CHAPTER 4 Encountering Diversity in France and “Eurafrica”
Between the founding of the French Union in 1946 and the 1949–1950 academic year, rates of schooling slowly but steadily rose in French Africa. By 1950, 100,000 more Africans in AOF and AEF were enrolled in some kind of school. Most of those gains were at the primary level, but Africans in secondary and higher education also increased from 5,819 in 1946 to 8,414 in 1950. Of those, 1,200 were studying in France on state scholarships.1 State support for mission schools during and after the war ensured that a disproportionate number of students on scholarships, known as boursiers, were Catholic; in 1951, half of the African students in France were Catholic, even though Catholics then made up just under 6 percent of French Africans overall.2 The number of boursiers continued to climb in the 1950s and reached more than four thousand by decade’s end.
More African students also went to France in the 1950s without state aid. French officials assiduously tried to discourage the practice, but the constitution of 1946 guaranteed French Africans the right to seek employment and education in the metropole. Therefore, the administration had no legal recourse to prevent young Africans from enrolling themselves in any French school that would have them. Non-boursiers were sometimes able to secure state aid after their arrival, incentivizing parents and students to try their luck. The danger for these students was not just the possibility of academic failure; the cost of living in France was always higher than expected, and young Africans’ uncertain access to food, clothing, and shelter jeopardized their health. Death became such a regular occurrence that African students organized an annual memorial service for their comrades who died pursuing their studies in France each year.3 Nonetheless, the prospect of social advancement encouraged thousands to take the risk. By the end of the 1950s, non-boursiers almost equaled their state-funded counterparts, bringing the total number of African students in European France to more than eight thousand.4
Despite its modest size, the African student population in France in the 1950s has generated considerable scholarly interest. The extant literature focuses on how African students and youth leaders inserted themselves in the process of decolonization by founding their own networks of associations, publications, and syndicalist movements. Politically organized and passionately committed to playing their part in shaping Africa’s future, this cohort of African students pursued a more radical anticolonial politics than the older generation of francophone African elites who were working for colonial reform from within the French government. African students grouped themselves along multiple axes, including territory and religion, but they also transcended those divisions in a federated Black African student union, the Fédération des étudiants d’Afrique noire en France (FEANF). Scholars have stressed the pan-African ethos of the FEANF and its increasingly militant advocacy for independence. The literature also details French responses to African student mobilizations, particularly the surveillance of African youth and censorship of their journals, and presents those tactics as overt political repression in a highly charged Cold War context in which African political organizing and protest were often blamed on foreign Communist provocateurs.5
Encounters between French officials and African students in France in the 1950s can also be read as a struggle over those students’ entry into conversations about youth, pluralism, and global transformation that French, African, and European political leaders had been having since the middle war years. African students were not equal participants in those discussions, and their actions did not achieve their intended effects. Nevertheless, the presence of a vocal francophone student population moving back and forth between French Africa and metropolitan France—a population that was, in a way, bringing into being the Franco-African polity that French and African politicians hoped for in the postwar conjuncture—changed the terms of debate. As they navigated the tortuous path to obtaining a decent education and professional credentials in France’s postwar empire, young Africans formed their own views about multiracial democracy and the viability of a Franco-African community. African students’ critiques of ongoing colonial injustice and French racism, and French reactions to those critiques, were a key part of the toxic feedback loop of postwar racial common sense. Security services certainly monitored young Africans’ political activity, but administrative surveillance carried out by educators and youth workers themselves was more of an ethnographic enterprise. And like so many midcentury ethnographers, the colonial bureaucracy’s informants had a blinkered view of Africans’ social attitudes, comportment, and interactions with their French peers. Their “findings” produced new patterns of racialization that renaturalized structural inequality and race prejudice.
These high-stakes Franco-African encounters took place in a French Union trying to integrate itself into an expanding network of European institutions. The core institutions of today’s European Union were all founded in the 1950s; first came the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), whose governing bodies formed the basis of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice; then the 1957 Rome Treaty established the Common Market (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM). In addition, the Council of Europe was also developing its own parallel and complementary institutions in Strasbourg: the European Parliamentary Assembly (1949), made up of members of the national parliaments of member-states; the European Convention on Human Rights (1950); and ultimately, the European Court of Human Rights (1959).
This European institution building reframed the urgency of educating Africans in the 1950s—whether in France or French Africa—as a crucial building block in the construction of the modernist, technocratic project of “Eurafrica.” For many French officials, the success of colonial youth and education initiatives was no longer just a question of France’s relationships with its African colonies. As the leaders of tomorrow, francophone African youth, along with their metropolitan French and west European counterparts, now seemed to hold the future of Europe-Africa relations in their hands. Moreover, European efforts to elevate pluralism as a bedrock value of united Europe and dissociate the new Europe from its colonial, racist past further raised the stakes of democratizing France’s empire and including young Africans in quintessentially republican institutions like schools. Some African politicians, most famously but not only Léopold Senghor, saw European integration as an opportunity to force France to make good on its postwar promises: Senghor and others ardently championed Eurafrica from the late 1940s on.6 African students in France in the 1950s, on the other hand, overwhelmingly opposed Eurafrica. In a 1957 editorial in response to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, Samba Ndiaye, editor-in-chief of the FEANF’s main publication, L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire, denounced Eurafrica as a form of “colonial reconquest” and the Common Market as a road map for the “superexploitation” of African resources. He concluded bitterly: “So much for the ‘Spirit of ’46.’ ”7 Many important political and geopolitical shifts occurred in the intervening decade, but Ndiaye’s position cannot be fully understood without considering his generation’s experience of enduring structural inequality combined with new forms of racial resentment and everyday racism as they tried to complete their educations in postwar France.
French Strategies of “Managing” Diversity: From Brassage to Race Relations
Throughout the late colonial period, Africans seeking middle school, high school, and university educations came to France because local opportunities for postprimary schooling were exceedingly rare and advanced degrees virtually nonexistent. As colonial officials scrambled to build more schools in the territories in the late 1940s, sending African students to the metropole was a necessary stopgap measure. But to young Africans’ great consternation, travel to France remained the surest way for them to pursue advanced study throughout the 1950s. In a 1957 group interview in the French press, one African student did not mince words: “We come to France because the education here is much more complete than in the overseas territories. France, it is often said, does a lot for its territories. In reality, it has not done all that it could do. Period.” He continued, “By coming to France, the African student is asserting himself. For him, it’s an initial victory, that of moving from third-rate circumstances to a universal situation.”8
Such feelings were precisely what French reformers wanted to avoid by providing education of higher quality to Africans in the territories, but the requisite resources and political will to make that happen never materialized. French officials tried to put a positive spin on the fact that African students were coming to France out of necessity by emphasizing that their sojourns in France opened up new opportunities for metropolitan French and African young people to get to know one another better. They hoped African students would learn to mix and mingle with their French peers and that the rising generation of French and African youth would develop genuine admiration and mutual respect across racial lines. French officials and African politicians alike referred to that process as brassage, a term that can mean either intermixing or incorporation. In the early 1950s, French and African leaders championed brassage as a way to overcome the legacies of racism and colonialism. However, celebrating brassage served different purposes for French and African leaders. For the French, commitment to brassage was offered up as proof of France’s goodwill toward its African citizens and an unequivocal rejection of racism. For Africans, brassage justified more financial and material support for young Africans to study and train in France.9
African students were quick to note that such support was in short supply. However much French rhetoric celebrated African and French students mixing and mingling in the metropole, French policies denied most Africans the opportunity. Age limits kept anyone over twenty-five from obtaining a scholarship for higher education in the metropole, even though most African schoolchildren started later and took longer than their French peers because of the dismal state of primary education for Africans in the territories. The number of African boursiers in France was also kept low because the colonial administration summarily rejected scholarship applications for courses of study in France that could be pursued in Africa. In a 1953 “Plea for the African Student” in the Catholic student journal Tam-Tam, Antoine Yaméogo denounced both maneuvers as patently racist. The age limits perpetuated structural racism because Africans were not given “equal chances” from the outset, he argued, while the rejection of applications on the grounds of a viable local alternative was racially discriminatory because it applied only to Africans. “Time in France is necessary for a complete formation,” he wrote. “The French know this well, for the obstruction of student boursiers in Africa does not apply to white boursiers!”10
Significantly, Yaméogo, who went on to serve as economics minister in postindependence Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso), further exposed French hypocrisy toward African students in relation to European students. He wrote, “European countries have grasped the full importance of university exchanges: English, Germans, etc., study in France; and French study in England, in Germany.” If they all recognize that cultural exchange and the experience of being abroad expands young people’s horizons, “why refuse to Africans what is good for Europeans?” Yaméogo also considered the broader societal benefit of Africans studying and training in France in a comparative perspective: “The gains made by Africans in France will combine with Africa’s own assets, and thus an original, African civilization will be born! Other so-called civilized countries did not develop otherwise.”11 For Yaméogo, there was nothing particularly African about culturally enriching exchanges driving social and civilizational progress; that Africa suffered from a particular lack in that regard was just another racist fallacy.
However disingenuous French discourse about brassage may have been, it had real consequences. As a stated policy goal, it encouraged bureaucrats in both the colonial and education ministries to monitor how French and African students interacted. That entailed fastidious surveillance of and endless commentary on African students’ activities, behavior, and overall comportment, in France and back home in the territories. State officials obtained this information from various sources, soliciting reports from a vast network of educators and youth workers.12 In the late 1950s, French officials even commissioned the national polling agency (IFOP) to survey African students about their experiences in France.13 This administrative scrutiny was consistently inflected with ideas about “the African personality” that proved incredibly difficult to dislodge. Colonial tropes and racist stereotypes—especially about African sexuality, intelligence, and temperament—withstood evidence to the contrary again and again.
A common trope among French officials was that African students had an irrational penchant for studying the law rather than pursuing more “useful” professions tailored to Africa’s particular needs. This perception was rehearsed year after year, even though it was not true. In the 1950s, the vast majority of African postsecondary students in France were enrolled in programs in the sciences, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, and engineering.14 The racist discourse about Africans’ course of study was widely commented on by their French peers. In 1958, the largest metropolitan French student union weighed in on the issue, noting that the pervasive stereotype that African students flocked to the law “out of their love of controversy and endless debate” was false. However, they did not dispute that Africans were disproportionately going into law. That distortion was left unchallenged.15
Of course, some young Africans did want to study law or other fields French officials found pointless—not in general, just for Africans. Those students were often hamstrung by school administrators who refused to let them choose their courses for themselves. After completing the bac at the Lycée Van Vollenhoven in Dakar in 1955, Amadou Booker Sadji, son of the prominent Senegalese writer Abdoulaye Sadji, sought a scholarship to study German at a university in France. Despite France’s deepening institutional relationship with West Germany in European institutions at precisely that time, the official reviewing Sadji’s application saw no benefit in Africans studying German language and culture. He refused Sadji’s request and pushed him to pursue geography at the Institut des Hautes Études de Dakar instead. Sadji continued to press his case and ultimately prevailed, but when he finally arrived at the University of Toulouse, he was a full year behind his peers. He recalls how he constantly feared having to abandon his beloved German and resign himself to studying geography, a field “arbitrarily decided for me” by the French colonial authorities.16
The provision of scholarships produced new nodes of conflict and racialization. State aid to the boursiers bred palpable and widespread resentment. French officials and the colonial press complained that the state should not financially support students who were openly critical of France. Rather than engaging with the substance of critiques like Yaméogo’s and Sadji’s about insufficient resources, coercive measures, and unfair treatment, administrators and commentators dismissed African student demands as intolerable “ingratitude” that reflected a misplaced sense of entitlement, a set of qualities that became increasingly common in postwar characterizations of francophone African elites. Yaméogo’s piece in Tam-Tam inspired a vitriolic tirade in a weekly satirical magazine in Dakar, Les Échos de l’Afrique Noire, that was usually fiercely critical of the colonial administration. (The publisher and author of the rant, Maurice Voisin, was sued by the local authorities for defamation and even served jail time for his incessant invectives against colonial abuses of authority.) Voisin attacked Yaméogo personally as a “petit gourmand” for suggesting that African students’ stipends were so low they often went hungry. Voisin then declared that all Africans needed to be made to understand that “they are not owed everything.” Indeed, he suggested that African students got more support from the government than their French peers. He concluded his screed by mockingly anticipating the accusations of racism that were sure to follow: “Why should we sacrifice our metropolitan students … and replace them with black students? Where is the racism there? Where is the demagoguery?”17
Metropolitan commentators were no more sympathetic. In a series of articles for the pro-empire magazine Climats in 1952, Annie Gacon offered scathing critiques of African boursiers, many of whom she refused to recognize as “real students.” As part of her research, Gacon wrote to officials in the education ministry for information about the funding structure of African students’ scholarships, statistics on “mixed” marriages, and African students’ relations with French women more generally. She was particularly keen to learn more about other “distractions” affecting their studies and, sarcastically, “this famous ‘brassage’ we hear so much about.” She inquired about what happened when they returned to Africa, a question she posed in both sociocultural and political terms: Did they bring “our European habits” back with them? Were they “our advocates” before the local population or “the opposite”?18
Gacon received a full report that focused on demographics and details about student aid packages. Shortly thereafter, Gacon decided to go to Senegal to see for herself how the boursiers spent their time back home. In another piece for Climats later that fall (1952), she relayed her outrage at what she had seen. She affirmed, “We are here FOR the real overseas students, those who work and live loyally among us by trying to assimilate the habits and culture of our country; we are resolutely AGAINST the agitators and troublemakers, against those African bums who deceitfully call themselves students but who are not.” She was particularly incensed by the tone and tenor of a gathering at a movie theater in Saint Louis. Gacon was incredulous that virtually all the students in attendance, whom she accused of peddling “lies and hypocrisy” against France, were on paid leave from their studies in the metropole. She closed by distinguishing between the “unruly” boursiers, whose diatribes she found laden with “all the clichés of communist dialectics,” and the older generation of francophone elites whom she praised for their moderate views and steady character.19 Her depiction of boursiers was entirely one-dimensional: they were ungrateful, unrefined, and dangerous.
Housing was another node of bitter conflict. African students struggled to find suitable lodging among the general student population, both on account of the expense and because many landlords refused to rent to them. African organizations, prominent individuals, and eventually, territorial governments sometimes felt they had to take matters into their own hands. Already in 1947, Jeanne Vialle, senator for Oubangui-Chari, had personally purchased two hostels, including a fifty-room building in Paris, to house female students who could not afford suitable housing on their meager and often delayed government stipends.20 French officials were torn over whether they should encourage such special dormitories for Africans in France. Officials in Paris were especially concerned that doing so would fatally undermine brassage.
Despite those reservations, special student centers and dormitories for Africans were created not only in Paris but at all provincial universities with large contingents of African students in the early 1950s.21 Most notably, a special pavilion for students from “overseas France” was created at the Cité Universitaire Internationale in Paris in 1951, and the lion’s share of beds there were reserved for Africans. The Cité U, as it is commonly called, had been founded in the early 1930s as a residential village for international students in the spirit of promoting international intellectual and cultural cooperation, primarily among Europeans.22 The Maison de la France d’Outre-Mer broadened the Cité U’s purview by including students from the empire. That inclusion gave the project a progressive veneer, but the idea for the Maison was first proposed in response to unambiguous perceptions of racial threat shortly after the Liberation. As we saw in chapter 3, in 1945 the governor general of AOF, Pierre Cournarie, was so provoked by the angry tone of the correspondence of a single African medical student in Montpellier that Cournarie called on the central colonial authority in Paris to steer all African students into segregated dormitories and put them under rigorous surveillance. At the time, Cournarie’s concerns were dismissed by more moderate officials in the metropole like Henri Laurentie; and yet, Cournarie’s calls for extensive surveillance of African students and special housing were heeded.23
By the mid-1950s, bureaucrats in both the colonial and education ministries had grown more anxious that African students were becoming ghettoized in the Maison de la France d’Outre-Mer and its provincial analogues. As more African students arrived in France, they seemed to mix with metropolitan students less. The centers continued to receive substantial funding from the education ministry as well as from the overtaxed budgets of the territories. The passage of the Loi Cadre in 1956, which devolved more authority to local governments in the territories, made it more difficult for French officials in the metropole to change course. Once the territories were in control of their own budgets, they were free to purchase special residences for their students at their discretion. When the territorial assembly of Côte d’Ivoire decided to buy a building in Paris for its students in 1956, officials’ hands were tied, though they complained bitterly. Just before the passage of the Loi Cadre, education officials wrote to Gaston Defferre, minister of Overseas France and author of the law, protesting the Ivorian assembly’s plan. Both the rector of the Academy of Paris and the head of the Office of Overseas Students insisted that African students should be dispersed throughout the country to be “mixed [brassé] with metropolitan students, and not grouped together in a center that is more or less closed, where particularisms grow stronger.” Defferre agreed that it would be preferable to promote “brassage with metropolitan students,” but since the purchase was authorized by the territorial assembly, there was nothing he could do. His opposition, he hastened to add, would be particularly inopportune “at the very moment when I am trying so hard to get the Loi Cadre passed to give more autonomy to the territories.”24 Ultimately, the centers outlasted the end of empire and became an important part of the educational infrastructure for receiving African students in the postcolonial era.25
Concerns about housing and the behavior of the boursiers were key parts of the rationale for extensive administrative surveillance of African students in the 1950s. That surveillance offers a worm’s-eye view of the evolution of French views about francophone Africans in a rapidly changing domestic and geopolitical context. Cournarie’s move from thinking about one individual student to the African study body writ large became standard practice by the 1950s. The resulting portraits of African students were then reproduced and circulated not only among French officials but also among educators, youth organizers, and other nonstate actors who worked directly with young Africans studying or training in France.
The issue of interracial sex and marriage highlights the stickiness of colonial tropes and racist stereotypes. According to an IFOP poll commissioned by French officials, by the end of the 1950s, only a tiny fraction (4 percent) of African young men living in France had married French women.26 Interviews with African students reveal they had their own diverse views on interracial marriage; most seemed to feel it was not a good idea. As several male students put it in 1957, “since they are duly rejected by European society and African society, such unions are best avoided at all costs.”27 Moreover, African students criticized French dating practices and lax sexual mores in their journals, memoirs, and other writings from the period.28 Nevertheless, reports from French officials and local educators assumed that African young men pursued relationships with French women relentlessly, so much so that observers frequently registered their surprise at the “propriety” of African male students’ behavior toward French girls.29 Even though this was repeatedly proved to be a nonissue, this commentary did not go away.
The tenacity of such stereotypes may be explained at least in part by the fact that African students in France were written about as an anonymous mass rather than as individuals. As the ranks of African students in France swelled from a few dozen in 1945 to several thousand by the mid-1950s, administrative correspondence rarely identified African students by name. This depersonalization was reproduced in the media, even in articles whose express purpose was to better acquaint the French public with the African student population. In a 1957 feature entitled “Young Africans Speak,” the author-interviewer never identified her student interlocutors by name. Instead, the reader learns only their territory of origin and course of study: a Togolese and a Dahomean studying law, two Guineans interning as radio technicians, and another Guinean studying gynecology. The anonymity of the interviewees is particularly jarring in light of the thrust of the piece: “For most metropolitans, the young Africans they cross in the street or stare at distractedly in the metro or on the bus remain rather foreign. Why?” She attributed this to most French people’s willful indifference to the historic changes underway in French Africa, although she conceded many French continued to hold political, social, and racial prejudices of which they themselves were only dimly aware.30 By not naming her subjects, the author, who hoped to redress this situation, missed an obvious opportunity to demystify African students for the French public.
More egregious, however, is the sole image accompanying the piece (see figure 4.1). The article’s subjects are postgraduate students living in Paris, but the image on the title page is of an African child in traditional dress, naked from the waist up, with a bicycle in a desolate field. The profound contrast between this stock colonial imagery and the objective of the article is all the more remarkable given the author’s own description of the everyday exoticization African students endured in France: “All it takes is to listen to the amused reflections of pedestrians when they pass an African in the street to realize that a good number of French people still view a ‘black’ as an object of curiosity, a ‘savage,’ a ‘big child’ taken straight out of the exotic imagery in which the call of the tam-tam blends into the mysterious sounds of the bush at night.” She added that such views had real consequences: “One can also cite an incalculable number of cases in which a landlord refuses to house an African student because of prejudice and retrograde ideas.” She then reflected, “What most offends the young African who arrives in France, is to be seen as someone who has everything to gain and nothing to give.”31
The French public’s general indifference to and ignorance of colonial youth stands in stark contrast with a general preoccupation and desire to understand young people at precisely this time in French popular culture. “Young Africans Speak” was published the same year as Françoise Giroud’s landmark exposé on French youth in L’Express (October 1957), in which she dubbed the young postwar generation “the New Wave.” She quickly followed up that piece with a massive survey of millions of young French that was published in several mainstream news outlets to showcase young people’s opinions across boundaries of class, gender, education, and region. As Richard Ivan Jobs has shown, Giroud’s work helped “define a social group by intentionally homogenizing and generalizing the young.”32 Thus, young Africans were being reified as a group apart at the very moment that “youth” was crystallizing in the French imagination as a vital and cohesive national category.
FIGURE 4.1. Title image of the article “De Jeunes Africains parlent.” Courtesy of the Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, ANOM: BIB SOM c/br/3324.
“Young Africans Speak” ended with a set of deeply ambivalent reflections on African difference. The interviewer drew two conclusions from her conversations with African students. The first speaks directly to stereotypes about African intelligence and ability to reason. She affirmed, “The positions of these young Africans can sometimes seem unnuanced, brutal, and impassioned, but they are resolute, stable, and coherent.” To further drive home the point, she added, “none of them contradicted themselves at any point in the discussion. And when they gave an opinion, they justified it straightaway.” Her second impression spoke more to why brassage did not seem to be working. Unlike many administrators, she did not put the blame solely on young Africans’ shoulders. She acknowledged their distrust of metropolitan French was strong, but she did not think it was based on any kind of inherent “bias.” With people they trust, she reassured her readers, they are quite capable of warm and thoughtful exchanges of views. The difficulty for them, she concluded, was in finding “true interlocutors.”33
The “reserve” of African students was a common refrain among local educators and youth workers throughout the decade. On the eve of African independence in 1960, officials in the education ministry urged rectors of universities across France with large contingents of African students to designate special faculty mentors to work with them more closely. Responses to this missive varied widely: some insisted there was no need since their African students did not seem to have any issues; some opposed the idea on principle, arguing that integration should proceed “naturally” without signaling anyone out for special treatment; others replied curtly that they had more important priorities.34 Several reported that their faculty had already taken it upon themselves to reach out to African students—that they had been inviting them to dinner or to their summer homes for years.35 The rector in Bordeaux forwarded several letters from faculty detailing activities already undertaken and impressions of the students. One law professor wrote that in his ten years of experience, African students were initially intimidated and withdrawn, but he found that “they open up very quickly and are glad to have personal contacts with French families.”36 Another similarly commented that in the students’ reserve, “one could detect a kind of fear,” but that once students realize “we do not have a segregationist attitude, they open up and bloom and offer a lot of trust, deference, and attachment.” He concluded, “I believe it is a duty—a duty of charity in the good sense of the word—to try to liberate them from their fearful reserve which certainly causes them pain.”37 By portraying African students as suffering from debilitating inferiority complexes without serious consideration of how that might be tied to their lived experience, such accounts naturalized those dispositions as intrinsically African.
These portraits of African students informed how French officials structured exchange programs that brought African youth to France. Planning documents often referred to “what we know of the African temperament” or warned that program organizers must “beware of the well-known distrust of the students.”38 Those observations often led program organizers to focus even more on fostering personal contacts between young Africans and the local French population and scrutinizing those interactions ever more minutely. Brassage was the raison d’être of these initiatives, even as the myopic monitoring of African students hardened conceptions of African difference, reshaped policy in counterproductive ways, and made brassage more difficult in practice.
Throughout the decade, French officials invoked brassage as a distinctly French approach to managing diversity. However, administrative discourses about the African student population were laying the groundwork for the “race relations” model of postwar liberalism that scholars have typically associated with Britain, Germany, and the United States to take root in France.39 That model places the onus on minoritized populations to integrate into the dominant society without expecting society or individual members of the dominant group to change from the encounter. It does not address the deep structural roots of continuing inequalities. French officials hoped that racial identifications would simply fade away through brassage, but African students in France kept forcing their French interlocutors to think about race and confront the realities of structural racism. Young Africans’ reactions to French society and their vocal protests about the racism they experienced in France and French Africa encouraged officials to frame hostile Franco-African encounters as an inevitable, intractable “race relations” problem.
Africans in monthlong stages had different impressions of France than those who became long-term student residents, but the former also addressed racism head-on. Unlike the student population in the metropole who spoke out about racism in France, participants in short-term youth exchanges focused on racism in the territories. An evaluation of youth exchanges in 1956 cited one young Mauritanian teacher who completed a stage with the secular youth group Francs et Franches Camarades, on the stark contrast between his experience in France and life at home. He declared:
We leave filled with emotion … from the open friendship we found among the metropolitan French. And before such personal contact, that sincere fraternity, we cannot help but ask ourselves: why don’t the Whites in Africa work together with the Blacks? What must we do to breach that barrier of hate and contempt that spreads day by day between the two races?40
French youth workers were distressed to learn of this situation in the territories. Lamy Roger, president of the Fédération Départementale des Foyers Ruraux de la Côte d’Or, which hosted a few dozen African stagiaires in the summer of 1957, reported to the education ministry that the African trainees were stunned that the local population was not “racist, for the only reason (and I am only quoting them) that ‘the French here are not like the French there.’ ” He continued, “For us metropolitan French, it’s a disconcerting report.”41
The stagiaires expressed these sentiments in their own words to the population in the region in a letter that was published by several local news outlets. Addressing their “Burgundian friends,” the African trainees professed profound shock at the warm welcome they received. They assured their readers they would tell everyone back home how surprised they were to find that France is a country of “humanism and civilization.” With rhetorical flourish, they continued that they had “heard and seen the beating of the French heart, so little and poorly understood in the overseas territories.” In that same spirit of mutual comprehension, they entreated the local population to be patient with them: “If, on our side, one day by accident we offended one of you or made a mistake, some blunder, please forgive us, because though we are animated by similar souls as you, it is undeniable that we have different customs and a different way of life.”42
African students’ uncomfortable insistence that racism remained an intractable part of their everyday lives did occasionally compel some French officials to acknowledge enduring institutional inequality—in the second-rate education Africans received prior to coming to France and in housing discrimination once they got there—but most French officials reacted defensively. Often this entailed shifting the blame back onto Africans’ supposedly “irrational” hostility toward the French and their distinctly African “inferiority complexes.” Henri Laurentie’s modest candor about racism in the territories in the postwar conjuncture (see chapter 3) did not survive long under the crushing weight of the contradictions of postwar empire and the rightward turn in the colonial administration in 1947–1948. Unwilling to confront those contradictions, the more conservative, often Christian Democrat administrators who came to dominate colonial affairs in the 1950s devised an array of rhetorical strategies to deflect African criticisms of stalled youth and education reforms. By mid-decade, the tactic of attributing the persistence of “racial prejudice” to a handful of misfits and bad apples to sidestep the issue altogether had become the norm.43
Such deflections are crucial for understanding how French officials interpreted and evaluated African students’ experiences in France. Convinced that brassage was the solution to their troubles, French officials and others who worked with African students were baffled and dismayed that racial tension did not in fact wither away in light of their efforts. These ostensible “failures” reified African difference and young Africans’ seemingly intractable inability to integrate into French social and cultural life. Little wonder, then, that young Africans were completely excluded from the French national discourse of rejuvenation in the 1950s and Françoise Giroud’s limited portrait of white French youth as the “New Wave.”44
African Perspectives: “This Is Truly a White Country”
Subjected to extensive surveillance and stereotyping, young Africans turned the “colonial gaze” back on their surveillants as they took stock of French people, culture, and society during their time in France. They judged their surroundings in light of their own cultural values, social norms, and lifestyle preferences. In student journals, personal correspondence, and literature, African youth in France critiqued stalled colonial reforms, French racism, the lack of material support for them to pursue their studies, and French ways of life more generally.
Responding directly to French caricatures of Africans as “ungrateful,” African students refuted the notion that they were “anti-French.” In a 1956 editorial in the FEANF journal, L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire, R. Mawlawé turned this accusation on its head: “Logic, truth, justice—we have been taught that these are quintessentially French qualities. Why when we avail ourselves of them do you find us anti-French? A surprising truth!” He continued, “As paradoxical as it seems, it is the colonized who are reviving the authentic tradition of France, of the true France whose vocation surely is not to stifle black consciousness, but to arouse their initiative, to help them realize their freedom as men.”45 As Laurentie had feared a decade earlier, francophone Africans had indeed become well acquainted with French values, which they mobilized as a powerful rhetorical weapon in their fight for racial equality and social justice.46
In the same issue, Isabelle Tévoedjrè, a literature student at the University of Toulouse from Dahomey (contemporary Benin), framed African students’ contacts with their French peers in a charged political and racial context in a piece entitled “ ‘Metropolitan’ Students and Us.” She found that France’s colonial wars, first in Indochina and then Algeria, seemed to have pushed some of their French peers to open themselves up to and learn about African students’ concerns, while others distanced themselves even more. In describing her daily experiences at her provincial university, she detailed a constant stream of what we would recognize today as microaggressions.47 In the lecture hall, she wrote, it is easy to read the faces of French students and to slot them in one camp or the other: “By instinct, we can perceive straightaway the hostility that animates their looks, gestures, vocal inflections. That hostility affects us so profoundly that we also suffer when our comrades are nothing more than indifferent, cruelly indifferent.” Even on the streets of Paris, she continued, “that supposedly cosmopolitan city—I could not ignore those stares looking me up and down, those glances that would follow me, inquisitive, ironic, disdainful, distrustful, scared.”48
For Isabelle, the most frustrating part of those encounters was how woefully ignorant her French peers were of the full spectrum of racial discrimination she and other African students faced on a daily basis, which took different forms in France and in the territories. She lamented that metropolitan French have no idea that “still now, in certain cities like Brazzaville, for a Black to enter the ‘White’ quarter would be a sacrilege,” just as they also do not know that when African students are sent to organizations that find students housing, they are presented with listings “that carry that atrocious line, unworthy of the French who are supposed to be against racial discrimination: ‘No Blacks, No Arabs!’ ” Given this situation, she found it especially intolerable that African students were, as a group, constantly accused of “ingratitude.” She was unsparing in connecting accusations of disloyalty to old colonial stereotypes of “docile, sycophantic blacks.” Here was further proof that Africans remained inferior in French eyes: Africans were denied the right to protest inequality and discrimination, and when they did, they were perceived as a dangerous threat, as radical anticolonial nationalists or Communist provocateurs, rather than loyal defenders of French values. “They claim to know us,” she concluded, “but could not be more mistaken.”49
Isabelle’s husband, Albert Tévoedjrè, also sought to educate his French peers about the realities of Africans’ social experience in his writing, and he too emphasized the different forms racism took in French Africa and the metropole. His 1958 cri de coeur, L’Afrique révoltée, painted a bleak picture of “Black France” and unsparingly catalogued the ways that the “spiritual revolution” so jubilantly announced for French Africa in the postwar conjuncture had not come to pass. Albert used photography to convey this to powerful effect. The book’s insert presents images of racial hierarchy and everyday racism in his home territory of Dahomey alongside others that highlight structural racism throughout AOF. A photograph titled “July 1957: Cotonou (Dahomey), return from the market,” shows a young white mother pushing a baby carriage down the street, followed by a Black man, in a military uniform, carrying her bags (see figure 4.2). The caption reads, “A European woman elegantly walks with her baby. Behind her, her Mamadou, in this case, a tirailleur ‘sénégalais,’ carrying her purchases. The African in military service can live in the barracks, participate in the repression of some Arabs in revolt … or serve as an unpaid domestic in the household of a European.” The indignity of that scenario was then juxtaposed with an image that homes in on the root of structural inequality: a photograph of a dozen scantily clad, primary-school-age children, milling about on the steps of a building in Saint Louis (see figure 4.3). The caption reads, “After three hundred years of French presence in Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal, one child in six can go to school. And the rest? Well … they hang out in the streets!”50 For Albert Tévoedjrè, Africans’ unequal access to education in the territories was the foundation of the larger edifice of racial domination in postwar French Africa.
Albert focused more on racism in France in his writing in student publications. In addition to serving as an editor of L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire, he was also a frequent contributor to the journal of the Association of Catholic Students in Dakar. In a 1955 piece in that publication, he framed his experience of racism in Toulouse in explicitly Christian terms. African Catholic students, he wrote, found their isolation in metropolitan France especially painful. Like so many African students, Albert was stung by the trauma of trying to find lodging: “We have all felt the pathological distrust that certain sons of France harbor towards people of color.” But he was devastated to find that a ready welcome in French congregations could prove equally challenging. He relayed with relief and excitement that the Catholic Institute in Toulouse recently created a special parish for overseas students. If they were not welcome in French churches, they would form their own.51
Religion could have been a factor of internal division among African students, but they developed their own kind of religious pluralism. As Catholic Senegalese student Thomas Diop wrote in 1957, African youth included Christians, Muslims, Communists, and “traditionalists,” but they all shared a commitment to Africa’s future. Indeed, he emphasized that African Christians and Muslims in particular shared common views and spiritual principles. Diop defended African Muslims who traveled to Cairo to pursue higher Islamic study—students the colonial administration maligned as “Wahhabi” fanatics.52 Indeed, intra-African diversity, as well as the very real differences separating Africans from their French counterparts, led Diop to think more expansively about building solidarity in the globalizing postwar world. He urged that “to think globally,” young people should root their identities in goals and objectives rather than religion or ideology. He concluded, “Identity of goals would promote tolerance, not only between diverse groups of young Blacks, but also between black youth and metropolitan youth.”53
FIGURE 4.2. Photographic insert in Albert Tévoedjrè’s L’Afrique révoltée (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1958).
FIGURE 4.3. Photographic insert in Albert Tévoedjrè’s L’Afrique révoltée (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1958).
The everyday racism that African students detailed in their periodicals was also a recurrent theme in francophone African literature of the period. In his moving fictional memoir Un nègre à Paris (1959), Ivorian writer Bernard Dadié subversively turned the colonial-administrative gaze on its head. Set in 1956, the narrator keenly observes everything around him, at one point declaring forcefully, “This is truly a white man’s country.”54 Dadié’s narrator channels the tone and mood of the colonial travelogue as he meticulously scrutinizes France and the French: “What we share with this people makes us more sympathetic towards them. I even found here fairytales just like ours.” He continues, “And when I see a French father take his child by the hand, smiling at him and telling him stories, I say to myself, ‘but they act just like blacks—they are just like us!’ They too love their children.”55
Despite those surprising ironic flashes of connection, Dadié’s narrator dwells on the isolation he feels in Paris, the fast pace of city life, and the lax moral behavior of French youth. These observations lead to extended reflections on the prospect of a nonracist multiracial society: “I watch the people come and go. I am aware of my color that distinguishes me at a distance, day and night. And I ask myself: didn’t God create men of different colors so that we would have to study each other? Is color the only barrier that men free themselves from with such difficulty?” He continues, “We speak of different customs, colors, countries, cultures, but aren’t men all the same?” And yet, the book’s take on Franco-African relations is ultimately deeply ambivalent. The narrator not only notes that Africans are exoticized in France but also detects a new, performative aspect to French behavior toward Africans:
These Parisians still have that affection that their ancestors had for us back in the days when everyone had their own little Negro [Négrillon]. It’s truly a pleasure for them to have us. What’s more, those who [in the territories] would never dare invite us to their table, here they are the first to do so. They want to publicly prove their generosity of spirit and dupe everyone.56
Significantly, the narrator explicitly frames these reflections about racial diversity in France in the context of European integration. He marvels at the prospect of European unity and admires its universal aspirations. As the narrator recounts his rambling walks through Paris, he pauses for a moment’s reflection at the Place de l’Europe in the eighth arrondissement. He muses, “The Parisian believes that men will be able to unite themselves.… The Place de l’Europe imagines that each nation, with its history and its monuments will let go of its victories which were defeats for others. History will no longer be the history of killing fields, but rather of man tout court.”57
Youth and Eurafrica
Dadié’s narrator may have been moved by the idealism of the European project, but pro-Europe activists struggled to generate popular enthusiasm for European integration in the 1950s. That was not for want of effort. The decade-spanning (and CIA-funded) European Youth Campaign focused on educating young people about European integration and how European institutions work. Headquartered in Paris, the campaign’s leadership was largely French. The campaign’s outreach efforts added a pronounced European dimension to the way French colonial education officials thought about African youth and brassage. Indeed, some came to promote an explicitly “Eurafrican” vision that pointed beyond the French Union to the grander, intercontinental scale of Europe-Africa relations.
African leaders’ qualified support for Eurafrica lent credibility to this Eurafrican turn in colonial policy. As colonial reform stalled in the late 1940s, many African leaders sought to leverage the upsurge in European institution building in the early 1950s to get the French to recommit to the democratization of the empire. As the French delegate to the European Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg in 1950, Ousmane Socé Diop (senator for Senegal) voiced his and his constituents’ support for both the proposed European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the “third continent” such an institution would bring into being. However, he forcefully declared that this support was conditional on real social and economic progress in Africa, “at the European level.” Then and only then, Diop insisted, would Africans give their consent to the construction of Eurafrica.58 In the end, French Africa was not included in the ECSC, but subsequent plans for a European Defense Community (EDC) and a European Political Community (EPC) re-posed the question of Eurafrica even more pointedly. Most African leaders also embraced this more political form of European integration, but only if French Africa was included on equal terms with the rest of France. At the peak of the EDC/EPC debate in 1953, Sourou Migan Apithy (deputy for Dahomey) warned that “to admit France into Europe without its territories would be to foreclose the possibility of a French grand ensemble integrated from the Rhine to the Congo, by definitively giving the impression to the African public that we refuse to exit the colonial regime.”59 With the prospect of political European integration looming on the horizon, it became vitally important to bring the generational projects of Franco-African and European integration together.
Eurafricanism and French Colonial Education Policy
Eurafrica figured prominently in the rhetoric of Louis-Paul Aujoulat, the top education official in the colonial ministry from 1949 to 1953. A missionary doctor and Christian Democrat who represented the white population of Cameroon in the French National Assembly for the first postwar decade, Aujoulat also chaired the coordinating committee for FIDES in 1950 that disbursed French development funds to youth and education initiatives in French Africa. He was instrumental in creating one of the earliest training programs for young Africans, a summer stage at the national teacher training institute at Saint-Cloud. From 1951 on, this program provided pedagogical training for both African and metropolitan schoolteachers assigned to posts in Africa. Aujoulat celebrated the inaugural program at Saint-Cloud as one of the administration’s shining achievements of the year, alongside the ostensibly more significant opening of the Institut des Hautes Études de Dakar and the Maison de la France d’Outre-Mer in Paris.60
Aujoulat promoted his Eurafrican vision for Franco-African relations at the second Saint-Cloud stage in 1952. In a long presentation to the stagiaires, he articulated the administration’s goals for colonial education in a new spirit and vocabulary. First, he proudly declared, “it is time for us to listen to what Africa and Madagascar want.”61 Second, he called on the stagiaires to build “a new Eurafrican civilization.” Aujoulat alluded to Senghor’s well-known support for Eurafrica and stressed that he was not the only Black intellectual to champion Eurafricanism. Aujoulat expressed the challenge of reaching a Eurafrican symbiosis in temporal metaphors: “It concerns the inevitable conflict between two conceptions of life and world, the instability between the old equilibrium of yesterday and the new equilibrium of tomorrow.” Crucially, he insisted Africans could not be forced to choose between “Europe” and “Africa”; rather they must achieve a synthesis:
Even if the African elite demonstrates a remarkable receptivity to Latin culture and European values, they are well aware that they should not renounce their origins nor lose touch with their ancestral patrimony for any price. [The African elite] shares the aspirations of all non-European countries that hope to benefit from the West’s technical secrets without losing their own personalities, to assimilate [those techniques] into their values in pursuit of a human universal.62
Aujoulat then concluded by associating his stance with several prominent Africans in the campaign for robust education reform: “We must reject both the cultural imperialism that presumes Africa is a blank slate and a systematic filtering of the kinds of knowledge and disciplines offered to black children: that seems to me to be the position of African teachers and thinkers like Senghor, Hazouné or Alioune Diop.”63
Aujoulat distilled his “Eurafrican symbiosis” into three action items: (1) develop elite and mass education at the same time and stop treating this as an either-or proposition; (2) stop fearing Africans obtaining advanced degrees; and (3) overcome the false opposition between “l’esprit” and “la technique.” On this last point, he added, “Africans are the first to declare that we are living in a technical age, and that countries cannot thrive or modernize without technicians.” He continued, “If Blacks reject assimilation by force, they are nevertheless eager to participate in the great advances of modern civilizations.”64
Aujoulat mobilized the framework of “Eurafrica” as a new way to think about the function and design of education for Africans in a French Union that was deepening its ties to its European neighbors and trying to modernize in the process. Not only was Eurafrica therefore gaining currency as a way of thinking about institutional arrangements between united Europe and European-controlled parts of Africa; Eurafrica was also becoming a new scalar frame for considering the social and cultural work of educating Africans in France’s African territories. Aujoulat’s insistence that Africans must be consulted about their own goals and aspirations also had a European dimension. As we have seen, African leaders had made this consultation the sine qua non for African participation in the European project. But the importance of African consent could also be tied to pro-Europe propaganda of the period—especially in youth and education initiatives—that aggressively proclaimed the new Europe’s liberal, tolerant, and pluralist values. That added pressure for France to make the French Union a genuinely inclusive, democratic entity: a noncolonialist France within a larger nonimperialist Europe.
This was a new register in the cultural repertoire of France’s historic civilizing mission.65 In prewar colonial parlance, “Eurafrican” designated mixed-race people (métis).66 Eurafrican discourse was not a common feature of either “assimilationist” or “associationist” colonial education policies. But in the 1950s, the geopolitical situation reframed the problem of difference in France and French Africa and sometimes turned conventional identifications on their head. In this era of rapid political change, many French officials were wary of overidentifying with Europe. Just a few months after the stage at Saint-Cloud, as the French parliament began to debate the European Political Community, officials in the French Foreign Affairs Ministry warned: “France is not a European power.… Her interests, her aspirations and her destiny have long extended beyond the continent.” The officials insisted, “A great future may yet await her in Africa.”67
At the same time, African politicians who continued to try to leverage their support for the European project to secure more robust reform in the French Union proudly declared themselves committed “Europeans”—not ethnically, but politically. They found a ready welcome in the pro-Europe movements, whose interest in Eurafrica peaked in the second half of the decade. By the mid-1950s, virtually all the European movements had created special committees on Europe-Africa relations. In 1958, Hamani Diori, a former schoolmaster in Niamey, deputy and vice president of the French National Assembly, and later first president of independent Niger, delivered a speech to the European Movement’s Europe-Africa Commission. He affirmed, “We are Europeans, because we are facing the same problems,” but he quickly qualified that support: “I am telling you that we are resolutely Europeans on the strict condition that the juridical and political reform of the Franco-African Community precedes our definitive entry into the construction of Europe. European nations and the French African territories have arrived together at the same idea of a communal association at the appropriate scale for the modern world: Eurafrica.” After a long reflection on the importance of fostering mutual understanding among European and African youth, Hamani Diori concluded, “we are not presenting ourselves to European Nations as beggars, whatever our social needs may be. We come to Europe with France and through France in the hope of becoming what you have taught us to want to be: free citizens.” These remarks resonated with the French leaders of the European Youth Campaign (EYC); they reprinted Hamani Diori’s speech in its entirety in the EYC’s main publication, whose print run was in the tens of thousands.68 Thus, as global pressures made linking Africa, through France, to the new Europe-in-the-making more appealing to some French and African leaders, long-standing questions about cultural métissage and cultural pluralism in colonial African youth and education policy took on an added “Eurafrican” valence. “Eurafrica” became an important framework for reimagining African difference in the context of an emergent modern, technical, and interconnected society.
Roland Pré, another Christian Democrat in the upper ranks of the colonial bureaucracy in the mid-1950s, also embraced this conceptual repertoire. Pré’s career perfectly captures how entangled colonial and European concerns had become. A former governor of both Gabon and Guinée, Pré was a founding member of the Union of European Federalists’ study group for “overseas” issues in Paris in 1953. Moreover, the following year, he oversaw the allocation of the second installment of FIDES, which financed youth and education initiatives in Africa. In late 1954, Pré returned to French Africa as chief administrator in Cameroon.69 Like the European Movement, the Union of European Federalists was a transnational European political action group with its own youth wing. At the first session of its Europe-Overseas Commission, Pré urged that the group should promote more than narrowly technical and economic cooperation between Europe and Africa. He forcefully argued that they must pursue “political integration” as well if they were going to get Africans to accept the idea of Eurafrica:
African opinion will soon be torn between two poles: Eurafricanism (the integration of Africa into Europe by way of technical arrangements) and Pan-Africanism (the integration of African countries amongst themselves by way of political arrangements). In this way, the victory of Eurafricanism risks being compromised if the issue is solely approached from a technical perspective without consideration of political questions.70
This argument did not convince everyone. Cornelius Van Rij, a Dutchman on the commission, rejected Pré’s vision of political integration for Europe and Africa for religious reasons. The Netherlands, he declared, did not envision integrating any overseas territories into united Europe precisely because “religious issues will accentuate the many difficulties” such integration raised.71
Religion was also deeply important to Pré, but he viewed it as a potential connector rather than a divider. Christianity occupied a central place in the deliberations of Pré and his colleagues in charge of deciding how to allocate FIDES money to expand education in French Africa. Under Pré’s leadership, the FIDES board characterized Eurafrica as a “civilizational choice” in favor of the Christian West over the Islamic world.72 Ignoring Aujoulat’s entreaty to stop regarding Africa as a blank slate, Pré and the FIDES planners framed that choice in a vacuum:
Unlike the populations of the Middle East and Asia, our populations in French Africa cannot claim a civilization of their own. Rather, they are looking to fill the void with external elements that they can adapt to their own tendencies. This is a unique opportunity we must seize, for the Eurafrican bloc, the cornerstone of this “great entity Metropole-Outre-Mer” that we are so intently trying to build, can be realized by a solid foundation: a common civilization, which is to say, Western civilization, which is nothing other than French civilization tout court.73
In their view, millions of sub-Saharan Africans were awaiting “an orientation toward new forms of civilization.” Crucially, Pré and the FIDES planners believed that Islam noir had not yet taken on the “totalitarian forms that are incompatible with our civilization”—unlike in the Arab world. Indeed, they considered conditions in Africa favorable to westernization and African Islam as not posing an obstacle to that evolution. As we shall see in chapter 5, this attitude was widespread and had profound implications for colonial education policies in Muslim-majority regions in both AOF and AEF.
Africa and the European Youth Campaign
The European Youth Campaign initially focused on promoting the European Defense Community and the European Political Community. The collapse of those projects in 1954 was not only a devastating blow to more robust European political integration: it also raised doubts about the efficacy of the EYC’s tactics and strategy. In its early years, the EYC organized small-scale educational programming for young people who were already involved in organized youth movements. By 1955, a showier display of young people’s support for European integration seemed urgently needed and would require transforming the EYC from an elite movement of young cadres to a mass movement for all. To reach a wider audience, the EYC concentrated on regional and local activities “to reach out to young people where they live, work, and learn.”74
At the same time that the EYC was pivoting to more grassroots organizing, it was also trying to redefine its objectives in light of the rapidly changing international situation. French officials in the EYC felt the upheavals wrought by decolonization in Asia and the failure of the EDC and EPC put European youth in a double bind. EYC officials feared that young people, confronted with a “heritage of failure,” were resigning themselves to withdraw from the international arena. According to Jacques Eugene, one of the French leaders of the EYC, the campaign needed to get young people involved in finding a role for Europe in world affairs, to encourage direct civic participation in the process of European integration, and to clearly outline young Europeans’ responsibilities toward “under-developed countries and the associated territories.”75
In pursuit of that latter goal, the French section of the EYC created its own “Overseas Group,” which was presided over by Antoine Lawrence, a Guinean youth leader who was involved with a number of French youth organizations and served as the president of the US-backed World Association of Youth for most of the 1950s.76 The founding of the group was a key step in converting the French section of the EYC to the Eurafrican cause. By 1957, the section’s official program identified its core objectives as creating a European representative assembly elected by universal suffrage and formally instituting a “Europe-Africa Community.”77 Subsequently, Eurafrica was a recurring theme in the EYC’s journal Young Europe, which published studies on the Loi Cadre and a steady stream of reflections on the political, economic, and “ethnic” issues raised by the prospect of forging closer ties between Europe and Africa.78
The EYC’s “Eurafrican” turn was not just rhetorical. The French section fought hard to get African students in France involved in EYC initiatives in neighboring European countries. By the end of the decade, a quarter of state-funded summer stages and exchange programs had added a European dimension to their initiatives for Africans. For example, in 1959, the Confédération Nationale de la Famille Rurale designated five places for African trainees to attend its study sessions in the Netherlands and Germany; the Fédération française des maisons de jeunes et de la culture reserved five spots for Africans in a study mission on rural life in Italy and another ten spaces for Africans to attend a six-month training session for directors of youth clubs in France, Italy, and Germany; the Organisation centrale des camps et activités de jeunesse arranged for several Africans to go to Italy for a cultural enrichment program on “Roman Civilization” and pledged to reserve spots for young Africans upon request in its network of 180 camps and youth centers across Western Europe.79
Like the gathering at Brest that opened this book, European youth initiatives in the early 1950s had focused on getting French and European youth to envision French Africa as part of Europe. Political developments like the Loi Cadre refocused EYC officials’ attention on making sure young Africans participated in these efforts directly.80 Jacques Eugene admitted,
It is distressing to note that until now these projects [of associating Europe and Africa] have practically only been studied by metropolitan French, or at best, by Africans of the preceding generation who have been thoroughly Frenchified [francisés]. The reactions of the younger generations, of more modest cultural development, remain to be properly studied. If this work is not done, we should fear Eurafrican projects will appear to them as a hypocritical new form of colonization. In that case, it would be a total failure.81
Henceforth, Eugene concluded, engaging African youth would be a priority.
The French section of the EYC attempted to do just that at a three-day conference in Troyes in November 1957 on the theme, “The Responsibility of Youth Toward Europe.”82 In a notable departure from past practice, Africans were invited to participate in the proceedings. Nabi Ibrahima Youla, a Guinean former teacher, past education director for the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (the largest African political party at the time), and member of the Social and Economic Council of the EEC, gave an impassioned speech on the role of youth in building Eurafrica. He declared that for Eurafrica to succeed, African youth must first be truly welcomed in metropolitan France—that is, they must finally achieve brassage. Summer stages and exchange programs were a step in the right direction, but Nabi Youla cautioned that organized programming would go only so far. Brassage required metropolitan French to really get to know young Africans. He exhorted his audience that it was wholly up to them to take on this responsibility: “You can do it,” he urged, “reach out to them, create contacts, overcome the difficulties.” He concluded that if his talk inspired even just one person in the audience to make the effort, it would be a real turning point. “By multiplying contacts,” he concluded, “we will create new horizons.”83
Nabi Youla’s views were folded into the final recommendations of the Overseas Group. Its top two priorities were to dispel the impression that France wanted to substitute a new European “supracolonialism” for the old French model and to develop more contacts with African students in the metropole. The group’s observations and proposals on the latter point reprised many of the French bureaucrats’ tropes and tactics. The main challenge would be what the group referred to as the “psychological difficulties” of working with African youth, which the group identified as the particular African “mentality” and also the “appeal of communism.” The group posited that Africans were instinctually drawn to Communism because it resembled the “structure of the African world, with its hierarchy, taboos, and the disappearance of the individual in the collective,” rather than any reasoned ideological, political, or genuine social commitments. In light of these African qualities, group members concluded they would have to be extremely careful in how they managed their exchanges with African youth.84
Over the course of the following year, the group organized regular conferences and “dinner-debates” on Eurafrica across France. According to one of its leaders, Louis Planchais, the group’s priority was to facilitate contacts between young Africans and metropolitan French as well as youth from the other member-states of the new EEC.85 Planchais was quite candid about the difficulties they encountered at these events, which included a two-day “Franco-African Colloquium” in Noisy-sur-Oise with more than fifty participants. Planchais reflected at length about the challenges of frank exchanges between “young people who come from the most diverse political and religious backgrounds,” which he published as a “Letter to an African Friend” in one of the EYC’s monthly publications. The conversations at Noisy-sur-Oise, he wrote, were useful and important but quite “painful” for the young Europeans. Their African comrades were wary of Europeans, he wrote, and it was difficult for them to break through that barrier of distrust.86
Like Laurentie a decade earlier, Planchais acknowledged that that distrust stemmed from legitimate grievances. “We know that French action in Africa has not always been positive,” he admitted. Writing in 1958, Planchais had witnessed thirteen more years of stalled reform, “endlessly postponed and distorted in application.” Nevertheless, he still launched into a vigorous defense of French colonial policy, citing the Loi Cadre and France’s “generous scholarships” as evidence. He insisted, “We believe that your very presence in metropolitan universities and the Grandes Écoles, the scholarships you receive, which are often much higher than those of French students, and the freedom of expression that you enjoy that allows you to openly criticize the action of the metropole, can be considered as so much proof that French actions in the overseas territories are not entirely negative.” Planchais admitted these remarks were tinged with “bitterness,” but he entreated his African audience not to see that as a reproach, but rather as a symptom of the “painful shock” of the encounter. He recognized it was now time for Africans to decide Africa’s fate, but he still hoped they would choose a Franco-African community and eventually a “Eurafrican” one as well.87
In this hope, Planchais would be intensely disappointed. African students in France overwhelmingly opposed Eurafrica and passionately denounced their own politicians for entertaining the prospect. Togolese vice president of the FEANF Noé Kutuklui not only rejected the idea of Eurafrica but also incisively juxtaposed French support for European integration and the “balkanization” of Africa with the Loi Cadre. In a 1957 essay, “The Fear of the Truth,” Kutuklui called out this shocking hypocrisy in no uncertain terms: “It is no surprise that [the Loi Cadre] will lead to the formation of 13 Républiquettes. At the very moment that [the French] commit themselves to working toward European unity, they are doing everything in their power to make African unity impossible by cementing artificially imposed divisions. Vigilant youth,” Kutuklui forcefully concluded, “cannot but denounce this new form of colonialism,” whatever their elected representatives may say.88
Some of Kutuklui’s comrades, like Samba Ndiaye, whom we met at the beginning of this chapter, focused more on the neocolonial economic relations Eurafrica would surely entail. For Ndiaye, Eurafrica amounted to nothing more than the machinations of “European capitalists.”89 Communist militant and FEANF press secretary Joseph van den Reysen, a Congolese student with roots in both the French and Belgian Congo, agreed. His opposition to Eurafrica looked beyond the French sphere to transnational Europe. He attacked “Monsieur Europe” Paul-Henri Spaak, then serving as Belgium’s foreign minister, in the pages of the L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire. Van den Reysen questioned Spaak’s Socialism and called him out for never consulting the Congolese about whether they were interested in Eurafrica. He also compared German chancellor Konrad Adenauer to Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar and highlighted Britain’s tacit support for apartheid in South Africa.90 For young pro-Europe activists who saw united Europe as a beacon of democracy and pluralism, such views must have been a “painful shock” indeed.
African and European Youth and Globalization
African student leaders like Ndiaye, Kutuklui, and van den Reysen vociferously denounced Eurafrica as a political and economic project. And yet, by inserting themselves in conversations about youth, development, and global transformation that were unfolding across France, Europe, and Africa, these young Africans were in many ways helping to create an Afro-European public sphere and a shared conceptual repertoire about youth, agency, pluralism, and global change. A central anchor of that repertoire was Daniel Halévy’s widely read 1948 treatise, Essay on the Acceleration of History. Halévy’s Essai was a meditation on modernity and what we would now call globalization—but it was also an aperçu of “Europe” and what distinguished Europe and Europeans from other “peoples” and civilizations. Laden with orientalist tropes about the immobility of Eastern societies, the Essai defined Europe as a fundamentally “youthful” civilization that grows, invents, and innovates: “It was in Europe that the idea to change the world originated.”91
Halévy’s tone and style are reminiscent of the Romantic historiography of the nineteenth century. In fact, the Essai begins with an extended quotation from Michelet: “The pace of time has totally changed,” Michelet wrote in 1872. “In the average man’s lifespan (typically 72 years), I have witnessed two great revolutions, which in the past, would have likely been separated by a thousand years’ interval.” This reflection, Halévy argues, was worth revisiting in 1948, a time when “the ground has disappeared beneath our feet; in fact there is no more history, just an obscure movement of peoples.”92 Halévy’s Essai bridges a very nineteenth-century way of thinking about historical acceleration and late-twentieth-century theories of the shifting terrains of temporality and the diffuse and impersonal “forces” associated with globalization.93 The Essai asks how people could regain the reins of those forces, but Halévy did not propose a clear course of action. Nevertheless, he did provide a new vocabulary that resonated strongly with those concerned with education and the formation of youth, as well as with young people themselves.
The theme of the “acceleration of history” cut across African and European meditations on the role of youth in charting a new future for Europe and Africa in the 1950s. The quickening pace of historical change meant that the young generations would henceforth be the main drivers of history—the generation upon whose shoulders it fell to remake a changing world. In 1950, Catholic African intellectual Alioune Diop organized a conference on this theme in Saint Louis, Senegal. Diop was then representing Senegal in the French Senate, but he remained close to African student and youth milieus in both Paris and AOF. In Paris, where he had founded the influential journal and imprint Présence Africaine in 1947, Diop regularly participated in student mobilizations and, after 1951, the cultural life at the Maison de la France d’Outre-Mer. In his talk in Saint Louis, Diop ruminated on Franco-African relations in the French Union. He framed those relations in racial terms and located the problem of race in the context of a worldwide “acceleration of history,” citing Halévy’s Essai explicitly.94
Diop opened his presentation with an extended reflection on what separates “Blacks and Whites.” He asserted, “Whites and Blacks do not understand one another” for two main reasons—one economic, the other psychological. Diop’s characterization of “the European” echoed Halévy’s: “For the European, the universe is an equation of forces endlessly put in play by the militant and constituent will of man.” Diop continued, “the European” seeks a permanent revolution in given institutions and constantly strives to transcend them. Whereas “for the Black,” the purpose of life is to prosper within and through extant institutions, religion, natural laws, and “the heritage of our ancestors.” And so, Diop went on, “our aspirations are not constituted in the same way, or in the same style. What can remedy this incomprehension?”95
Diop then exclaimed, “Pluralism, is what they propose to us!” But in that very concept, Diop found yet another layer of “misunderstanding” between whites and Blacks. “In fact, there has never been pluralism without assimilation,” and it was always Africans who were expected to assimilate, not the other way around. Rather than reject genuine pluralism as a pipe dream, Diop insisted it was imperative to find a new balance, precisely considering the seemingly inevitable future of global integration. He declared, “This pluralist association concerns the equilibrium of the world. History, in its turbulent trail, demands and awakens urgent reflection in both groups. For history is moving fast.” Diop’s concluding exhortation was for Africans to confront this reality and liberate themselves from older, colonial ways of thinking about preparing Africans to take control of their own destinies. Africans must be “equipped” (équipé)—rather than “educated” (éduqué)—with the same acuity and frenetic energy as that cultivated in young Europeans. Diop was optimistic that African youth could make this happen, and he ended by cheering on young Africans and their aspirations.96
African students in Diop’s orbit in Paris embraced this message. The same theme and vocabulary were picked up by Joseph Ki-Zerbo, a prominent Catholic student leader in France from Dahomey who frequently published in Tam-Tam. In a 1955 piece entitled, “Pioneers or Mandarins?” Ki-Zerbo reflected on the crucial role African students in France would play in building Africa’s future, not only by returning home to contribute to the development of the local economy but also in forging links between Africa and the rest of the world. Ki-Zerbo anchored the recent history of “encounters between Europe and Africa” in the mobilization of African troops in World War II, when “black heroes went to die on the ‘front of liberty’ to defend the world, all of the world, against a Racism elevated to a state religion.” He continued, “Then crowds of young blacks were given access to Universities and Schools in the metropole—a second encounter, and those who find themselves in that position have a special responsibility.”97 Ki-Zerbo stressed that since the tax dollars of their compatriots back in Africa sent them to France and subsidized their studies, African students in France owed it to their fellow Africans—not the French—to master a profession that would be “useful” for Africa.
Ki-Zerbo had a broad view of the significance of growing numbers of African students in France. He declared, “It is up to us to make this influx of African students to Europe a historic phenomenon, that is, a turning point in the development of the black world, rather than a random bit of miscellany.” According to him, that would depend on whether they chose to be “pioneers” or “mandarins,” that is, what they chose to do with their new educations. Ki-Zerbo framed the urgency of that choice specifically in the context of historical acceleration. He wrote, “In an era when airplanes allow the colonizers to streamline their commercial operations and to gain ever more time, can we convince the colonized that this ‘acceleration’ is made for them? Technology is a shortcut that we too can seize.” However, Ki-Zerbo warned that technological prowess also threatened to annihilate “all that remains of black culture.” On this point, he added, “Human progress has accelerated also for moral, ideological and spiritual discoveries that we must also draw inspiration from.… We cannot build Africa if we bring the virus eating away at western civilization back with us.” In a prescient critique of technocracy and overspecialization, Ki-Zerbo continued: “Whoever today proposes a five-year plan for African development will be handicapped tomorrow by the blinkers of his ‘specialty’.… We must be vigilant in opposing the spirit of profit and egotistical individualism that is already infecting Africa.” He concluded with an appeal to Africans of his generation to imagine, invent, and create. The task of his generation, he exhorted, was not to continue “to ruminate in the abstract on theories about Négritude” but rather “to get to work, without delay.”98
The sense that there was no time to lose also inspired reflections about youth in pro-Europe circles. Writing in the main publication of the Union of European Federalists’ youth wing in 1954, the leader of the movement, Max Richard, invoked Halévy and the acceleration of history in a meditation on the distinctiveness of European culture and European conceptions of democracy and freedom. For Richard, youth had to steel themselves against not only Soviet Communism and Islamism but also US hegemony. He called on young Europeans to resist the mounting forces of Americanization: “It is out of the question to adopt an American way of life, to become American colonies. We will conserve, we will elaborate our own European way of life if we learn to unite as Europeans.”99 The preservation of a “European way of life” in the face of historical acceleration and global integration was an important part of the rationale for creating properly transnational European universities. A year after Richard’s cri d’alarme, Michel Mouskhély, French delegate to the Council of Europe, elaborated on this theme in a special session of the European Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg. Mouskhély suggested that European universities would prepare rising generations of Europeans to tackle new situations as they arose. He declared, “With the acceleration of the rhythm of history, every day we will be confronted with unexpected challenges.” He lamented an “intellectual laziness” that looked to “nineteenth-century solutions” to address twentieth-century problems. That laziness held them hostage to the nation-state, “even though current realities are brutally pushing us toward international and supranational entities.” European universities, Mouskhély concluded, would provide Europe with the “spiritual infrastructure” to forge ahead into an uncertain future.100
Proposals to create a European university stalled in the mid-1950s. When the project was revived a decade later, the theme of historical acceleration was even more pronounced. In a widely circulated Council of Europe report, French youth specialist Jean Jousselin (who, as it happens, had represented the Protestant scouts in Vichy’s Secretariat of Youth during the war) identified the acceleration of history as the determinant factor that produced “youth” as a distinct social category and turned young people into a new social and political force, both domestically and on the world stage.101 He wrote, “Technical civilization is a civilization of youth and it will be so ever more with each passing day. Henceforth, the young person knows and even understands more … than his elder.” In this sense, “the effect of the acceleration of history is the source of a rupture in the dialogue between adults and young people, and consequently, a radical transformation of youth.” This “new” youth required different institutions and the structural transformation of society. That assessment was borne out just a few years later in the May 1968 student uprisings across Europe and ex-French Africa that led to the massive overhaul of higher education on both continents.102
The generational conflict between youth and their elders in Europe ignited by historical acceleration was not quite the same as that between French-educated African youth and the traditional African gerontocracy, but French colonial officials stressed the similarities. In a 1957 article entitled “From the Africa of Yesterday to That of Tomorrow,” veteran colonial official Robert Delavignette pinned Africa’s prospects on an alliance between French and African youth. He wrote, “Eight and a half million children and adolescents are returning to class in European France.… It is banal to say that this youth constitutes France’s great hope.” He continued:
[That youth] is charged with building a less inhuman world.… Who doubts that [that youth] is already interdependent with another youth, which does not always have schools, and yet has its own ways of being and its own aspirations. Who doesn’t dream of that beautiful and necessary common future of which metropolitan youth and the youth of black Africa, both carriers of hope, are the key elements?
Like Ki-Zerbo, Delavignette opposed an obsession with Negritude and the precolonial African past with a more future-oriented outlook. It was important to celebrate Africa’s rich history, but he hoped that would not “lock African youth in an impasse, in which it would lose time, at a moment when there is no time to lose if men of all colors and all races want to learn to live together.”103 Delavignette ended his piece with a forceful affirmation that Africans themselves had to deal with Africa’s problems, but he also insisted those problems were also French and European problems. Indeed, he declared, “these are problems of human relations within a universal civilization that is more and more mechanized, these are problems of psychological equilibrium amidst disruptive technologies.” He concluded, “We are all equal before the unknowns [these problems] bring. We all must study them and free ourselves of old superiority and inferiority complexes. Neither Europe nor Africa holds the solutions. But the youth of Europe and the youth of Africa must work together to humanize the atomic age that has descended on us.”104 With these words, Delavignette acknowledged—albeit obliquely—the need to overcome the ongoing legacies of colonial domination based on racial hierarchies if not just French but also European and African youth were to build a future together under the conditions of historical acceleration.
Over the course of the 1950s, the promise of pluralism and brassage waned, leaving in its wake a toxic stew of disappointed hopes, political resentment, and new patterns of racialization and institutional inequality. This set the stage for a more radical conceptual shift with African independence and deepening European integration in the 1960s. These two world-historical developments became entwined in more ambitious European cultural policy with the launching of the Council of Europe’s European Cultural Fund in 1960. A successor to the EYC, which by then was defunct, the European Cultural Fund homed in on education and youth development as crucial vehicles for further European cooperation. The fund identified the “presentation of Europe to non-Europeans” as one of its key mandates. Its executive board affirmed, “One of our main tasks must be to make quite clear the part Europe must play in a world in which its former supremacy is giving way to cultural pluralism.” This global pluralism was characterized by “the great difficulties that arise from the inevitable conflict between our liberal and technical culture and the traditional cultures of Asia, Africa and the Middle East.” In this formulation, there was a singular “Europe,” and there was the rest of the world: “European civilization should be presented to the outside world as a single unit embodying national variations. There can be no point of contact between French, English or Italian national culture and a completely different civilization such as that of India or Mexico. Europe as a whole must be presented as a single entity to the rest of the world.”105
Africa was of particular concern because France had locked European institutions into providing technical aid to its former African colonies.106 The board asserted in no uncertain terms its view that those countries had acquired “premature and perhaps somewhat precarious independence.” Nevertheless, the fund would not renege on its commitments and would continue training European technicians to send to Africa. The fund would also publicize European unity to African students and trainees in Europe:
Although Great Britain and France have long been aware of the problems raised by the presence of temporary residents from distant countries, the general situation has changed considerably in recent years, and responsibility towards these visitors is no longer national but European; they no longer come to France, Germany, or Italy, but to Europe, and they must be given an opportunity to gain a true picture of Europe as a whole.
It was hoped this kind of pan-European education campaign directed at students from former colonies would overcome the legacies of colonialism. Since the “overseas peoples” had obtained independence, “they tend[ed] to hold hostile prejudices to their former masters. Only by encouraging the peoples of the new states to consider Europe as a whole will this uneasiness be dispelled.”107 Thus already in 1960, the year of African independence, institutions like the European Cultural Fund were actively reframing the issue of receiving African students from France’s former empire in a transnational European perspective.
That process continued to unfold in a series of colloquia organized by the Council of Europe over the next several years. At a session held in Paris in January 1964, French delegates stressed the need for shifting French thinking about students from France’s former empire into a transnational European frame: “A Senegalese, a Cambodian, a Moroccan, an Algerian—they are all foreigners, even though the French are reluctant to apply that label because they all speak French.” In this formulation, language is singled out as the only reason for this “reluctance,” erasing not just the postwar experiment of Franco-African integration but all of France’s colonial history. The delegates further pressed the issue by noting that Tunisians or Vietnamese might speak French even though they have their own national languages, while French was the national language everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa, confusing matters further still. “Despite these nuances,” the delegates insisted, “it is necessary to speak of ‘foreign’ students and trainees for francophone Africans, as for Americans or Latin Americans.”108
Participants at the colloquium also drew attention to the percentages of foreign students in different European countries. In Britain and France, approximately two-thirds of all “foreign students” came from former colonies. In France, most of those students were North African and sub-Saharan African: 45 percent of all “foreign students” in France were listed as coming from Africa, whereas only 21 percent were listed as coming from Western Europe. These statistics raised concerns that there was a decline in the percentage of European students “in favor of Africans.” Commentary on those students’ attitudes and social milieus noted a latent hostility among former colonial students toward their ex-metropoles. Consequently, participants suggested that countries without colonies like Germany were attracting more students from developing countries precisely because they were not a (recent) colonial power.109 In their concluding report, participants noted that Africans in France, “despite a certain reluctance,” had been welcomed in France and “only very rarely” showed real hostility toward the French. And yet, the report also acknowledged that racism among host populations was real. This phenomenon was both externalized as a particularly acute problem in Germany and totally naturalized—as if the mere presence of Africans explained hostility or aversion toward them in and of itself. The authors suggested that since there were few students of color in Germany before 1950, the “reserve” but also the “curiosity” that these students inspired in the German population was an “obvious, natural reaction.”110 As Heide Fehrenbach has shown, the naturalization of racial conflict anchored a particular strand of racial liberalism that took root in postwar Germany under US occupation.111 Shifting the register of the now decades-long discussion about youth, race, and pluralism from a Franco-African imperial context to the transnational European plane further encouraged the eclipse of brassage and the ascendancy of that “race relations” model in late twentieth-century France. The transformation of African student-citizens of the French Union to “foreign students in Europe” was complete.
1. Tableaux statistiques, Première Partie, Enseignement Outre-Mer: Bulletin de l’Inspection-Générale de l’enseignement et de la jeunesse du Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer (December 1950): 37–41, ANOM: BIB AOM 20505/1950.
2. Foster, African Catholic, 128.
3. For a description of this practice, see “Premier Novembre,” Bulletin Mensuel de l’Association des Étudiants Congolais, no. 7 (December 1954), ANOM: AEF GGAEF 5D/280.
4. Fabienne Guimont, Les étudiants africains en France, 1950–1965 (L’Harmattan, 1997), chap. 2.
5. Michel Sot, ed., Étudiants africains en France, 1951–2001: Cinquante ans de relations France-Afrique, quel avenir? (Paris: Karthala, 2002); Françoise Blum, “Transfers of Knowledge, Multiple Identities: The Example of Students from the FEANF (Fédération des Étudiants d’Afrique Noire en France),” African Identities 16, no. 2 (2018): 130–145, https://
doi .org /10 .1080 /14725843 .2018 .1449719; Blum, “L’indépendance sera révolutionnaire ou ne sera pas: Étudiants africains en France contre l’ordre colonial,” Cahiers d’histoire: Revue d’histoire critique 126 (2015): 119–238, https:// doi .org /10 .4000 /chrhc .4165; Louisa Rice, “Between Empire and Nation: Francophone West African Students and Decolonization,” Atlantic Studies 10, no. 1 (2013), https:// doi .org /10 .1080 /14788810 .2013 .764106; Amady Aly Dieng, Les premiers pas de la Fédération des Étudiants d’Afrique noire en France (1950–1955): De l’Union française à Bandoung (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003); Pierre Nkwengue, L’union nationale des étudiants du Kamerun: Ou la contribution des étudiants africains à l’émancipation de l’Afrique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005). 6. I discuss Senghor and Eurafrica in the introduction.
7. Samba Ndiaye, “Nouvelle mesure arbitraire,” L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire, no. 11 (April 1957), reprinted in Sadji, Le rôle de la génération charnière, 207.
8. Lena de Faramond, “De Jeunes Africains Parlent,” Pensée française-fédération, special issue, “Jeunesses d’Afrique Noire,” no. 3 (January 15, 1957): 27, ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324.
9. Brassage was a recurrent theme in Houphouët-Boigny’s successful campaign to expand exchange programs for Africans in France during school breaks. See, for instance, his letter to the minister of national education, December 7, 1956, AN: F17/15727.
10. Antoine Yaméogo, “Plaidoyer pour l’Étudiant Africain,” Tam-Tam, deuxième année, no. 4 (April 1953), Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF). Yaméogo’s reflections on Europe and racism in the 1950s may have proved formative later in his career. He represented Upper Volta in the negotiations with the EEC that led to the Yaoundé Accords (1963) and, in the late 1970s, was a key figure in the campaign to get the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stop lending to apartheid South Africa.
11. Yaméogo, “Plaidoyer pour l’Étudiant Africain,” Tam-Tam, BNF, 10.
12. Présidence du Conseil, Haut Comité de la Jeunesse de France et d’Outre-Mer, Groupe de travail “Contacts entre jeunes de France et d’Outre-Mer,” January 1957, AN: F17/15727.
13. See, for instance, “Les Étudiants d’Outre-Mer en France,” IFOP, November 1960, CAC: 19771275/28.
14. Tableaux Statistiques in the Bulletin de l’Inspection-Générale de l’Enseignement et de la Jeunesse du Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer, ANOM: BIB AOM/20505/1950-1958.
15. See “Le Logement des Étudiants d’Outre-Mer,” in UNEF Informations—Outre-Mer (1958), BNF.
16. Sadji, Le rôle de la génération charnière, 191–196. I return to Sadji’s tortuous path to study German in chapter 5.
17. Maurice Voisin, “Si Nous Parlions un peu de la Situation des Étudiants Africains,” Les Échos de l’Afrique Noire, June 29, 1953. Reprinted in Tam-Tam, troisième année, no. 1 (November–December 1953), 15–18, BNF.
18. Letter from Annie Gacon to M. le Chef de Cabinet de M. le ministre de l’Éducation Nationale, May 14, 1952, AN: F/17/17768.
19. Annie Gacon, “La Propagande communiste en Afrique Noire: Choses vues et entendues à un meeting ‘d’étudiants’ à Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal,” Climats (October 30–November 5, 1952), ANOM: 1AFFPOL/2199.
20. Joseph-Gabriel, Reimagining Liberation, 90–91.
21. For the founding documents of the Maison, see ANOM: 1AFFPOL/2265. On local foyers des étudiants africains, see ANS: 18G/211 (160). For heated exchanges between the colonial and education ministries on the creation of the foyers in the early 1950s, see AN: F/17/17768.
22. Akira Iriye links the founding of the Cité U to the League of Nation’s Eurocentric initiatives in interwar international intellectual cooperation. See Iriye, Cultural Internationalism. The vast majority of pavilions from the interwar period were European, though the United States and Latin America were also well represented.
23. On the extensive surveillance of students from AOF, both during their time in France and when they returned home, see multiple dossiers: ANS: 17G/269 (111), 17G/604 (152), O/666, O/668 and O/669 (31), 21G/210 (178); and ANOM: 1/AFFPOL/2265, 1/AFFPOL/2395, 1/AFFPOL/2398.
24. Billères-Defferre correspondence, March 20 and April 5, 1956, AN: F17/15727.
25. For correspondence, administrative reports, and budgets, see the dossier “Maison de la France d’Outre-Mer—subventions AOF—1953–1958,” ANS: 18G/211 (160). For the postcolonial era, see dossiers on the Office de Coopération et d’Accueil Universitaire, successor of the Office des Étudiants d’Outre-Mer, in CAC: 19780596/42. See also Sot, Étudiants africains en France.
26. “Les Étudiants d’Outre-Mer en France,” IFOP, November 1960, CAC: 19771275/28. None of the female African students polled had married French men.
27. Faramond, “De Jeunes Africains Parlent,” 30, ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324.
28. Bernard Dadié, Un nègre à Paris (Paris: Éditions Présence Africaine, 1959), 183.
29. Rapport de M. Lamy Roger sur les stages ruraux, undated (c. 1957), CAC: 19860445/2.
30. Faramond, “De Jeunes Africains Parlent,” 25, ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324.
31. Faramond, “De Jeunes Africains Parlent,” 29, ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324.
32. Jobs, Riding the New Wave, 32–33.
33. Faramond, “De Jeunes Africains Parlent,” 30, ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324.
34. Dossier “Réponses à la circulaire ministérielle du 15 janvier 1960,” CAC: 19770181/6; Letter from Recteur Clermont-Ferrand to HJCS, May 9, 1960, CAC: 19860445/6.
35. Letter from Doyen de la Faculté de Médecine to the Recteur de l’Académie de Bordeaux, February 19, 1960, CAC: 19860445/6. See also the response from the rector at the University of Nancy in the Dossier “Réponses,” CAC: 19860445/6.
36. Letter from Jean Brethe de la Gressaye to Doyen Garrigou-Lagrange, February 27, 1960, CAC: 19860445/6.
37. Letter from Lucien Martin to Doyen Garrigou-Lagrange, February 15, 1960, CAC: 19860445/6.
38. Note à l’attention de M. le HCJS a/s projet d’établissement de contacts entre des étudiants africains et la population de Villefranche de Rouergue (Aveyron), undated; Directeur de l’Office des Étudiants d’Outre-Mer à Délégué Académique, Dir-BUS, May 3, 1960, CAC: 19860445/5.
39. See Fehrenbach, Race after Hitler; Paul Gilroy, “There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack”: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
40. Présidence du Conseil, Haut Comité de la Jeunesse de France et d’Outre-Mer, Groupe de travail “Contacts entre jeunes de France et d’Outre-Mer,” January 1957, AN: F17/15727.
41. Rapport de M. Lamy Roger sur les stages ruraux, undated (c. 1957), CAC: 19860445/2.
42. Annexe II: Les Stagiaires d’Afrique Noire disent au revoir à leurs Amis Bourguignons, signed Bagouro Noumansana, undated, CAC: 19860445/2. Noumansana became a top agricultural engineer in independent Mali. The exchanges did indeed produce a new African elite.
43. See my “Obscuring Race.”
44. Jobs, Riding the New Wave.
45. R. Mawlawé, “Sommes-nous anti-Français?,” L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire, nouvelle série, no 3 (April 1956), ANS: 21G/209 (178).
46. Laurent Dubois has long observed that it was people in France’s colonies that concretized the promise of French revolutionary values in their most radical and egalitarian forms. See his Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1794–1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
47. For a lucid analysis of these dynamics today, see Derald Wing Sue, Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender and Sexual Orientation (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010). I discuss African students’ keen and prescient perceptions of how racism actually worked in France’s postwar empire based on their lived experience in France at greater length elsewhere. See Emily Marker, “African Youth on the Move in Postwar Greater France: Experiential Knowledge and Decolonial Politics at the End of Empire,” Know: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge 3, no. 2 (Fall 2019), 283–303, https://
doi .org /10 .1086 /704620. 48. Isabelle Tévoedjrè, “Les étudiants ‘métropolitains’ et nous,” L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire, nouvelle série, no 3 (April 1956), ANS: 21G/209 (178).
49. Such critiques often proved too much for French officials, who seized multiple editions of L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire that year. African students aggressively protested to their political representatives in Paris and made appeals to international youth organizations, which eventually led to the journal’s reinstatement. Lettre ouverte à Guy Mollet du Bureau exécutif du Bloc Populaire Sénégalais: “Laissez Paraître L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire,” March 18, 1957, ANS: 17G/596 (152). I return to this in chapter 5.
50. Albert Tévoedjrè, L’Afrique révoltée (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1958).
51. Albert Tévoedjrè, “Un écho des étudiants africains catholiques de France: Discours adressé à son excellence Mgr. Garronne, Archevêque-Co-Adjuteur de Toulouse au nom des Étudiants d’Outre-Mer,” Jeunesse d’Afrique: Organe mensuel de l’Association des Étudiants catholiques de Dakar, no. 3 (June–July 1955): 8, ANOM: BIB SOM POM/b/275.
52. Thomas Diop, “Problèmes philosophiques et religieux,” Pensée française-fédération no. 3, special issue, “Jeunesses d’Afrique Noire” (January 15, 1957): 20–21, ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324. I discuss this topic at length in chapter 5.
53. Diop, “Problèmes philosophiques et religieux,” 23, ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324.
54. Dadié, Un nègre à Paris, 25.
55. Dadié, Un nègre à Paris, 30. My interpretation draws on an excellent master’s thesis by Nicole Cesare, “An African in Paris … and New York and Rome: Bernard Dadié and the Postcolonial Travel Narrative” (master’s thesis, Villanova University, 2007).
56. Dadié, Un nègre à Paris, 182–183.
57. Dadié, Un nègre à Paris, 206.
58. Ousmane Socé Diop, Intervention faite à Strasbourg par M. Ousmane Socé Diop, Sénateur du Sénégal, Délégué de la France au Conseil de l’Europe a/s le Plan Schuman, August 22, 1950, AMAE: K-Afrique, 1944-1952-Généralités, 53.
59. Cited in Supplément a/s la Communauté politique européenne, unsigned, Perspectives, November 14, 1953, 7, AN: C//15913.
60. Louis-Paul Aujoulat, “Avant-Propos,” Bulletin de l’Inspection-Générale de l’Enseignement et de la Jeunesse du Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer, no. 3 (April 1952), ANOM: BIB AOM/20505/1952.
61. “Conférence donnée le 8 juillet 1952 devant les Stagiaires de Saint Cloud par Dr. Aujoulat,” reprinted in Bulletin de l’Inspection-Générale de l’Enseignement et de la Jeunesse du Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer, no. 4 (December 1952) (emphasis in original), ANOM: BIB AOM/20505/1952.
62. “Conférence donnée le 8 juillet 1952 … par Dr. Aujoulat,” ANOM: BIB AOM/20505/1952.
63. “Conférence donnée le 8 juillet 1952 … par Dr. Aujoulat,” ANOM: BIB AOM/20505/1952.
64. “Conférence donnée le 8 juillet 1952 … par Dr. Aujoulat,” ANOM: BIB AOM/20505/1952.
65. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize; Bryant, Education as Politics; Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State. Wilder emphasizes the newness of Senghor’s postwar vision of Eurafrica in a contribution to the edited volume Black France/France Noire.
66. Saada, Les enfants de la colonie; Owen White, Children of the French Empire: Miscegenation and Colonial Society in French West Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Rachel Jean-Baptiste, “Miss Eurafrica: Men, Women’s Sexuality, and Métis Identity in Late Colonial French Africa,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 20, no. 3 (September 2011): 568–593, https://
www .jstor .org /stable /41305885. 67. Direction Générale-Affaires Politiques, Direction-Afrique, “Note sur la position des territoires français d’outre-mer dans la question de l’intégration européenne,” October 14, 1952, AMAE: K-Afrique, 1944-1952-Généralités, 53.
68. Hamani Diori, “Le Pari du Siècle: France—Europe—Afrique,” Les Cahiers de Jeune Europe, no. 4 (Supplément à Jeune Europe no. 7, March 1, 1958): 13–16, BNF.
69. In Cameroon, Pré acquired a reputation as a fanatical crusader against African nationalists. The “massacre of May” 1955 in Cameroon occurred during his tenure. See Martin Atangana, The End of French Rule in Cameroon (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010), 53.
70. Procès-verbal des débats de la Commission Europe-Outre-Mer, UEF, Paris, July 3–4, 1953, ANOM: 1AFFPOL/2314.
71. Procès-verbal des débats de la Commission Europe-Outre-Mer, UEF, Paris, July 3–4, 1953, ANOM: 1AFFPOL/2314.
72. James Chappel argues that by 1950, the more open, pluralist strand of social Catholicism associated with Jacques Maritain and his associates had been thoroughly eclipsed by the “Defenders of the West” in Catholic federalist circles, including the Union of European Federalists. Chappel, Catholic Modern, chap. 4.
73. Commission Roland Pré, “L’Afrique à la recherche d’une civilisation: Orient ou occident?,” February 1954, ANOM: 1AFFPOL/2260.
74. “Note sur les objectifs et méthodes des ‘États-Généraux de la Jeunesse d’Europe’ 1957,” January 19, 1955, 1, AHUE: ME-1458.
75. Jacques Eugene, “Déclaration-Programme,” January 19, 1955, AHUE: ME-1458.
76. Lawrence was sharply criticized by more radical African youth leaders as a lackey of the colonial regime and the Americans. It is surely not a coincidence that he was involved with the WAY and the EYC, which were both sponsored by the United States. On the eve of independence, Kane Ali Bokar, president of the Federal Council of Youth of AOF, described Lawrence’s position as president of the WAY as “pure demagoguery.… It was just necessary to hire a nègre to prove that the WAY was not racist.” Extraits du Rapport moral de Kane Ali Bokar concernant le Conseil de Jeunesse de l’Union Française, UNEF Informations—Outre-Mer 1958, Annexe II, 73, BNF.
77. Jacques Eugene, “Rapport Général,” Comité National d’Action Jeune du Mouvement Européen, Secrétariat Français de la Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse, June 28, 1957, 60, AHUE: EN-2703.
78. Eugene, “Rapport Général,” 55–56, AHUE: EN-2703.
79. See the folder “Dossier Échanges France Outre-Mer, 1959,” CAC: 19860445/2.
80. The EEC created its own “Bureau Liaison France-Afrique-Europe,” which was also headquartered in Paris. See AHUE: BAC003/1965-28. Some of the faculty mentors discussed earlier in the chapter got funding from the bureau to take their African mentees on educational trips to EEC countries. For instance, one of the Bordelais law professors received support to take students to Berlin. Letter from Lucien Martin to the HCJS, May 31, 1960, CAC: 19860445/6.
81. Eugene, “Rapport Général,” 26 (emphasis in original), AHUE: EN-2703.
82. Rapport d’orientation, “Éléments pour une nouvelle étape,” Les cahiers de Jeune Europe, no. 1 (supplément au Jeune Europe, no. 1, nouvelle série, December 1957), BNF.
83. Nabi Ibrahima Youla, “L’Eurafrique, une communauté librement consentie,” Les cahiers de Jeune Europe, no. 1 (December 1957): 13, BNF.
84. “Rapport de la commission ‘outre-mer,’ ” Les cahiers de Jeune Europe, no. 1 (December 1957): 14, BNF.
85. Louis Planchais, “Bilan des activités de la CEJ,” undated, AHUE: ME-185.
86. Louis Planchais, “Lettre à un ami africain,” Les Cahiers de Jeune Europe, no. 3, “L’espace Europe-Afrique” (supplément au Jeune Europe, no. 5, nouvelle série, February 1, 1958): 13–14, BNF.
87. Planchais, “Lettre à un ami africain,” 13–14.
88. Noé Kutuklui, “La peur de la vérité,” L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire, nouvelle série, no. 10 (March 1957), partially reprinted in Sadji, Le rôle de la génération charnière, 203–204.
89. Ndiaye, “Nouvelle mesure arbitraire,” reprinted in Sadji, Le rôle de la génération charnière.
90. Joseph van den Reysen, “L’Eurafrique, le Marché Commun et quelques autres projets,” L’Étudiant d’Afrique Noire, nouvelle série, no. 8 (January 1957), reprinted in Sadji, Le rôle de la génération charnière, 211.
91. Daniel Halévy, Essai sur l’accélération de l’histoire (Paris: Editions Self, 1948), 45, 60.
92. Halévy, Essai, 1, 12.
93. “The acceleration of history” is the opening line of Pierre Nora’s “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 7–24, https://
doi .org /10 .2307 /2928520. François Hartog acknowledges the provenance of the phrase in his Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and the Experience of Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 123–124. Reinhardt Koselleck also took up this issue in a 1976 essay translated and republished in High-Speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity, ed. Harmut Rosa and William E. Sheuerman (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009). 94. Alioune Diop, “Pour que Noirs et Blancs se comprennent,” résumé d’une conférence organisée à Saint-Louis par la Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, December 23, 1950, ANS: 21G/172 (144). On Diop’s politics and activities in this period, see Foster, African Catholic, chap. 2.
95. Diop, “Pour que Noirs et Blancs se comprennent,” ANS: 21G/172 (144).
96. Diop, “Pour que Noirs et Blancs se comprennent,” ANS: 21G/172 (144).
97. Joseph Ki-Zerbo, “Pionniers ou Mandarins?,” Tam-Tam, deuxième année, no. 5 (May 1955): 5, BNF. Ki-Zerbo also features prominently in Foster’s work. See African Catholic, chap. 4.
98. Ki-Zerbo, “Pionniers ou Mandarins?,” Tam-Tam, BNF. This piece was widely read among African students in France and the territories. It was cited at length in a similar reflection by Senegalese student Pape Soulaye Ndiaye, “L’étudiant africain et la notion d’élite,” which was published in Dakar-Étudiant shortly thereafter and reprinted in full in Sadji, Le rôle de la génération charnère, 186–188.
99. Max Richard, “Justice et réconciliation dans la transformation de la société,” Jeunesses européennes fédéralistes (September 15, 1954), AHUE: UEF-176.
100. Michel Mouskhély, “Les Universités et la communauté spirituelle de l’Europe,” Rapport présenté à la 2ème réunion spéciale a/s universités européennes, Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l’Europe, Commission des Questions Culturelles et Scientifiques, June 11–13, 1955, AN: 70/AJ/27.
101. Jean Jousselin, Comité de l’Education Extrascolaire, Conseil de l’Europe, “L’Organisation de la Jeunesse en Europe,” Tome 1, Strasbourg, January 12, 1965, CAC: 19780596/66.
102. For a transnational Franco-African perspective on May 1968, see Hendrickson, Decolonizing 1968. The “acceleration of history” became a common refrain in the Association of European Teacher’s meeting to draft a “Charter of European Education,” which was held in Brussels just weeks before the May 1968 uprisings. AHUE: AEDE-23.
103. Robert Delavignette, “De l’Afrique d’hier à celle de demain,” Pensée française-fédération, special issue: “Jeunesses d’Afrique Noire,” no. 3 (January 15, 1957): 4–8 (emphasis added), ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324.
104. Robert Delavignette, “De l’Afrique d’hier,” 8, ANOM: BIB SOM C/BR/3324.
105. Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, 12th Ordinary Session, Resolution 186 (1960) in reply to the First Report of the Administrative Board of the Cultural Fund, CAC: 19770181/1.
106. Véronique Dimier, “Bringing the Neo-patrimonial State Back to Europe: French Decolonization and the Making of European Development Aid Policy,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 48 (2008): 433–457, https://
www .fes .de /index .php ?eID =dumpFile&t =f&f =46875&token =b7cbf72149fd16efd967b632d62d31d4914fb944. 107. First Report of the Administrative Board of the Cultural Fund, CAC: 19770181/1.
108. Accueil et Séjour en Europe des Étudiants et Stagiaires Étrangers: Étude comparative sur leur accueil et leur orientation du point de vue social, linguistique, pédagogique et technique dans les pays membres du Conseil de l’Europe,” undated, CAC: 19771275/28.
109. On ex-colonial students in Germany, see Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham and Oxford: Duke University Press, 2012).
110. Accueil et Séjour en Europe des Étudiants et Stagiaires Étrangers: Étude comparative sur leur accueil et leur orientation du point de vue social, linguistique, pédagogique et technique dans les pays membres du Conseil de l’Europe,” undated, CAC: 19771275/28.
111. Fehrenbach, Race after Hitler.