Initial Reactions to Sputnik

President Eisenhower was at his farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, when he received news of Sputnik’s launch from his press secretary James Hagerty late in the day on Friday, October 4. Hagerty, fielding questions from the press, said that the United States had “never thought of our [space satellite] program as one which was in a race with the Soviets,” and that the launch would have no effect on the timetable of the U.S. program, which planned to launch a smaller satellite in the spring of 1958. “Ours is geared to the International Geophysical Year,” he said, “and is proceeding satisfactorily in accordance with its scientific objectives.” After consulting with White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams the next morning, Eisenhower released a brief statement that Hagerty read to the press. “The launching of the Soviet Satellite is, of course, of great scientific interest,” he said. “It should contribute much to scientific knowledge that all countries are seeking to gain for the world during the International Geophysical Year.” When asked if the statement meant that the satellite had “no defense or security significance,” he replied that he was sticking with “scientific interest.”⁴

The congressional reaction was led by Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO), who interpreted Sputnik very differently than the president. “The recently announced launching of an earth satellite,” Symington said in a statement from Kansas City, “is but more proof of growing Communist superiority in the all-important missile field.” The senator left no doubt that he blamed Eisenhower’s fiscal conservatism for the failure of the United States to lead the world in satellite and missile technology. “At the same time” that the Soviet Union was achieving its superiority, Symington claimed that “for fiscal reasons” the United States was continuing “to cut back and slow down its own missile program.” He ended his statement with a call for the Senate Armed Services Committee to open an investigation, “because the future of the United States may well be at stake.”⁵

Sputnik’s launch had been scheduled to coincide with an IGY conference in Washington, DC, and many of America’s top scientists had the awkward experience of learning about it while attending a reception for the event at the Soviet embassy. While the scientists mingled over drinks, word spread through the crowd that the New York Times had received a Radio Moscow report of the launch. Despite their disappointment, they magnanimously congratulated their Soviet colleagues for the accomplishment. Not all scientists were so magnanimous. When Richard Witkin of the New York Times asked “high-ranking scientists” whether the United States could have launched a satellite before the Soviet Union “if money had not been held back and time wasted,” many, he reported, had answered “yes.”⁶ One scientist who believed this was Wernher von Braun, director of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA). On the day of the launch, he was giving newly appointed Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy a tour of Redstone Arsenal, near Huntsville, Alabama. Upon hearing of the launch von Braun exploded. “For God’s sake turn us loose and let us do something,” he said to the secretary. “We can put up a satellite in sixty days, Mr. McElroy! Just give us a green light and sixty days!”⁷

Back in Washington on Tuesday morning, Eisenhower asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles about the published claims that the army could have put a satellite into orbit several months before the Soviet Union. Quarles said that “there was no doubt that the Redstone, had it been used, could have orbited a satellite a year or more ago.” Taking the position that he would adhere to at the next day’s press conference, Eisenhower recalled that “timing was never given too much importance in our own program.”⁸ The army’s claim was legitimate. On September 20, 1956, ABMA launched the first Jupiter-C missile, based on the Redstone rocket, from Cape Canaveral, Florida. It landed in the ocean 3,350 miles from the launch pad—a distance record. It had reached an altitude of 682 miles—also a record. At this altitude it could have launched a satellite. In fact, prior to launch, an eager von Braun had been warned not to put a satellite in the nose cone.⁹

Later that day, Eisenhower met with Detlev Bronk, president of the National Academy of Sciences, to go over a statement that he planned to release prior to his press conference the next day. “His intent,” Eisenhower said, “was not to belittle the Russian accomplishment. He would like, however, to allay hysteria and alarm.” Bronk approved of the statement with one or two minor changes. Adams asked Bronk if he thought there was “anything in this achievement to alter our research and development program.” Bronk said there was not and that “we cannot constantly change our program with every action by the Russians.” He said that “if the president were asked if the scientists had been given adequate responsibility and opportunity to develop a satellite, he should say that they had been.”¹⁰

The press release the next day explained that in October 1954, the Eisenhower administration had decided to institute a scientific satellite program as part of the U.S. contribution to the IGY. The scientific aspects of the program were assigned to the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the U.S. Committee for the IGY, while the Department of Defense would supply the rocketry needed to place the satellite in orbit. Defense awarded this project to the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Because the NRL was not involved in ballistic missile research, its work on Vanguard, as the NRL satellite program was called, would serve two purposes. First, in keeping with the IGY’s mission, all data from the project could be shared with scientists throughout the world. Second, it would prevent any interference with the ongoing army and air force military missile programs. Eisenhower emphasized that Vanguard was never given the top priority that missile research enjoyed and, therefore, the “speed of progress in the satellite project cannot be taken as an index of progress in ballistic missile work.” The statement ended with a reminder that “our satellite program has never been conducted as a race with other nations.”¹¹ Nor could it have been. The big drawback of Vanguard was that it was an entirely new rocket and would not be ready before 1958.

The president’s carefully worded statement did not satisfy the 245 reporters who had assembled that day, and his responses did little to calm the hysteria to which many in the news media, not to mention the political and scientific communities, had succumbed. One week earlier, most of the questions at the presidential press conference had been about the ongoing Little Rock integration crisis, and Eisenhower had been praised for his handling of them. Faced with this new crisis, he stumbled a bit. The first question set the tone: “Russia has launched an earth satellite. They also claim to have had a successful firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile… . I ask you sir, what are we going to do about it?” Eisenhower’s response did not say what he intended to do about it, instead he reviewed what had already been done, emphasizing that despite its growing cost, he had always given Project Vanguard whatever it had asked for. “There never has been one nickel asked for accelerating the program. Never has it been considered a race.” Eisenhower was clearly sensitive to the claim that his fiscal austerity had cost the nation a chance to pull ahead in the race for space. Perhaps sensing that he was deflecting criticism, something that would have been uncharacteristic of him, another reporter asked, “Do you think that our scientists made a mistake in not recognizing that we were … in a race with Russia in launching this satellite, and not asking you for top priority and more money to speed up the program?” Clearly wishing to move on, his response was brief: “No, I don’t.”

Considering his determination to downplay the event, Eisenhower made some notable, and perhaps unintended, admissions. He said that scientists were “astonished” at Sputnik’s weight. He volunteered that it was “probably true” that the Soviets had gained a political and psychological advantage throughout the world. And when asked if he was satisfied with U.S. progress in the missile field, he said “I wish we were further ahead and knew more.” He also betrayed his frustration at times, something he tried not to do in public. He said that to him “there didn’t seem to be a reason … to grow hysterical about it [Sputnik].” In response to one suggestion, he said, “Suddenly all America seems to become scientists” (that at least got him a laugh). Most quoted, however, was his response to a question that played to his strengths: “In light of the great faith which the American people have in your military knowledge and leadership, are you saying at this time that with the Russian Satellite whirling about the world, you are not more concerned nor overly concerned about our nation’s security?” In its attempt to be precise, his response seemed equivocal: “Well, I have time and again emphasized my concern about the nation’s security… . Now, so far as the satellite itself is concerned, that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota.”¹²

If Eisenhower had led with, and refused to stray from, his lack of concern, he might have been more convincing. Instead, he had buried the lede in a long press conference during which he did, at times, seem concerned. The next day’s coverage of Eisenhower’s press conference was not good. “We agree with Ike that the Russian Sputnik up there can’t hurt us. It isn’t armed, it apparently isn’t likely to fall on us,” said an editorial in the New York Post. “Despite his reassurances, the country remains uneasy. For the first time we know what it feels like to be a have-not nation. We have no sputniks, and all the rationalizations of all our leaders … [do not] alter that fact… . We see poor planning, lack of imagination, underestimation of our adversary, faulty education, a lack of scientists… . We see a nation obsessed with material comforts, more adept at producing washing machines than sputniks.”¹³

Crafting a Response

The October 10 meeting of the NSC was devoted almost entirely to the subject of earth satellites and the missiles that carry them. DCI Allen Dulles reviewed the world reaction to Sputnik. The Soviet Union was, he said, seeking to make the most of the satellite launch and the preceding test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for propaganda purposes. Although their efforts were aimed primarily at the Middle East and other areas of the developing world, an interview published the previous day in the New York Times made clear that they were aimed at the West as well. In it, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev said, “When we announced the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile, some American statesmen did not believe us … now that we have successfully launched an earth satellite, only technically ignorant people can doubt this. The United States does not have an intercontinental ballistic missile; otherwise, it would have easily launched an earth satellite of its own. We can launch satellites because we have a carrier for them, namely the ballistic missile.”¹⁴

The NSC held an extended discussion of the difference between the American and Soviet satellite programs. Quarles explained that the Soviet Union’s satellite program had been integrated into its ICBM program from the beginning, and its prime objective was to be the first nation to orbit a satellite. Their success made clear that their abilities in the field of rocketry were greater than the United States had believed. The United States had separated its satellite and ICBM programs. Doing so necessitated a longer timeline, but it had allowed the United States to be “very open and above-board” about what it was doing, said Quarles, while “the Russians have not been.” In addition, he said, the satellite that the United States would deploy would be more sophisticated and provide more useful data. Bronk added that he was “greatly concerned” that the United States “avoid getting our whole scientific community into a race to accomplish everything before the Russians do.” The president concurred. He told those present that when they spoke to members of Congress or to the press “he could not imagine anything more important” than that they “stand firmly behind the existing earth satellite program which was, after all, adopted by the Council after due deliberation.”¹⁵

What Eisenhower and the NSC did not yet know was that there was a connection between the tremendous power of the Soviet R-7 rocket and the lack of sophistication of Sputnik. Soviet scientists had not yet developed the ability to miniaturize their instruments or create lightweight metal alloys. Powerful rockets were necessary just to get their hardware off the ground. Soviet missile guidance systems also lagged behind those of the United States. So, the Soviets could launch a missile that would travel a great distance, but their nuclear warheads were not yet small enough to fit inside the nose cone, and they could not be sure that the missile would come down within range of its target.¹⁶

Eisenhower later reflected that “there were two problems created by the Soviet Sputnik.” The first was a short-term one, “to find ways of affording perspective to our people and so relieve the current wave of near-hysteria.” The second problem was long-term—“to take all feasible measures to accelerate missile and satellite programs.”¹⁷ It was with these problems in mind that he spoke to the Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). The meeting had been planned before Sputnik but took on a greater importance given the circumstances. Eisenhower told the group that “he would like to try to create a spirit—an attitude toward science similar to that held toward various kinds of athletics in his youth.” He added that perhaps it was a good time to do so. “People are alarmed and thinking about science, and perhaps this alarm could be turned to a collective result.” With this in mind he planned to make a series of speeches on science and national security. One member of the group, Nobel Prize–winning physicist Isidor Rabi, suggested the idea of naming a presidential science adviser—an idea that Eisenhower liked.¹⁸

On November 7, Eisenhower addressed the American people from the Oval Office. By this time, the Soviet Union had launched a second satellite, Sputnik II. The 1,121-pound satellite carried a dog named Laika and a limited life-support system. Its weight required a rocket with at least 500,000 pounds of thrust—enough to power an ICBM for a 5,000-mile flight. “I am going to lay the facts before you—the rough with the smooth,” he said. “Some of these security facts are reassuring; others are not.” He began with the reassuring—an impressive list of modern arms possessed by the United States. Then, not wanting to dismiss an “achievement of the first importance,” he recognized the scientists responsible for Sputnik. But, he said, “Earth satellites, in themselves, have no direct present effect upon the nation’s security,” and “although the Soviets are quite likely ahead … of us in satellite development, as of today the over-all military strength of the free world is distinctly greater than that of the communist countries.”¹⁹

Moving on to the promotion of science he had discussed with the science advisers, he said that one of the nation’s greatest deficiencies was the failure “to give high enough priority to scientific education and to the place of science in our national life.” Following through on Rabi’s recommendation he said that he had created the position of special assistant to the president for science and technology to which he would appoint James Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Science Advisory Committee would also be moved from the ODM to the White House, becoming the Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC).²⁰ After his appointment, Killian told the press that he saw his job “as a means to integrate American science in every proper way with national policy making.”²¹ Killian’s appointment was not a hollow gesture. He attended meetings of the cabinet and the NSC and became one of Eisenhower’s most trusted advisers.

Eisenhower also responded to some of the criticism he had endured since Sputnik. To prevent interservice rivalries from holding up ballistic missile development in the way his critics claimed it had held up satellite development, he was creating the position of guided missile director in the Department of Defense to administer all missile development without regard to branch of military service. In response to demands for a massive increase in defense spending, however, he was less accommodating. “We can have both a sound defense, and the sound economy on which it rests,” he promised, “if we set our priorities and stick to them and if each of us is ready to carry his own share of the burden.”²²

In his follow-up speech the next week in Oklahoma City, Eisenhower said that he understood the fear that had gripped many Americans since the launch of Sputnik. “When such competence … is at the service of leaders who have so little regard for things human, and who command the power of an empire, there is danger ahead for free men everywhere,” he said, referring to the Soviet Union. “That, my friends, is the reason why the American people have been so aroused about earth satellites.” At the same time, he sought to assure Americans that despite what they were hearing from his critics in Congress and the press, they were safe. “The Soviets must be convinced that any attack on us and our allies would result, regardless to damage to us, in their own national destruction,” he told the assembled crowd. “A principle deterrent to war is the retaliatory nuclear power of our Strategic Air Command and our Navy… . It will be some time before either we or the Soviet forces will have long-range missile capability equal to even a small fraction of the total destructive power of our present bomber force.” Eisenhower assured the crowd that although maintaining and protecting the nuclear deterrent would be expensive, it would be done. “Our people,” he said, “will not sacrifice security to worship a balanced budget.” He would not, however, give in to demands that he spend more than what was necessary. “Over the long term a balanced budget is one indispensable aid in keeping our economy and therefore our total security, strong and sound.”²³

The speeches did not have the effect that Eisenhower had hoped. Reviews ranged from harsh criticism to lukewarm praise. A Gallup poll showed that his popularity had dropped from 79 percent in January 1957 to 57 percent in November 1957. With the Little Rock situation ongoing and the economy struggling, the drop cannot be attributed entirely to Sputnik, but it certainly did not help.²⁴ Eisenhower had planned to deliver a third speech in response to Sputnik in Cleveland later that month, but he was unable to do so. After lunch on Monday, November 25, Eisenhower complained of dizziness, then discovered he was having difficulty speaking. To his frustration, some words came out jumbled and others he could not remember at all. The president had suffered a mild stroke. The constant strain he had been under since the 1956 election campaign—and more recently by the concurrent Little Rock and Sputnik crises—had likely contributed to its onset. Within two days he had recovered his ability to speak and resisted any further restrictions on his activity. “If I cannot attend to my duties,” he told Mamie Eisenhower, “I am simply going to give up this job. Now that is all there is to it.”²⁵ Eisenhower did indeed attend to his duties. In fact, his secretary Ann Whitman said that in the days after his stroke he attended them with a new vigor, perhaps attempting to show that he still had it in him.

The Gaither Report

The winter of 1957–58 offered Eisenhower no break from the strain of his job. The period was defined primarily by debate over the defense budget. The terms of the debate were shaped not only by post-Sputnik political pressure, but by the unfortunate timing of the Gaither Report. The Gaither Committee, or more formally, the Office of Defense Mobilization Security Resources Panel, had been appointed by Eisenhower in April 1957 to study the Civil Defense Administration’s proposal to spend $40 billion on blast and fallout shelters. Despite the president’s request that the panel limit its study to passive defense measures that would protect the American people in the event of a nuclear attack, the Gaither Committee undertook a much broader study that included active defense measures such as improving the nation’s nuclear deterrent to prevent an attack. The committee submitted its report during the sensitive period following Sputnik when Eisenhower was attempting to calm fears and prevent Congress from overreacting with demands for massive increases in defense spending.

The Gaither Committee’s brief but alarming report estimated that if current trends in defense spending continued, the USSR’s annual military expenditures would be double those of the United States by the end of the 1960s. “The singleness of purpose with which they have pressed their military-centered industrial development,” the report warned, “has led to spectacular progress.” Most notable was the assumption that they had already surpassed the United States in ICBM development. Its conclusion was that “active defense programs now in being and programmed for the future will not give adequate assurance of protection to the civil population.” To lessen American vulnerability to surprise nuclear attack, the Gaither Committee made several recommendations. These included the following: reducing the response time for the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the primary deterrent to such an attack; protecting SAC by dispersing aircraft and building blast shelters for its aircraft and personnel; increasing the planned initial numbers of Thor and Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) from 60 to 240; increasing the planned initial numbers of Atlas and Titan ICBMs from 80 to 600; accelerating production of Polaris, the submarine-based IRBM; and creation of a nationwide system of fallout shelters. To implement the measures that the Gaither Committee considered of the highest value (everything mentioned here except for fallout shelters) would increase U.S. defense spending by $3–5 billion dollars per year for the next five years. This, the committee believed, would necessitate an increase in taxes and cuts in domestic spending such as highway construction. The final paragraph of the report was, no doubt, worded for its shock value. “By 1959, the USSR may be able to launch an attack with ICBMs carrying megaton warheads, against which SAC will be almost completely vulnerable under present programs… . If we fail to act at once, the risk, in our opinion, will be unacceptable.”²⁶

On November 7, the same day that he addressed the American people from the Oval Office, the NSC discussed the Gaither Committee report. If Eisenhower was angry that the Gaither Committee had exceeded its authority and put unnecessary pressure on him to increase spending, he did not show his anger to the council. He did tell them that despite the seriousness of the report, it was “essential that we neither become panicked nor allow ourselves to be complacent.” Rather, he said, they should make an urgent “economic, psychological, and political survey” of what should be done—and do it. He even suggested that in this regard, perhaps Sputnik had been helpful. He added that he had received information that day indicating that “fear had pervaded the population of the United States,” and that it was important that they not “appear frightened.”

Eisenhower did not disagree with all the recommendations of the Gaither Committee, but it was clear that he believed that the increased spending that the report recommended would damage the economy on which American security was based. “Was the panel proposing to impose controls on the U.S. economy?” he asked, reminding the council that he had removed controls upon taking office, believing this would allow the economy to grow more rapidly. He commented that “if those present were a group sitting in the Kremlin, we would probably adopt the recommendations … in toto, regardless of the effect of such action on our people.” But of course, he could not do that. “We have a big problem of molding public opinion as well as of avoiding extremes.”²⁷ Eisenhower would later write that “the president, unlike a panel which concentrates on a single problem, must always strive to see the totality of the national and international situation. He must take into account conflicting purposes, responding to legitimate needs but assigning priorities and keeping costs within bounds.”²⁸

Historian David Snead has pointed out another flaw in the Gaither Report that certainly influenced Eisenhower’s decisions about which of its recommendations to accept and which to dismiss. In making its recommendations, Snead wrote, the Gaither Committee “failed to evaluate the likelihood of the risks the Soviet Union might take to achieve its goals; therefore, it proposed major increases in defense spending that did not reflect the improbability of a Soviet attack.”²⁹

At the conclusion of the NSC meeting, Eisenhower said that it would be interesting to see how long the Gaither Report could be kept secret. Within a month the Gaither Committee report had leaked to the press, and in December the Washington Post published a summary of its findings. In his accompanying story, Chalmers Roberts said that the “Gaither Report portrays a United States in the gravest danger in its history.”

It pictures the nation moving in frightening course to the status of a second-class power. It shows an America exposed to an almost immediate threat from the missile bristling Soviet Union. It finds America’s long-term prospect one of cataclysmic peril in the face of rocketing Soviet military might and of a powerful, growing Soviet economy and technology which will bring new political, propaganda, and psychological assaults on freedom all around the globe. Many of those who worked on the report … were appalled, even frightened, at what they discovered to be the state of the American military posture in comparison with that of the Soviet Union.³⁰

Roberts’s editorial missed the mark by a wide margin. His remarks, and the Gaither Committee’s report, compared American missile development with what they assumed the Soviet Union had already done. Eisenhower was confident that their assumptions were incorrect. Since 1956, American U-2 planes had been making regular overflights of the Soviet Union. From an altitude of 70,000 feet, U-2 reconnaissance flights photographed a strip of Soviet territory 125 miles wide and 3,000 miles long. The images were clear enough to read a newspaper headline. From this intelligence data, Eisenhower knew that the Soviet Union was not as far along in its ICBM development as Sputnik had made it seem. They were still in the early stages of testing and had made no preparations for their deployment. Contrary to claims being made by his critics, the Soviets were no more than a few months ahead of the United States in ICBM development. The primary deterrent to World War III, America’s nuclear arsenal and its current delivery system, the long-range B-52 bomber, were not in danger of surprise attack.

Allen Dulles advised Eisenhower that he should tell the American people that “the United States has the capability of photographing the Soviet Union from a very high altitude without interference.” The idea of doing so must have been very attractive to Eisenhower. Such an admission would have silenced his critics and eased his burdens tremendously, but he refused to jeopardize the program by exposing it.³¹ The closest he came was in a letter to Swede Hazlett. “You can understand that there are many things that I don’t allude to publicly,” he wrote during the month following Sputnik, “yet some of them would do much to allay the fears of our own people.”³²

Sputnik and the U-2 were tied together in another way as well. At his post-Sputnik press conference, Eisenhower had been asked whether satellites had “significance in surveillance of other countries.” He had responded, “I wouldn’t believe at this moment you have to fear the intelligence aspects of this.”³³ In fact, it was the surveillance potential of satellites that interested Eisenhower the most. He had always been tentative about the use of the U-2, admitting that if he became aware of the Soviet Union overflying U.S. territory, he would consider it an act of war. If satellites could provide superior intelligence from low earth orbit, it would eliminate the need to violate Soviet airspace. The air force was already at work on WS-117L, a reconnaissance satellite to replace the U-2. The day before the press conference, Eisenhower had commented that the “Russians have in fact done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space.”³⁴ No nation protested that Sputnik had violated their territory.

On the same day as Eisenhower’s stroke, Lyndon Johnson opened Senate hearings on the U.S. satellite and missile programs. Johnson had arranged for his Defense Preparedness Subcommittee to hold the hearings rather than the full Senate Armed Services Committee as Symington had called for. With Johnson and Symington as leading candidates for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination, this move was a bit of intraparty politics. Johnson wanted to take a more bipartisan approach to the hearings. This, he believed, would make both Symington, who wanted to blame Eisenhower, and Republicans, who wanted to blame Truman, look like they were playing politics with national security. If successful, it would also make him look presidential.³⁵

Congressional critics claimed that Eisenhower had allowed interservice rivalries to interfere with the development of ballistic missiles. Eisenhower was sensitive to this criticism because he believed that competing missile projects had inflated the budget for weapons development. But with four ballistic missile systems making significant progress, and none of them hurting for need of additional funding, the criticism that development had been compromised was misplaced. The air force had two ICBM projects, Atlas and Titan. IRBMs, which, if deployed in Europe, would give the United States the ability to strike targets in the Soviet Union before ICBMs were available, were under development by the air force, which had Thor, and the army, which had Jupiter. All four of these missiles required highly volatile liquid fuel that needed to be stored at very low temperatures. This meant that they had to be fueled just before launch, which cut down response time significantly. To solve this problem, the air force was developing Minuteman, a solid-fueled ICBM. Solid-fueled missiles were ready to launch and could, therefore, be housed in protective silos. They had the added benefit of being much lighter. The navy was developing a solid-fueled IRBM called Polaris that could be launched from a specially designed, and very expensive, submarine.

Eisenhower found himself in a difficult position. He did not want to build too many first-generation, liquid-fueled missiles, knowing they would be obsolete when solid-fuel missiles became available. Nor did he want to overspend on solid-fuel missiles before the research had proven them viable. What he did want to do was end duplication and unnecessary spending by eliminating the less promising projects in the ICBM and IRBM categories. So Eisenhower’s determination to “maintain a defense posture of unparalleled magnitude and yet do so without a breakdown of the economy” would not have disadvantaged ballistic missile research and development; but in a post-Sputnik America, he could not appear to be sacrificing security for the sake of a balanced budget.³⁶ In a letter to financier Frank Altschul, Eisenhower had commented at length regarding the difficulty of providing security without destroying what he was trying to defend.

You mention that security is more important than balanced budgets… . The problem is not so simple as the statement implies… . We must remember that we are defending a way of life… . That way of life, over the long term, requires observance of sound fiscal policies … so that the system may continue to work primarily under the impulse of private effort rather than by fiat of centralized government. Should we resort to anything resembling a garrison state, then all that we are striving to defend would be weakened and, if long subjected to this kind of control, could disappear.³⁷

If the United States was behind the Soviet Union in missile development, it was not because Eisenhower had not given it high priority. As historian Yanek Mieczkowski has argued, post-Sputnik claims by congressional Democrats and the Gaither Committee that Eisenhower had allowed the Soviet Union to open a “missile gap” between itself and the United States “ignored the emphasis that he had placed on missile development and national security.”³⁸ Absent the setback in the unplanned race to orbit a satellite, U.S. missile development made significant progress under Eisenhower. In 1953, his first year in the White House, the United States had spent $3 million on missiles. In 1957, the year of Sputnik, it spent $1.4 billion. Wernher von Braun, designer of the German V-1 and V-2 rockets used against Britain in World War II and now working on the U.S. Army’s Jupiter missile, defended the president from charges of not prioritizing missiles. “The United States had no ballistic missile program worth mentioning between 1945 and 1951. Those six years, during which the Russians obviously laid the ground work for their large rocket program, are irretrievably lost… . Our present dilemma is not due to the fact that we are not working hard enough now, but that we did not work hard enough during the first six to ten years after the war.”³⁹ Vice President Nixon was quick to see the political benefits of this position—blame Truman.

Although Eisenhower emphasized to Defense Secretary McElroy and his science adviser James Killian that he did not want to spend money in response to public pressure, the defense budget increased approximately $2 billion as a result of Sputnik, the Gaither Report, and Democratic claims of a missile gap.⁴⁰ It is tempting to conclude that Eisenhower compromised his principles by agreeing to spend money that he did not believe was necessary for American security, but without revealing the existence of the U-2 intelligence it was really the best he could do. Given that the Gaither Report had recommended an additional $3–5 billion per year for defense, the $2 billion Eisenhower conceded to under intense pressure could be considered a victory. “I had made as strong a case for confidence and sane direction as I could,” he later wrote. “I was hampered, of course, by the fact that I could not reveal secrets which in themselves would have reassured our people.”⁴¹

Satellites, the NDEA, and NASA

In his first press conference following Sputnik’s launch, Eisenhower had promised that the United States would put up a satellite in December 1957. That promise was ill-advised. On December 6, after several delays in the countdown, the press watched as Vanguard exploded on the launchpad. “Vanguard Rocket Burns on Beach; Failure to Launch Test Satellite Assailed as Blow to U.S. Prestige,” proclaimed the New York Times.⁴² Others were not so diplomatic, “Flopnik,” “Kaputnik,” and “Rearguard,” were among the many attempts to derive humor from an embarrassing public failure. On January 28, 1958, after a ten-day delay, a second Vanguard launch was called off after a fuel leak was discovered fourteen seconds before liftoff. The administration was quick to point out that Vanguard did not use military rockets, so its failures had no bearing on the ballistic missile program. Earlier that month, however, Killian had recommended that although Vanguard should be allowed to attempt the launches that were already scheduled, the program should not be expanded. Any additional resources should be given to the army’s Jupiter program, which he said should be supported and encouraged in their quest to launch a satellite.⁴³

Finally, just after midnight on February 1, an army Jupiter-C (formerly known as the Redstone) missile put Explorer, America’s first satellite, into space. “That’s wonderful,” Eisenhower said to Hagerty. “I surely feel a lot better now… . Let’s not make too great a hullabaloo over this.” Within eight weeks, the United States placed two additional satellites in orbit. On March 17, Vanguard finally succeeded. Although it was just six inches in diameter and weighed only three and a half pounds, its orbit was 2,500 miles above sea level, and it was expected to remain in orbit for two hundred years (it is still there!). On March 26, Explorer III went into orbit (Explorer II had failed to reach orbit on March 5). By the end of 1960, the United States had successfully launched thirty-one satellites, and sixteen were still in earth orbit. Sputnik had fallen out of orbit on January 4, 1958, burning up on reentry after ninety-two days in space. This left Sputnik II as the lone Soviet satellite in earth orbit.⁴⁴

Later in life Eisenhower admitted that keeping the satellite program separate from missile development might have been a mistake. “It would have been easier, in hindsight,” he wrote, “to have used the Redstone from the beginning.” Former secretary of defense Charlie Wilson admitted the mistake almost immediately after the Sputnik launch. “Non-interfering with the high-priority ballistic missiles was certainly reasonable at the time,” he wrote in a memo to the president, “even though it may appear questionable in retrospect.”⁴⁵

Following the launch of Sputnik, many Americans expressed the opinion that prosperity had made the United States overly materialistic and in turn complacent about things that really mattered. “The Roman Empire controlled the world because it had roads,” Lyndon Johnson said. “The British Empire was dominant because it had ships… . Now the communists have established a foothold in space. It is not very reassuring to be told that next year we will put a better satellite into the air. Perhaps it will even have chrome trim and automatic windshield wipers.”⁴⁶ Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) echoed the theme. “The time has clearly come,” he said, “to be less concerned with … the height of the tailfin on the car and to be more prepared to shed blood, sweat and tears if this country and the free world are to survive.”⁴⁷ One area where Americans had become “soft” according to this point of view was education. Russians had beaten Americans into space because the United States had deemphasized science and mathematics. Eisenhower was reluctant to get the federal government involved in education, but he would have to compromise here just as he had with the defense budget.

Eisenhower’s proposals for federal aid to alleviate the nationwide classroom shortage due to the postwar baby boom had been complicated in the two previous years by desegregation amendments, and the heightened tensions caused by the Little Rock crisis made it very unlikely that such a bill could be passed in 1958. Secretary of HEW Marion Folsom later recalled that the decision to shift the emphasis of the education program predated the launch of Sputnik. “We both felt it would be unlikely that we could get any classroom construction legislation through,” Folsom wrote. “The President said, ‘why can’t we get up something to step up the teaching of mathematics and science and put that in?’ ”⁴⁸ By the time Folsom presented his plan to the Cabinet, Sputnik had been launched, giving added impetus to the program.⁴⁹ In fact, by this time, Eisenhower’s main concern, as with defense spending, was to prevent Congress from going too far. “Some alarmed citizens,” he later wrote, “were urging vastly increased spending and wholesale revision of our schools so as to turn nearly every student into a scientist or engineer as quickly as possible.”⁵⁰

The administration adopted Folsom’s plan, and Eisenhower presented it to Congress on January 27, 1958. Folsom called it a “well rounded program … preferable to the many radical proposals certain to be introduced in the next session.”⁵¹ For the NSF, the proposal recommended additional funds for the training of math and science teachers, additional funds to improve the content of science courses at all levels, an increase in graduate fellowships, and funds to allow the NSF to initiate new programs providing fellowships for secondary school science teachers, aspiring high school math and science teachers, and graduate teaching assistants. Other programs to be administered by the HEW included a program of ten thousand federal scholarships a year for four years for qualified high school graduates who lacked the financial resources to go to college, federal matching grants to the states to improve and expand the teaching of science and math, graduate fellowships for students to prepare for college teaching careers, federal matching grants to help universities to expand their graduate programs, and support for universities to expand and improve the teaching of modern foreign languages. Eisenhower emphasized: “This emergency program stems from national need, and its fruits will bear directly on national security. The method of accomplishment is sound: the keystone is state, local, and private effort; the federal role is to assist—not control or supplant—those efforts.”⁵² The proposed four-year program would cost $1.6 billion.⁵³

The administration’s bill, the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), made it through Congress relatively easily. The national attention generated by the news media over Sputnik made every member of Congress anxious to contribute to the U.S. effort to catch up with the Soviets in technology, and training more students in math and science seemed, to many, a good way to start. The main controversy regarding the bill was over Eisenhower’s request for ten thousand federal scholarships a year for four years. The House passed an amendment stripping the bill of its scholarship provisions and placing the $120 million that would have financed them into a low-interest college loan fund.⁵⁴ Eisenhower, who was personally uncomfortable with the scholarships, was not disappointed when they were eliminated. The loans, Eisenhower believed, would “make an education available to the student while encouraging self-reliance.”⁵⁵ Once the scholarship provision was eliminated, the NDEA passed the House easily. The Senate passed a version of the bill that included twenty-three thousand federal scholarships but accepted the House of Representatives’ version in conference committee. Eisenhower signed the NDEA into law on September 2, 1958, noting that it would “do much to strengthen our American system of education so that it can meet the broad and increasing demands imposed upon it by considerations of basic national security.”⁵⁶

Meanwhile, in February 1958, congressional activity threatened to take the initiative for space policy away from the White House. Senators Albert Gore (D-TN) and Clinton Anderson (D-NM) introduced legislation to put all space programs under the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), while Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) and Estes Kefauver (D-TN) introduced legislation to create a new Department of Science and Technology. Meanwhile, Lyndon Johnson created a new Senate Committee on Outer Space, which he would chair himself. In response, Secretary McElroy, to avoid the kind of interservice rivalries that many blamed for holding up missile research, placed all military space activities under the direction of the newly created Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The administration also announced that it was considering a separate civilian agency to direct nonmilitary space activity.⁵⁷

On February 4, when the subject of a civilian space agency came up at a Republican congressional leaders’ meeting, Eisenhower spoke in favor of leaving all space-related activity within the Defense Department. Citing the reconnaissance satellite as the primary example, Eisenhower said, “Our major interest in this for some years will be a defense one.” Eisenhower showed little interest in space exploration, stating his objection to putting “unlimited funds into these costly ventures where there was nothing of value to the nation’s security.” When Senator William Knowland (R-CA), remembering the impact of Sputnik on world opinion, spoke in favor of a lunar probe, Eisenhower was unmoved. “I’d rather have a good Redstone than hit the moon,” he said. “I don’t think we have an enemy on the moon!” Even accounting for the possibility that Eisenhower had exaggerated his position to impress the congressional leaders, it was clear that he had reservations about the value of a civilian space agency.⁵⁸

Later that day, Eisenhower announced that he had asked PSAC to make a recommendation regarding a new agency. Killian had been present at the Republican congressional leaders’ meeting and knew Eisenhower’s reservations, but he and the other members of PSAC strongly believed that “a separate agency largely centered about non-military activity” was important. Having ruled out the possibility of keeping the space program within the military, PSAC also considered the alternatives that had been proposed in Congress. They believed that the AEC’s primary mission was too far removed from space policy, and they rejected the idea of creating an entirely new Department of Science and Technology— something Eisenhower was unlikely to support.⁵⁹

Ultimately, PSAC decided that the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), an independent agency founded in 1915, was best suited to take on the task of directing civilian space programs. NACA had been created by President Woodrow Wilson in 1915 “to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight with a view to their practical solution.”⁶⁰ NACA’s history of cooperation with the military eased fears about the potential for unproductive competition between a civilian space agency and the Department of Defense. On March 5, Killian recommended to Eisenhower that all civilian space activity be placed under the direction of NACA, which would be reconstituted as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Eisenhower, who by now had warmed to the idea of a civilian space agency, responded positively. His lone reservation was that duplication of effort between NASA and ARPA would lead to wasteful spending. Killian explained that both agencies would have to bring their proposals to the president for approval, so Eisenhower would have the final word.⁶¹ Eisenhower approved the recommendation and on April 2, 1958, sent a message to Congress proposing legislation to create NASA and give it jurisdiction over all civilian space programs.⁶²

NASA was well received by Congress, which acted with remarkable speed. In June, the House and Senate each passed a bill creating NASA. The Senate version proposed the creation of a “Space Council” to advise the president on space policy. Killian told Johnson that Eisenhower opposed the idea of a Space Council, preferring an administrator who would report directly to him, but Johnson refused to eliminate it from the bill. On July 7, at the senator’s request, Johnson and Eisenhower met at the White House. Eisenhower later told Killian that he had given in on the Space Council to speed passage of the bill. The nine-member Space Council, Johnson had explained, would be modeled on the NSC with the president as chair and seats for the secretaries of state and defense. Having overcome the president’s objections, the conference committee included the Space Council in the final version of the bill, which the House and Senate each passed unanimously. On July 29, Eisenhower signed the bill creating NASA into law. Several days later he appointed Keith Glennan, president of Case Western Reserve University, NASA’s first administrator.⁶³

On November 8, one month after Sputnik and the Gaither Committee report, and three weeks before his stroke, Ike wrote a letter to his oldest brother Arthur. It was clear that the string of crises since his reelection was getting to him.

This past year … seems to have been one of steadily mounting crises and pressures, culminating in the Little Rock situation at home and blows to our prestige by that and by the Russian scientific achievements in the past few weeks. When I wake up in the morning I sometimes wonder just what new problem can possibly be laid on my desk in the day to come; there always seems to be an even more complex one than I could have imagined.⁶⁴

Sputnik had certainly taken a toll on Eisenhower, but by the spring of 1958 it seemed that he had weathered the worst of the storm. A public opinion survey conducted by Claude Robinson in the days following Sputnik and supplemented with additional data following the launch of the American satellite Explorer suggested that most Americans were not particularly concerned. Furthermore, most did not blame the president. Although 95 percent of Americans were aware of Sputnik, 40 percent had dismissed it without serious thought. After Sputnik, 80 percent thought the United States was “at least even” with the Soviet Union or would “catch up before long.” As for the reasons the United States was behind in the development of missiles, 69 percent blamed science education, 67 percent believed the United States had become “complacent” about its national strength, 63 percent blamed interservice rivalries in the military, 61 percent believed that scientists did not get appropriate recognition, and 41 percent thought Congress (not Eisenhower) was too economy minded. Only 39 percent thought that Eisenhower had failed to provide the necessary leadership. Among those who did blame Eisenhower, political allegiance was a contributing factor—54 percent were Democrats and 33 percent were Republicans. Robinson concluded that Eisenhower’s popularity, which had declined in the summer of 1957, had fallen no further as a result of Sputnik.⁶⁵

In his response to Sputnik, Eisenhower attempted to find balance. He believed that the news media, scientific community, and Congress were overreacting, but he understood that staying the course would not be possible. His task was made more difficult by the Gaither Report and his unwillingness to divulge U-2 intelligence. Ultimately, he agreed to increase defense spending and expand the federal government’s role in education, but in both cases, he had succeeded in scaling back the proposals of those who wished to do considerably more. Although he initially opposed the creation of a civilian space agency, he came to see the benefits of one and proposed NASA, which would prove its value in the decade to come.

Eisenhower’s determination to prevent a dramatic increase in military spending in response to Sputnik is consistent with his desire to balance the needs of military security with those of economic prosperity. The Great Equation, as Eisenhower called it, is a topic that remains relevant in our time. There are many ways to compare military spending during the Eisenhower administration with our own. In 1960, Eisenhower’s last full year in office, U.S. military spending was $47.35 billion. In 2020, it was $778.23 billion. After adjusting for inflation this is an increase of more than 80 percent. Well over half of that increase occurred during the ten-year period following September 11, 2001, during which the United States fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Military spending as a percentage of GDP, however, has gone down. In 1960, U.S. military spending was 9 percent of GDP, while in 2020, it was 3.7 percent. This is not surprising since the GDP has gone up more than 500 percent since the Eisenhower administration.⁶⁶

Perhaps a better way to determine whether the Great Equation is in balance is to ask the questions that Eisenhower would have asked. Are we spending more than we have? Based strictly on the budget deficit, yes. The 1960 budget, Eisenhower’s last, was balanced. By contrast, in 2020 there was a budget deficit of $3.13 trillion.⁶⁷Are we spending more on defense than necessary? If we compare the United States with other nations, it seems so. The United States spends more on defense than any other nation in the world—more than the next nine nations combined and nearly 40 percent of the world’s total.⁶⁸Are we neglecting other necessary expenses? The answer to this question is a subject of much debate. Because of the growth of mandatory spending, such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and interest on the federal debt, discretionary spending as a percentage of the federal budget is shrinking. In 2022, it was just over 30 percent. Defense spending accounted for almost half of that.⁶⁹ What remains is vigorously contested.