
  27. 27.Harris 2018, 62.
  28. 28.Lambert 2016, 112.
  29. 29.Lambert 2016, 115.
  30. 30.Figes 2011, 154.
  31. 31.Badem 2010, 187.
  32. 32.Figes 2011, 280.
  33. 33.Figes 2011, 281.
  34. 34.Curtiss 1979, 327.
  35. 35.Fletcher and Ishchenko 2004, 277.
  36. 36.Figes 2011, 355–56.
  37. 37.Terner 1858, 100.
  38. 38.Anderson 1967, 256.
  39. 39.J. L. Ricardo 1855, 21.
  40. 40.Nifrontov 1971, 73. According to E. V. Tarle, on average between 1851 and 1853, England imported 40.7 percent of Russian exports and provided 25.8 percent of Russian imports. Tarle 1950, 50–51.
  41. 41.Anderson 1967, 256.
  42. 42.Terner 1858.
  43. 43.“Memorandum on the Commercial Policy Pursued with Respect to Russian Produce since the Commencement of the War,” October 23, 1854, Add. Ms. 43355, ff 144–51, British Library.
  44. 44.Stepanov 2012, 20; Terner 1858, 11, 335.
  45. 45.“British Order in Council, Granting General Reprisals against Russia,” in British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:37.
  46. 46.“British Order in Council, for Preventing Vessels Clearing Out of Russia, and Ordering a General Embargo or Stop of Russian Vessels,” in British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:38.
  47. 47.Anderson 1967, 248.
  48. 48.House of Commons Debate, March 13, 1854, Hansard, vol. 131, cc 698–700; House of Lords Debate, March 17, 1854, Hansard, vol. 131, cc 885–92.
  49. 49.Stepanov 2012, 19.
  50. 50.Nifrontov 1971, 74; Tarle 1950, 50–51; Stepanov 2012, 20.
  51. 51.Levasseur 1911, 239.
  52. 52.Levasseur 1911; Terner 1858.
  53. 53.Terner 1858, 232.
  54. 54.Levasseur 1911.
  55. 55.Original: “si les relations commerciales de la Russie et de la France venaient à être momentanément suspendues nos approvisionnements n’ausaient par autant à souffére.” Minister of Commerce to Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 24, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  56. 56.Minister of Commerce to Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 24, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  57. 57.“Commerce entre la Russie et la France,” attached to letter from Minister of Commerce to Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 24, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  58. 58.“Commerce entre la Russie et la France,” attached to letter from Minister of Commerce to Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 24, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  59. 59.Report of Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Emperor of France, April 7, 1854, 422QO18, French Diplomatic Archives, 16–17.
  60. 60.F.12.8998, 1854–55, French National Archives.
  61. 61.Merchants to Minister of Commerce, March 25, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  62. 62.Hosack 1854, 41.
  63. 63.Anderson 1961, 36.
  64. 64.J. L. Ricardo 1855, 12.
  65. 65.J. L. Ricardo 1855, 12.
  66. 66.Hosack 1854.
  67. 67.France was anxious that Britain make no declaration on this point without first consulting with France. Report no. 285, March 6, 1854, FO 27.1009, British National Archives. In fact, France pressed for a joint declaration of the rights of neutrals but never managed to accomplish this. Walewski to Drouyn de Lhuys, March 17, 1854, P.451, French Diplomatic Archives.
  68. 68.Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Commerce, March 10, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  69. 69.“Correspondence respecting the Withdrawal of British Property from Russia,” in British and Foreign State Papers 1853, 44:105–10.
  70. 70.Marseilles Chamber of Commerce to Minister of Commerce, March 13, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives; Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce to Minister of Commerce, March 15, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  71. 71.Original: “L’Angleterre a émis la généreuse pensée d’abolir les lettres de marque, comment dans cette occasion, au mépris des principes qu’elle professe et que nous sommes disposés à pratiquer, aurait elle l’inconséquence d’accepter elle même le rôle de corsaire, vis-à-vis des navires neutres amis, nationaux, chargés en tems de paix, sur la foi des traités.” Marseilles Chamber of Commerce to Minister of Commerce, March 13, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  72. 72.The idea of linking these two principles appears in James Graham’s declaration against the use of letters of marque. March 3, 1854, FO 96.24.33, British National Archives. Clarendon pointed out to the French ambassador that if the British had to make sacrifices, so did the French. March 17, 1854, P.451, French Diplomatic Archives.
  73. 73.“British Declaration, with Reference to Neutrals and Letters of Marque,” in British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:36; “Rapport et déclaration concernant les neuters, les letters de marque, etc.,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1854, 54:174.
  74. 74.Cowley to Clarendon, March 29, 1854, C.16, ff 647–56, Clarendon Depository.
  75. 75.“Her Majesty’s Government have it in contemplation to relax in some degree the exercise of belligerent rights as respects neutrals in ordinary case, this would appear to render it more than ever necessary to insist upon the vigorous exercise of such rights in the event of blockade, otherwise the Enemy’s trade will be transferred to, and covered by neutral Flags, the Flags of England, France and Russia being alone excluded.” Harding to Clarendon, March 20, 1854, FO 83.2280, British National Archives.
  76. 76.This reasoning for a strict blockade was formed before British decision-makers began to consider what effect the adoption of neutral rights might have on their wartime commercial policy.
  77. 77.“Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 52; French Council-General in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 20, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  78. 78.Cowley to Clarendon, March 10, 1854, no. 304, FO 27.1009, British National Archives.
  79. 79.Minister of Foreign Affairs to Walewski, March 8, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  80. 80.Both countries adopted a monthlong grace period. Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Commerce, March 10, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  81. 81.Minister of Foreign Affairs to Walewski, March 8, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  82. 82.Minister of Commerce to Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 13, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  83. 83.F.12.8998, 1854–55, French National Archives.
  84. 84.Drouyn de Lhuys to Minister of Commerce, March 10, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Count Walewski, March 8, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  85. 85.“Note sur le délai à accorder aux navires Russes après la déclaration de guerre,” March 22, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Commerce, March 22, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  86. 86.It does not seem as if the cabinet gave the issue much thought. “Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 33.
  87. 87.Queen’s Advocate to Clarendon, March 15, 1854, FO 83.2280, British National Archives.
  88. 88.Minister of Commerce to Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 13, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  89. 89.“Translation of Russian Decree on Initial Commercial Policy towards Belligerents,” April 16, 1854, BT 1.512, British National Archives.
  90. 90.Walewski to Clarendon, April 12, 1854, FO 27.1038, British National Archives. A note by the French minister of commerce also states that Britain was likely to acquiesce, at the very least, on giving licenses to transport products that were purchased before the declaration of war. April 3, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  91. 91.Add. Ms. 43355, April 5, 1854, British Library.
  92. 92.Letter written by Granville and forwarded by Clarendon to Cowley to present to the French government, April 15, 1854, FO 146.506, British National Archives.
  93. 93.Cowley to Clarendon, April 20, 1854, no. 522, FO 27.1012, British National Archives.
  94. 94.Clarendon to Cowley, May 1, 1854, no. 422, FO 146.508, British National Archives.
  95. 95.France pressed the point that the most important item to be exported from Archangel to France was timber, which was necessary for military stores. Cowley to Clarendon, April 21, 1854, FO 27.1012, British National Archives.
  96. 96.April 6 by the Julian calendar used in Russia. Since the Gregorian dates were used thus far, the dates for Russian policies have also been converted to the Gregorian calendar.
  97. 97.The grace period was set to start on April 25 in the Black Sea, Azov Sea, and Baltic Sea. In the White Sea, the grace period started from the day navigation was open. This policy specifically excluded two British ships, which were detained for military purposes. “Translation of Russian Decree on Initial Commercial Policy towards Belligerents,” April 16, 1854, BT 1.512, British National Archives.
  98. 98.“Translation of Russian Decree on Initial Commercial Policy towards Belligerents,” April 16, 1854, BT 1.512, British National Archives.
  99. 99.The allied governments’ policy was to confiscate the contraband only, unless more than 75 percent of the ship’s cargo was contraband. Extract from the Moniteur, “Divergences entre les déclarations francaise et russe au sujet du droit des neuters.” May 1854, FO 27.1014, British National Archives.
  100. 100.Cardwell to Aberdeen, April 3, 1854, Add. Ms. 43197, ff 282–86, British Library.
  101. 101.Lushington to Granville, April 5, 1854, PRO 30.29.23.4, British National Archives. Unfortunately, the text of this memorandum is unavailable as the document was lost while being transferred to the National Archives.
  102. 102.“Privy Council Minutes,” April 6, 1854, PC 4.20, British National Archives.
  103. 103.Add. Ms. 43355, April 7, 1854, ff 141–43, British Library.
  104. 104.“British Order in Council, in furtherance of Her Majesty’s Declaration of March 28, 1854, respecting the Trade of Neutrals and British Subjects,” in British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:49.
  105. 105.“Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 43.
  106. 106.Original: “Je m’empresse de vous informer sans délai que mon gouvernement n’a aucune objection à faire contre l’ordre du Conseil projeté pour autoriser le commerce avec l’ennemi. Nous n’aurons probablement aucune mesure de ce genre à prendre de notre côté, parce que la législation française laisse l’interdiction de ce commerce à peu près dénuée de sanction.” Walewski to Clarendon, April 19, 1854, FO 27.1038, British National Archives. The same is reflected in a telegraph Cowley sent to Clarendon, April 15, 1854, FO 27.1012, British National Archives.
  107. 107.Add. Ms. 43355, October 23, 1854, ff 144–51, British Library, 5.
  108. 108.“Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 39.
  109. 109.Add. Ms. 43355, October 23, 1854, ff 144–51, British Library, 2.
  110. 110.“Observations by Mr. Wilson upon the Various Objections to Interfering with the Trade of Russia,” November 17, 1854, Add. Ms. 43355, ff 168–80, British Library.
  111. 111.Add. Ms. 43355, November 18, 1854, ff 152–55, British Library, 2–3.
  112. 112.“Remarks by Mr. Cardwell on the Commercial Policy of this Country towards Russia,” October 31, 1854, Add. Ms. 43355, ff 160–63, British Library.
  113. 113.Russell to Granville, October 30, 1954, PRO 30.29.23.4, British National Archives.
  114. 114.Russell to Granville, October 29, 1954, PRO 30.29.23.4, British National Archives.
  115. 115.Collier, House of Commons Debate, February 20, 1855, Hansard, vol. 136, cc 1659–713.
  116. 116.J. L. Ricardo 1855.
  117. 117.Aberdeen to Queen, February 17, 1854, Add. Ms. 40348, ff 251–52, British Library.
  118. 118.“Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 31.
  119. 119.“Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 31.
  120. 120.“Proclamation Prohibiting the Exportation of Arms, Stores, etc.,” in British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:31.
  121. 121.Anderson 1961, 35.
  122. 122.“British Order of the Lords of the Council, respecting Permission to Export Contraband of War,” in British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:48.
  123. 123.British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:52.
  124. 124.British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:53–59.
  125. 125.British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:53–57.
  126. 126.British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:53–57.
  127. 127.After the invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, Russia was forced to sink its own fleet in the Black Sea. This made British efforts to prevent products necessary for the repair of ships from reaching the Black Sea obsolete—there was nothing left to repair.
  128. 128.British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:53–57.
  129. 129.British and Foreign State Papers 1855, 46:57–59.
  130. 130.Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Commerce, May 4, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives; Minister of the Marine to Minister of Commerce, June 21, 1854, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  131. 131.“Note pour le Ministre, sur le commerce entre le France et la Russie, et sur les mesures à prendre pour atténuer les conséquences de l’état de guerre,” April 17, 1854, 422QO18, French Diplomatic Archives.
  132. 132.While any country can change its tariff schedule, for a free-trade country with an optimum tariff level this would constitute a considerable cost. For a protectionist country, changing tariff levels to redirect trade does not need to be a net negative.
  133. 133.“Décret impérial qui autorise l’admission temporaire, en franchise de droits, des suifs bruts destinés à être exportés, après conversion en acide stéarique ou en chandelles,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1855, 55:225.
  134. 134.“Décret impérial modifie le tariff d’entrée pour les laines brutes,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1855, 55:109.
  135. 135.“Décret impérial qui suprime le droit établi à I’importation du cotton en laine des colonies françaises,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1854, 54:385.
  136. 136.Walewski to Clarendon, April 19, 1854, FO 27.1038, British National Archives.
  137. 137.“Décret impérial qui institue un conseil des prises à Paris,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1854, 54:435.
  138. 138.“Décret impérial qui fixe le droit à acquitter à l’entrée en France des merchandises prohibées faisant partie du chargement des navires capturés sur l’ennemi Durant la guerre actuelle,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1855, 55:336.
  139. 139.Cowley to Clarendon, February 22, 1854, FO 27.1008, British National Archives.
  140. 140.“Décret impérial qui prohibe la sortie et la réexportation d’entrepôt des armes et munitions de guerre, etc.,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1854, 54:90. List of items prohibited by the decree: “1° Armes de guerre de toute sorte; 2° plomb, soufre, poudre, salpêtre, pierres à feu, capsules de poudre fulminante, bois de fusil, projectiles et autres munitions de guerre de toute sorte; 3° effets d’habillement, de campement, d’équipement, et de harnachement militaire; 4° chevaux; 5° bâtiments à voiles et à vapeur, machines et parties de machines propres à la navigation, agrès et apparaux de navires de tous autres objets bruts ou confectionnés de matériel naval et militaire.”
  141. 141.“Décret impérial qui prohibe la sortie et la réexportation du nitrate de soude,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1854, 54:232.
  142. 142.“Décret impérial qui prohibe la transit des armes, munitions et autres objets propres à la guerre,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1854, 54:559.
  143. 143.Walewski to Clarendon, April 12, 1854, FO 27.1038, British National Archives.
  144. 144.Anderson 1967, 248.
  145. 145.“Décret impérial qui prohibe l’exportation des grains et farines jusqu’au 31 juillet 1855,” in Collection Complète des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglements, et Avis du Conseil-d’État 1854, 54:551.
  146. 146.“Note pour le Ministre,” June 22, 1855, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  147. 147.Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Commerce, October 1, 1855, F.12.8998, French National Archives.
  148. 148.“О воспрещеніи, впредь до усмотрѣнія, вывоза за границу Россійской золотой монеты, моремъ и сухопутно,” March 11, 1854, no. 27965, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1854 1855, 29:224.
  149. 149.Nifrontov 1971, 14.
  150. 150.“О воспрещеніи вывозить хлѣбъ за границу изъ Одесскаго и всѣхъ Черноморскихъ и Азовскихъ портовъ,” no. 27934, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1854 1855, 29:186.
  151. 151.Terner 1858, 59–60.
  152. 152.“О воспрещеніи вывоза хлѣба за границу,” no. 28530, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1854 1855, 29:758.
  153. 153.With the exception of wheat.
  154. 154.“О воспрещеніи вывоза хлѣба за границу,” no. 29819, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1855 1856, 30:673.
  155. 155.“Enquiry regarding Trading with the Enemy, Historical Summary,” October 16, 1911, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 52.
  156. 156.“О допущеніи нѣкоторыхъ облегченій для торговли чрезъ западную сухопутную границу,” no. 28349, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1854 1855, 29:636.
  157. 157.“Высочайше утверженная роспись иностраннымъ товарамъ, съ коихъ по сухопутной западной границѣ понижаются установенныя общимъ тарифомъ 1850 года привозныя пошлины,” no. 28362, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1854 1855, 29:643.
  158. 158.House of Commons Debate, February 20, 1855, Hansard, vol. 136, cc 1659–713.
  159. 159.“О недозволеніе ввозить въ Закавказскій край нѣкоторые иностранные товары,” no. 28524, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1854 1855, 29:756.
  160. 160.“О общемъ тарифѣ по Европейской торговлѣ для таможень Россійской Имперіи и Царства Польскаго,” no. 24533, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1850 1851, 25:501–31. Prohibited items with product numbers: all tea (88); crude saltpeter (180); saltpeter (181); natrum nitricum, nitrate de soude, chili-saltpeter (192); blades or epees, sabers, daggers with or without gold and silver notches (341); firearms, such as rifles, pistols, and other unnamed weapons in every rim and without it, as well as all accessories to firearms (346); ammunition (352); matches and incendiary chemicals of all kinds (381); wicks (392); tickets of credit issued by Russia (439); foreign lottery tickets (440); all items with holy images (441); gold, silver, or bronze foreign coins or medals, except low-proof Russian gold and silver coins (451); skins of beavers, otters, sable, fur seals, sea dogs, and seals (460); gunpowder, small and for cannon (469).
  161. 161.A part of this law, no. 24533, might have been overturned on Oct 2, 1855. The new decree, no. 29661, allowed, “until the end of the current war, the import to Transcaucasia through the land border with Persia and Turkey all European and colonial goods, which by the tariff of 1850 were allowed to be imported into the Black Sea ports of this region.” This might refer only to the tea, animal skins, holy items, and foreign coins and medals, but it is very unclear.
  162. 162.“О воспрещеніи вывоза за границу простаго сукна всѣхъ цвѣтовъ,” no. 29584, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1855 1856, 30:545.
  163. 163.“О воспрещеніи вывоза всякаго рода мяса по всей Европейской границѣ Имперіи,” no. 29979, in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii—1855 1856, 30:748.
  164. 164.Nifrontov 1971, 82; Stepanov 2012, 21.
  165. 165.Quoted in Nifrontov 1971, 80–81 Original quote: “Во время войны запрещены были к вывозу от нас в европейские государства некоторые предметы, кои требовались в большом количестве для наших войск или в которых мог иметь надобность неприятель.”
  166. 166.Terner 1858, 100.
  167. 167.Terner 1858, 104.
  168. 168.Terner 1858, 201–2.
  169. 169.Nifrontov 1971, 83; Terner 1858, 45.
  170. 170.Terner 1858.

4. Britain in World War I

  1. 1.“Terms of Reference,” 1912, Report and Proceedings of the Standing Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defense on Trading with the Enemy, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, vi (hereafter cited as Report).
  2. 2.This portion of the case study relies solely on information gathered by the Board of Trade for the Committee of Trading with the Enemy as this was the information the committee used to make their policy recommendations. The accuracy of either the statistical information or the conclusions drawn by the Board of Trade is largely irrelevant as it was the only expert information provided to the committee.
  3. 3.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, Standing Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense (SSCID), WO 106.45, British National Archives, 2.
  4. 4.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 2.
  5. 5.Products are arranged in order of value of trade.
  6. 6.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 3.
  7. 7.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 2.
  8. 8.Predominant refers to more than 50 percent. “Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 13.
  9. 9.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 13.
  10. 10.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, Standing Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense, BNA, WO 106.45, Annex I and III.
  11. 11.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 13.
  12. 12.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 9.
  13. 13.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 10.
  14. 14.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 11.
  15. 15.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 11.
  16. 16.“The Wool Trade and Germany,” February 7, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 394.
  17. 17.“The German Sugar Trade and the Effect of Prohibiting the Importation of German Sugar,” February 15, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 415.
  18. 18.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 3–8.
  19. 19.“Note by the General Staff,” March 12, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 424.
  20. 20.With the exception of arms, ammunition, and naval and military stores.
  21. 21.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 8.
  22. 22.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 8.
  23. 23.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 9.
  24. 24.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 10.
  25. 25.“Note by Sir H. Llewellyn Smith,” February 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 422.
  26. 26.“Note by Sir H. Llewellyn Smith,” February 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 422.
  27. 27.“The Question of Trading with the Enemy from the Legal and Political Point of View, No. 9,” December 11, 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 14.
  28. 28.All irony applies.
  29. 29.“The Question of Trading with the Enemy from the Legal and Political Point of View, No. 9,” December 11, 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 16.
  30. 30.“The Question of Trading with the Enemy from the Legal and Political Point of View, No. 9,” December 11, 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 16.
  31. 31.“The Question of Trading with the Enemy from the Legal and Political Point of View, No. 9,” December 11, 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 16.
  32. 32.“The Question of Trading with the Enemy from the Legal and Political Point of View, No. 9,” December 11, 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 19.
  33. 33.Oppenheim’s position does not provide a reason to trade with the enemy as much as a negative case explaining the lack of reasons not to trade with the enemy.
  34. 34.“Extract from the Report of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Imperial Defense on the Military Needs of the Empire,” December 12, 1908, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 383.
  35. 35.“Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” December 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 5.
  36. 36.“Memorandum by the Admiralty on the Economic Effect of War on German Trade,” December 12, 1908, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 388.
  37. 37.Indeed, it is possible that the Admiralty expected to break neutral rights at the start of the war since accepting such rights substantially tied their hands. Offer 1988.
  38. 38.“Note by Lord Esher,” May 2, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 427.
  39. 39.Humorously, there was no agreement on whether the British public would patriotically and spontaneously cease all trade with the enemy or be tempted into war profiteering by the increased war prices.
  40. 40.“Note by the Chairman,” February 21, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 419.
  41. 41.“Minutes of Sixth Meeting,” February 23, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 86.
  42. 42.“Minutes of Fifth Meeting,” February 9, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 80.
  43. 43.“Memorandum by Lord Esher,” February 12, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 412.
  44. 44.“Note by the Secretary, No. 1,” February 6, 1911, SSCID, WO 106.45, British National Archives, 1.
  45. 45.The emphasis on “finished goods” is for theoretical reasons; the term is not used by the committee. In fact, none of the proposals for prohibitions on arms and ammunition included the raw materials required to make the weapons.
  46. 46.“Draft Report,” February 21, 1915, Interdepartmental Committee on Trading with the Enemy, CAB 42.1.46, British National Archives, 1.
  47. 47.“Report,” July 30, 1912, SSCID, CAB 38.21.31, British National Archives, 5.
  48. 48.“Memorandum by the Admiralty on the Economic Effect of War on German Trade,” December 12, 1908, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 388.
  49. 49.“Report,” July 30, 1912, SSCID, CAB 38.21.31, British National Archives, 5.
  50. 50.“Minutes of Fourth Meeting,” January 29, 1912, Report, CAB 16.18A, British National Archives, 74.
  51. 51.“Report,” July 30, 1912, SSCID, CAB 38.21.31, British National Archives, 7.
  52. 52.Llewellyn Smith, “Licenses to Import Goods from Germany while the New Order in Council Is in Force,” March 8, 1915, FO 382.186, British National Archives.
  53. 53.Llewellyn Smith, “Licenses to Import Goods from Germany while the New Order in Council Is in Force,” March 8, 1915, FO 382.186, British National Archives.
  54. 54.Turner 1988, 1.
  55. 55.French 2014, 64.
  56. 56.Prete 2009, 21.
  57. 57.French 2014, 15.
  58. 58.Warner 2008, 33.
  59. 59.French 2014, 51.
  60. 60.Warner 2008, 31.
  61. 61.Turner 1988, 5; Beckett 2004; Black 2011, 46.
  62. 62.Concurrently, expectations about the cost of the war experienced a fundamental change, going from a low cost to enormous expenditures in both lives and funds with little battlefield progress to show for it. However, while the expectations of the costs of war would only continue to rise as the war dragged on, expectations about the length of war experienced more variation. Downes 2011, 90–91.
  63. 63.Mallinson 2016, 81.
  64. 64.Warner 2008, 39.
  65. 65.Warner 2008, 32; Black 2011, 57.
  66. 66.Warner 2008, 57.
  67. 67.Warner 2008, 69.
  68. 68.Warner 2008, 61–62.
  69. 69.French 2014, 87.
  70. 70.Warner 2008, 65.
  71. 71.French 2014, 78.
  72. 72.French 2014, 105.
  73. 73.French 2014, 112.
  74. 74.Warner 2008, 95.
  75. 75.Warner 2008, 100.
  76. 76.Warner 2008, 100.
  77. 77.Black 2011, 155.
  78. 78.Black 2011, 108.
  79. 79.Mosier 2002, 261.
  80. 80.Warner 2008, 136.
  81. 81.Warner 2008, 141.
  82. 82.Mosier 2002, 295.
  83. 83.Mosier 2002, 313.
  84. 84.Soutou 2015, 36.
  85. 85.Chickering 2015, 113.
  86. 86.S. Tucker 1998, 157.
  87. 87.Black 2011, 168.
  88. 88.Black 2011, 186.
  89. 89.S. Tucker 1998, 171.
  90. 90.Cole and Cheeseman 1984, 25.
  91. 91.Butler 2006, 94.
  92. 92.E. V. Morgan 1952, 106.
  93. 93.Higgins 1949.
  94. 94.Salter 1921.
  95. 95.Reid 2005.
  96. 96.Ciment and Russell 2007, 272.
  97. 97.Thom 2005.
  98. 98.Pulling 1914, 160–64.
  99. 99.“Action during the War, 1914–18,” May 15, 1938, BT 11.1000, British National Archives, 10.
  100. 100.“Proclamation Prohibiting the Exportation from the United Kingdom of Warlike Stores to Certain Countries,” London Gazette, August 7, 1914, 6186–6188.
  101. 101.“Action during the War, 1914–18,” May 15, 1938, BT 11.1000, British National Archives, 10.
  102. 102.“Proclamation Prohibiting the Exportation from the United Kingdom of Certain Warlike Stores,” supplement, London Gazette, August 3, 1914, 6056.
  103. 103.“Proclamation Prohibiting the Exportation form the United Kingdom of Certain Warlike Stores, Provisions, and Victual,” supplement, London Gazette, August 5, 1914, 6167.
  104. 104.London Gazette, August 21, 1914, 6583–84.
  105. 105.Pulling 1914, 172–74.
  106. 106.Pulling 1914, 520–21.
  107. 107.Supplement, London Gazette, September 30, 1914, 7766–67.
  108. 108.Davson 1915; B. H. Morgan 1927.
  109. 109.“Memorandum on the Work of the Board of Trade in Connection with Trading with the Enemy,” September 1920, BT 11.1017, British National Archives, 7.
  110. 110.“Memorandum on the Work of the Board of Trade in Connection with Trading with the Enemy,” September 1920, BT 11.1017, British National Archives, 7.
  111. 111.“Memorandum on the Work of the Board of Trade in Connection with Trading with the Enemy,” September 1920, BT 11.1017, British National Archives, 8.
  112. 112.“Draft Report,” February 21, 1915, Interdepartmental Committee on Trading with the Enemy, CAB 42.1.46, British National Archives, 1.
  113. 113.“Draft Report,” February 21, 1915, Interdepartmental Committee on Trading with the Enemy, CAB 42.1.46, British National Archives, 1.
  114. 114.Second supplement, London Gazette, February 3, 1915, 1165–69.
  115. 115.At this point, it was called the Trade Clearing House. The name changed in 1916.
  116. 116.“Draft Report,” February 21, 1915, Interdepartmental Committee on Trading with the Enemy, CAB 42.1.46, British National Archives, 1.
  117. 117.“Note by the Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise,” February 22, 1915, Trading with the Enemy, CAB 42.1.40, British National Archives, 1.
  118. 118.“Memorandum on the Work of the Board of Trade in Connection with Trading with the Enemy,” September 1920, BT 11.1017, British National Archives, 8.
  119. 119.“Report of a Subcommittee Appointed by the Prime Minister to Consider Certain Questions of Principle Raised by the War Trade Department,” April 12, 1915, Committee on Imperial Defense, HO 45.10769.273933, British National Archives, 2.
  120. 120.Osborne 2004, 95.
  121. 121.London Gazette, March 16, 1915, 2617–18.
  122. 122.Butler 2006, 94.
  123. 123.Nathaniel Highmore, “Full Record of the Department,” 1916, War Trade Department, BT 11.1022, British National Archives, 34.
  124. 124.“Notes by Lord Emmott on How the Department Came into Being,” 1916, War Trade Department, BT 11.1022, British National Archives, 4.
  125. 125.“Memorandum on the Work of the Board of Trade in Connection with Trading with the Enemy,” September 1920, BT 11.1017, British National Archives, 9.
  126. 126.Turner 1988, 5; Beckett 2004; Black 2011, 46.
  127. 127.Supplement, London Gazette, November 10, 1914, 9225–28.
  128. 128.Second supplement, London Gazette, February 3, 1915, 1165–69.
  129. 129.Warner 2008, 57.
  130. 130.Second supplement, London Gazette, February 3, 1915, 1165–69.
  131. 131.Longstaff and Atteridge 1917.
  132. 132.Pulling 1914, 162–64.
  133. 133.Second supplement, London Gazette, July 28, 1915, 7427–32.
  134. 134.Edinburgh Gazette, October 22, 1915, 1595–96.
  135. 135.Second supplement, London Gazette, August 5, 1914, 6168–69.
  136. 136.Supplement, London Gazette, October 7, 1914, 7999.
  137. 137.Supplement, London Gazette, October 13, 1915, 10095–96.
  138. 138.London Gazette, December 18, 1917, 13241–42.
  139. 139.Pulling 1914, 162–64.
  140. 140.London Gazette, October 20, 1914, 8390.
  141. 141.Second supplement, London Gazette, February 3, 1915, 1165–69.
  142. 142.Supplement, London Gazette, May 10, 1916, 4633–41.
  143. 143.All differences in means are statistically significant at the .01 level.
  144. 144.McDermott 1989, 270.
  145. 145.Director of Locke Lancaster to Assistant Secretary, August 14, 1914, Commercial Department, Board of Trade, HO 45.10728.254895, British National Archives, no. 49. See also follow-up conversation, “Re. Prohibition of the Export of Pig Lead, Sheet and Pipe,” August 24, 1914, HO 45.10728.254895, British National Archives, no. 279.
  146. 146.Pulling 1914, 168–70.
  147. 147.Second supplement, London Gazette, August 5, 1914, 6168–69; London Gazette, August 21, 1914, 6583–84.
  148. 148.London Gazette, March 13, 1917, 2510–11.
  149. 149.“Papers relating to the Proclamation of August 20th concerning the Prohibition of Exportation of Certain Articles,” August 20, 1914, BT 11.7, British National Archives, c 7397.
  150. 150.African Lakes Corporation Limited to Privy Council Office, November 18, 1914, PC 8.789, British National Archives, no. 114676.

5. Germany in World War I

  1. 1.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 1.
  2. 2.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 1.
  3. 3.Reich Chancellor to Minister of Interior, April 2, 1913, S. IV. 64, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 286–89, 2.
  4. 4.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 2.
  5. 5.“Die Versorgung Deutschlands mit den wichtigsten Lebenmitteln im Falle eines Krieges,” November 4, 1911, Nr. 645/11. geh. S 2, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 59–71, 13.
  6. 6.Reich Chancellor to Johann Hermann Eschenburg, president of the senate of Lübeck, letter, February 7, 1913, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 138–39, 1–2.
  7. 7.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 50.
  8. 8.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 50.
  9. 9.“Aufzeichnung über die Beratung am 21. November 1912, betreffend Fragen wirtschaftlicher Mobilmachung,” November 21, 1912, CB 1458, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 2–15, 5.
  10. 10.“Aufzeichnung über das Ergebnis der kommissarischen Besprechung vom 22. November 1912, betreffend die Zufuhr von Brotgetreide und Futtermitteln nach eingetretener Mobilmachung,” November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 46–56, 2.
  11. 11.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 17; Letter to Minister of Interior, March 10, 1913, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 146–51, 8.
  12. 12.Moltke to War Minister, February 19, 1914, 2603, R1501-118527, German Federal Archives, 97–106, 6.
  13. 13.“Die dauernde Sicherung der Ernährung der Bevölkerung für den Fall eines Krieges,” April 23, 1914, R43-1268, German Federal Archives, 207–25, 9; Reich Chancellor to Minister of Interior, April 2, 1913, S. IV. 64, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 286–89, 4; “Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 6.
  14. 14.Letter to Minister of Interior, March 10, 1913, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 248–252, 7.
  15. 15.Letter to Minister of Interior, March 10, 1913, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 146–51, 6.
  16. 16.“Die Versorgung Deutschlands mit den wichtigsten Lebenmitteln im Falle eines Krieges,” November 4, 1911, Nr. 645/11. geh. S 2, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 59–71, 21.
  17. 17.“Aufzeichnung über die Beratung am 21. November 1912, betreffend Fragen wirtschaftlicher Mobilmachung,” November 21, 1912, CB 1458, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 2–15, 13.
  18. 18.“Aufzeichnung über das Ergebnis der kommissarischen Besprechung vom 22. November 1912, betreffend die Zufuhr von Brotgetreide und Futtermitteln nach eingetretener Mobilmachung,” November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 46–56, 3.
  19. 19.“Aufzeichnung über das Ergebnis der kommissarischen Besprechung vom 22. November 1912, betreffend die Zufuhr von Brotgetreide und Futtermitteln nach eingetretener Mobilmachung,” November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 46–56, 3.
  20. 20.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 17–18.
  21. 21.Letter to Minister of Interior, March 10, 1913, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 146–51, 6–8.
  22. 22.“Die Versorgung Deutschlands mit den wichtigsten Lebenmitteln im Falle eines Krieges,” November 4, 1911, Nr. 645/11. geh. S 2, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 59–71, 22.
  23. 23.“Die dauernde Sicherung der Ernährung der Bevölkerung für den Fall eines Krieges,” April 23, 1914, R43-1268, German Federal Archives, 207–25, 9.
  24. 24.“Die dauernde Sicherung der Ernährung der Bevölkerung für den Fall eines Krieges,” April 23, 1914, R43-1268, German Federal Archives, 207–25, 9.
  25. 25.Moltke to War Minister, February 19, 1914, 2603, R1501-118527, German Federal Archives, 97–106, 6.
  26. 26.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 23, 40; Moltke to War Minister, February 19, 1914, 2603, R1501-118527, German Federal Archives, 97–106, 8.
  27. 27.Original: “die Zufuhr sowohl von Rohstoffen und Halbfabrikaten wie die Ausfuhr von Fabrikaten so gut wie völlig lahm gelegt sein würde.” “Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 6.
  28. 28.Letter to Minister of Interior, March 10, 1913, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 146–51, 6.
  29. 29.The German reports refer specifically to Holland.
  30. 30.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 17.
  31. 31.“Aufzeichnung über das Ergebnis der kommissarischen Besprechung vom 22. November 1912, betreffend die Zufuhr von Brotgetreide und Futtermitteln nach eingetretener Mobilmachung,” November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 46–56, 3.
  32. 32.“Aufzeichnung über das Ergebnis der kommissarischen Besprechung vom 22. November 1912, betreffend die Zufuhr von Brotgetreide und Futtermitteln nach eingetretener Mobilmachung,” November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 46–56, 5.
  33. 33.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 18.
  34. 34.Original: “Versagt aber das Ausland, so muß die zu sehr gunsten der Einzelwirtschaften arbeitende Volkswirtschaft in Schwierigkeiten kommen.” “Die dauernde Sicherung der Ernährung der Bevölkerung für den Fall eines Krieges,” April 23, 1914, R43-1268, German Federal Archives, 207–25, 2–3.
  35. 35.Appendix 2, November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 37–45, 6.
  36. 36.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 9.
  37. 37.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 9.
  38. 38.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 10.
  39. 39.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 8.
  40. 40.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 10.
  41. 41.“Aufzeichnung über die Beratung am 21. November 1912, betreffend Fragen wirtschaftlicher Mobilmachung,” November 21, 1912, CB 1458, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 2–15, 6.
  42. 42.Minister of Interior to Reich Chancellor, December 28, 1912, S. IV. A. 81, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 129–31, 2.
  43. 43.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 38–55.
  44. 44.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 23.
  45. 45.Original: “Im ganzen wird sich nicht vermeiden lassen, daß einzelne schwache Unternehmen die Belastungsprobe eines schweren auswärtigen Krieges nicht aushalten werden.” “Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 24.
  46. 46.Appendix 2, November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 37–45, 6.
  47. 47.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 10.
  48. 48.Appendix 2, November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 37–45, 8.
  49. 49.Appendix 2, November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 37–45, 6.
  50. 50.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 11.
  51. 51.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 11.
  52. 52.Appendix 2, November 22, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 37–45, 1.
  53. 53.Hermann Müller to Minister of Interior, June 24, 1913, IV A 109, R1501-118523, German Federal Archives, 74.
  54. 54.Hermann Müller to Minister of Interior, June 24, 1913, IV A 109, R1501-118523, German Federal Archives, 74.
  55. 55.Finance Minister to Presidents of Royal Customs Boards, December 30, 1912, S. J. Nr. 1493, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 142–43, 2.
  56. 56.“Ankauf und Bestellung von Kraftwagen seitens der Russischen Regierung,” 1913, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 204–5.
  57. 57.“Im Januar 1913 eingegangene Nachrichten über Ausfuhr von Kriegsmaterial,” February 11, 1913, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 214–15.
  58. 58.“Aufzeichnung der Sitzung der 2. Unterkommission für die wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachungfragen am Mittwoch den 18. Dezember 1912,” December 18, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 164–66, 2.
  59. 59.Original: “Der Vertreter des Kriegsministeriums wies daraufhin, daß die Heeresverwaltung ein großes Interesse an der Förderung der Industrie von Kriegsmaterial durch Lieferung an das Ausland habe.” “Aufzeichnung der Sitzung der 2. Unterkommission für die wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachungfragen am Mittwoch den 18. Dezember 1912,” December 18, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 164–66, 2.
  60. 60.“Aufzeichnung der Sitzung der 2. Unterkommission für die wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachungfragen am Fresitag, den 13. Dezember 1912,” December 13, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 154–57, 2.
  61. 61.“Aufzeichnung der Sitzung der 2. Unterkommission für die wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachungfragen am Mittwoch den 18. Dezember 1912,” December 18, 1912, R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 164–66, 2.
  62. 62.Original: “Wenn der Herr Reichskanzler in Zeiten politischer Spannung erklärt, daß in nächster Zeit mit einem Kriege zu rechnen ist, in den Deutschland wahrscheinlich hineingezogen werden wird, so liegt es im Interesse der Landesverteidigung, daß Mittel und Wege gefunden werden, unseren voraussichtlichen Gegnern das Kriegsmaterial vorzuenthalten, das von ihnen in Deutschland bestellt ist.” Declaration from Ministry of War, May 11, 1913, Nr. M. J. 276/13. A1., R1501-118522, German Federal Archives, 342.
  63. 63.General Headquarters to Imperial Statistical Office, May 26, 1913, IA 3659, R1501-118523, German Federal Archives, 73.
  64. 64.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, August 1914, 858–862, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  65. 65.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, November 1914, 1205, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  66. 66.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, August 1914, 860, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  67. 67.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, August 1914, 860–62, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  68. 68.Original: “Der Umfang der Verbote ist in erster Linie bestimmt worden durch Gründe der militärischen Sicherheit und durch die Fürsorge für die Erhaltung der jue Striegführung notwendigen Rohstoffe und Waren, ferner durch die Sorge für den Schuß des Bestandes an Nahrungs- und Futtermitteln.” Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 48.
  69. 69.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, November 1914, 1201–2, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  70. 70.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, August 1914, 862, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  71. 71.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, August 1914, 864, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  72. 72.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, September 1914, 1033–34, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  73. 73.Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 44.
  74. 74.“Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives, 26–28.
  75. 75.Even accounts suggesting that German military leaders believed the war would be long and grueling indicate that this information was not passed on to political leaders. Lieber 2007, 182.
  76. 76.Fisher 1977, 115; Warner 2008, 23; Moyer 1995, 83–84.
  77. 77.Fisher 1977, 115.
  78. 78.Fisher 1977, 116; Turner 1988, 1.
  79. 79.Moyer 1995, 81.
  80. 80.Herwig 2014, 293.
  81. 81.Gilbert 2014, 35.
  82. 82.Herwig 2014, 19.
  83. 83.Warner 2008, 31.
  84. 84.Neiberg 2006, 32.
  85. 85.Keegan 2012, 163–64.
  86. 86.Warner 2008, 32.
  87. 87.Beckett 2004; Black 2011, 46; Turner 1988, 5.
  88. 88.Meyer 2007, 221.
  89. 89.Herwig 2014, 116–17; Goemans 2012, 84.
  90. 90.Lloyd 2021, 130.
  91. 91.Keegan 2012, 179–80.
  92. 92.Lloyd 2021, 83.
  93. 93.Meyer 2007, 244.
  94. 94.Warner 2008, 54.
  95. 95.Herwig 2014, 144.
  96. 96.Neiberg 2006, 116; Gilbert 2014, 155.
  97. 97.Mosier 2002, 229.
  98. 98.This change constituted a German turn toward economic warfare with Britain. Mostly, states design their wartime commercial policies to work symbiotically with economic warfare; however, this was not the case for Germany in this instance. German economic warfare, in the form of unrestricted submarine warfare, was meant to decrease British ability to resupply the island, and thereby shorten the war. The wartime commercial policy at the same point in the war was focused on permitting the import of enemy products by the German army and navy. In essence, Germany sought to limit British trade with the world while increasing its share of indirect British trade.
  99. 99.Herwig 2014, 287.
  100. 100.Neiberg 2006, 158–59; Black 2011, 95.
  101. 101.Herwig 2014, 182; Keegan 2012, 278.
  102. 102.Kitchen 2019, 33.
  103. 103.Mosier 2002, 256.
  104. 104.Gilbert 2014, 282.
  105. 105.Kitchen 2019, 37.
  106. 106.Herwig 2014, 249.
  107. 107.Herwig 2014, 246.
  108. 108.Keegan 2012, 323.
  109. 109.Kitchen 2019, 118.
  110. 110.Warner 2008, 108; Turner 1988, 65; Lloyd 2021, 262; Herwig 2014, 312; Stevenson 2004, 261.
  111. 111.Meyer 2007, 367; Kitchen 2019, 118; Moyer 1995, 185.
  112. 112.Gilbert 2014, 306; Kitchen 2019, 124.
  113. 113.Neiberg 2006, 139; Kitchen 2019, 121; Gilbert 2014, 306.
  114. 114.Meyer 2007, 481–82.
  115. 115.Stevenson 2004, 322.
  116. 116.Kitchen 2019, 137; Herwig 2014, 393.
  117. 117.Mosier 2002, 305.
  118. 118.Kitchen 2019, 165–66; Keegan 2012, 377.
  119. 119.Keegan 2012, 377; Meyer 2007, 598.
  120. 120.Chickering 2015, 113.
  121. 121.Neiberg 2006, 334.
  122. 122.Herwig 2014, 424; Kitchen 2019, 250.
  123. 123.This assumption proved wrong in the course of the war, but it was nevertheless a starting assumption for German leadership. “Denkschift betreffend Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Mobilmachung,” August 1913, S. IV. 130, R43-1268 407, German Federal Archives.
  124. 124.Gilbert 2014, 55.
  125. 125.Gilbert 2014, 55.
  126. 126.Keegan 2012, 163–64.
  127. 127.Herwig 2014, 167; Moyer 1995, 82.
  128. 128.Herwig 2014, 167; Moyer 1995, 82.
  129. 129.Herwig 2014, 285.
  130. 130.B. Davis 2003.
  131. 131.Moyer 1995, 82–83.
  132. 132.Herwig 2014, 284–85.
  133. 133.Moyer 1995, 123.
  134. 134.Ritschl 2005.
  135. 135.Moyer 1995, 123.
  136. 136.Herwig 2014, 284; Moyer 1995, 125.
  137. 137.Watson 2014, 384.
  138. 138.Moyer 1995, 157.
  139. 139.Herwig 2014, 281.
  140. 140.Moyer 1995, 123.
  141. 141.Feldman 1997, 58.
  142. 142.B. Davis 2003, 79–80.
  143. 143.Gilbert 2014, 238.
  144. 144.Watson 2014, 559.
  145. 145.Original: “Der Bezug von Rohstoffen durch neutrale Staaten erscheint, wie ich vertraulich bemerken darf, insbesondere über Holland, Dänemark, Schweden und vielleicht auch über Italien nicht unmöglich.” Minister of Interior to Hansa-Bund, August 30, 1914, IV A 8450, R1501-118526, German Federal Archives, 31.
  146. 146.Telegram 170 Walter Reichenau to Minister of Interior, August 22, 1914, R1501-118525, German Federal Archives, 190.
  147. 147.Letter to Minister of Interior, August 28, 1914, IV 8868, R1501-118563, German Federal Archives, 24–27.
  148. 148.Minister of Interior to Reich Chancellor, September 1914, S. IV. A. 489, R1501-118527, German Federal Archives, 272–78, 5.
  149. 149.Minister of Interior to Reich Chancellor, September 1914, S. IV. A. 489, R1501-118527, German Federal Archives, 272–78, 5.
  150. 150.Delbrück to Reich Chancellor, telegram 45, August 28, 1914, R43-2465, German Federal Archives, 2–4.
  151. 151.Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 85.
  152. 152.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, November 1914, 1236–37, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  153. 153.Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 88.
  154. 154.Second supplement, London Gazette, August 5, 1914, 6165–66.
  155. 155.Second supplement, London Gazette, September 8, 1914, 7177–78.
  156. 156.Edinburgh Gazette, September 29, 1914, 1145–46.
  157. 157.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, November 1914, 1237, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  158. 158.Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 83.
  159. 159.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, December 1914, 1349, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  160. 160.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, March 1915, 250–51, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543620&view=1up&seq=7.
  161. 161.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, March 1915, 269, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543620&view=1up&seq=7.
  162. 162.Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 48.
  163. 163.Original: “Daß es auf diesem Wege erreicht worden ist, zwischen ben durch den Schuß des Heeres und des Landes bedingten Anforderungen und den Interessen der am Ausfuhrhandel beteiligten Kreise diejenige Mitte zu wahren, welche dem allgemeinen Interesse entsprach.” Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 48–49.
  164. 164.“Niederschrift über die Besprechung von Fragen des Reichsfinanzwesens mit den Vertretern der einzelstaatlichen Finanzverwal tungen am 10. Juli 1915,” July 10, 1915, R43-218, German Federal Archives, 127–64, 16.
  165. 165.Original: “Diese riesige Summe zwinge uns, nur einen Frieden zu schließen, der uns für eine geraume Zeit vor unseren Feinden sichere, wenn wir nicht gezwungen sein sollten, diese Summen in allerkürzester Zeit abzubürden, um nicht bei einem dann sicherlich bald eintretenden neuen Kriege mit dieser ungeheuren Last beschwert zu den Waffen greifen zu müssen.” “Niederschrift über die Besprechung von Fragen des Reichsfinanzwesens mit den Vertretern der einzelstaatlichen Finanzverwal tungen am 10. Juli 1915,” July 10, 1915, R43-218, German Federal Archives, 127–64, 14.
  166. 166.“Niederschrift über die Besprechung von Fragen des Reichsfinanzwesens mit den Vertretern der einzelstaatlichen Finanzverwal tungen am 10. Juli 1915,” July 10, 1915, R43-218, German Federal Archives, 127–64, 30–31.
  167. 167.“Niederschrift über die Besprechung von Fragen des Reichsfinanzwesens mit den Vertretern der einzelstaatlichen Finanzverwal tungen am 10. Juli 1915,” July 10, 1915, R43-218, German Federal Archives, 127–64, 30–31.
  168. 168.Friedr. Bayer & Co.to Minister of Interior, January 4, 1915, 655, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 25–30.
  169. 169.Chemische Fabrik Griesheim-Elektronto Minister of Interior, January 6, 1915, EG/Z, 949, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 15–17.
  170. 170.Badische Anilin- & Soda-Fabrik to Minister of Interior, January 3, 1915, 343, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 44–47.
  171. 171.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, November 1914, 1201, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  172. 172.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, November 1914, 1203–4, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  173. 173.Deutsches Handels-Archiv, November 1914, 1209–10, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c2543618&view=1up&seq=15.
  174. 174.Association of Thuringian Industrialists and Association of Saxon Industrialists to Minister of Interior, December 29, 1914, Ab. IV Exp 2252, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 2–7.
  175. 175.State Secretary of Foreign Office to Secretary of Naval Office, December 23, 1916, R. K. Exp 799, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 66.
  176. 176.Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brüning to Minister of Interior, January 4, 1915, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 18–20.
  177. 177.Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brüning to Minister of Interior, January 4, 1915, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 18–20.
  178. 178.Anilinfarben-Fabrik Düsseldorf-Derendorf to Minister of Interior, January 3, 1915, 366, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 40–43; Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brüning to Minister of Interior, January 4, 1915, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 18–20.
  179. 179.Badische Anilin- & Soda-Fabrik to Minister of Interior, January 3, 1915, 343, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 44–47.
  180. 180.Association of Thuringian Industrialists and Association of Saxon Industrialists to Minister of Interior, December 29, 1914, Ab. IV Exp 2252, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 2–7.
  181. 181.Minister of Interior to General Headquarters, September 22, 1914, Rk. 287, R43-2466-2, German Federal Archives, 19.
  182. 182.Association of Thuringian Industrialists and Association of Saxon Industrialists to Minister of Interior, December 29, 1914, Ab. IV Exp 2252, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 2–7.
  183. 183.German Chemical Industry Association to Minister of Interior, January 13, 1915, Ku/S, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 9–14.
  184. 184.Central Office for Export Licenses for the Chemical Industry to Minister of Interior, November 20, 1914, 10931, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 91–92.
  185. 185.Society for Chemical Industry in Basel to Dr. Horney, November 30, 1914, 12446, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 73–80.
  186. 186.Society for Chemical Industry in Basel to Dr. Horney, November 30, 1914, 12446, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 73–80; Minister of Interior to General Headquarters, September 22, 1914, Rk. 287, R43-2466-2, German Federal Archives, 19.
  187. 187.Letter to Judicial Councilor, Dr. Haeuser, November 21, 1914, 11367, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 85–90.
  188. 188.Commissioner for Import/Export License to Minister of Interior, December 22, 1916, R. K. Exp 8270, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 12–16, 5.
  189. 189.Commissioner for Import/Export License to Minister of Interior, August 25, 1917, R. K. Exp 4376, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 87.
  190. 190.Commissioner for Import/Export License to Minister of Interior, December 22, 1916, R. K. Exp 8270, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 12–16.
  191. 191.State Secretary of Foreign Office to Secretary of Naval Office, December 23, 1916, R. K. Exp 799, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 66.
  192. 192.Original: “so soll natürlich eine Belieferung nur insoweit erfolgen, wie sie in Rücksicht auf den deutschen Bedarf und militärische Interessen überhaupt gestattet werden kann.” Commissioner for Import/Export License to Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office, December 30, 1916, R. K. Exp 799, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 67.
  193. 193.Secretary of the Finance Ministry to Minister of Interior, February 8, 1917, I. 3086, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 26–27.
  194. 194.Commissioner for Import/Export License to Minister of Interior, February 24, 1917, R. K. Exp 1149, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 69.
  195. 195.Original: “Auf diese Weise könnten bei den enormen Preisen, die für Farbstoffe in der Schweiz von dort lauernden Ententekäufern aus Frankreich, England, Italien und besonders Amerika bezahlt werden.” Sigmund Schwarzenberger to Ministry of Interior, June 25, 1917, I. 2389, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 81–83.
  196. 196.Commissioner for Import/Export License to Minister of Interior, August 25, 1917, R. K. Exp 4376, R3101-18, German Federal Archives, 87.
  197. 197.Minister of Interior to Reich Chancellor, December 28, 1912, S. IV. A. 81, R43-1267c, German Federal Archives, 129–31, 2.
  198. 198.Moltke to War Minister, February 19, 1914, 2603, R1501-118527, German Federal Archives, 97–106, 14.
  199. 199.Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 48–49.
  200. 200.“Niederschrift über die Besprechung von Fragen des Reichsfinanzwesens mit den Vertretern der einzelstaatlichen Finanzverwal tungen am 10. Juli 1915,” July 10, 1915, R43-218, German Federal Archives, 127–64, 14.
  201. 201.Original: “Dabei ist es natürlich, dass das Interesse der Heeresverwaltung allen arnieren Interessen vorangehen muss und die Freigabe von requirierten Rohmaterial nur in einem Umfange verlangt werden kann, in dem eine Schädigung der Interessen nicht zu befürchten ist.” Minister of Interior to Privy Councilor of Commerce, Werner von Siemens, August 17, 1914, IV A 6239, R1501-118525, German Federal Archives, 12.
  202. 202.Association of Thuringian Industrialists and Association of Saxon Industrialists to Minister of Interior, December 29, 1914, Ab. IV Exp 2252, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 2–7.
  203. 203.Association of Thuringian Industrialists and Association of Saxon Industrialists to Minister of Interior, December 29, 1914, Ab. IV Exp 2252, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 2–7.
  204. 204.Association of Thuringian Industrialists and Association of Saxon Industrialists to Minister of Interior, December 29, 1914, Ab. IV Exp 2252, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 2–7.
  205. 205.Anilinfarben-Fabrik Düsseldorf-Derendorf to Minister of Interior, January 3, 1915, 366, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 40–43; Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brüning to Minister of Interior, January 4, 1915, R8703-2, German Federal Archives, 18–20.
  206. 206.Delbrück, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen aus Anlass des Krieges,” November 23, 1914, R43-2415-4, German Federal Archives, 96, 48–49.

6. Britain in World War II

  1. 1.“Summary of Measures That Can Be Taken to Exert Economic Pressure on the Enemy,” November 25, 1938, ATB 93 (Revise), CAB 47.4, British National Archives, 11.
  2. 2.“Conclusions of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee,” May 6, 1926, ATB 7th Conclusions, CAB 47.1, British National Archives, 2.
  3. 3.“Fifth Annual Report,” April 29, 1929, ATB, CID 938-B, CAB 47.1, British National Archives, 8.
  4. 4.“Fifth Annual Report,” April 29, 1929, ATB, CID 938-B, CAB 47.1, British National Archives, 8.
  5. 5.Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1939/89/pdfs/ukpga_19390089_en.pdf.
  6. 6.“Conclusions of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee,” May 6, 1926, ATB 7th Conclusions, CAB 47.1, British National Archives, 2.
  7. 7.“Part I—General Remarks,” August 8, 1923, Trading with the Enemy, Commonwealth War Book Paper 20, CAB 47.3, British National Archives, 4.
  8. 8.“Part I—General Remarks,” August 8, 1923, Trading with the Enemy, Commonwealth War Book Paper 20, CAB 47.3, British National Archives, 4.
  9. 9.“Chapter I: Objects, Methods and Organization,” December 16, 1938, Economic Warfare Handbook, BT 11.994, British National Archives.
  10. 10.“Fifth Annual Report,” April 29, 1929, ATB, CID 938-B, CAB 47.1, British National Archives, 5.
  11. 11.“Summary of Measures That Can Be Taken to Exert Economic Pressure on the Enemy,” November 25, 1938, ATB 93 (Revise), CAB 47.4, British National Archives, 4.
  12. 12.“The Organization of the Supply of Munitions and Armaments in a Future War,” 1921, CC (HA) 6, CAB 15.20, British National Archives, 2.
  13. 13.“The Organization of the Supply of Munitions and Armaments in a Future War,” 1921, CC (HA) 6, CAB 15.20, British National Archives, 2.
  14. 14.“Fifth Annual Report,” April 29, 1929, ATB, CID 938-B, CAB 47.1, British National Archives, 8.
  15. 15.“Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Sub-committee,” April 19, 1929, ATB 14th Meeting, CAB 47.1, British National Archives, 9.
  16. 16.This was in the midst of the Canton–Hong Kong strike of 1925–26.
  17. 17.“Possible Application of Economic Pressure to Canton,” March 22, 1926, ATB 26, CAB 47.2, British National Archives, 3.
  18. 18.“Priority and Control: Suggestions for Alternative Schemes,” 1921, ASC (HA) 11, CAB 15.20, British National Archives, 1.
  19. 19.“Priority and Control: Suggestions for Alternative Schemes,” 1921, ASC (HA) 11, CAB 15.20, British National Archives, 2.
  20. 20.“Priority and Control: Suggestions for Alternative Schemes,” 1921, ASC (HA) 11, CAB 15.20, British National Archives, 2.
  21. 21.“Chapter VI: Military Action,” February 10, 1939, Economic Warfare Handbook, BT 11.994, British National Archives, 15.
  22. 22.“Chapter VI: Military Action,” February 10, 1939, Economic Warfare Handbook, BT 11.994, British National Archives, 16.
  23. 23.While the specific reasoning for this stringent adherence to international law is not provided, it is likely that the general reasons for supporting neutral rights stated in chapter 1 apply: the maintenance of precedent and the expectation of the enforcement of neutral rights by neutral states.
  24. 24.Hughes 1988, 862.
  25. 25.Murray, Knox, and Bernstein 1996, 408.
  26. 26.“Defense Expenditure in Future Years,” December 1937, CP 316 (37), CAB 24.273.41, British National Archives, 2.
  27. 27.“Certain Aspects of the Present Situation,” March 22, 1940, War Cabinet, COS 40, WO 193.132, British National Archives, 1.
  28. 28.“Certain Aspects of the Present Situation,” March 22, 1940, War Cabinet, COS 40, WO 193.132, British National Archives, 1.
  29. 29.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, Annex I.
  30. 30.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, Annex I.
  31. 31.“Notes for Appreciation by the Joint Planning Committee of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany on August 1, 1938,” August 1, 1938, CAB 104.35, British National Archives, 10.
  32. 32.Letter to Lt. Col. LC Hollis, Committee of Imperial Defense, June 21, 1938, ICF/265/S.93, CAB 104.35, British National Archives.
  33. 33.“Notes for Appreciation by the Joint Planning Committee of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany on August 1, 1938,” August 1, 1938, CAB 104.35, British National Archives, 10.
  34. 34.“Notes for Appreciation by the Joint Planning Committee of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany on August 1, 1938,” BNA, CAB 104/35; “Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” 5 July 1937, Industrial Intelligence, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, BNA, CAB 47/13, Annex I; “Memorandum by the Board of Trade on the Probable Effect of a War with Germany on British Trade, No. 8,” Annex I and III.
  35. 35.“Note by Secretary,” May 19, 1933, ATB (EP) 2, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 10.
  36. 36.“Note by Secretary,” May 19, 1933, ATB (EP) 2, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 10.
  37. 37.“Possible Economic Consequences of an Embargo on German Goods,” April 11, 1934, ATB (EP) 15, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 5.
  38. 38.“Possible Economic Consequences of an Embargo on German Goods,” April 11, 1934, ATB (EP) 15, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 5.
  39. 39.“Possible Economic Consequences of an Embargo on German Goods,” April 11, 1934, ATB (EP) 15, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 5.
  40. 40.“Note by Secretary,” May 19, 1933, ATB (EP) 2, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 10.
  41. 41.“Possible Economic Consequences of an Embargo on German Goods,” April 11, 1934, ATB (EP) 15, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 5.
  42. 42.“Notes for Appreciation by the Joint Planning Committee of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany on August 1, 1938,” August 1, 1938, CAB 104.35, British National Archives, 10.
  43. 43.“Note by Secretary,” May 19, 1933, ATB (EP) 2, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 10.
  44. 44.“Notes for Appreciation by the Joint Planning Committee of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany on August 1, 1938,” August 1, 1938, CAB 104.35, British National Archives, 10.
  45. 45.“Possible Economic Consequences of an Embargo on German Goods,” April 11, 1934, ATB (EP) 15, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 7.
  46. 46.“Possible Economic Consequences of an Embargo on German Goods,” April 11, 1934, ATB (EP) 15, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 7.
  47. 47.ATB (EP) 7th Meeting, April 4, 1935, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 2.
  48. 48.“Some Notes on German Industry and Industrial Capacity,” January 4, 1933, CAB 47.8, British National Archives.
  49. 49.“Draft Revise of Appendix 1 of Paper No. A.T.B. 181,” April 5, 1939, ATB (EPG) 50, CAB 47.15, British National Archives, 2.
  50. 50.“Note by Secretary,” May 19, 1933, ATB (EP) 2, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 10.
  51. 51.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, 14–15.
  52. 52.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, 16.
  53. 53.“Economic Situation in Germany in April 1939,” April 5, 1939, ATB (EPG) 50, CAB 47.15, British National Archives, 3–4.
  54. 54.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, 17–18.
  55. 55.“Notes for Appreciation by the Joint Planning Committee of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany on August 1, 1938,” August 1, 1938, CAB 104.35, British National Archives, 4.
  56. 56.“Note by Secretary,” May 19, 1933, ATB (EP) 2, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 17.
  57. 57.However, it was likely written before August 23, 1939, since it did not take into account the Soviet-Nazi Commercial Agreement.
  58. 58.“Plan for Economic Warfare against Germany and Italy,” September 1, 1939, ATB (EPG) 61, CAB 47.15, British National Archives, 1–2.
  59. 59.“Plan for Economic Warfare against Germany and Italy,” September 1, 1939, ATB (EPG) 61, CAB 47.15, British National Archives, 1–2.
  60. 60.“Minutes of the First Meeting of the Sub-committee,” July 29, 1937, ATB (EPG) 1st Meeting, CAB 47.12, British National Archives, 8.
  61. 61.“Minutes of the First Meeting of the Sub-committee,” July 29, 1937, ATB (EPG) 1st Meeting, CAB 47.12, British National Archives, 8.
  62. 62.“Plan for Economic Warfare against Germany and Italy,” September 1, 1939, ATB (EPG) 61, CAB 47.15, British National Archives, 2.
  63. 63.“Minutes of the First Meeting of the Sub-committee,” July 29, 1937, ATB (EPG) 1st Meeting, CAB 47.12, British National Archives, 11.
  64. 64.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, 14.
  65. 65.“Minutes of the First Meeting of the Sub-committee,” July 29, 1937, ATB (EPG) 1st Meeting, CAB 47.12, British National Archives, 12.
  66. 66.“Plan for Economic Warfare against Germany: Report by Economic Pressure Sub-committee,” July 18, 1938, ATB 176, CAB 47.6, British National Archives, 8.
  67. 67.“Chapter II: Ministry of Economic Warfare,” December 16, 1938, Economic Warfare Handbook, BT 11/994, British National Archives.
  68. 68.“Plan for Economic Warfare against Germany: Report by Economic Pressure Sub-committee,” July 18, 1938, ATB 176, CAB 47.6, British National Archives, 4.
  69. 69.“Economic Situation in Germany in April 1939,” April 5, 1939, ATB (EPG) 50, CAB 47.15, British National Archives, 6.
  70. 70.“Notes for Appreciation by the Joint Planning Committee of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany on August 1, 1938,” August 1, 1938, CAB 104.35, British National Archives, 2.
  71. 71.“Imports to Limitrophe States of Principal Commodities to be Covered by a Rationing Scheme,” June 27, 1938, ATB (EPG) 26, CAB 47.14, British National Archives, 1–2.
  72. 72.“Plan for Economic Warfare against Germany,” July 1938, ATB 181, CAB 47.14, British National Archives, 5.
  73. 73.J. W. Nicholls to E. W. Reardon, February 20, 1939, BT 11/994, British National Archives.
  74. 74.J. W. Nicholls to E. W. Reardon, February 20, 1939, BT 11/994, British National Archives.
  75. 75.“Imports to Limitrophe States of Principal Commodities to Be Covered by a Rationing Scheme,” June 27, 1938, ATB (EPG) 26, CAB 47.14, British National Archives, 2.
  76. 76.“Export of Goods (Prohibition) Order, 1939,” August 25, 1939, London Gazette, 5835–36.
  77. 77.“Export Prohibited List—Memorandum by the Board of Trade,” March 27, 1939, ATB (EPG) 49, CAB 47.15, British National Archives.
  78. 78.F. Phillips to Hopkins and Wilson,” September 10, 1939, Interdepartmental Committee on Economic Policy, T 273/297, British National Archives.
  79. 79.“Draft Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Sub-committee,” December 13, 1937, ATB (EPG) 4th Meeting, CAB 47.12, British National Archives, 3.
  80. 80.“A Proclamation Specifying the Articles to Be Treated as Contraband of War,” September 4, 1939, London Gazette, 6051–52.
  81. 81.“Draft Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Sub-committee,” December 13, 1937, ATB (EPG) 4th Meeting, CAB 47.12, British National Archives, 3.
  82. 82.“Plan for Economic Warfare against Germany: Report by Economic Pressure Sub-committee,” July 18, 1938, ATB 176, CAB 47.6, British National Archives, 9.
  83. 83.“Suggestions of Evidence on Which to Base an Estimate of the Time-Lag before Economic Pressure Would Decisively Affect Germany,” June 9, 1936, ICF.278, CAB 104.34, British National Archives, 6.
  84. 84.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, 6.
  85. 85.“Minutes of the First Meeting of the Sub-committee,” July 29, 1937, ATB (EPG) 1st Meeting, CAB 47.12, British National Archives, 3.
  86. 86.“Extracts from the 331st Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” September 5, 1938, Subcommittee of Economic Pressure, CAB 47.14, British National Archives, 5.
  87. 87.“Scheme for the Exercise of Economic Pressure against Germany,” September 8, 1938, ATB 182, CAB 47.6, British National Archives, 5.
  88. 88.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, 27.
  89. 89.“Note by Secretary,” May 19, 1933, ATB (EP) 2, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 1.
  90. 90.“Economic Warfare against Germany: Notes on the Probable Situation in 1939,” July 5, 1937, ICF 265, ATB (EPG) 2, CAB 47.13, British National Archives, 28.
  91. 91.“Plan for Economic Warfare against Germany and Italy,” September 1, 1939, ATB (EPG) 61, CAB 47.15, British National Archives, 1–2.
  92. 92.Overy 1994, 124.
  93. 93.Parker 1997, 23.
  94. 94.Ferris and Mawdsley 2017, 30–31.
  95. 95.Ponting 2012, 50.
  96. 96.Bell 2011, 2.
  97. 97.Danchev 1994, 2.
  98. 98.Ferris and Mawdsley 2017, 35.
  99. 99.Rees 2009, 116.
  100. 100.Ponting 2012, 126.
  101. 101.Rees 2009, 196.
  102. 102.Black 2003, 126.
  103. 103.Although in World War I optimism about the success of specific campaigns led leaders to update their expectations about the length of the war, the same did not occur in World War II. Perhaps it was the experience of World War I itself that taught leaders to guard their expectations and think of wars of attrition exclusively in the long term. Explaining when, how, and which factors affect leaders’ expectations of the length of war could be a fruitful avenue for future research.
  104. 104.Beevor 2012, 529.
  105. 105.Beevor 2012, 530.
  106. 106.Bell 2011, 181.
  107. 107.Parker 1997, 205.
  108. 108.Beevor 2012, 633.
  109. 109.Parker 1997, 205–6.
  110. 110.Black 2003, 177.
  111. 111.Bell 2011, 188.
  112. 112.Ferris and Mawdsley 2017, 32.
  113. 113.Mackay 2013, 4.
  114. 114.Knight 2011, 10.
  115. 115.Collier 2004.
  116. 116.“‘If the Empire Lasts a Thousand Years Men Will Say, This Was Their Finest Hour,’” War Illustrated, June 28, 1940, 687.
  117. 117.Ponting 2012, 116.
  118. 118.“Commercial Policy: Import Control,” January 9, 1940, Board of Trade War History, BT 131.7, British National Archives, 1.
  119. 119.Medlicott 1952, 1:18.
  120. 120.London Gazette, November 28, 1939, 7959–60.
  121. 121.London Gazette, August 6, 1940, 4800.
  122. 122.“Board of Trade War History, Sept 1939—June 1940,” 1940, BT 131.7, British National Archives, 5.
  123. 123.“Board of Trade Announcement: Export Licenses,” January 4, 1940, CUST 106.118, British National Archives.
  124. 124.H. J. Shackle, Board of Trade, to G. H. Newsom, Trading with the Enemy Branch, May 8, 1941, CUST 106.374, British National Archives.
  125. 125.H. J. Shackle, Board of Trade, to G. H. Newsom, Trading with the Enemy Branch, May 8, 1941, CUST 106.374, British National Archives.
  126. 126.“Licensing Advisory Committee,” August 23, 1950, BT 271.343, British National Archives, 2.
  127. 127.Medlicott 1952, 1:18.
  128. 128.“Weekly Summaries of T/E Licenses,” 1940, TE 11741, BT 271.612, British National Archives; BT 271.610 for 1941; BT 271.609 for 1942.
  129. 129.The start date and the end date are not meant to indicate that licenses were not granted outside of this time period. The data is limited by the extent of the weekly summaries made to the Board of Trade. Such summaries started in June 1940 and were no longer required after March 1942.
  130. 130.“Weekly Summaries of T/E Licenses,” 1940, TE 11741, BT 271.612, British National Archives; BT 271.610 for 1941; BT 271.609 for 1942.
  131. 131.“Weekly Summaries of T/E Licenses,” 1940, TE 11741, BT 271.612, British National Archives; BT 271.610 for 1941; BT 271.609 for 1942.
  132. 132.“Licensing Advisory Committee,” August 23, 1950, BT 271.343, British National Archives, 2.
  133. 133.“J&P Coats, Limited,” June 7, 1943, Document 156, Licensing Advisory Committee (1942–44), BT 271.675, British National Archives.
  134. 134.“Minutes of the 15th Meeting of the Committee,” June 9, 1943, Licensing Advisory Committee, BT 271.675, British National Archives, 4.
  135. 135.“Note on the Possible Field for an Extension of Import Licensing,” September 27, 1939, Import Licensing Department, BT 131.10, British National Archives.
  136. 136.“Commercial Policy: Import Control,” January 9, 1940, Board of Trade War History, BT 131.7, British National Archives, 1.
  137. 137.“Note by Secretary,” May 19, 1933, ATB (EP) 2, CAB 47.8, British National Archives, 10.
  138. 138.Medlicott 1952, 1:18.
  139. 139.Original: “Toutefois il est évident qu’en ce qui concerne les produits d’importation vitale pour l’ennemi, la similitude des listes est hautement désirable.” “Preliminary Report on the Economic Warfare Staff Talks Held in Paris from 27 June to 29 June, 1939,” July 5, 1939, ATB (EPG) 63, CAB 47.15, British National Archives, 13.
  140. 140.“Use of Trade Associations Etc. in Licensing Imports of Machinery,” April 7, 1942, BT 131.7, British National Archives, 1.
  141. 141.“A Short Account of the Scheme for Licensing Imports of Watches and Clocks through the London Chamber of Commerce,” April 7, 1942, BT 131.7, British National Archives.

7. United States in Post–Cold War Conflicts

  1. 1.Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 12–13; Monteiro 2014, chap. 2.
  2. 2.Kreps 2011.
  3. 3.Henke 2019.
  4. 4.Arreguin-Toft 2001.
  5. 5.UN Statistics Division, UN COMTRADE, International Merchandise Trade Statistics, accessed July 19, 2024, http://comtrade.un.org/.
  6. 6.UN Charter, accessed July 19, 2024. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
  7. 7.Thomas and Duncan 1999.
  8. 8.Brewster 2009.
  9. 9.Newcomb 1992.
  10. 10.Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 303.
  11. 11.Hess 2009, 163.
  12. 12.Freedman and Karsh 1993, 81–83.
  13. 13.UN Resolution 661, August 6, 1990, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/661.
  14. 14.Niblock 2001, 100.
  15. 15.Hufbauer et al. 2008, 285.
  16. 16.A. Thompson 2006, 19.
  17. 17.UN Resolution 665, August 25, 1990, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/665.
  18. 18.Gordon 2010, 42.
  19. 19.Hufbauer et al. 2008, 286.
  20. 20.UN Statistics Division, UN COMTRADE, International Merchandise Trade Statistics, accessed July 19, 2024, http://comtrade.un.org/.
  21. 21.“Executive Order 12779—Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Haiti,” American Presidency Project, October 28, 1991, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-12779-prohibiting-certain-transactions-with-respect-haiti.
  22. 22.Malone 1998, 77.
  23. 23.UN Statistics Division, UN COMTRADE, International Merchandise Trade Statistics, accessed July 19, 2024, http://comtrade.un.org/.
  24. 24.Strednansky 1996, 34.
  25. 25.UN Resolution 873, October 13, 1993, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/873.
  26. 26.“Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti,” American Presidency Project, November 13, 1993, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-haiti-0.
  27. 27.“Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers on Haiti,” April 15, 1994, Memorandum of Conversation, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC, 1392, Declassified Documents Concerning Haiti, 2013-0122-M, Clinton Digital Library, 57–68, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/101184.
  28. 28.Recchia 2015, 73.
  29. 29.UN Resolution 917, May 6, 1994, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/917.
  30. 30.“Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Haiti,” May 24, 1994, 94 FR 12880, 26925–26, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1994-05-24/html/94-12880.htm.
  31. 31.“Haiti Political Action Plan,” May 12, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC, 474, Declassified Documents concerning Haiti, 2013-0122-M, Clinton Digital Library, 1010–14, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/101184.
  32. 32.“Trade in Goods with Haiti,” US Census Bureau, accessed July 19, 2024, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2450.html#1994.
  33. 33.Rose 2005, 462.
  34. 34.Gordon 2010, 55.
  35. 35.“U.S. Imports from Iraq of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,” US Energy Information Administration, accessed July 19, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMIZ1&f=M.
  36. 36.“Trade in Goods with Iraq,” US Census Bureau, accessed July 19, 2024, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5050.html#2003.
  37. 37.“Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban,” July 4, 1999, EO 13129, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-07-07/pdf/99-17444.pdf.
  38. 38.“Trade with Goods in Afghanistan,” US Census Bureau, accessed July 19, 2024, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5310.html#2000.
  39. 39.United Nations Statistics Division, UN COMTRADE, International Merchandise Trade Statistics, accessed July 19, 2024, http://comtrade.un.org/.
  40. 40.United Nations Statistics Division, UN COMTRADE, International Merchandise Trade Statistics, accessed July 19, 2024, http://comtrade.un.org/.
  41. 41.“Trade in Goods with Syria,” US Census Bureau, accessed July 19, 2024, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5020.html#2014.
  42. 42.UN Resolution 757, May 30, 1992, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/757; UN Resolution 1022, November 22, 1995, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1022.
  43. 43.Steven Erlanger, “U.S. and Allies Set Sanctions on Yugoslavia,” New York Times, March 10, 1998.
  44. 44.“Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and the Ministers to the Contact Group on Kosovo Press Conference,” US Department of State, March 9, 1998, https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/980309a.html.
  45. 45.Daalder and O’Hanlon 2004, 29.
  46. 46.Vesko Garcevic, “NATO’s Intervention Changed Western-Russian Relations Forever,” Balkan Insight, March 22, 2019.
  47. 47.Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, 86; Arkin 2001, 2; Daalder and O’Hanlon 2004, 18.
  48. 48.Daalder and O’Hanlon 2004, 103; Arkin 2001, 5.
  49. 49.Lambeth 2001, 13.
  50. 50.Roberts 1999, 111.
  51. 51.“House of Commons—Foreign Affairs—Fourth Report—Kosovo,” June 7, 2000, paras. 106–11, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm.
  52. 52.Lambeth 2001, 26.
  53. 53.Lambeth 2001, 37.
  54. 54.Lambeth 2001, 38.
  55. 55.Daalder and O’Hanlon 2004, 132.
  56. 56.Dana Priest, “Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War,” Washington Post, September 19, 1999.
  57. 57.“Blocking Property of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro and Prohibiting Trade Transactions Involving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Response to the Situation in Kosovo,” May 5, 1999, EO 13121, 99 FR 11410, 24021–22, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-05-05/html/99-11410.htm.
  58. 58.“Economic Measures to Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities,” April 30, 1999, Clinton Presidential Records, Department of State, Declassified Documents concerning PDD-68, International Public Information, 2013-0830-M, Clinton Digital Library, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47977.
  59. 59.The documents required to ascertain why the US response was so extreme are still classified. A possible explanation could be that the US decision-makers expected the cost of enforcement of a more nuanced policy to outweigh the gains from trade.
  60. 60.“Proposal for a Council Regulation Prohibiting the Sale, Supply, Provision, and Export of Certain Goods, Services, and Technology to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Order to Prevent Repairing of Certain Damage,” April 26, 1999, 51999PC0266, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A51999PC0266&qid=1694132796360.
  61. 61.“Trade in Goods with Serbia and Montenegro,” US Census Bureau, accessed November 20, 2024, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4799.html#1999.
  62. 62.“Serbia, FR Trade,” World Integrated Trade Solution, accessed July 19, 2024, https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/SER.
  63. 63.Given current data, it is not possible to disaggregate by month.
  64. 64.Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, “Obama Takes Hard Line with Libya after Shift by Clinton,” New York Times, March 18, 2011.
  65. 65.Chivvis 2015, 24.
  66. 66.Owen 2015, 69.
  67. 67.Owen 2015, 76.
  68. 68.UN Resolution 1970, February 16, 2011, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1970.
  69. 69.Chivvis 2015, 21.
  70. 70.Nygren 2013, 117.
  71. 71.“Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, August 23, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/8/23/battle-for-libya-key-moments.
  72. 72.Owen 2015, 76.
  73. 73.Chivvis 2015, 23.
  74. 74.“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, March 28, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-President-address-nation-libya.
  75. 75.Kidwell 2015, 135, 146.
  76. 76.“Trade in Goods with Libya,” US Census Bureau, accessed November 20, 2024, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c7250.html#2011.
  77. 77.UN Statistics Division, UN COMTRADE, International Merchandise Trade Statistics, accessed July 19, 2024, http://comtrade.un.org/.
  78. 78.Missy Ryan and Annabelle Timsit, “U.S. Wants Russian Military ‘Weakened’ from Ukraine Invasion, Austin Says,” Washington Post, April 25, 2022.
  79. 79.Because of the nature of colonial relations and the difficulty of establishing commercial relations with communist economies at the end of World War II, the US did not have trade relations with North Korea or North Vietnam before its involvement in the prominent proxy wars of the Cold War. Where there is no peacetime trade, wartime trade is not likely.
  80. 80.US Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs,” press release, February 24, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608.
  81. 81.“Sanctions on Russia over Ukraine,” Congressional Study Group on Foreign Relations and National Security, Brookings, December 29, 2022.
  82. 82.Elizabeth Rosenberg and Eric Van Nostrand, “The Price Cap on Russian Oil: A Progress Report,” US Department of the Treasury, August 16, 2023.
  83. 83.UN Statistics Division, UN COMTRADE, International Merchandise Trade Statistics, accessed November 29, 2024, http://comtrade.un.org/.
  84. 84.Average numbers are used to normalize the potentially idiosyncratic pandemic trade levels. The comparison is to an average of US-Russia imports and exports for the months of March through December from 2019 to 2021.
  85. 85.Georgi Kantchev, Paul Hannon, and Laurence Norman, “How Sanctioned Western Goods Are Still Flowing into Russia,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2023.
  86. 86.Benjamin Bidder, Gerald Traufetter, and Lisa Goldschmidtböing, “A Suspicious Boom in German Exports: Are Russia’s Neighbors Secretly Trading with Moscow?,” Der Spiegel, April 14, 2023.
  87. 87.Aaron Eglitis, “Western Trade with Russia’s Neighbors May Show Dodged Sanctions, EBRD Says,” Bloomberg, February 16, 2023.
  88. 88.Levent Kenez, “Turkey’s Exports to Russia Continue to Rise amid Declining Trade with Other Countries,” Nordic Monitor, July 5, 2023.
  89. 89.“Expansion of Sanctions against Russian Industry Sectors under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR),” May 9, 2022, 15 CFR 746, 87 FR 28758, 28758–74, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/05/11/2022-10099/expansion-of-sanctions-against-russian-industry-sectors-under-the-export-administration-regulations.
  90. 90.“Implementation of Additional Sanctions against Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls,” September 15, 2022, 15 CFR 732-62, 87 FR 57068, 57068-106, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/09/16/2022-19910/implementation-of-additional-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-under-the-export-administration.
  91. 91.“Implementation of Additional Sanctions against Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls,” September 15, 2022, 15 CFR 732-62, 87 FR 57068, 57068-106, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/09/16/2022-19910/implementation-of-additional-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-under-the-export-administration.
  92. 92.“Implementation of Additional Sanctions against Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls,” May 19, 2023, 15 CFR 734-50, 88 FR 33422, 33422–70, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/23/2023-10774/implementation-of-additional-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-under-the-export-administration.
  93. 93.“Implementation of Additional Sanctions against Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls,” January 23, 2024, 15 CFR 734-46, 89 FR 4804, 4804–15, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/25/2024-01408/implementation-of-additional-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-under-the-export-administration.
  94. 94.“Implementation of Additional Sanctions against Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls,” June 12, 2024, 15 CFR 734-74, 89 FR 51644, 51644–80, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/06/18/2024-13148/implementation-of-additional-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-under-the-export-administration.
  95. 95.“Russia Sanctions Dashboard,” Castelium.AI, accessed July 19, 2024, https://www.castellum.ai/russia-sanctions-dashboard.
  96. 96.“Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” March 8, 2022, EO 14066, 87 FR 13625, 13625–26, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/10/2022-05232/prohibiting-certain-imports-and-new-investments-with-respect-to-continued-russian-federation-efforts.
  97. 97.“Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment with Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression,” March 11, 2022, EO 14068, 87 FR 14381, 14381–83, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/15/2022-05554/prohibiting-certain-imports-exports-and-new-investment-with-respect-to-continued-russian-federation.
  98. 98.“Publication of Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations Determination,” September 15, 2022, 31 CFR 587, 87 FR 56590, 56950, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/09/15/2022-20030/publication-of-russian-harmful-foreign-activities-sanctions-regulations-determination.
  99. 99.“Prohibition Related to Imports of Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds of Russian Federation Origin and Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Exported from the Russian Federation,” US Department of the Treasury, February 8, 2024, https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932606/download?inline.
  100. 100.Kevin Hack, “The United States Imports More Petroleum Products than Crude Oil from Russia,” US Energy Information Administration, March 22, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51738.
  101. 101.Simon Johnson, Oleg Johnson, and Oleg Ustenko, “Why Are Russian Oil Products Still Being Sold in America?,” Project Syndicate, July 3, 2023; Lazaro Gamio et al., “How India Profits from Its Neutrality in the Ukraine War,” New York Times, June 22, 2023.
  102. 102.Maia Nikoladze and Kimberly Donovan, “Russia Sanctions Database,” Atlantic Council, April 12, 2023.
  103. 103.“Prohibition Related to Imports of Aluminum, Copper, and Nickel of Russian Federation Origin,” US Department of the Treasury, April 12, 2024, https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932796/download?inline.
  104. 104.“Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act,” May 13, 2024, H.R. 1042, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1042/text.
  105. 105.Ewa Manthey, “What New Metal Sanctions on Russia Mean for Global Trade,” ING Think, April 15, 2024.
  106. 106.Ken Klippenstein and James Risen, “The CIA Thought Putin Would Quickly Conquer Ukraine. Why Did They Get It So Wrong?,” Intercept, October 5, 2022.
  107. 107.Jim Sciutto and Katie Bo Williams, “US Concerned Kyiv Could Fall to Russia within Days, Sources Familiar with Intel Say,” CNN, February 25, 2022.
  108. 108.Phillips O’Brien, “The War That Defied Expectations,” Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2023.
  109. 109.Mike Eckel, “How Did Everybody Get the Ukraine Invasion Predictions So Wrong?,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 17, 2023.
  110. 110.Mike Eckel, “How Did Everybody Get The Ukraine Invasion Predictions So Wrong?,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 17, 2023.
  111. 111.George Wright, “Ukraine War: Putin Preparing for Long Haul, US Intelligence Says,” BBC News, May 10, 2022.
  112. 112.“Russischer Angriffskrieg: Scholz telefoniert mit Putin: Kanzler sieht keine Einsicht,” Die Zeit, September 14, 2022.
  113. 113.Charap and Priebe 2023.
  114. 114.Jonsson and Norberg 2022, 97.
  115. 115.Vladislav Zubok, “No One Would Win a Long War in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, December 21, 2022.
  116. 116.“Putin ‘Planning for a Long War’ in Ukraine: NATO Chief,” France 24, December 16, 2022.
  117. 117.Jamie Dettmer, “As Ukraine Counteroffensive Gets Bogged Down, It’s Back to the Drawing Board,” Politico, August 17, 2023.
  118. 118.Tom Soufi Burridge, “Ukraine General’s View of War ‘Stalemate’ Appears to Be Recognition of Failed Counteroffensive: Reporter’s Notebook,” ABC News, November 3, 2023; James Jordan, Samya Kullab, and Illia Novikov, “The AP Interview: Ukraine’s Zelenskyy Says the War with Russia Is in a New Phase as Winter Looms,” AP News, December 1, 2023.
  119. 119.Jill Lawless and Samya Kullab, “More US Aid Will Help Ukraine Avoid Defeat in Its War with Russia. Winning Is Another Matter,” AP News, April 24, 2024; Alexander Ward, “Biden Admin Isn’t Fully Convinced Ukraine Can Win, Even with New Aid,” Politico, April 24, 2024.

Conclusion

  1. 1.Willige 2024; Cristea et al. 2013.
  2. 2.Hummels and Schaur 2013.
  3. 3.Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 2015.
  4. 4.Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; R. Johnson and Noguera 2012.
  5. 5.Baldwin and Venables 2013.
  6. 6.Backer and Miroudot 2013.
  7. 7.Antràs 2020.
  8. 8.Raei, Ignatenko, and Mircheva 2019.
  9. 9.Backer and Miroudot 2013.
  10. 10.Miroudot, Rouzet, and Spinelli 2013.
  11. 11.Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 2015.
  12. 12.R. Johnson and Noguera 2012.
  13. 13.I. S. Kim 2017; I. Osgood 2017.
  14. 14.Francois 1990; Nordås 2011.
  15. 15.Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr 2005.
  16. 16.Ishikawa, Morita, and Mukunoki 2016.
  17. 17.Milner 1988.
  18. 18.Hiscox 2001; Krugman 1980; Melitz 2003.
  19. 19.Grieco 1988; Snidal 1991.
  20. 20.Mastanduno 1985.
  21. 21.Zielinski 2016; Kreps 2018.
  22. 22.Bowen 2020, 60; Hagemeyer-Witzleb 2021.
  23. 23.Ruys and Ryngaert 2020.
  24. 24.Barbieri and Levy 2003.
  25. 25.Farrell and Newman 2019.
  26. 26.Mulder 2022.
  27. 27.Drezner 2011; Drezner 2022.
  28. 28.Zongyuan Zoe Liu, “Besides China, Putin Has Another Potential De-dollarization Partner in Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 11, 2022; Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India-Russia-China Explore Alternative to SWIFT Payment Mechanism,” Economic Times, November 14, 2019.
  29. 29.Keohane 2005.
  30. 30.Rivalries are typically defined as pairs of states that engage in a set number of militarized interstate disputes over a pre- specified number of years. W. Thompson 1999.
  31. 31.Park and Stangarone 2019.
  32. 32.D. J. Kim 2019.
  33. 33.Some scholars argue that the oil embargo was meant to provoke an attack to allow the United States to enter World War II. Trachtenberg 2009, chap. 4; Schuessler 2010.
  34. 34.Bilousova et al. 2023.
  35. 35.Natalia Konarzewska, “Turkey Will Not Give Up on Its Lucrative Trade with Russia,” Turkey Analyst, June 26, 2023.
  36. 36.Friedberg 2022.
  37. 37.Mearsheimer 2018.
  38. 38.Art 2010.
  39. 39.Daniel W. Drezner, “Would a Realist Approach to China Have Been Better for the United States?,” Washington Post, November 3, 2021.
  40. 40.D. J. Kim 2017.
  41. 41.Edelstein 2020.
  42. 42.Mastanduno 1992.
  43. 43.Cain 2005.
  44. 44.Alex W. Palmer, “‘An Act of War’: Inside America’s Silicon Blockade against China,” New York Times, July 12, 2023; Alan Patterson, “Former U.S. Officials Urge New Export Alliance on China,” EE Times, August 4, 2023.
  45. 45.McLean and Whang 2014.
  46. 46.Brad Glosserman, “China Decoupling Debate Misses the Most Important Point,” Japan Times, February 21, 2023.
  47. 47.Liberman 1996.
  48. 48.Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994; Gowa and Hicks 2015.
  49. 49.Ryan McMorrow et al., “Chinese Chip Designers Slow Down Processors to Dodge US Sanctions,” Financial Times, November 7, 2022.
  50. 50.Copeland 2014; Mansfield and Pollins 2001; McMillan 1997. For an alternative point of view, see Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1977.
  51. 51.Brad Glosserman, “China Decoupling Debate Misses the Most Important Point,” Japan Times, February 21, 2023.
  52. 52.Mousseau 2019; Friedberg 2005.
  53. 53.Jervis 1989; Lieber and Press 2020.
  54. 54.Torsekar 2018.

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