Preface

This essay is part of a larger project to produce a fully developed theory of the conditions under which world peace might be established and maintained.

To work on that project within the framework of a Ph.D. dissertation, I have adopted a format which is somewhat unusual. In Part I of this essay, “Toward a Theory of Peace,” I set out the main ideas of the general theory. Chapter 1 introduces the larger project and relates it to current political theory. Chapter 2 presents the main hypotheses. Then in Part II, “Socially-sanctioned Violence,” comprising Chapters 3–6, I develop some of the main ideas set out in Chapter 2, leaving others for further study at a later time.

Part II presents theoretical and empirical evidence to support two of the main hypotheses put forward in Chapter 2: that a modest change in moral beliefs could catalyze the conditions needed to end war; and that a more profound change in moral beliefs, likely to follow the initial abolition, could prevent the future re-institution of war. At the same time, Part II responds to three of the four main reasons to believe that war cannot be abolished. These are: human beings have innate aggressive instincts that trigger or foster war, and these instincts will always be with us; moral beliefs about ends that justify the use of armed force motivate war and, in the view of many, should do so; and even if world peace were achieved, it would not last indefinitely since eventually some severe stress would motivate those under stress to circumvent any global security system and go to war.

Part II looks at the roles of moral beliefs and innate impulses in causing and preventing various forms of socially-sanctioned and non-sanctioned violence. It begins by reviewing the evidence that while innate aggressive impulses can lead to non-sanctioned violence in individuals and mobs, other motivations, particularly culturally-determined moral beliefs, dominate innate aggressiveness in accounting for organized, socially-sanctioned, large-group violence. It then shows that moral beliefs justifying sanctioned forms of violence tend to change over time, in tandem with changes in political and economic conditions, leading to the permanent abolition of previously sanctioned forms of violence; and it argues that in the same manner, the declining tolerance for war could lead to its abolition.

While Part II supports the main theoretical claims of Chapter 2 and responds to arguments against these claims, it does not complete the development of the material presented in Chapter 2. Several topics will require further attention. Most important, further development is needed on the relatively topical and politically-oriented aspects of the theory, including the fourth main reason to believe that war cannot be abolished (the idea that insuperable political, economic, and cultural obstacles block the establishment of war-preventing institutions) and the claims concerning the prospects for attaining the degree of change in moral beliefs required to catalyze the initial abolition of war. The fully developed version of this material will explore the growing body of literature on the relationship between democracy and peace; it will look at the failure of past collective security arrangements to create a lasting peace; it will review the implications for the abolition of war of recent trends away from international war and toward civil and ethnic conflict; and it will discuss the relationship between historical trends and voluntary individual and government action in bringing about the conditions for the abolition of war. In covering these topics, it will provide a more thorough analysis of the relevant theoretical literature on ethics and public policy, ethical relativism, egalitarian social values, cultural evolution, and the causes of war and peace.

While the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 exceed the scope of the subsequent development in Part II, the discussion of socially-sanctioned violence in the latter pertains to all of the main hypotheses, including those on the spread of democracy and the initial abolition of war. At the same time, by giving a relatively complete statement of my theory of the conditions for the abolition of war, Chapter 2 shows that abolition is sufficiently plausible to give the study of socially-sanctioned violence more than academic interest.