A Rockefeller on the Campaign Trail

Rockefeller’s entrance into electoral politics would include a great number of public appearances to raise his profile in the Republican Party, but his private meetings with delegates and party leaders were the most important element of his nomination bid. The New York Republican Party chose its nominee not by primary but through a competition to win the support of party delegates who would choose the nominee at the state convention. One of the most important meetings for Rockefeller took place in his home county in the winter of 1958. Herb Gerlach, Westchester County’s GOP chairman, amenable to his political ambitions, invited State Assemblyman Malcolm Wilson of Yonkers to meet with him and Rockefeller in his office in White Plains a few days after Rockefeller and Wilson spoke at a Westchester County Republican fundraising dinner. At forty-three, Wilson was a veteran from Westchester with nearly twenty years in the state assembly and close ties to upstate Republicans. He first won election in 1938, at age twenty-four, and built a reputation as a “conservative’s conservative,” who was a stickler for rules in the legislature with a successful record of getting bills passed.⁵ A few months later, the two met again and Wilson agreed to show Rockefeller around the state, but Wilson told Rockefeller that he would not be able to work with him unless he had a better understanding of his ideological background. “I observed that, in terms of labels,” recalled Wilson, “I would be called a conservative and he would be called a liberal and that I couldn’t in good conscience undertake to sponsor him unless I knew more about his views on things. As our discussion proceeded, it became very evident to me that he was then what he always remained—namely an economic conservative and a human rights liberal, a combination for which the press had no label.” In another recollection, Wilson described their meeting more succinctly: “He convinced me that he wasn’t the flaming liberal people had said.” Timing may have encouraged the relationship between Rockefeller and Wilson; the latter had just been passed over to become majority leader, which had stalled his career.⁶ As for winning the nomination, Wilson told Rockefeller he needed the support of upstate conservatives because they had a disproportionate advantage at the convention. Their active support would also be important in the general election.⁷ The plan then would be to introduce Rockefeller to as many Republicans and delegates in upstate New York as possible rather than try to get the endorsements of county chairmen first, which was the approach of the other gubernatorial candidates. Wilson also told Rockefeller that he should downplay his wealth and emphasize that he was simply hoping to introduce himself to local Republicans.

Rockefeller and Wilson set out on a purposefully low-key six-week tour of New York in the assemblyman’s old Buick, with Rockefeller’s son Steven, who had recently graduated from Princeton, at the wheel. The tour, masterminded by Wilson, gave Rockefeller an opportunity to get his feet wet as a candidate away from the glare of reporters. Wilson would brief the candidate in the car as they would travel from one town to the next to meet as many Republican voters and delegates as possible. Wilson remembered that time fondly, recalling, “No baggage carriers, no sycophants, no PR men, nothing but us. And I paid for it personally. Not a farthing of Nelson Rockefeller’s was used. When I had accumulated a debt I’d forward a statement to Herb Gerlach and I’d be reimbursed.” Wilson took pride in refusing gifts from Rockefeller, whether that included the use of family resort properties, income for his law firm, or donations to the Westchester County Republican Committee, from which Wilson received reimbursement for their trip upstate. This set Wilson apart from people like Morhouse and numerous members of Rockefeller’s staff who enjoyed substantial gifts from Rockefeller as a candidate and later as governor.⁸ Steven recalled how demanding the tour was on his father: “He’d get back to his hotel room around 11:30 p.m. or midnight, and the door on the outside world closed, his whole face would just collapse. He would get his clothes off and fall into bed, and boom, he was out cold.”⁹ The tour also provided an opportunity for Rockefeller to put his charm to work and give more traditionally conservative Republicans who would have only recognized his surname a chance to meet the millionaire. Rockefeller’s tours of upstate New York had more to do with photo ops with livestock and county fair princesses than debates about Republican credentials. The Yonkers newspaper Herald Statesman reported, “A warm smile, a firm handshake and the obvious fact that Rockefeller is greatly enjoying his first political campaign … is credited with a large part of the success his drive has attained.” It went on to say that with the assistance of his political coach Wilson, Rockefeller had astounded “old pros” in upstate New York with his ability to win over delegates, county leaders, and average Republican voters. Many onlookers seemed impressed, perhaps because of low expectations, that Rockefeller was “down to earth,” a “nice guy,” and “pretty sharp.” Wilson explained, “People are most impressed by his handshake and the way he looks straight in the eye.” It is doubtful that Rockefeller’s opponents earned similar praise by shaking hands.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the visits were successful, and when Rockefeller would announce his entrance into the race, he had ninety-four delegates backing him from Westchester and Putnam Counties—as well as the Canadian border counties of St. Lawrence and Franklin.¹¹

While Rockefeller was meeting and greeting, he enjoyed the unusual support from the state party chair. Traditionally, someone in Morhouse’s position remains neutral in a campaign while helping to organize the party’s ticket. Ignoring custom, Morhouse made it clear, perhaps motivated by his somewhat weak position in the party, that he was in Rockefeller’s corner early in the process. Morhouse had become party chairman in 1954, when he was selected by outgoing Governor Dewey, but lacked influence in the state party. His precarious status was due to not being Dewey’s first choice and his association with the party’s loss of the governorship in 1954.¹² With a chance to change his fortunes, Morhouse circulated statewide sampling poll results from the fall of 1957, for example, that revealed that in an overall bad year for Republicans, there was no Republican front-runner for governor, but Rockefeller was the best-known potential candidate. He promptly took this information to local leaders trying to convince all concerned that a Rockefeller-led ticket was the party’s best option. Morhouse, who remained secretive about the origins of the polls, raised suspicions that Rockefeller paid for them.¹³ He defended his lack of neutrality by saying that he hoped only to help the party choose the candidate with the best chance of beating Harriman, whoever that person may be. Morhouse’s actions drew complaints from another Republican gubernatorial candidate, Leonard W. Hall, a former eight-term US congressman and moderate Republican from Oyster Bay, Long Island, who had also served as the Republican national chairman in the mid-1950s. Hall, who felt that Morhouse had unfairly nominated his own candidate, complained that the polls were fabricated. Although Hall had not yet announced his campaign, he had begun touring the state criticizing Harriman’s record. Hall was not the only other prospective candidate; US attorney Paul W. Williams and State Senate Majority Leader Walter J. Mahoney from Buffalo, a pro-business fiscal conservative, were both unannounced candidates working to amass delegate votes behind the scenes.¹⁴ Meanwhile, Morhouse continued circulating polls until the press began to report his activities in the spring.

Although Morhouse’s support was brazen—in a private meeting in June 1958 he told twelve Republican leaders he would step down if they did not support Rockefeller—there were additional factors to sway the Republicans who were reluctant to accept Rockefeller.¹⁵ At the outset, Republican professionals preferred a party regular such as Hall, despite his limited popularity; but over time, and with the help of Morhouse, Rockefeller began to appear as a viable candidate. Despite trailing Harriman, Rockefeller’s numbers were better than politicians such as Hall and Mahoney.¹⁶ “Old-line party bigwigs,” according to biographer Frank Gervasi, “took the attitude that it might be best to allow Rockefeller to ‘run for the exercise,’ go down to defeat, and clear the way for a ‘more regular Republican’ four years later.”¹⁷ Party leaders also knew that a Rockefeller campaign would be well funded and that held great appeal to a party that was regularly low on cash. State party professionals were becoming accustomed to the once laughable idea of a Rockefeller nomination, but few thought that he had a chance against Harriman. If the economy had been stronger or if there had been other Republicans with statewide recognition and appeal, Rockefeller might have found it difficult or impossible to earn the Republican nomination for governor. However, extenuating circumstances meant he had a real, although somewhat unenviable, opportunity to challenge Harriman.

On June 30, 1958, after months of speculation, Rockefeller stood at a podium on the fifty-sixth floor of the RCA building in Rockefeller Center and entered the race for the Republican gubernatorial nomination. Rockefeller said the state’s economic decline motivated him to run and called for a “new approach” to government. The current administration, he stated, suffered from complacency. It had failed to counteract the state’s downturn that caused it to lose status as the nation’s leader in “social and economic growth.” A Republican governor and legislature would work together to provide “progressive, imaginative leadership.” For the moment, this was Rockefeller’s brand of partisan politics—a nonideological critique of Harriman followed by the promise to provide new and better government. Rockefeller’s statement was purposefully amorphous and spoke more to his business acumen than his Republican credentials, but he made it clear that he did not plan to cut the state’s social programs to reverse the state’s “economic erosion.” If the state’s leadership refused to face the impending crisis, he warned, the residents’ aspirations would go unfulfilled. He sought to help New Yorkers achieve their ambitions of “strengthening family ties,” improving educational opportunities, and addressing problems such as juvenile delinquency, organized crime, and obsolete roads.¹⁸ Rockefeller’s speech made promises designed to please voters of any political background. State Republicans, however, were likely to be more concerned than Democrats about how this politician planned to achieve his lofty goals. Fortunately for them, his desire to earn the Republican nomination meant they would vet him and his potentially costly plans.¹⁹

Rockefeller’s campaign thrived largely due to the force of his own personality, the assistance of Wilson, and the poor prospects for the Republican Party in 1958. On August 16, a week and a half before the convention, the press reported that Rockefeller led the delegate race with 348, followed by Mahoney with 255, Hall with 163, and Williams with zero.²⁰ The following day, Hall, who had hoped for a floor fight at the convention, surprised his supporters and withdrew from the race. He explained that he was a realist in politics and knew he was unlikely to win with less than half of the votes commanded by Rockefeller. Hall’s delegate count had stagnated once Rockefeller entered the race and he failed to excite voters. That was not necessarily a problem since he had well-established relationships with party professionals in the state; however, the leaders he had expected to support him were drifting into Rockefeller’s column. Money may have played an important role; Rockefeller biographer Cary Reich explains, “Rockefeller did not buy his first gubernatorial nomination. But the awesome weight of his fortune—particularly going into a contest against another megamillionaire, Harriman—acted as decisively as he did.”²¹ Once the field narrowed, delegates rushed to support Rockefeller, leaving him ten delegates short of the required 586. Mahoney, who had entered the race on July 18 in an attempt to prevent the loss of delegate votes, stepped down on August 20, just five days before the convention, citing the importance of unity within the party.²² Williams stepped down the following day leaving Rockefeller the unopposed Republican gubernatorial nominee. Rockefeller had defied the expectations of numerous political analysts. In June, the New York Mirror glibly pointed out that Hall had forgotten more politics than Rockefeller had ever known.²³ Yet Rockefeller proved to be a formidable opponent.

Despite some inherent uncertainty about his politics, on the evening of August 25, 1958, the New York State Republicans convened in Rochester to announce Rockefeller as their gubernatorial nominee. Rockefeller’s speech emphasized the Republican legacy in New York that most closely represented his own ideology, the progressive record of Dewey, who had retired from politics four years before. The Republican Party, he declared, held a deep concern for people, as shown by Dewey’s accomplishments: “The nation’s first anti-discrimination law, the tripling of State aid for education, the protection of five million workers with sickness disability benefits,” and the “planning and building of the State Thruway.” Rockefeller wanted to pick up where Dewey had left off and reminded his audience that Dewey accomplished all those goals while “building reserves, paying off debt, and reducing taxes.” Rockefeller expressed lofty goals to “stop the flight of industry from New York,” attract new businesses to the state, and improve the state’s health and welfare programs, all of which would be possible through the financially sound and businesslike management of government.²⁴ The platform also declared its support of Eisenhower, enforcement of civil rights, expansion of higher education, pollution abatement, urban renewal, improvement of the state’s roadways, and the protection of labor’s right to collective bargaining. Rockefeller assumed an extremely difficult task, particularly because the booming economy that Dewey had enjoyed was now slackening. It was also impossible to know if Rockefeller could assemble a political organization strong enough to reconcile the differences in the party, as Dewey had, and get support for his agenda. If this liberal program angered the most conservative of the party, they could take small comfort in the platform’s assurance that “the fulfillment of [these] objectives depends upon increased economic growth within our state.”²⁵ In the end, this platform did not ask conservatives for concessions they had not made before, but it was an outcome a number of Republicans to the right of Rockefeller had hoped to avoid.

Rockefeller’s support of civil rights and enhanced antidiscrimination laws were not the centerpiece of his campaign for the nomination, but there were hints that Rockefeller hoped to build a tent large enough to create room for African American voters. The demonstration at Rochester’s War Memorial auditorium with a capacity crowd of ten thousand was extravagant. The New York Times described it as resembling a presidential nominating convention. Lionel Hampton’s eighteen-person jazz band played songs such as “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” while revelers, equipped with fifteen hundred hats and noisemakers, wound their way around the floor under five thousand balloons suspended sixty feet above the crowd waiting for release.²⁶ The New York Amsterdam News, the state’s most widely-read African American newspaper, reported that Hampton’s group, who received a “fat $5,000” fee to entertain the convention for two days, was likely the first African American band to lead the march of a state convention. The same article noted that “there was little overall activity for Negro delegates to give loud cheers over at the convention,” although several delegates received token honors at the convention.²⁷

The Amsterdam News reported in the spring that Harold C. Burton, an African American Republican leader from Harlem, had expressed hope that the party would nominate an African American for lieutenant governor or comptroller.²⁸ Black Republicans would not enjoy such an overture by Rockefeller to court their support, but he made low-key efforts to reach out to African Americans. In July, Rockefeller met with Black Republicans in Harlem to tell them that their support was important to him. Journalist James Booker wrote that Black “Republican leaders were confident a Rockefeller candidacy could break the Democratic stranglehold in Harlem and conceivably elect a Republican from Harlem for the first time since 1932.”²⁹ In August, an independent group of African Americans founded the People for Rockefeller Committee headed by John H. Young III. The committee, which was headquartered in the Belmont Plaza Hotel, was not likely to be a solely independent organization, although Young did say it was funded primarily through contributions from uptown voters. The Rockefeller campaigns often coordinated committees that worked in tandem with the official campaign. Although the People for Rockefeller Committee may not be evidence of altogether spontaneous support for Rockefeller among Black New Yorkers, it does reflect an effort to appeal to a more diverse electorate. Days before the convention, Young told the Amsterdam News that “the Negro people of Harlem and the state, joined by liberals, Puerto Ricans and independent voters, will see to it that he defeats Gov. Harriman in November.”³⁰ In characterizing Rockefeller’s political future and chances of attracting a broad constituency, political commentator Marquis Childs observed, “That old John D’s grandson, Nelson Rockefeller, should today be the Republican candidate for Governor of New York—and, what is more, a liberal candidate who has a chance to win the support of left of center and minority groups—is one of the political miracles of our time.”³¹ Like his overall nomination campaign, Rockefeller’s outreach to Black voters relied more on symbolism than policy pledges, but articulating a commitment to civil rights would become an important part of courting Black voters.

Republican Resistance to Rockefeller

Rockefeller’s ascendancy to the Republican nomination was meteoric, but it attracted pointed and credible critiques from fellow Republicans throughout his effort to win the nomination. Four hours after Rockefeller announced his candidacy, Hall challenged his new rival to a debate. He hoped to expose Rockefeller as a liberal, too far left of mainstream Republican thought. Although he was unknown by rank-and-file Republicans outside of Long Island, Hall had received Eisenhower’s informal endorsement a year and a half before Rockefeller announced his decision to run.³² “Welcome to the political arena,” Hall’s telegram stated. “I think it’s fine you have decided to get into the race.” With the niceties covered, Hall called for Lincoln-Douglas-style debates across the state to “stimulate public interest” and increase voter turnout.³³ What did Hall want to debate? First and foremost, “the principles of the Republican party,” followed by campaign issues and strategies necessary for victory.³⁴ While Rockefeller initially told reporters he thought discussion was healthy, Hall never got his wish.

Hall’s challenge to Rockefeller on the principles of the party was a telling statement about Rockefeller’s outsider status in relation to the New York Republican Party. An upstate newspaper noted, “The fact that Nelson Rockefeller will get serious consideration is probably a confession that the party is somewhat hard up and thinks Governor Harriman is a formidable opponent.”³⁵ In late July, Hall accused Rockefeller of running a popularity contest rather than a campaign. He complained that Rockefeller, who refused to debate, was attempting to “tiptoe” into the nomination with fabricated polls overstating his advantage. He also said that Rockefeller had not “expressed an opinion on anything,” nor had he demonstrated that he could present a strong case against Harriman.³⁶ Rockefeller replied that he would not sling mud at a fellow Republican.³⁷ While Hall critiqued Rockefeller’s campaign style, he also complained about Rockefeller’s politics, which he said his managers were trying to keep from the public. The Long Island–based newspaper Newsday, which supported Hall’s candidacy, wrote, “Hall said the closest idea that he had of Rockefeller’s opinions were the reports by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.… Hall said these reports were more in sympathy with the Democratic Party’s views on spending than the Republican Party’s.” Hall went on to say that if implemented, the reports’ plans would result in a $20 billion deficit for the federal government.³⁸ Hall hoped he could prove to more conservative New York Republicans that Rockefeller was too liberal.

Around the same time that Hall criticized Rockefeller for an issueless campaign, the National Review published an article arguing that Rockefeller was attempting to hide the fact that he was not a “genuine” Republican. The influential conservative publication founded by William F. Buckley Jr. in New York City in 1955 criticized Rockefeller for a campaign it said was nothing more than “the emission of pleasantries—and the circularization of Mr. Morhouse’s poll proving that Rockefeller is a well-known name.” The article also claimed that Harriman originally nominated Rockefeller, referring to an offhand comment the governor had made in the spring of 1957 that New York Republicans should nominate Rockefeller to run against him. For the sake of this article, this was supposed to be in stark contrast to Hall, who received an endorsement from President Eisenhower, although the National Review and its readership were no admirers of Eisenhower and his moderate politics. The National Review argued that it was important to examine Rockefeller’s political views, particularly if the candidate seemed to avoid discussion of topics that might reveal that he was out of step with the typical Republican voter. “Nowhere does Rockefeller speak up for Republican principles of the free, non-statist society,” wrote J. P. McFadden. “His position seems to be that Republicans can do a superior job of implementing a Democratic philosophy of government.”³⁹ Rockefeller’s charisma could quiet the concerns of the local Republican voters he met, but important detractors remained—and would remain—within the party.

Even as many Republicans were willing to give Rockefeller a chance, questions lingered regarding his political loyalties and the ramifications of him taking command of the state party. The Berkshire Eagle, based in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, near the New York border, printed a candid critique of Rockefeller’s imminent nomination by George C. Connelly. “During a recent visit to my native haunts upstate,” wrote Connelly, “I found bitter disappointment that neither Len Hall nor Senate Majority Leader Walter Mahoney of Buffalo had the political courage to stand pat against a political newcomer like Nelson Rockefeller.” He went on to say that many upstaters were concerned about Rockefeller’s liberalism, particularly since the Rockefeller Brothers Fund produced the “give-away” reports that were “radical,” and possibly “pink”—that is, socialist. Connelly observed, “Upstaters want to keep their party a conservative party, distinguishable from the liberal Democrats, and I respect them for it and think less of Len Hall and Sen. Walter Mahoney for their cheap but profitable jump on the Rockefeller bandwagon.” Connelly concluded that “New Dealer Republicans” should leave the party altogether. “Surely they should not run for office on the Republican ticket and expect conservative Republicans … to drive in to the polls and elect them.”⁴⁰ As it turned out, Connelly articulated a criticism of Rockefeller that would persist throughout his career.

In the days leading up to the state convention, the press reported a disagreement within the party over a controversial welfare policy that exhibited the ideological divide in the New York Republican Party. During the previous two years, the most prominent Republican conservative, Mahoney, had been the chief sponsor of an unsuccessful legislative bill that imposed a one-year residency requirement for anyone seeking to obtain welfare—a bill that encouraged the notion that the state’s welfare program attracted undesirables to New York. Whereas Republicans such as State Senator John H. Cooke had argued that the existing law, which allowed newcomers to receive welfare, made New York “a dumping ground for ne’er-do-wells,” moderate Republicans such as Assembly Speaker Oswald D. Heck defended it.⁴¹ Although Mahoney’s Relief Residency Bill passed the state senate in 1957 and 1958, it died in assembly committee in 1957 and in 1958 was twice defeated on the floor, once because of Heck’s public opposition. Despite a lack of consensus among Republicans, several of Mahoney’s associates testified before the platform committee calling for the inclusion of an endorsement of the residency requirement.

The residency requirement troubled Rockefeller. The New York Times credited the Republican nominee’s “persuasive influence” over the convention for ensuring that the platform would not include a plank calling for a one-year residency requirement.⁴² Rockefeller and his staff were able to keep the plank out of the final platform but not without some effort. A residency requirement would have stood out as the most divisive of platform planks in a document that was largely affirmative. The issue was made more complicated because, as the New York Times reported, Rockefeller’s “chief political sponsor and upstate guide, Assemblyman Malcolm Wilson of Yonkers, ha[d] been one of the chief advocates of a residency requirement for relief.”⁴³ It is unclear if conservatives thought it possible to get a residency requirement endorsement added to the platform, but perhaps it was their way of demonstrating that they were still committed to their own principles despite Rockefeller’s nomination. In comparison, four years before, the most controversial planks in the Republican platform called for a reversal of Dewey’s long-standing opposition to nonprofit groups holding bingo nights and an effort to “eliminate financially irresponsible motorists from the highway.”⁴⁴ Ultimately, the 1958 Republican state platform resembled the politics of Dewey and Rockefeller, but it did not mask entirely the ideological divide within the party. The disagreement over residency requirements revealed that Rockefeller would need to perform a balancing act to lead the state party.

An Ambiguous Victory

I like him very much. He worked for me when I was president and did a fine job.

The only thing wrong with Rockefeller is he’s a Republican. When he quits being a Republican, he’ll get somewhere.

—Harry S. Truman, September 18, 1958

Rockefeller’s entrance into electoral politics was undoubtedly a personal victory, but the nonpartisan style of his campaign made it difficult to draw any conclusions about the command of moderate Republicanism.⁴⁵ Rockefeller faced two significant challenges in his campaign for governor in 1958: disassociate himself from the Republican Party in a difficult campaign year and distinguish himself from Harriman. He achieved the first by rarely mentioning his party while campaigning. Numerous radio and television advertisements, billboards, and pamphlets made no mention of the Republican Party in favor of slogans such as “Rockefeller Gets Things Done” and “Put Some Go in Government with Rockefeller.” When the press asked for Rockefeller’s reaction to Eisenhower calling Democrats “political radicals” or saying unions needed “fumigating,” he did not contradict the president but remarked, “I wouldn’t put it quite that way.” While Eisenhower’s approval ratings remained above 50 percent in the months leading up to the elections, his fellow Republicans seeking office across the nation were not as fortunate.⁴⁶ Voters nationwide expressed dissatisfaction with Republicans, particularly conservatives, who were associated with the recession and the party’s anti-labor theme that focused on “right to work” laws, which labor unions used to rally opposition in key states.⁴⁷ Rockefeller’s progressive politics put him more in line with Harriman than with upstate Republicans or even Eisenhower. “Mr. Rockefeller, just like Mr. Harriman,” wrote the Wall Street Journal, “promises to continue State government regulation of rents, to espouse a liberal civil rights program and to broaden the state’s welfare services.”⁴⁸ To differentiate himself from Harriman, Rockefeller accused his opponent of being beholden to the Tammany machine, failing to keep industry in the state, and falling short of his campaign promises. Rockefeller blamed New York’s economic slowdown on the governor, but he made no promises to reduce spending on social programs or cut taxes. It was Rockefeller’s plan to show the state’s voters, particularly independents and Democrats who supported Harriman in 1954, that he brought, if not new ideas, a new enthusiasm that set him apart from Democrats and Republicans alike.

Rockefeller and his staff dared leave nothing to chance; he committed a great deal of his and his family’s resources to win the governorship. Drew Pearson of the Washington Post reported that Rockefeller spent $60,000 a day on television ads, which were still something of a novelty in the late 1950s. Full-page newspaper advertisements listed the twelve phone numbers one could call to listen to Rockefeller’s recorded answers to questions. However, Pearson noted that it would be difficult to know how much was truly spent on campaign expenses like setting up fifty-four Rockefeller headquarters in department stores to pass out campaign literature to shoppers. Pearson, among others, observed that the Rockefeller family’s decades-long campaign to burnish its reputation through philanthropic works also benefited the candidate. The family had left an indelible mark on New York City’s landscape, whether that meant purchasing the East River site to build the United Nations headquarters or contributing generously to the development of Lincoln Square.⁴⁹ In the previous twenty years, the Rockefeller Foundation’s General Education Board gave an estimated $50 million to Black education, particularly in the South. When the Rockefeller family’s long reach drew criticism in comparison to Harriman’s, Rockefeller defended his family’s contributions by asking, “Has anyone heard of a Harriman Foundation?”⁵⁰

As the election neared, Rockefeller’s chances improved to the dismay of some who longed for an election determined by the issues and to the delight of others who strained for an opportunity to shake a Rockefeller’s hand. The gubernatorial race became an opportunity for New Yorkers to trade one millionaire for the next. An editorial in the Washington Post expressed concern that both Harriman and Rockefeller had failed the state’s voters by conducting campaigns reliant on glad-handing and personal appeals rather than issues.⁵¹ The voters, perhaps confident in New York’s standing in the late 1950s, did not insist that the candidates wage aggressive campaigns. The New York Times conducted a survey of the entire state and concluded that voters had decided to “give a young guy a chance” because “it’s not likely to make much difference anyway.”⁵² At the end of the conventions in August, Harriman had a commanding 60 percent to 40 percent lead over Rockefeller, but by mid-October, that lead dwindled and people were unsure who might win the race.⁵³ Some Rockefeller supporters stated in interviews that they hoped he would cut taxes—a promise he resisted the entire campaign—while others hoped he would quicken the pace of highway construction. According to the New York Times, the most important factor swaying voters was indeed personalities, while many failed to identify what issues the candidates advocated.⁵⁴

On November 4, 1958, at 9:00 p.m., two hours after polls closed, it was clear that Rockefeller would be the victor and had blurred party lines in the process. At 11:30 p.m., Rockefeller stood in front of an audience of three thousand supporters at the Roosevelt Hotel in New York City to announce his victory. The governor-elect told the audience that it was a “wonderful moment” that he accepted with a “deep sense of humility.” It was not an average win. Rockefeller had bested Harriman by 557,000 votes—the second biggest victory margin in a New York gubernatorial election—and with 5,678,666 votes cast, the election surpassed the previous records.⁵⁵ His campaign was also the most expensive for statewide office in New York. The official totals stated that Rockefeller spent close to $1.8 million, while Harriman spent $1.1 million.⁵⁶ The figures were estimates based on a system of campaign finance in New York that was regulated by laws with numerous loopholes.⁵⁷ Rockefeller’s win was also notable because of the inroads he made with union members, Jews, African Americans, and Puerto Ricans. Although Harriman garnered more votes from these groups, Rockefeller attracted a notable amount of minority support in New York City. “Mr. Rockefeller,” the New York Times reported, “is the second Republican candidate for Governor since the advent of the New Deal to make such substantial inroads into the Negro Democratic vote.”⁵⁸ One Democratic politician commented that Rockefeller sounded like a Democrat and was running on a Democratic platform.⁵⁹ Rockefeller successfully ran as a politician removed from the traditions of the Republican Party, a smart strategy in a tough Republican election cycle. As one journalist wrote, Rockefeller was a “Republican oasis in a desert of defeat,” but his victory was not a vote of confidence for his vision of moderate Republicanism, at least in any clearly defined manner.⁶⁰ Rather, Rockefeller convinced the majority of the electorate that he was capable, enthusiastic, and resolute in his desire to hold high office.

Rockefeller’s victory drew attention across the country because it was one of few Republican successes, which many regarded as a repudiation of the Eisenhower administration. Roscoe Drummond of the Washington Post noted, however, “Wherever the Republicans won, it was almost invariably the Republican liberals—the Eisenhower Republicans, the ‘modern’ Republicans—who withstood and in New York turned back the Democratic avalanche. The sensational triumph of Governor-elect Nelson Rockefeller is the most vivid example.”⁶¹ The day after the election, Eisenhower fielded questions about the possibility that Rockefeller would succeed him in two years. Edward Morgan of the American Broadcasting Company asked if Eisenhower might approve of Rockefeller winning the Republican presidential nomination, despite the longtime expectation that Nixon would be nominated and the possibility that Rockefeller was “too much on the radical or the spending side.”⁶² Rather than refute the notion that Rockefeller was too radical, Eisenhower explained that time in office reveals what every man believes. While Rockefeller’s political fortunes appeared to flourish overnight, it was unclear whether he won because he was so far left of the Republican mainstream that voters did not associate him with their disapproval of the Eisenhower administration’s economic policies or because he personified a version of the “modern Republicanism” that the president had advocated for in the past. When a reporter asked Eisenhower if the widespread Democratic victories would discourage his attempts to mold the party along the lines of modern Republicanism, Eisenhower assured the reporter that he remained strongly committed to it, which he described as a “Republican party that is ready to meet modern problems in accordance with the basic principles or traditional principles of the party.”⁶³ Rockefeller’s success may not have been an obvious victory for moderate or modern Republicanism, but some moderates hoped that outcomes like the one in New York indicated that the party had a bright future beyond the singular popularity of Eisenhower.

An editorial in Life magazine called Rockefeller’s victory proof that the Republican Party needed a new kind of candidate to win elections. The publication posited that the Republican Party had a difficult election year because it needed to update its leadership and approach to governing. Henry Luce, the publisher of Life, was himself a moderate pro-Rockefeller Republican and his publications reflected that position.⁶⁴ According to Life, old guard Republicans’ focus on aggressive foreign policy and an ever-vigilant crusade against socialism in the Democratic Party was no longer able to sway voters.⁶⁵ By contrast, Rockefeller in New York, Mark Hatfield in Oregon, Gerald Ford in Michigan, and Hugh Scott in Pennsylvania had won because they were appealing and enthusiastic moderate Republicans, who could replace the “Old Guard stereotype with a new image of a national party pledged both to private enterprise and the public welfare.”⁶⁶ One name that was not mentioned by Life was that of Barry Goldwater, who also won an impressive reelection as US senator from Arizona. While the press paid much attention to Rockefeller’s victory in New York and speculated whether he could be the presidential nominee in 1960, Goldwater, who ran on a platform that opposed socialism in government and growth of union power, also proved to be an attractive candidate who drew enthusiastic bipartisan support from voters. One-third of the state’s nominal Democrats voted for Goldwater. At the age of forty-nine, the senator, who was a year younger than Rockefeller, was a rising star known for his conservative views. Goldwater was at the forefront of a wave of GOP success in Arizona, where a Republican was elected governor along with the reelection of two Republican congressmen.⁶⁷ Goldwater’s campaign, imbued with ideological certainty and a rejection of liberalism, offered an alternative path forward for the Republican Party that did not cut through the industrial Northeast.

Searching for Votes in “All Possible Quarters”

As a natural and tireless campaigner, Rockefeller showed signs of being able to connect to diverse audiences in New York City as easily as he had won over Republican crowds upstate. On October 24, 1958, Rockefeller had one of his most exciting campaign appearances at a rally for Rockefeller and Kenneth Keating, the Republican nominee for US senator, where three thousand Puerto Rican residents gathered in Spanish Harlem to listen to the candidate. Rockefeller, speaking in fluent Spanish, discarded his prepared notes and launched into a twenty-minute ad lib talk to a riveted audience. The crowd chanted “Viva Rockefeller.”⁶⁸ Rockefeller told the audience that the state “desperately need[ed] to develop a housing policy to assure decent homes for all its people.” Furthermore, he reiterated his calls for improved low-income housing, maintenance of rent controls, a continuation of the fifteen-cent subway fare, and no residence requirement for relief eligibility. The problem, according to Rockefeller, was not that Harriman failed to recognize these needs, but rather, he had not ensured that the state economy was strong enough or the state administration efficient enough to address them.⁶⁹ Once the speech was over, Rockefeller jumped into the audience to greet people and was swept up into the crowd riding high on people’s shoulders. He disappeared at one point to the consternation of his staff—one remarked, “We’re losing the candidate. He’ll break a leg”—but he reemerged again still smiling as if he were having the time of his life.⁷⁰

Rockefeller made his first public appearances in Harlem one month into the general election campaign and focused on issues related to discrimination and enhanced civil rights legislation. During both events in mid-September—an African American Masonic order gathering and a civil rights rally—Rockefeller shared the dais with his rival Harriman. At the first event, where Rockefeller was the featured speaker and Harriman offered brief introductory remarks due to a scheduling conflict, Rockefeller proposed the creation of an economic advisory council under the auspices of the State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD) to expand job opportunities for African Americans who he said were underutilized in the economy. Rockefeller also called for the strengthening of SCAD and the civil right bureau of the attorney general’s office, which was a combination of efforts proposed by Democrats and Republicans, respectively. While Rockefeller sought to offer a “fresh and progressive program” to end bias in employment, housing, and education, he also avoided introducing specific proposals that contradicted the recent positions of Republican legislators. He did express a desire, however, to make New York a leader in the effort to end discrimination in the United States. He presented an idea that would become a theme of his campaign in this field: “We in New York have an unparalleled opportunity to give leadership in this crisis.… Now we can set an example that will lift the hearts and the hopes of men throughout our country and throughout our world as well.”⁷¹

Rockefeller’s appearances in Harlem revealed that his views on civil rights more closely resembled Harriman’s, minus some partisan disagreements on Eisenhower’s record, than New York Republican legislative leaders. Days after attending the same event, Rockefeller and Harriman found themselves together in Harlem again at a civil rights rally in honor of Martin Luther King Jr., who was the featured speaker before a crowd of five thousand people. Rockefeller’s and Harriman’s speeches highlighted their similar views on civil rights including their condemnation of school segregation in the South and discrimination in New York. They also criticized southern segregationists and said it was immoral for leaders in Arkansas and Virginia to close schools to prevent integration. Rockefeller, however, felt compelled to defend Eisenhower’s role in Little Rock and position on school desegregation after several speakers criticized the president’s reluctance to support the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings. Harriman who countered Rockefeller’s defense said that Eisenhower’s handling of Little Rock the year before “created a vacuum into which bigots and demagogues have moved.” Rockefeller’s remarks again highlighted his aspirations for New York’s role in this national controversy. “We cannot rewrite the laws of Arkansas, but we can embark on a bold program to solve the problems of our own state. We have a proud record of combatting prejudice based on race, creed and color. We have pioneered in social programs and legal programs to overcome discrimination.” He then went on to praise the state’s pioneering efforts under the leadership of Dewey, while also noting that there was more work to be done to counteract discrimination in New York. Rockefeller’s mere acknowledgment of discrimination in New York set him apart from Republican leaders in New York. King argued that the federal government must take control of schools when states interfered with desegregation. He also articulated the urgency of the moment and framed the fight for civil rights as being at the heart of the nation’s identity: “I believe in states’ rights, but no state has the right to do wrong.… We must now decide whether we will be a nation of law and order or a nation of anarchy, a nation of democracy or a nation of fascism.”⁷²

Rockefeller’s statements in Harlem reflected the work of his adviser Roswell B. Perkins and other staff members who ensured that the candidate’s positions on civil rights reflected his views while trying not to draw attention to his disagreements with party leadership.⁷³ Perkins, a lawyer whom Rockefeller met while they worked in the Eisenhower administration, outlined a careful position on civil rights for the candidate that called for more work in the field of civil rights, praised the Republican record—one memo called it a “brilliant record of achievement”—and obscured the ways in which Rockefeller’s position on civil rights challenged his own party. Rockefeller’s civil rights plan was to first “intensify efforts to end discrimination in employment, housing, and education,” second, “develop a new and positive approach to civil rights based on human potentialities,” and third, “develop bolder programs for elimination of slums and expansion of housing opportunities in essentially segregated urban areas.” Perkins recommended Rockefeller call to strengthen SCAD without saying he favored giving the agency authority to launch its own investigations, and the creation of the economic advisory board under SCAD. A proposed civil rights speech prepared by Perkins also suggested Rockefeller praise the Republican record on civil rights on the federal and state levels, the latter focusing on the efforts of Dewey. The materials from Perkins also made the case that New York had lost momentum in its efforts to curb discrimination because of Democrats’ partisan politics and Harriman’s lack of focus because of his desire to run for president. There was no mention, however, of the Republican-led state legislature blocking Democrats’ antidiscrimination legislation. The positions outlined by Perkins were striking because they contradicted the conclusions of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund report produced for Rockefeller that found that Democrats’ efforts to strengthen SCAD were reasonable and concluded that there was no advantage in relying on the office of the attorney general to address discrimination issues. Perkins’s work demonstrated the efforts to downplay the New York Republican Party’s inconsistent record on civil rights after 1956, but Rockefeller rarely had to defend his position on antidiscrimination laws to the level of detail that would highlight differences between him and his party.⁷⁴

Harriman attempted to put Rockefeller on the defensive by drawing attention to the areas in which Rockefeller’s policies broke with the Republican Party or questioning his ability to convince Republican legislators to embrace his ideas, but such criticism did not change the general impression that Rockefeller was a liberal or that he would be able to maintain liberal positions once elected. With a week and a half before the election, Harriman told a gathering of Democratic Party workers, “This is the phoniest and most fraudulent campaign I have ever seen. Rockefeller is trying to conceal the fact that he is a Republican. This is the thirtieth anniversary of my quitting the Republican party and if Rockefeller was honest, he would do what I did.” Earlier in the campaign, Harriman said that Rockefeller was a fraud because he publicly opposed right-to-work laws but was unwilling to denounce fellow Republicans such as the California gubernatorial candidate, Senator William Knowland, who supported the anti-labor position. Harriman also noted that Rockefeller supported rent controls, while Republican legislators opposed the measure. He also pointed out that Rockefeller’s running mate Wilson continued to hold contrary positions to Rockefeller on issues such as low-cost and middle-income housing, which Rockefeller supported and he did not.⁷⁵ Despite Harriman’s efforts, editorial endorsements for and against Rockefeller revealed that his attempts may have had limited impact. The New York Times, in its “enthusiastic” endorsement of Rockefeller, found him to be a modern Republican with liberal views. While finding Harriman’s time in office “pedestrian,” the editorial board praised Rockefeller’s plan to improve the education system, build better housing, and advance the state’s record on civil rights to ensure it became, quoting Rockefeller, a “shining example of our faith in freedom and opportunity for all men.”⁷⁶ The New York Amsterdam News endorsed Harriman but made it clear that it found Rockefeller to be an excellent candidate and a man of “unusual talent, ability and resources who has served his country well both in public and private affairs.”⁷⁷ Meanwhile, La Prensa, the oldest Spanish-language newspaper in New York, endorsed Harriman and cast doubt on Rockefeller’s campaign, which it thought was plagued with promises the candidate could not fulfill.⁷⁸ The New York Herald Tribune also endorsed Rockefeller with a focus on his pledges in relation to economic growth, railroads, education, and juvenile delinquency. The newspaper also praised Rockefeller’s desire to, again, quoting the candidate, make New York “a shining example of our faith in freedom and opportunity for all men.”⁷⁹ Based on editorial commentary in New York City’s major newspapers, it appeared that Rockefeller was largely successful in his efforts to create distance between himself and both the local and national Republican Party. He also presented a convincing case about his commitment to civil rights and his desire to make New York a leader for the nation.

The praise Rockefeller received in the press seemed to show that his campaign’s resources were well spent or, at the very least, did not go unnoticed. In her nationally syndicated column, Dorothy Fleeson observed, “Nelson has pursued his immediate objective with utter single-mindedness and the efficiency with which his present bid has been operated to shut out rivals and bring support from all possible quarters has been remarkable.” One of those quarters, Harlem, for example, received an unusually high amount of attention from both candidates. Earl Brown, a New York City council member from Harlem, observed in his Amsterdam News column, “The two candidates gave Harlem more attention than it has ever enjoyed from the heads of the tickets during a campaign. Mr. Rockefeller appeared in Harlem five times and Gov. Harriman, seven. Once or possibly twice are deemed par for the course.”⁸⁰ Harriman carried the four predominately African American voting districts in New York City but by a smaller margin than in 1954. According to analysts at the Democratic national headquarters, Rockefeller’s percentage of support in three of those four districts was less than Eisenhower in 1956. In the sixth assembly district where Rockefeller outperformed Eisenhower, Harriman received 50.8 percent of the vote overall in comparison to 62.2 percent in 1954. In the eleventh assembly district in Harlem, the district with the highest percentage of African American voters, Harriman received 12,322 votes to 4,447 for Rockefeller. The Chicago Defender reported, however, that Harriman’s three-to-one victory was evidence of him losing ground in the community.⁸¹ Similarly, the New York Amsterdam News, in its front-page coverage of the election returns, reported that despite not winning a majority of the Black vote, Rockefeller’s “man-in-street, glad handing campaign in Negro districts in New York paid off.” It concluded the article with an ambivalent comment: “At Roosevelt Hotel, headquarters of the Republican Party, there were many Negroes in prominence as the happy GOP party once more sat in the drivers [sic] seat. What this will mean in the future of Negroes is something else to ponder.”⁸²

“To Generate a New Era of Progress”

On January 1, 1959, Rockefeller became the forty-ninth governor of New York. With a sweeping inaugural address that expounded on the Cold War, the western hemisphere, and the might of the atom bomb, Rockefeller spoke not simply to New Yorkers but to “citizens of America and of the free world.”⁸³ The governor introduced himself as a grand thinker who aspired to use New York as a platform to introduce his vision of how the United States should set an example for the world. It was essential for New York to be a leader in the nation economically, Rockefeller explained, but perhaps more importantly to fulfill the nation’s duty to guarantee equality for its citizens. A major theme in the address was that the United States could not be a leader of the free world unless it protected the freedom of its own citizens. “We can serve—and save—freedom elsewhere only as we practice it in our own lives. We cannot speak of the equality of men and nations unless we hold high the banner of social equality in our own communities.”⁸⁴ The majority of the address was global in focus, and the press took notice. Roscoe Drummond said the address “could as well have been delivered from the steps of the Capitol in Washington as from the steps of the Capitol in Albany.”⁸⁵ Arthur Krock observed that “not until the twenty-ninth paragraph of his inaugural address at Albany did he mention ‘New York.’ ”⁸⁶

When Rockefeller did turn the focus of his address to his home state, he discussed an expansive program that called for initiatives in numerous fields. “We must speed our economic growth,” stated Rockefeller, while addressing transportation problems, developing natural resources, and reorganizing governmental processes. “We must put the state’s fiscal house in order,” he continued, while improving and expanding social and health insurance, enhancing programs for the aged, and increasing the amount of intellectual and cultural facilities.⁸⁷ Rockefeller concluded his remarks with what would become a theme throughout his political career. He explained that rather than try to find a political label to define his approach to governance, he hoped the public would unite behind him to meet the needs of society. “We shall be conservative—for we know the measureless value that is our heritage, to save and cherish and to enrich, we shall be liberal—for we are vastly more interested in the opportunities of tomorrow than the problems of yesterday,” and “we shall be progressive—for the opportunities and the challenges are of such size and scope that we can never halt and say: our labor is done.”⁸⁸

Rockefeller broke with many traditions during his inauguration. He forewent a morning coat and striped trousers in favor of a blue business suit, he paid $40,000—the equivalent of four-fifths of the gubernatorial salary—for his inaugural ball, which featured Cab Calloway and the New York City Ballet, and most notably, he gave a speech that removed any doubt that he saw the governorship as his vehicle to the White House. Unlike Harriman, Grover Cleveland, Al Smith, and Theodore Roosevelt before him whose addresses had all kept to New York issues, Rockefeller made no attempt to quiet talk of his desire to be a national candidate.⁸⁹ It was a calculated risk and the results were largely positive. The Albany-based Knickerbocker News published an editorial praising Rockefeller’s emphasis on how one state could play a major role in the struggle to defeat communism: “We found it difficult to listen to Governor Rockefeller’s inaugural address without thinking of another state and another governor—Faubus of Arkansas. And from that starting point one’s mind wandered quickly to distant lands and to the known reaction of peoples of many and varied racial strains to what happened—and still continues to happen—in Little Rock.”⁹⁰ Now free from the demands of the campaign and before the legislative session, Rockefeller seized the opportunity to express his philosophical concerns about national and international affairs.

State legislators learned quickly that Rockefeller had no plans on governing without increased revenue. To make possible his ambitious program that ranged from enlarging forest preserves to making immediate investments in education, Rockefeller said the state must make “hard decisions” to avoid “fiscal disaster.” In the past four years, he explained, state expenditures increased 46 percent while revenues increased 35 percent. Deficits were avoided by using bond funds and drawing from the Capital Construction Fund of the state, but this pattern needed to be halted.⁹¹ Although Rockefeller blamed the state’s problems on Harriman’s leadership, a New York Times editorial noted that Rockefeller “tacitly criticized members of his own party in the Legislature, as well as the Democrats.”⁹² During his campaign, Rockefeller had often accused Harriman of spending more than the state could afford without ever mentioning that the Republican-controlled legislature denied the sitting governor’s requests to increase revenue. Before presenting his budget, the governor made an unprecedented call on legislators for an early vote to increase the gas tax. With the quip, “If my grandfather could only see me now!” Rockefeller signed the bill, which was expected to generate an additional $60 million of annual revenue on January 20.⁹³ Harriman had unsuccessfully attempted to get a similar but smaller increase the year before, but Senate Republicans voted 31 to 3 to reject it. Now when faced with a similar appeal from a Republican governor, a majority of Republicans supported an increase.⁹⁴ Rockefeller succeeded with the support of Republicans, but soon he would face significant protest from both sides of the line when he proposed the first budget in New York history that would surpass $2 billion.

Rockefeller stood in front of the state legislature in Albany on February 2 and asked for approval of both the state’s largest budget and tax increase in history. This was necessary, he explained, because the state had committed to the vast majority of the proposed expenditures prior to his election.⁹⁵ Rockefeller presented himself and his proposed budget, perhaps not as a person who was fiscally conservative but someone who was a fiscal realist. The goal was to return the state to a pay-as-you-go policy on capital construction as soon as possible and to rely less on bond financing and more on efficiency and economy. The record $2,041,000,000 budget, which exceeded the previous year’s budget by $240 million, called for a tax increase of $277 million, the majority of which would be collected from increasing the personal income tax and instituting an automatic withholding system to prevent nonpayment. The two largest increases in the budget were for education—nearly one-third of the budget was allocated for state aid to local school districts—and new highway construction. Rockefeller asked the joint session of the senate and assembly for a truce on partisan politics. It was unusual for the governor to read the budget message personally; typically, a clerk would read the message to the two houses separately. The legislature received the proposal “in glum silence.”⁹⁶ “Like small boys faced with a giant spoonful of nasty medicine,” wrote New York Times journalist Weaver, the Republican legislators sat in stony silence preparing themselves for the personal battles they would wage to get Rockefeller’s budget passed.⁹⁷ The New York Times reported a few weeks before that Rockefeller’s popularity after the November election had persuaded many Republicans that they would have to support “enlargements of social welfare and civil rights programs that they rejected when recommended by a Democratic Governor.”⁹⁸ That evening, Rockefeller took his appeal to the television airwaves telling New Yorkers that it was more important to address the critical fiscal situation than to place blame.⁹⁹ Democrats in the legislature joined by union leaders complained that Rockefeller’s fiscal program would disproportionately harm the poor. Meanwhile, Republicans were less vocal but no more satisfied. The displeasure with the budget was indeed nonpartisan.

New Yorkers expressed heavy opposition to Rockefeller’s proposed budget and tax increase. Although state legislators were not surprised that the vast majority of letters they received in reference to Rockefeller’s budget plan were critical, the sheer volume and the threats of political reprisals did cause concern. Conservative estimates were that more than one hundred thousand letters arrived in legislators’ offices in the two weeks after the budget message. Although many letter writers called for a reduction in state spending, few made specific recommendations for cuts. Rockefeller claimed that of the 843 letters sent to him in reference to his program, two expressed support, and with his trademark humor he added he planned to frame them. Whereas many New Yorkers were unafraid to voice their displeasure—Rockefeller was even booed at a public appearance at the Coliseum in Manhattan—local newspapers were split on the issue; about half of the upstate newspapers printed editorials criticizing the plan while the other half, including the New York Times, praised the governor for his calls for fiscal responsibility.¹⁰⁰ The Wall Street Journal printed an editorial that gave Rockefeller credit for insisting that people pay for the services they demanded but questioned the wisdom of increasing taxes and looking for new sources of revenue rather than seeking ways to reduce spending.¹⁰¹ Rockefeller intended to meet the changing needs of New Yorkers, but it came at a cost that his fellow Republicans were wary to pay.

In the face of protracted opposition within his own party, Rockefeller took it upon himself to use his influence to get his budget approved with minimal cuts. Although the senate, with the leadership of Majority Leader Mahoney, did not pose a problem, by late February it was clear that there were not enough votes supporting the proposed budget to get it passed in the assembly. All fifty-six Democrats united in their refusal to support the budget bill; with eighteen Republicans against it, Rockefeller lacked the necessary majority. The most vocal and adamant opposition to Rockefeller’s budget hailed from upstate Onondaga County (Syracuse, NY), Erie County (Buffalo, NY), and Monroe County (Rochester, NY). Rockefeller spent early March in conference with Republican legislative leaders trying to work out a compromise. On March 11, 1959, the state senate and assembly voted to increase the income tax by a vote of 31 to 25 and 78 to 70. The final budget came in at $2,000,577,797.¹⁰² The Republican rebels, as they were called, who led the revolt against Rockefeller did obtain some important concessions, including the elimination of a tax credit proposed by the governor. And Mahoney, who had delivered state senators’ support of Rockefeller’s budget, gained his own personal victory. A quarter of the budget reduction was achieved by cutting $10 million from the $15 million Rockefeller had promised New York City in new state aid.¹⁰³ Mahoney’s backing had been essential throughout; his support was particularly notable because ten years before, he made a name for himself by leading a tax revolt against Dewey.¹⁰⁴

“Governor Rockefeller has won a spectacular fiscal victory” that “showed a refreshing willingness on his part to exercise executive leadership,” wrote the Washington Post in its editorial supporting Rockefeller’s budget victory. The New York Times also supported Rockefeller’s leadership and congratulated his success but took note of the growing opposition in the United States to increased taxes and the political danger in suggesting their necessity. In Washington, few members of Congress spoke seriously about raising taxes to balance the budget, and even modest increases in the gasoline tax to balance the federal highway construction account were shunned. The New York Times wrote that despite a general demand for services, people had an illogical aversion to paying for them; as a result, the government would need to “shape its course accordingly.”¹⁰⁵ Rockefeller survived his tax increase relatively unscathed and proved himself a formidable force in New York, but a vocal minority of Republican legislators expressed opposition to Rockefeller’s leadership that would outlive his first legislative session.

At the end of his first year in office, Rockefeller commissioned a private survey, which concluded optimistically that he had reoriented the state’s political terrain. Although the upstate-downstate dynamic would continue to be challenging for Rockefeller as it had been for governors before him, Rockefeller had nonetheless put himself in an unusually advantageous position: “Rockefeller has reshaped the political line-up of the state so thoroughly that professional politicians of either party are being forced gradually into a more non-partisan approach to important state matters. The partisan appeals of party leaders are beginning to sound increasingly half-hearted and routine.”¹⁰⁶ Rockefeller’s presence as governor had destabilized traditional politics in the state. Republicans found themselves in the uncomfortable position of refraining to oppose Rockefeller’s governing style, which conflicted with their approach to fiscal matters. Unlike Harriman, Rockefeller enjoyed the support of the conservative majority leader, who lobbied fellow legislators to support Rockefeller’s budget. Deal making behind the scenes seemed to make the difference. Rockefeller did not shy away from using his wealth and influence to sway members of his party. In addition to the usual distribution of patronage, Rockefeller and his family made substantial contributions to state campaigns in addition to giving less conspicuous gifts to fellow Republicans. For example, State Assembly Leader Joe Carlino had the opportunity to vacation in a cottage at the Rockefeller-owned Caneel Bay Resort in the Virgin Islands when Rockefeller learned of the assemblyman’s family trip.¹⁰⁷ According to Rockefeller biographer Richard Norton Smith, Mahoney’s support for Rockefeller was due in part to the governor authorizing funds for infrastructure projects in his district and naming one of Mahoney’s top aides to the Public Service Commission, one of the most sought-after positions in state government.¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, Democrats also found themselves in a difficult position as they tended to support the “spending elements” of the Rockefeller program. The destabilization was also not all in Rockefeller’s favor, however. Twenty years after this episode, which he called a “very bitter, bitter battle,” New York State Tax Commissioner Joseph Murphy expressed the belief that the seeds of the Conservative Party of New York were laid during the fight over taxes during Rockefeller’s first year in office. Murphy recalled that the outrage over taxes became so great in his hometown of Syracuse that the state police recommended he and his family vacate their house for a few days due to the threats that he received.¹⁰⁹ Rockefeller’s reputation as a “nonpartisan leader” increased his appeal to Democrats and independents but resulted in a weakening of his support among some conservative Republican voters.¹¹⁰ With a successful year behind him, Rockefeller looked to the national Republican Party to see if he could get party professionals to fall in line as they had in New York. Rockefeller hoped to make the most of his rising political fortunes but would soon learn that his victories in New York would not persuade the national party to embrace his brand of Republicanism.

Rockefeller’s foray into politics was largely a great success. His careful preparation and cultivation of relationships had worked in his favor and at times seemed unnecessary, as a wink and a handshake appeared to cure much of the mistrust felt by Republican voters and delegates. The early victories Rockefeller experienced in New York reveal the potential of what would always be his greatest strength, or at least, the case he would make for his political viability—his identity as a bipartisan vote getter. Rockefeller’s moderate politics appeared particularly appealing in a period of consensus in New York politics as reflected by the similarities between Harriman and Rockefeller, but Rockefeller’s own research on postwar New York and criticisms of conservative Republicans suggested that there were limits to the political consensus Rockefeller relied on. In general, both parties had made peace with New Deal liberalism and the participation of enlightened business leadership in politics, but a conservative critique of this status quo persisted and posed an important challenge to Rockefeller. Rockefeller succeeded in this period despite ideological attacks in part because many Republicans were still unsure how the party’s conservative traditions could and should be adapted to the era of postwar big government. The nomination and election of Dwight Eisenhower raised similar concerns in 1952. The party leaders who acquiesced to Rockefeller’s candidacy were accustomed to the party sacrificing political philosophy for a chance at victory, but there was a minority in the party that voiced complaints in 1958 and challenged Rockefeller’s leadership in 1959 in the form of a small but vocal group of legislative “rebels” who opposed tax increases. The New York governorship was supposed to provide Rockefeller’s stepping-stone to the presidency, but it would be difficult for Rockefeller to lead a Republican Party that although accustomed to his brand of politics was, at best, unsure if it should continue to seek the middle path and, at worst, ready to reject it altogether.

In pursuit of the Republican nomination, Rockefeller consulted the right leaders and shook hands with numerous upstate voters to ensure that he demonstrated his commitment to taking an active role in the Republican Party. What he did not do, however, was change key elements of his policy agenda, such as advocating for racial equality, infrastructure projects, and revenue intensive programs that were likely to require tax increases. As a candidate for the nomination, Rockefeller avoided discussing his views that were outside the Republican mainstream. Once the general campaign began, Rockefeller did express his support for civil rights legislation and other liberal programs, but he avoided going into detail about his plans as a way to deemphasize that his support for “positive leadership” would mean advocating for the legislation that Republican legislators had opposed. Rockefeller aspired to construct a diverse constituency that included, for example, Black voters who supported the welfare state and enhanced antidiscrimination laws with whites from the suburbs of Long Island or upstate New York who wanted to divert tax dollars away from cities to their communities and protect their ability to maintain segregated spaces. He sought to achieve his goal on the campaign trail by refraining from going into detail about how the policies that he agreed with and appealed to Black voters broke with conservative positions within the Republican Party and refuted the claims of Republican leadership who said New York was free of discrimination. Rockefeller did experience some success appealing to Democrats and independents, but voting results in Harlem, for example, a community he committed an unusual amount of time and resources to courting, were promising but limited. Marginal polling gains with African Americans did not mean he had ushered in a new era of bipartisan appeal for the Republican Party. He would need to figure out how to begin fulfilling his promises in this controversial field if he hoped to return to Harlem pledging solidarity. As a candidate, Rockefeller chose silence and evasion to try to conceal the divides in the constituency he sought to build, but that strategy would be inadequate as governor if he hoped to advocate for civil rights legislation among other initiatives. With the national stage on his mind and a genuine commitment to liberal policies that he believed appealed to most of the populace, Rockefeller had a difficult task before him.