Notes
INTRODUCTION
1. Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER), 1116.6.1, Norman to Strong, October 10, 1926.
2. FRASER, 1116.6, Strong to Norman, March 6, 1926.
3. FRASER, Strong to Pierre Jay, September 11, 1926, and previously, Jay to Strong, August 3, 1924.
4. FRASER, Strong to George L. Harrison, August 9, 1926.
5. Meyer 1970, 25.
6. Meyer 1970; Moreau 1991.
7. FRASER, 0320.115, Percy Jay Fuller, August 4, 1926.
8. Moreau 1991.
9. Turner 1996, 32.
10. Kindleberger 1973, 303.
11. Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1981; Gilpin 1987; Mearsheimer 1994.
12. Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977.
13. Eichengreen 1992; Simmons 1994; Webb 1995.
14. Aizenman and Pasricha 2010; McDowell 2012; Broz 2015.
15. Mitrany 1976; Haas 1964.
16. Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 1985; Haas 1992; Emirbayer 1997; McNamara 1998; Abdelal 2007; Chwieroth 2010; Nelson 2017.
17. With the notable exception of Morrison 2021.
18. Sociology, especially economic sociology and relational sociology, have evaluated the role of social ties in policymaking. See Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 1985; Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Zelizer 2000; Zelizer 2012; White 2002.
19. Keohane 2010; Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010.
20. North and Weingast 1989.
21. Friedman 1962; Siklos 2002, 21–26.
22. Katzenstein and Nelson 2013.
23. Mundell 1999; Morrison 2021.
24. Braun 2016; Beckert 2016.
25. Bagehot 1912.
26. For broader discussions on the origins and rationale for central banks and the political economy of financial governance, reform, and regulation, see Broz 1997; Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002; Obstfeld 2009a; Helleiner and Pagliari 2011; Borio, James, and Shin 2014; Frieden 2016.
27. Moessner and Allen 2010.
28. Nelson 2017; Copelovitch 2010; Vreeland 2003; Vreeland 2007.
29. Stone 2013.
30. Nelson and Katzenstein 2014, 362.
31. Keynes 1937, 214. Per Knight 1921 and Keynes 1937, the conceptual distinction between calculable risk, based in known probability distributions, and incalculable uncertainty is where the “probable distribution of outcomes itself is unknown.” Lockwood 2015, 727; Nelson and Katzenstein 2014.
32. Widmaier, Blyth, and Seabrooke 2007.
33. Blyth 2006; Nelson 2017; Kirshner 2015.
34. Keynes 1936, 162–63.
35. Haas 1992; McNamara 1998; Abdelal 2007; Nelson 2017; Chwieroth 2015.
36. Adolph 2013.
37. Seabrooke and Tsingou 2021.
38. Granovetter 1985, 486; Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Haas 1992.
39. Zelizer 2012, 148.
40. See Goddard 2009; McCourt 2016; Pouliot 2016; MacDonald 2018; and Jackson and Nexon 2019 on relational approaches to international politics. See Siklos 2002; Singleton 2011; Helleiner 2013; Bytheway and Metzler 2016; Johnson 2016; and Morrison 2021 on financial diplomacy.
41. Widmaier, Blyth, and Seabrooke 2007, 748.
42. Zelizer 2012, 148.
43. Volcker and Gyohten 1992. See also Johnson 2016 on how the transnational central bank community engages with one another.
44. Granovetter 1985, 486.
45. Collins quoted in Zelizer 2012, 8. See also White 2002.
46. Zelizer 2012, 145, 149.
47. Zelizer 2000.
48. FRASER, 1116.2.1, Strong to Norman, November 17, 1921.
49. Bank for International Settlements Archives (BISA), HAL.10 (F02), Edward Jay Epstein, “A Brave New Role for the BIS.”
50. Silver 1989, 276.
51. Wheeler 2018, 59.
52. Mercer 2005, 95.
53. MacMillan 2003.
54. Dore 1983.
55. See Wheeler 2018 on a review of theories of trust in international relations and a discussion on the various means in which trust emerges. Also Larson 1997; Rathbun 2012; Jervis 1976; and Kydd 2001 on trust and trust formation.
56. Wheeler 2012; Wheeler 2018; Holmes 2018; Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2017.
57. Gray 2013; Gray 2009.
58. FRASER, 1116.7.1, Strong to Norman, October 19, 1927; emphasis added.
59. On leaders’ influence in central banking and crises, see Friedman 1962; Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Siklos 2002; Singleton 2011; Romer and Romer 2004. For international relations scholarship on leaders, see Saunders 2009; Lupton 2020; Horowitz 2018; Horowitz 2015; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Krcmaric, Nelson, and Roberts 2020.
60. Author interview, anonymous.
61. Romer and Romer 2004.
62. Nelson 2017; Kertzer 2016; Lupton 2020; Yarhi-Milo 2014.
63. Krasner 1976; Kindleberger 1973.
64. See Strange 1971; Webb and Krasner 1989; Eichengreen and Flandreau 2009; Eichengreen, Mehl, and Chiţu 2019. Throughout this book, unless otherwise specified, “postwar” indicates the post-1945 period, “prewar” indicates the pre-1914 period, and “interwar” indicates the 1918–1938 years.
65. McDowell 2017.
66. Katzenstein 1977; Kapstein 1992; Kapstein 1994; Drezner 2007.
67. Kirshner 2015; Cohen 2015.
68. Aizenman and Pasricha 2010; McDowell 2012; Broz 2015.
69. Bernanke 2002.
70. Eichengreen 1992; Simmons 1994; Simmons 2001.
71. Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977.
72. Copelovitch 2010; Toniolo 2005; Borio, Toniolo, and Clement 2008.
73. Woods 2010; Helleiner 2014.
74. Keohane 2011; Kreps 2011.
75. Chwieroth 2010; Nelson 2014; Nelson 2017.
76. Adolph 2013; Chwieroth 2015; Marple 2021.
77. Kindleberger 1989; Kindleberger 1990; Kindleberger 1978.
78. Horowitz 2018, 185. See also Goddard 2009 on how political entrepreneurs can shape and produce structural change, from a lens of social network theory.
79. Broz 2015; Sahasrabuddhe 2024.
80. Johnson 2016 also illustrates the hierarchical nature of the transnational central bank community, with a focus on hierarchies in the transnational central bank communities in the West and Eastern Europe.
81. Carnegie and Carson 2020.
82. Brown 2014, 409.
83. Brown 2014.
84. Friedman 1962; Siklos 2002; Singleton 2011, 21–26.
85. Romer and Romer 2004.
86. Keating and Ruzicka 2014, 745.
87. Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Wheeler 2018.
88. Ku and Mitzen 2022, 800.
89. Gerring 2007.
90. Although the Depression continued through 1939, I do not address the post-1933 efforts as they present a distinct context to the pre-1933 years and are outside the scope of this project. The remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 violated the Versailles and Locarno Treaties; states were now on the road to war.
91. Moss and Thomas 2021.
92. Frieden 2016, 45; Chinn and Frieden 2011.
93. Drezner 2014a; Drezner 2014b; Helleiner 2014, 35; FOMC 2008b.
94. Schedler 2007.
95. See Martin 2022 and Slobodian 2018 on the deep histories of political contestation in the origins of key global governance institutions and governing ideas.
96. Johnson 2016.
97. Ikenberry 2001; Cooley 2005; Lake 2009.
98. MacDonald 2018.
99. Essentially, central bankers tend to run in, and reinforce, elite networks that are propped up through ties to prestigious education backgrounds, past careers, wealth, race, and gender, not unlike other elitist organizations as studied in Mills 1956; Tsingou 2015; Rivera 2016.
100. McNamara 2002; Dietsch 2020; Best 2016; van ’t Klooster 2020; Downey 2021; Monnet 2024; Moschella 2024.
101. Balls, Howat, and Stansbury 2018.
102. O’Driscoll, Jr. 2011; Perry 2020; Högenauer and Howarth 2019.
103. Smialek 2023; Greider 1989; Conti-Brown 2016.
104. Blinder 1998; Drazen 2002; Alesina and Tabellini 2007; Alesina and Tabellini 2008. For a discussion on the domestic politics of this institutional setup see Broz 2005; Tucker 2018.
105. See Farrell and Newman 2014 on the new interdependence approach on rule overlap across national jurisdictions.
106. Horowitz 2018, 249.
107. Clarke 1967.
1. STRONG MEN AND STRONG'S MEN
1. Clarke 1967.
2. Kirshner 2007; Poast 2015.
3. Mouré 2002, 50–51.
4. Kindleberger 1973.
5. Kindleberger 1973.
6. Eichengreen 1992.
7. Kindleberger 1973; Eichengreen 1992.
8. Simmons 1994, 30.
9. Eichengreen 1992.
10. Clarke 1967; Mouré 2002; Bytheway and Metzler 2016.
11. Berman 1998; Gourevitch 1986; Polanyi 1957. See also Eichengreen and Kakridis 2023 on the establishment and institutionalization of modern-day central bank practices in the interwar period.
12. Eichengreen 2019a, 34; Eichengreen 2019b.
13. MacMillan 2003.
14. Keynes 1920.
15. Fink 1991, 11.
16. Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER), 797.04, Assistant Observer, James A. Logan, Jr., April–August 1922.
17. FRASER, 797.4, Strong to Logan, June 23, 1922.
18. Fink 1991, 17.
19. Eichengreen 1992.
20. Clarke 1967, 35.
21. Mouré 2002; Clarke 1967, 35.
22. Hawtrey 1922.
23. Sayers 1976, 162–63; Singleton 2011.
24. Eichengreen and Flandreau 2009.
25. Bytheway and Metzler 2016.
26. Boyle 1967.
27. Ahamed 2009.
28. Broz 1997.
29. Moreau 1991, 39. This ideological preference is recounted in Moreau's diary entry of July 20, 1926.
30. Bytheway and Metzler 2016, 65.
31. Bank of England Archives (BEA), Richard Sydney Sayers, Papers: Records of Interviews, 1969–1973, file ADM/33/25, Interview with R. N. Kershaw, March 27, 1969; and 1969–1973, file ADM/33/25, Interview with Lord Rennell, April 24, 1969.
32. FRASER, 210.1, Hamlin to Strong, January 9, 1917.
33. Sayers 1976 (appendices). NB: Only two of Norman's principles are listed here, as relevant to this discussion.
34. Turner 1996, 31.
35. FRASER, 1000.2, Strong's Diary, March 24, 28, and 30, 1916.
36. Mouré 2002.
37. FRASER, 1116.3.2, Norman to Strong, August 9, 1922. See also Mouré 2002.
38. FRASER, 1116.5.1, Norman to Strong, May 11, 1925.
39. FRASER, 1116.3.1, Strong to Norman, March 28, 1922.
40. FRASER, 1116.5.2, Norman to Strong, April 15 and May 11, 1925.
41. FRASER, 1116.5.1, Strong to Norman, April 27, 1925.
42. Mouré 2002, 155.
43. BEA, Overseas Department: Japan, OV16/106, Norman to Fukai, May 22, 1923; Fukai to Norman, May 29, 1923.
44. Sayers 1976, 339.
45. Eichengreen 1992; Sargent 1982.
46. Clarke 1967, 46.
47. Morrison 2021, 181.
48. Schacht 1956.
49. Weitz 1997.
50. LeBor 2013.
51. Moreau 1991.
52. BEA, ADM/33/24, Interview with Allan Sproul, October 21, 1969.
53. Mirwis 1987; Boyle 1967; Toniolo 2005.
54. LeBor 2013.
55. Schacht 1956, 179; Boyle 1967, 170.
56. Boyle 1967, 171.
57. Boyle 1967, 172–73.
58. Schacht 1956; Morrison 2021, 183.
59. Clay 1957, 212.
60. FRASER, 1116.4.2, Norman to Strong, January 7, 1924.
61. Meyer 1970, 11.
62. FRASER, 111.6.2.2, Norman to Havenstein, December 5, 1921.
63. FRASER, 1116.2.1, Strong to Norman, November 25, 1921.
64. FRASER, 1135.1, Office Correspondence, J. E. Crane to Mr. Case, December 8, 1921.
65. FRASER, 1116.3.1, Strong to Norman, February 2, 1922.
66. FRASER, 1135.1, Strong to Havenstein, February 2, 1922.
67. Schacht 1956, 185.
68. FRASER, 1116.3.1, Strong to Norman, March 28, 1922.
69. Boyle 1967, 168–69.
70. Clarke 1967, 47.
71. Schacht 1956, 190–91.
72. Clarke 1967, 58.
73. Clay 1957, 212.
74. Boyle 1967, 167.
75. FRASER, 1116.4.2, Norman to Strong, January 30, 1924.
76. FRASER, 1116.4.1, Strong to Norman, July 9, 1924.
77. Clarke 1967, 63.
78. Clarke 1967, 66.
79. Clarke 1967, 67–68.
80. Clarke 1967.
81. Sayers 1976, 183.
82. Clarke 1967, 111.
83. Schacht 1927, 206.
84. Chandler 1958, 285.
85. Chandler 1958.
86. FRASER, 1135.0, Telegram, Schacht to Strong, July 13, 1927.
87. Metzler 2006, 96.
88. Metzler 2006, 119–20.
89. Metzler 2006.
90. Bytheway and Metzler 2016, 94.
91. Kirshner 2007.
92. Smethurst 2001.
93. FRASER, 1116.1, Strong to Norman, March 27, 1917.
94. FRASER, 1330.1.1, Strong to Inoue, November 1, 1923.
95. Metzler 2006.
96. Pak 2013, 37.
97. Bytheway and Metzler 2016, 82.
98. FRASER, 1330.1, Speech by Eigo Fukai, “Mr. Benjamin Strong and the Restoration of the Gold Standard.” October 23–24, 1924.
99. Bytheway and Metzler 2016, 83.
100. Metzler 2006, 128.
101. FRASER, 1000.4.2, Speech by Benjamin Strong at the Tokyo Ginko Club, May 24, 1920.
102. FRASER, 1330.1.1, Strong to Inoue, November 17, 1921.
103. Pak 2013; Metzler 2006.
104. Eichengreen 1992; Eichengreen and Temin 2000.
105. Inoue and de Bunsen 1931; Bytheway 2014; Bytheway and Metzler 2016; Kirshner 2007.
106. FRASER, 1330.1.1, Strong to Inoue, November 1, 1923.
107. FRASER, 1330.1.1, Strong to Inoue, November 1, 1923.
108. FRASER, 1330.1.1, Inoue to Strong, December 13, 1923.
109. Pak 2013, 177.
110. FRASER, 1330.1.1, Telegram, Inoue to Strong, January 31, 1924.
111. FRASER, 1330.1.1, Telegram, Inoue to Strong, January 23, 1924.
112. BEA, Overseas Department: Japan, OV16/107, Norman to Inoue, October 30, 1924.
113. FRASER, 1330.1.1, Strong to Inoue, October 28, 1924.
114. Bytheway and Metzler 2016; Metzler 2006.
115. FRASER, I330.1.1, Strong to Inoue, May 10, 1927.
116. Moggridge 1972; Eichengreen 1992; Morrison 2021.
117. Keynes 1923; Morrison 2021.
118. Clarke 1967, 73–74.
119. Morrison 2021, 193.
120. FRASER, 1116.4.1, Norman to Strong, October 16, 1924; Clarke 1967, 80.
121. FRASER, 1116.4.1, Strong to Norman, November 4, 1924.
122. FRASER, 1116.4.1, Strong to Norman, November 4, 1924.
123. FRASER, 1116.2.1, Strong to Norman, February 8, 1921.
124. FRASER, 1116.4.1, Norman to Strong, October 16, 1924.
125. FRASER, 1116.4.2, Norman to Strong, October 8, 1923.
126. FRASER, 1116.4.1, Strong to Norman, November 18, 1924.
127. FRASER, 1116.2.1, Strong to Norman, November 17, 1921.
128. FRASER, 1116.5.2, Norman to Strong, January 18, 1925.
129. Morrison 2021.
130. Clarke 1967.
131. FRASER, 1116.5.1, Strong to Norman, April 15, 1925.
132. FRASER, 1116.5.2, Norman to Strong, April 8, 1925.
133. Bytheway and Metzler 2016.
134. The National Archives, n.d.
135. Bytheway 2014, 112.
136. BEA, Richard Sydney Sayers, Papers, ADM/33/25, Interview with R. N. Kershaw, March 27, 1969.
137. Clavin 2013.
138. Meyer 1970.
139. Ahamed 2009, 68.
140. Ahamed 2009, 267.
141. BEA, ADM/33/24, Interview with Mr. I. Rooth, May 17, 1968.
142. Turner 1996, 32.
143. BEA, ADM/33/32, Interview with Jacques Leon Reuff, May 8, 1969.
144. BEA, ADM/33/24, Interview with Allan Sproul, October 21, 1969.
145. BEA, ADM/33/32, Interview with Robert Lacour-Gayet, May 9, 1969.
146. Moreau 1991, 51.
147. Moreau 1991, 53.
148. Strong to Harrison, August 1926, quoted in Mouré 2002, 157.
149. Mouré 2002, 166.
150. Moreau 1991; Mouré 2002.
151. Strong to Pierre Jay, quoted in Chandler 1958, 350.
152. Moreau 1991, 54.
153. Martin 2022, 113.
154. Meyer 1970; Moreau 1991.
155. Meyer 1970, 41; Moreau 1991; Mouré 2002, 158–59.
156. Kindleberger 1973, 303.
157. Meyer 1970, 64–68.
158. Pittaluga and Seghezza 2012, 599.
159. Pauly 1996; Clavin 2013; Martin 2022.
160. FRASER, 1007.1, Strong to Harrison, May 15, 1926.
161. Rosenberg 1999.
162. Martin 2022, 93.
163. Meyer 1970, 74–75.
164. See Rosenberg 1999 on Germany's preference for strong controls. I am grateful to Jamie Martin for highlighting this point on the political dispute between Germany and Poland on the Polish corridor.
165. Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library (RBML), Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 46, Memorandum of Conversation with Governor Norman, April 11, 1927.
166. Allen 2020, 65.
167. Turner 1996, 38; Moreau 1991.
168. Meyer 1970, 76.
169. Kindleberger 1973, 303; Meyer 1970.
170. FRASER, 0320.227, Strong to Deputy Governor James Herbert Case, February 20, 1927.
171. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 34, Harrison to Case and Strong, March 29, 1927.
172. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Memorandum of Conversation with Governor Norman, April 11, 1927.
173. BEA, Norman Diaries, ADM34/16, March 31, 1927.
174. Clay 1957, 259.
175. Allen 2020, 59.
176. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Memorandum of Conversation with Governor Norman, April 11, 1927.
177. Allen 2020, 62.
178. Allen 2020.
179. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Memorandum of Conversation with Governor Norman, April 12, 1927.
180. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Memorandum of Conversation with Governor Norman, April 11, 1927.
181. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Memorandum of Conversation at Bank of France, April 11, 1927.
182. Moreau 1991.
183. Turner 1996, 38.
184. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 13, Binder 27, Strong to Moreau, June 23, 1927; Clay 1957; Boyle 1967.
185. FRASER, 1000.9, Strong Papers. “Memorandum Re.: Discussions with the Bank of France,” May 27, 1928, 1.
186. FRASER, 1000.9, Strong Papers. “Memorandum,” 5.
187. Boyle 1967, 237.
188. FRASER, Foreign Countries: Trip to Europe, 1928, “Postscript to Memorandum Re.: Discussions with the Bank of France,” May 27, 1928, 1000.9, Strong Papers; “anything of that sort” refers to the prospect of overcoming personal disagreements with Moreau.
189. Moreau 1991, 246.
190. Boyle 1967, 238.
2. THINGS FALL APART
1. Clarke 1967, 33.
2. Kindleberger 1973.
3. Bernanke 2000, 11.
4. Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 412.
5. Wheelock 1992, 4.
6. Meltzer 2003.
7. Discount rates are distinct from interest rates. The discount rate is that charged to commercial banks or depository institutions for overnight loans from Federal Reserve Banks. They are not affected by market demand and supply nor by interest rates but are determined by the central bank. Interest rates are those charged by the lender on loans and are affected by market dynamics.
8. Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER), Allan Meltzer Papers, The Discount Rate Controversy Between the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Box 1246. See also Meltzer 2003; Calomiris and Wheelock 1997; Romer and Romer 2013.
9. Bernanke 1983.
10. Kindleberger 1973; Eichengreen and Temin 2000, 186.
11. Eichengreen and Temin 2000, 2.
12. Eichengreen and Temin 2000, 28.
13. Kindleberger 1973, 30.
14. FRASER, 1116.2.2, Norman to Strong, September 15, 1921.
15. FRASER, 1116.2.1, Strong to Norman, November 17, 1921.
16. Palyi 1972, 143; Eichengreen 1992.
17. Boyle 1967, 239.
18. The New York Times 1928.
19. Chandler 1958; Bytheway and Metzler 2016, 32.
20. Of course, the BIS in Basel did not exist in Strong's lifetime, but Harrison's active avoidance of international central bank meetings in Basel, which in important ways emulated the Long Island meeting of 1927, was a stark departure from Strong's international activism.
21. Boyle 1967, 239.
22. Clingan 2010, 9, 55.
23. Bank of England Archive (BEA), OV/34 79; Clingan 2010.
24. Sayers 1976, 344.
25. Sayers 1976, 455, 464; Clavin 1992; Mouré 1992, 274.
26. Chandler 1971.
27. Chandler 1958, 42.
28. Wicker 1966; Chandler 1971.
29. Chandler 1958, 465.
30. Clarke 1967, 41.
31. BEA, ADM/33/24, Richard Sayers Papers, Interview with Allan Sproul, October 21, 1969.
32. Clement 2023. See also Baffi 2002 on the first two years of the BIS and its role in systematizing and institutionalizing central bank cooperation.
33. Clay 1957, 269.
34. Eichengreen 1992.
35. Clay 1957, 366.
36. Eichengreen 1992, 260; Mouré 1992, 274.
37. Hungary also faced a similar crisis; however, I do not consider that case study in this book.
38. Eichengreen 1992.
39. Bennett 1962.
40. Horn 2022.
41. Eichengreen 1992.
42. BEA, OV32/7, Overseas Department: FRBNY—Confidential Cables, FRBNY Telegram to Norman, May 29, 1931.
43. Bank for International Settlements Archive (BISA), 7.18.2.MCG.1.20191217-2174.1 Credit-Anstalt crisis, Personal Harrison to McGarrah, May 26, 1931.
44. BISA, 7.18.2.MCG.1.20191217-2174.1 Credit-Anstalt crisis, Personal McGarrah to Harrison, May 26, 1931.
45. Horn 2022.
46. BEA, OV32/7, Overseas Department: FRBNY—Confidential Cables, Telegram to Harrison, June 3, 1931.
47. BISA, 7.18.2.MCG.1.20191217-2174.1 Credit-Anstalt crisis, “Telephone Message Received,” Gates McGarrah, June 1, 1931.
48. Pak 2013.
49. BISA, 7.18.2.MCG.1.20191217-2174.1 Credit-Anstalt crisis, “Telephone Message Received,” Gates McGarrah, June 1, 1931.
50. Clement 2023.
51. BISA, 7.16.3.RBL.B1, Harrison to McGarrah, April 24, 1931.
52. Meltzer 2003, 344.
53. BEA, Overseas Department: Germany: Reichsbank, OV34/79, Sir Horace Rumbold to Arthur Henderson, MP, March 12, 1930.
54. Boyle 1967, 260.
55. Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library (RBML), Harrison Papers, Box 9, Binder 20, Norman to Harrison, June 2, 1931. Norman references his correspondence with Stewart in this communication with Harrison. Emphasis added.
56. BEA, Overseas Department: FRBNY—Confidential Cables, OV32/7, Harrison to Norman, June 1; Norman to Harrison, June 2, 1931.
57. BEA, Overseas Department: FRBNY—Confidential Cables, OV32/7, Harrison to Norman, June 1; Norman to Harrison, June 2, 1931.
58. RBML Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Telephone Conversation with Norman, July 1, 1931.
59. Ahamed 2009.
60. BEA, Overseas Department: Germany, OV34/8, Telephone call Norman and Luther, June 22, 1931.
61. Horn 2022.
62. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Telephone Conversation with McGarrah, December 21, 1931.
63. BEA, OV32/7, Norman Phone Call with Harrison, July 9, 1931.
64. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Telephone Conversation with McGarrah, July 14, 1931; Conversation with Norman, July 14, 1931; Box 14, Binder 29, Harrison to Moret, Copy of Cable to Luther, November 17, 1931.
65. BISA, 7.16.3.RBL.B1, Harrison's Office Correspondence “Germany; Meeting of BIS Directors at Basle,” July 14, 1931.
66. BISA, 7.16.3.RBL.B1, Harrison's Office Correspondence “Germany; Meeting of BIS Directors at Basle,” July 21, 1931.
67. Horn 2022.
68. Singleton 2011, 105.
69. BEA, Overseas Department: Germany, OV34/8, H. A. Siepmann Note, June 23, 1931.
70. Clay 1957; James 1984.
71. BEA, Overseas Department: FRBNY—Confidential Cables, OV32/7 Harrison to Norman, July 8, 1931.
72. Eichengreen 1992, 277; Mouré 2002, 194.
73. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Conversation with Lacour-Gayet, July 11, 1931.
74. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Conversation with Lacour-Gayet, July 11, 1931.
75. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Conversation with Lacour-Gayet, July 11, 1931.
76. Eichengreen 1992.
77. Sayers 1976.
78. BEA, G1, 456, Siepmann conversation with Moret, August 5, 1931.
79. Mouré 2002, 202.
80. See BEA, ADM33, Papers of Richard Sydney Sayers Relating to the Composition of His History of the Bank of England. See files ADM33/24-27 and 31-31 for Sayers's interviews, especially regarding Norman, Norman's relationship with Harvey and deputies, and also with other key associates at this time.
81. Boyle 1967, 296.
82. BEA, G1, 456 Harvey to Norman, August 10, 1931.
83. Eich 2022; Ahamed 2009.
84. RBML, Harrison Box 21, Binder 45, Telephone conversation with Lacour-Gayet, August 8, 1931.
85. BEA, G1, 457 record of comms with French and US, US and French Credits to UK, August 25, 1931.
86. RBML, Harrison Box 21, Binder 45, Telephone conversation with Lacour-Gayet, August 25, 1931.
87. BEA, Governor's File: Netherlands—Financial Crisis 1931, and French and American Credits to United Kingdom (UK) Government, G1/457 Harvey to Norman, August 31, 1931; Daily Express News clipping, September 1, 1931.
88. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Conversation with Harvey, September 16, 1931.
89. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Telephone calls with Harvey and Norman, September 16–17.
90. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Telephone conversation with Harvey, September 17, 1931.
91. BEA, ADM/33/27, Interview with Mr. P. S. Beale, October 18, 1972; RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Conversation with Harvey, September 19, 1931.
92. BEA, Richard Sayers Papers, ADM/33/27, Interview with Mr. P. S. Beale, October 18, 1972.
93. Ahamed 2009.
94. Eichengreen 1992.
95. RBML, Harrison Papers, Box 21, Binder 45, Conversation with Norman and Harvey, October 2, 1931.
96. Schacht 1956.
97. Clarke 1973, 41.
98. Meltzer 2003, 344.
99. BEA, ADM/33/24, Interview with Mr. H. Schacht, August 20, 1968.
100. Clavin 1992, 291.
101. Clavin 1992; Clavin 1996.
102. Mouré 2002.
103. Mouré 1992.
104. Clavin 1992, 287; Clavin 1996; Mouré 2002.
105. RBML, Box 21, Binder 46; Harrison and Norman Telephone, May 26, 1933.
106. Clavin 1992; Eichengreen 1992, 321; Mouré 2002.
107. RBML, Box 21, Binder 46; Harrison and Lacour-Gayet, Telephone, May 26, 1933; and Harrison and US Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, Telephone, June 2, 1932.
108. Hull 1948, 260.
109. Edwards 2017, 10.
110. Lindley 1933.
111. Edwards 2017.
112. Roosevelt 1938, 264–65.
113. Hull 1948, 262.
114. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1931–35, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: State Department, 1933), 673–74.
115. Hull 1948, 267.
116. Clavin 1996, 121.
117. Clavin 1996, 121.
118. This arrangement was later formalized in 1934.
119. BEA, G1, 415 Schacht papers, November 11, 1933.
120. Friedman 1962; Bernanke 2002.
121. Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 298.
122. Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 411; James 2013.
3. SPRINGTIME FOR BRETTON WOODS?
1. Singleton 2011, 154.
2. Borio, Toniolo, and Clement 2008, 4.
3. James 1996.
4. James 1996; Ruggie 1982; Best 2004; Helleiner 1994.
5. Coombs 1976, 32.
6. Note that these were not the only available arrangements to prop up the Bretton Woods system in the 1960s. See James 1996; Toniolo 2005; Borio, Toniolo, and Clement 2008; Bordo, Monnet, and Naef 2019 on the Gold Pool; and various IMF arrangements.
7. Allen 2013, 85–86.
8. McDowell 2017, 42.
9. Borio, Toniolo, and Clement 2008, 4.
10. Toniolo 2005, 352.
11. Toniolo 2005; Kaplan 1989.
12. Kaplan 1989, vi.
13. Cardwell 2011; P. B. 1952; Schenk 2010; Bordo, MacDonald, and Oliver 2009.
14. Borio, Toniolo, and Clement 2008, 82.
15. Borio, Toniolo, and Clement 2008.
16. Toma 1986; Singleton 2011.
17. Einzig 1960, 240.
18. Toniolo 2005.
19. Gavin 2004.
20. James 1996.
21. Toniolo 2005, 353.
22. Kindleberger 1973; Kindleberger 1987.
23. James 1996.
24. James 1996; Toniolo 2005.
25. Per Jacobsson quoted in James 1996, 162.
26. James 1996.
27. Singleton 2011, 147; Borio, Toniolo, and Clement 2008.
28. Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER), Letter, Charles Coombs to Allan Sproul, Coombs 1964.
29. LeBor 2013, xvii.
30. Helleiner 1994.
31. Triffin 1961; Triffin 1978, 2.
32. Bank for International Settlement Archive (BISA), GILB9, Papers: Milton Gilbert. These initial measures in 1961 were precursors to the “Basel Group Arrangements” offered to the Bank of England in 1966 and 1968.
33. Coombs 1976, 32.
34. Bank of England Archive (BEA), Economic Intelligence Department, Balance of Payments Estimates, EID3/352, Bank Bulletin—Basel Arrangements, September 20, 1961.
35. Coombs 1976, 31; Toniolo 2005.
36. Coombs 1976, 33.
37. Coombs 1976, 28.
38. LeBor 2013, 188.
39. Coombs 1976, 33.
40. Kaplan 1989, 210.
41. Bank for International Settlements 1980.
42. Coombs 1976, 31.
43. Schweizerische Nationalbank 2007, 149.
44. Schweizerische Nationalbank 2007, 148–49. Department III is the Banking Operations department, the SNB entity tasked with open market operations.
45. Schweizerische Nationalbank 2007, 151.
46. Meltzer 2003. He suggests that Coombs used the March 1961 Basel meeting as an opportunity to approve swap lines with Iklé and Bridge.
47. Coombs 1976.
48. Coombs 1976, 36.
49. Schweizerische Nationalbank 2007, 154.
50. Coombs 1976, 37.
51. From Swiss National Bank Archives in Schweizerische Nationalbank 2007.
52. Coombs 1976.
53. McCauley and Schenk 2020, 9.
54. See, for instance, BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling Balances: Central Bank Assistance and Coombs's Scheme, OV44/34, Roosa to Cobbold, March 17, 1961.
55. Coombs 1976, 38.
56. BEA, Economic Intelligence Department, Balance of Payments Estimates, EID3/352, Bank Bulletin—Basel Arrangements, September 20, 1961.
57. BEA, Overseas Department, OV44/34, “I.M.F. and Central Bank Co-operation,” May 2, 1961.
58. BISA, HAL.10 (F02), “The Role of the BIS in the International Monetary System Seen in a Historical Setting.”
59. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling Balances: Central Bank Assistance and Coombs's Scheme, OV44/34, M. Parsons, “Notes of Conversations in Basel on 10/11th April,” April 14, 1961.
60. Speech by Louis Rasminsky, 1973, in Bank for International Settlements 1980.
61. Coombs 1976, 26.
62. BEA, Economic Intelligence Department, Balance of Payments Estimates, EID3/352, note on revisions September 1, 1961 Draft: “Basel Co-operation” (no date, author unknown).
63. BISA, HAL.10 (F02), History Lectures, 1929–1986, Edward Jay Epstein, “A Brave New Role for the BIS,” BIS Press Service.
64. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling Balances: Central Bank Assistance and Coombs's Scheme, OV44/34, M. Parsons, “Notes of Conversations in Basel on 10/11th April,” April 14, 1961.
65. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling Balances: Central Bank Assistance and Coombs's Scheme, OV44/35, “Governor's Note,” June 11, 1961.
66. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling Balances: Central Bank Assistance and Coombs's Scheme, OV44/35, Lord Cromer, “B.I.S. ‘Experts’ Meeting,” December 20, 1961. Emphasis added.
67. BEA, Economic Intelligence Department, Balance of Payments Estimates, EID3/352, Draft, “Basle [Basel] Co-operation,” September 1, 1961.
68. BEA, Economic Intelligence Department, Balance of Payments Estimates, EID3/352, “Basle [Basel] Guidance” (no date specified).
69. BEA, Central Bank Assistant: General, 7A229/9, “Basel Arrangements: Reporting to B.I.S.,” November 27, 1964.
70. Coombs 1976, 37.
71. Volcker and Gyohten 1992, 77.
72. Coombs 1976, 28.
73. Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz 2015.
74. BEA, Cashier's Department: Gold and Foreign Exchange Files, C43/368, Bridge to Parsons on Switzerland, December 15, 1959; Coombs 1976.
75. Coombs 1976, 74.
76. Coombs 1976.
77. Coombs 1976, 74–75.
78. Coombs 1976, 75–76.
79. Bremner 2004, 167.
80. McDowell 2017.
81. BEA, Cashier's Department: Gold and Foreign Exchange Files, C43/742, Note of Meeting between Cromer and Brunet, May 8, 1962.
82. Gilbert 1980, 132.
83. McCauley and Schenk 2020, 9.
84. FRASER, Box 26, Folder 3, Joint Economic Committee Hearings, January 19, 1962.
85. FRASER, Box 24, Folder 8, Joint Economic Committee Hearings, August 1962.
86. FOMC 1962a.
87. Coombs 1976, 28–29.
88. Volcker and Gyohten 1992, 77.
89. BISA, DEA.12 (F35), “Note of Meeting of the Study Group on the Creation of Reserve Assets,” Rome, October 26–30, 1964.
90. Coombs 1976, 91.
91. Coombs 1976; Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz 2015.
92. BISA, DEA.12 (F36), “Comments by U.S. Representatives on Compatibility of the Various Proposals with the Evolution of the Existing System,” January 27, 1965.
93. Letter, Charles Coombs to Allan Sproul, Coombs 1964. Online Archival Collections, St. Louis Fed.
94. Toniolo 2005, 388.
95. BEA Cashier's Department: Gold and Foreign Exchange Files, C43/742, Rickett to Stevens, March 30, 1962.
96. McCauley and Schenk 2020.
97. BEA, Cashier's Department: Gold and Foreign Exchange Files, C43/742, Memo, J. M. Stevens, April 27, 1962.
98. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling and Sterling Area, OV44/35 R. Bridge, “Coombs Scheme,” October 11, 1961.
99. BEA, Cashier's Department: Gold and Foreign Exchange Files, C43/742, Bridge to Parsons, March 9, 1962.
100. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling and Sterling Area, OV44/35, H. Mynors, December 22, 1961.
101. FOMC 1962a; Coombs 1976.
102. FOMC 1962a.
103. Coombs 1976, 78.
104. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling and Sterling Area, OV44/35, “Notes of B.I.S Meeting 12th June 1961,” June 13, 1961.
105. Coombs 1976, 79.
106. BEA, Cashier's Department: Gold and Foreign Exchange Files, C43/742, Bridge to Parsons, April 5, 1962.
107. FOMC 1962b; Coombs 1976.
108. Schweizerische Nationalbank 2007, 153.
109. Capie 2010, 165.
110. Iklé memoirs, SNB.
111. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling and Sterling Area, OV44/34, Parsons to Iklé, March 16, 1961.
112. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling Balances: Central Bank Assistance and Coombs's Scheme, OV44/35, Lord Cromer, “Meeting of ‘Experts’ in Basel Saturday the 7th April 1962,” April 10, 1962.
113. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling Balances: Central Bank Assistance and Coombs's Scheme, OV44/35, Roy Bridge, “American Ideas for Strengthening the International Exchange Structure,” April 12, 1962.
114. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling Balances: Central Bank Assistance and Coombs's Scheme, OV44/35, Roy Bridge, “American Ideas for Strengthening the International Exchange Structure,” April 12, 1962.
115. Fforde 1992, 567.
116. Schenk 2010, 124.
117. Capie 2010, 227.
118. Capie 2010, 225.
119. Coombs 1976, 111.
120. Capie 2010.
121. Coombs 1976; Meltzer 2003; Schenk 2010.
122. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling and Sterling Area: Sterling Policy, OV44/125, Governor's Note, August 3, 1965.
123. Schenk 2010, 162.
124. Quoted in Schenk 2010, 162.
125. Coombs 1976, 86; Toniolo 2005.
126. Toniolo 2005, 395.
127. Toniolo 2005; Schenk 2010.
128. Quoted in Schenk 2010, 172.
129. Gavin 2004; Schenk 2010.
130. BEA, Economic Intelligence Department, Papers Concerning Work for Official Inquiries, EID 1/24, Cooke and Bull, “A History of the Sterling Crisis,” 1967, 52.
131. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling and Sterling Area: Sterling Crisis, OV44/124, Bridge to O’Brien, “For Treasury Meeting 5 p.m. Friday, 15 July,” July 15, 1966.
132. BEA, Overseas Department: Sterling and Sterling Area: Sterling Crisis, OV 44/123, McMahon to Cromer/O’Brien, “Economic Policy,” March 18, 1966.
133. Schenk 2010, 177.
134. Capie 2010; Coombs 1976; Fforde 1992; Schenk 2010; Toniolo 2005. See also elsewhere in this chapter the references to Bank of England communications from collections at the Bank of England Archive.
135. Capie 2010, 227.
136. Gavin 2004.
137. Garber 1993; Helleiner 1994; James 1996; Bordo and Eichengreen 1993; Bordo 2017.
138. Frieden 2006; Eichengreen 2019a.
139. Kindleberger 1978.
4. THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT?
1. Irwin 2013, 11.
2. Helleiner 2014; Henning 2015.
3. Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2009, 9.
4. Irwin 2013, 8.
5. Oatley 2015.
6. Drezner 2014b, 2.
7. Singleton 2011, 18.
8. Irwin 2013, 6.
9. Tooze 2018, 167.
10. Federal Reserve Board Press Release 2007.
11. Baker 2013; Irwin 2013, 133.
12. Baker 2013.
13. Bernanke 2009; Ball 2018.
14. Darling 2011.
15. Drezner 2014b; Drezner 2014a.
16. Drezner 2014b, 1.
17. Helleiner 2014, 35; FOMC 2008b.
18. Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2009.
19. Bernanke 2015, 36. Also Bernanke, interview.
20. Bernanke 2015, 410.
21. Bertuch-Samuels and Ramlogan 2007.
22. Moessner and Allen 2010.
23. FOMC 2008b, 10.
24. FOMC 2008b.
25. Lockwood 2016, 727. See also Nelson and Katzenstein 2014.
26. FOMC 2007b, 189.
27. FOMC 2007c, 110.
28. FOMC 2007a, 36.
29. Dudley 2012.
30. Aizenman and Pasricha 2010; McDowell 2012; Broz 2015.
31. Sahasrabuddhe 2019; Marple 2021.
32. Moessner and Allen 2010; Prasad 2014.
33. Samuelson 2008.
34. Irwin 2013, 12.
35. Interview with Benjamin Bernanke, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2006–2014). Interview by Aditi Sahasrabuddhe. Brookings Institute, Washington DC, August 29, 2019. See also Bernanke 2015.
36. Bernanke 2015.
37. King 2004.
38. Irwin 2013, 112.
39. Irwin 2013.
40. Bernanke 2015.
41. Tabuchi 2013.
42. Author interviews, anonymous.
43. Irwin 2013.
44. Bernanke, interview.
45. Interview with Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England (2003–2013). Interview by Aditi Sahasrabuddhe. NYU Law School, New York, December 17, 2018.
46. Interview with Donald Kohn, Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2006–2010). Interview by Aditi Sahasrabuddhe. Phone call, May 30, 2018. For a discussion on political constraints on the Fed's independence, see Binder and Spindel 2017.
47. Interview with Masaaki Shirakawa, Governor of the Bank of Japan (2008–2013). Interview by Aditi Sahasrabuddhe. The Millennium Hilton, New York City, December 5, 2019.
48. Interview with Charlie Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England for Monetary Policy (2008–2014). Interview by Aditi Sahasrabuddhe. 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London School of Economics, October 18, 2018.
49. Author interviews, anonymous.
50. Bean, Bernanke, King, Shirakawa, and Trichet interviews.
51. Bernanke, interview.
52. Author interviews, anonymous.
53. Simmons 2006; Keohane 1984; Oye 1986.
54. Author interview, anonymous.
55. Haas 1992.
56. Author interviews, anonymous.
57. Kohn, interview. Bernanke similarly emphasized the importance of working within the Fed's legal and political constraints.
58. FOMC 2007c; FOMC 2008b; FOMC 2010.
59. Bean, interview.
60. Interview with Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank (2003 to 2011). Interview by Aditi Sahasrabuddhe. Skype, March 30, 2020.
61. Author interview, anonymous.
62. Bean, interview.
63. Mercer 2005, 95.
64. Park 2011.
65. Sahasrabuddhe 2019.
66. Prasad 2014.
67. Author interviews, anonymous.
68. Matthijs 2022.
69. Author interview, anonymous.
70. On this point, see also Irwin 2013.
71. Author interviews, anonymous.
72. Shirakawa, interview.
73. Bernanke, interview.
74. Bernanke 2002.
75. Author interview, anonymous.
76. Author interviews, anonymous.
77. Shirakawa, interview.
78. Aizenman and Pasricha 2010; Broz 2015; McDowell 2012.
79. Wessel 2009.
80. FOMC 2007a; FOMC 2008b.
81. FOMC 2007c, 128.
82. Tooze 2018, 90.
83. Author interview, anonymous.
84. Bernanke 2015.
85. King, interview.
86. Kohn, interview.
87. Interview with Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England for Financial Stability (2009–2013). Interview by Aditi Sahasrabuddhe. The Delaunay, Aldwych, London, December 18, 2018.
88. FOMC 2008c; FOMC 2008a.
89. Shirakawa 2021, 155.
90. Trichet, interview.
91. Shirakawa 2021, 155. Also, Kohn, Shirakawa, interviews.
92. Irwin 2013.
93. King, interview.
94. Author interview, anonymous.
95. Bernanke 2015, 183.
96. Author interviews, anonymous.
97. These data are retrieved from the Federal Reserve's disclosures starting in December 1, 2007, to February 1, 2010, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/reform-swaplines.htm; Interviews, anonymous.
98. Grim 2009.
99. O’Driscoll, Jr. 2011.
100. Perry 2020.
101. Baker 2013.
102. FOMC 2010.
103. Irwin 2013, 154; Tooze 2018, 212.
104. FOMC 2007a.
105. Bernanke 2015; Bernanke, interview.
106. Author interviews, anonymous.
107. Bernanke 2015; Bernanke interview.
108. Author interview, anonymous.
109. Author interviews, anonymous.
110. FOMC 2010.
111. FOMC 2010.
112. FOMC 2010, 4.
113. FOMC 2010, 5.
114. Shirakawa, interview.
115. King, interview.
116. Bernanke 2015, 151.
117. Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson 2019, 81; Bernanke 2015, 164.
118. Author interview, anonymous.
119. Kohn 2010; Volcker and Gyohten 1992.
120. FOMC 2008b.
121. Sahasrabuddhe 2019; Marple 2021.
122. Vaughn 2020.
123. Government Accountability Office 2011; Broz 2015. See Bodea and Hicks 2015 and Garriga and Rodriguez 2020 on the disciplining effect of CBI on inflation.
124. Sahasrabuddhe 2019.
125. FOMC 2008b.
126. FOMC 2008b, 42.
127. FOMC 2008b, 39.
128. FOMC 2008b, 10.
129. FOMC 2008b, 17, 39.
130. Author interviews, anonymous.
131. Author interviews, anonymous.
132. Bernanke, interview.
133. Author interviews, anonymous.
134. Author interview, anonymous.
135. Author interview, anonymous.
136. Author interview, anonymous.
137. FOMC 2008b, 23.
138. FOMC 2008b.
139. Bernanke, interview.
140. Benediktsdóttir, Eggertsson, and Þórarinsson 2017.
141. Ingves 2022.
142. Freeman 2009.
143. Hilmarsson 2022, 28.
144. Author interview, anonymous.
145. Ingves 2022.
146. Ingves 2022.
147. Hilmarsson 2022, 27.
148. Author interviews with Icelandic officials, anonymous.
149. Author interviews with ECB and Iceland officials, anonymous.
150. Hilmarsson 2022.
151. Ingves 2022.
152. FOMC 2008b, 42.
153. FOMC 2008b.
154. Sahasrabuddhe 2019.
155. Author interview, anonymous.
156. Tucker 2022.
157. Author interviews, anonymous. NB: not Bernanke or Subbarao.
158. Interview with Duvvuri Subbarao, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (2008–2013). Interview by Aditi Sahasrabuddhe. WhatsApp Call, May 13, 2020.
159. Author interview, anonymous.
160. Subbarao, interview.
161. Author interview, anonymous. See also Subbarao 2016.
162. Shirakawa, interview.
163. Subbarao, interview.
164. Shirakawa, interview; Subbarao, interview; interviews, anonymous.
165. Shirakawa, interview.
166. Author interview, anonymous. Note that I have not spoken to Geithner or Bernanke specifically about Indonesia's swap request or had the chance to evaluate their side of this interaction.
167. Like India, Indonesia also secured a swap line from the Bank of Japan during the GFC.
168. Author interview, anonymous.
169. All quotes in this discussion and what follow below are sourced from FOMC 2009, 30–53. Emphases added.
170. FOMC 2013.
CONCLUSION
1. Ortlieb 2020.
2. Tett 2020.
3. Leonard 2020.
4. Wiggins et al. 2023.
5. Author interview, anonymous.
6. Culpepper 2011.
7. Pop, Fleming, and Politi 2022.
8. Toniolo 2005, 584.
9. Sheets, Truman, and Lowery 2018.
10. Kirshner 2019.
11. Park 2011.
12. Meyer 1970.
13. Aizenman, Ito, and Pasricha 2022.
14. Best 2016; van ’t Klooster 2020.
15. Fleming and Klagge 2010; Obstfeld 2009a; Sheets, Truman, and Lowery 2018; Baker 2013; Jacobs and King 2016.
16. Sayers 1976, 75.
17. O’Driscoll, Jr. 2011; Perry 2020; Högenauer and Howarth 2019.
18. Tooze 2020; Sahasrabuddhe 2021.
19. Allen and Sahasrabuddhe 2022; Högenauer and Howarth 2019.
20. Woods 2014; Woods 2010.
21. McDowell 2017.
22. FOMC 1996, 107.
23. FOMC 1996.