5
At the Edge of Belonging?
In March 2012, Roshan Ghising, a Nepali citizen and son of former Gurkha Lal Bahadur Ghising, appealed against the decision of the First Tier Tribunal. He had been refused the leave to remain (in the United Kingdom) as a dependent of a former British Brigade serviceman.1 While both Roshan’s parents possess the indefinite leave to remain (ILR) in the United Kingdom, he was not granted the same given a few reasons.2 As the appellant, Roshan had not furnished sufficient evidence to demonstrate “an interference with family life” due to the refusal of his ILR. According to the tribunal, his “emotional ties were no more than the usual ties which a twenty-five year old student has with his parents,” and that he had “lived apart from them for over two years.” Furthermore, whereas the spouse and minor children of discharged Gurkhas were allowed to remain, the case for adult children is subject to discretionary judgment. Besides, as Roshan had entered the United Kingdom in 2007 on a student visa “of limited duration,” there was therefore no “expectation of settling here permanently.” In the end, the “removal” of Roshan from the United Kingdom was deemed justified “because of the public interest in a firm and consistent immigration policy.” In legal terms, Roshan possessed no right to the ILR in spite of “public interest to remedy an historic injustice in the UK government’s previous treatment of Gurkha veterans.”3
Earlier, I discussed the everyday narratives and affective experiences of belonging and not-belonging among Gurkhas and their families. I now shift gears to attend to broader sociolegal and structural processes and frameworks herein. Bracketed belonging is explored as a legal process where I employ secondary data that include examples and records of (court) cases such as that of Roshan Ghising and others, as well as UK parliamentary debates and documents. Examples of such debates include:
Surely, given their service to this country and communities across the land, Gurkhas deserve better than being forced to survive on the edge of poverty. I hope the Minister will make clear just what our Government are doing for all those Gurkhas who gave up so much in service to our nation.4
We have always considered the Gurkhas’ service to be loyal, courageous and skillful. Gurkhas are synonymous with the very best of the British armed forces. During the world wars, more than 43,000 Gurkhas lost their lives in battle, and since then they have served in just about every theatre of war, including the Falklands, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately, it is a question of value. How do we consider these individuals? Do we consider them as equal and do we properly value them, or are they simply a convenient source of personnel?5
By analyzing such secondary data, I identify and discuss different modes of how legal bracketing takes place through law and policymaking as a useful site for interrogating and deepening the conceptual dimensions of belonging and not-belonging. Immigration controls of the Nepalese Gurkha community as meted out by the British government signal legal structures of rights to belong in close association with Gurkha service. I also address how the legacy of such service impinges on the rights of children in terms of entry for settlement. To do so, I examine court cases and appeals conducted in the United Kingdom from 2000 to the present-day, given that legislative and policy changes were enacted from the 1990s onward. I therefore trace the different shifts and argumentation concerning issues revolving around immigration and citizenship, as well as pay and pension arrangements as outcomes arising from the changes put in place since the 1990s. That said, there were indubitably legal proceedings and hearings conducted earlier both in Nepal and the United Kingdom. They include in the context of Nepal, the different parliamentary committees that investigated Gurkha pension issues in the 1990s. There was also another initiative on Gurkha recruitment vis-à-vis international relations and human rights, given concerns raised about Nepal’s foreign policy for the recruitment of Nepali citizens into foreign armies. On the UK side, the House of Commons had since 1947 debated Gurkha issues running the range from their terms and conditions of service (TACOS), pension arrangements, to immigration matters and welfare (see Laksamba et al. 2013; and G. Sangroula 2019).
In Hong Kong, one needs to consider the extent to which Gurkha families are themselves emplaced within larger South Asian diasporic communities and how they are situated within this hierarchy of foreigners (see for example, Erni and Leung 2014; Yung 2002).6 In the case of Singapore, mandatory repatriation to Nepal is exacted when the Gurkha fulfills his service up to forty-five years of age, or if he opts for early retirement as I earlier reiterated. While his children are allowed to receive education in local schools over the course of his police career, his wife is not granted permission to work. Upon retirement, the entire family has to return to Nepal. This “use-and-repatriate” policy of the Singapore Police Force in which the Gurkhas serve illustrates yet another example of bracketed belonging in terms of their contributions to security and no more beyond that.7 Prior to 2004 where Gurkha veterans with at least four years of service with the British Army were eligible to apply for settlement in the United Kingdom, they were often “treated less favourably than other comparable non-British Commonwealth citizens” who were also serving in the British Army.8 The latter group has been able to adhere to a concessionary policy that lay outside of the immigration rules (IR); both serving and retired members of the British Army of this group could obtain the ILR in the United Kingdom upon their discharge. Gurkhas were, before 2004, not included in this policy.9 Such imbalanced treatment between these two groups thereby reflects “stratified tiers of belonging for migrants” (Morrice 2017, 606).
The key question here is this: To what extent are the Gurkhas and their families allowed to belong in legal terms? If they are, according to the opening epigraphs, surviving at the “edge of poverty,” then how should one conceive of what constitutes equality and what of their “value” per se? I expand the conceptual utility of bracketed belonging to illustrate how the UK government and its legislative structures, though not without exceptions and changes, place the Gurkhas and their families at the edge of belonging.10 Such state and legislative behavior in effect points to the threshold of belonging; lines are drawn between citizenry and Gurkha “foreignness.”11 In terms of legal aspects, the Gurkhas and their families stand at the margins of belonging until otherwise decreed. This is so given that various laws and policies appear to discriminatorily bracket the Gurkhas’ belonging that thereby limit their lobbying for particular rights; what Geeta Sangroula would call them in contrast as “rights-holders” (2019, 15).12 Although legal bracketing marks both inclusionary and exclusionary boundaries as I show below, these brackets are not always calcified. I pose the title of this chapter as a question given that my reading of legal texts and court proceedings show how the edge of belonging for Gurkhas has also changed over time. Looking further into these different changes would aid in conceiving of bracketed belonging as a mutable practice as enacted through law and vis-à-vis immigration policies. In other words, the edge or threshold of belonging has shifted over the past few decades, through which Gurkha “value” is then foregrounded and made tangible as I later demonstrate. It follows that the equality of treatment is then debated and worked through in legal and parliamentary domains. It is thus my interest to map out and critique these shifts accordingly through the prism of bracketed belonging.
Instead of discussing court cases on their own individual terms in extenso, I extrapolate and present key thematic discussions of how bracketed belonging is broached in the legal and political arenas. Specifically, I investigate the myriad ways in which bracketed belonging is raised, contested, and redrawn in order to flesh out the shifting malleability of belonging and not-belonging vis-à-vis legal frameworks and immigration policies. Bracketed belonging as circumscribed by the states and legal structures illuminate the boundaries and parameters of belonging and not-belonging and of (in)eligibility. Even if one’s legal status or rights to legal inclusion is constrained, however, one could still feel a sense of “partial belonging” (Rottmann, Josipovic, and Reeger 2020, 241) as well. I scrutinize the legal aspects of citizenship, pension arrangements, and settlement rights that different cohorts and groups of Gurkhas and their adult children have lobbied for in the United Kingdom since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China, which meant that the Brigade of Gurkhas was then brought back to the United Kingdom.
I divide my discussion into four main sections. The first traces the shifting legal and immigratory contexts in order to comprehend the backdrop of how such changes have impacted the Gurkhas’ TACOS. I begin with the 1947 Tripartite Agreement (TPA) that laid out the Gurkhas’ TACOS and which explains their pay package and pension arrangements as well. This is followed by my discussion of other key turning points, including the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China, changes to immigration policy and rights to settlement enacted in the early 2000s, and subsequent policy reviews and further changes that also affected Gurkha adult children and their rights to abode in the United Kingdom. The second section addresses legal case hearings and considers claims and appeals for equal treatment, and rights to settlement in the United Kingdom put forward by both Gurkha veterans as well as their adult children. I approach these through an investigation into the various forms and features of legal bracketing. In doing so, I articulate the process, negotiation, resistance, and shifts of legal bracketing and also address the attendant outcomes and consequences thereafter. In the various legal cases I discuss below, one theme that I identify has to do with how principles and practices of the Gurkhas’ bracketed belonging to Nepal as adopted by the British government and Army are constantly adhered to. These are routinely raised in the face of their putting up compensation claims, leave issues, accompanied service, and other issues.13 Emphasizing such bracketing in these cases is a recurrent way to reject the various claims that ex-Gurkhas put up for tribunal hearing.14 They are, in effect, placed outside of the brackets of belonging to the United Kingdom, which explains such denial of their claims.
Another way to ensure that the Gurkhas remain at the edge of belonging to rights and claims presented to the British courts is that distinctions continue to be made between Gurkha and British soldiers on the basis of nationality. Such distinctions are thereby deployed as justification that “equality of treatment” for these two groups of military actors need to be rethought.15 Not only are brackets of belonging and not-belonging enforced on Gurkha veterans, similar processes also determine family lives of Gurkhas and their children. Definitions of the family form a unit of contention in legal terms, debated in view of the European Council of Human Rights’ (ECHR) values on protecting family lives. By presenting these various analytical threads in my examination of court cases, I explicate the different compositions and features of belonging in the legal arena. They include the four elements of how bracketing is (1) formulated to edge the Gurkhas out of the parameters of belonging and thereby to reject their claims; (2) being resisted in order to challenge the bounded parameters of belonging and not-belonging; (3) shaped by different sets of qualifying conditions to prompt legal recognition of such (newer) brackets of belonging and thereby rights to their claims; and (4) shifted owing to changes in immigration policies that have to do with rights to settlement in the United Kingdom.
In the third section, I discuss the recent 2021 hunger strike that Gurkha veterans and widows put up in protest against the UK government as they demand for equal pensions. Along with the strike was an accompanying petition that garnered more than 100,000 signatures in support of the Gurkha community. The strike and petition had culminated from a lack of sufficient and suitable responses from the UK government pertaining to equal and fair treatment for Gurkhas who have served the crown.16 As a corollary to this third section, I then scrutinize a UK parliamentary debate that took place in November 2021, arising from the petition above. In this fourth section where I examine the different advocatory speeches delivered by the different members of Parliament (MP), I show how their advocacy for the Gurkhas also reveal the different ways in which belonging is reconceived and tabled for legislative considerations. Together, all four sections therefore elucidate how debates and contestations over the threshold and edges of belonging vis-à-vis rights to resources and others are being worked out by a host of different institutional and individual social actors.
Legal and Immigratory Contexts
The 1947 TPA signed between the United Kingdom, Nepal, and India was anchored on the principle that Gurkhas were to be both recruited from and discharged back to Nepal, as I have earlier discussed.17 Issues to do with residency rights or full British citizenship at the end of one’s Gurkha service were never explicitly discussed or arranged (Laubenthal and Schumacher 2020). Gurkhas were essentially recruited for service in Asia, where they were expected to eventually return to Nepal (Kochhar-George 2010). Given this context, retired Gurkhas then had no right of settlement in the United Kingdom. Concomitantly, their TACOS were therefore different from those of other soldiers serving in the British Army. As many of the court cases involving Gurkha veterans as well as their adult children have to do with claims to pension arrangements, citizenship, and settlement rights, I note here the legal and immigratory contexts and changes since the 1990s. Pension pay schemes and rights to residence in the United Kingdom were revisited over time. Before the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the former served as the Gurkhas’ base, in addition to one regiment located in Brunei.18 The Brigade of Gurkhas was therefore mainly based in Asia, even if they did serve from time to time in Aldershot, United Kingdom. The Gurkhas’ TACOS, including pay, pension arrangements, Married Accompanied Service (MAS), and other conditions were pegged to rates adhered by the Indian Army. There was therefore a substantial pay difference between Gurkhas and those others who served in the British Army prior to 1997, and where pension arrangements were also entirely different for these two different groups of military actors.19 Under the Gurkha Pension Scheme (GPS), Gurkhas received pension amounts that were considerably lower than those of others who also retired from the British Army, but who were paid through the Armed Forces Pension Scheme (AFPS). The GPS was based on the Indian Army Model and for which it provided an immediate pension for retirees who had served at least fifteen years,20 awarded based on Indian Army rates (Thurley 2021a).21 Laksamba’s (2012) study on the changing identities of the Gurkhas and their struggles for justice in recent years regarding policy issues includes interview materials from former Gurkhas pertaining to the AFPS and pension-related dissimilarity. I quote at length some of their accounts here to illustrate pension disparities between the British and the Gurkhas in the British Army. The first account is from a former Gurkha who retired prior to 1997, and the second, after 1997:
I am a retired Rifleman from 6th Gurkha Rifles. I get £215 pounds per month in pension as per the Gurkha Pay and Pension Scheme (GPS). I am not allowed to join the British Armed Forces Pension Scheme (AFPS) as I retired before 1997. Even if they allow me to join the AFPS, I heard, my fifteen years in Hong Kong based service will be counted only 5.4 years for UK pensionable service. I think this is unfair for all Gurkhas. I do not understand why the British Government is not allowing us to join the AFPS? (Laksamba 2012, 118)
I served nineteen years and retired from the Army in 2003 at the rank of Staff Sergeant. I get £285 monthly pension. When I reach sixty years of age, my pension will be transferred to the AFPS where my pre 1997 service will be converted to the proportion of four years being equal to one year. This means that I will get around nine years Staff Sergeant’s pension. I am supposed to get nineteen years pension equal to my British counterparts. (Laksamba 2012, 118–19).
Ostensibly, both accounts indicate that the Gurkhas have been bracketed out of the AFPS and/or receive less pension compared to their British counterparts. Gurkhas who were temporarily stationed in the United Kingdom before 1997 had received a supplement to their pay. This arrangement subsequently turned into a permanent fixture for those who continued to be based in the United Kingdom after 1997. Even if this supplementary pay made it possible for the Gurkhas’ take-home pay to be equivalent to a soldier of similar rank in the British Army, such supplementation did not qualify as pensionable pay. This was because the assumption was that the Gurkhas would return to Nepal upon retirement. At such a point, Gurkhas who had retired were usually in their early thirties and they would embark on a second career after Gurkha service. To contextualize this, the UK courts pointed out that “the pension of an ordinary Gurkha in Nepal equated with the pay of a captain in the Nepalese Army.”22 The payable pension that retired Gurkhas would receive was deemed as sufficient enough for them to maintain a reasonable lifestyle.
The transfer of Hong Kong to China on 1 July 1997 gave rise to fundamental changes that were enacted in terms of the Gurkhas’ TACOS. From then till the early 2000s, newer immigratory regulations and citizenship issues were subsequently promulgated. Now that the three regiments based in Hong Kong were unable to remain there after the handover, the home base of the Gurkhas had by then shifted to the United Kingdom. The Gurkhas had, as time passed, “spent increasingly large amounts of their time in the United Kingdom and developed contacts and roots here [referring to the United Kingdom]; so too their families.”23 In the years leading up to the return in 1997, pressure had mounted on the MOD (Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom) in terms of the Gurkhas’ TACOS. This was because it was considered by many that the differences in pay and pension arrangements between Gurkha soldiers and others serving in the British Army would lose justification once the Brigade of the Gurkha would have shifted their home base from Hong Kong to the United Kingdom. Parallel to such pressure were concerted calls for the Gurkhas to possess the right to either remain in or to reenter the United Kingdom after they had retired from service. Owing to such collective insistence, Immigration Rules HC 395 were altered. As of 24 October 2004, any Gurkha who had served for at least four years in the British Army and who had been discharged after 1 July 1997, was able to apply for what was termed as indefinite leave to enter or remain (ILR/E) in the United Kingdom based on newly introduced Immigration Rules 276E–276K. This point was also earlier mentioned by some of my interlocutors in previous chapters.
It has been estimated that out of the 2,230 Gurkhas who were discharged after 1 July 1997 and therefore eligible for the ILR/E, 90 percent of these retirees have applied for the IRL/E accordingly.24 As for those who were discharged before 1 July 1997, the courts have estimated that there were about 25,000 Gurkhas who were in receipt of the GPS.25 Other reviews which looked into the differences between British Gurkhas and the rest of the army makeup were conducted pertaining to the Gurkhas’ TACOS as well as the availability of MAS. In January 2005, a review of the TACOS was announced by the Secretary of State for Defence. The outcome of this review was the promulgation of the Gurkha Offer to Transfer (GOTT). The promulgation meant that both serving as well as retired Gurkhas ought to be permitted to transfer from the GPS to the AFPS. For those who wished to remain on the GPS, this option was available but would later close from April 2006.26 The basis for the transfer from the GPS to the AFPS was that their accrued pension, based on service after 1 July 1997, would then be transferred into the AFPS on a year-for-year credit. Such transfer would imply that what the Gurkhas receive would therefore be equivalent to what the rest of the personnel in the British Army would have accrued for that period as well. As for the years of service registered prior to 1 July 1997, the rights accrued in the GPS would be of actuarial value, for which the total sum would be transferred as a pension credit to the AFPS. This pension credit amount was correspondingly lesser (relative to service counted after 1 July 1997 and pension calculations) as the pensionable pay for Gurkhas before 1 July 1997 was substantially lower than that of other soldiers in the British Army.
As for the MAS matter, it had by then become an “increasingly troublesome issue”27 given that the Brigade of Gurkhas was now based in the United Kingdom post-1997. The outcome for this review was that as of 1 April 2006, MAS was granted to those Gurkhas who had served at least three years with the brigade, in order to facilitate wives and children of Gurkhas serving in the United Kingdom to join their spouse or father.28 Three years later on 21 May 2009, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith announced to the UK Parliament that any retired Gurkha who had served for at least four continuous years and who had been discharged from the Brigade of Gurkhas prior to 1 July 1997 was eligible for settlement in the United Kingdom. The landmark ruling came on the heels of a motion put forward in the House of Commons by the Liberal Democrats on 29 April 2009 to offer all Gurkhas the right of residence. Voting results for the motion turned out to be 267 in favor of against 246, constituting a first motion defeat for the government since 1978 (Purthi 2011). Such a scheme, articulated as “discretionary arrangements,” indicates a recognition of the “unique nature of the service” that Gurkhas have provided and thus are only offered to them “on an exceptional basis.”29 Following on from the 2004 and 2009 policy changes then, most of the Gurkha veterans who were of pension-age had subsequently moved to the United Kingdom to take up residence, relying on pension credit and housing support (Laksamba et al. 2013).
Arising from these changes, one could argue that where legal recognition and bracketing of Gurkha belonging to the United Kingdom have been enacted, such processes also imply that there will be a shift in the home or family base that Gurkhas and their families occupy. In other words, legal recognition and subsequent provision for living in the United Kingdom would similarly entail a recalibration of how Gurkhas and their family members regard where home and family life would be. Such recognition follows from the assumption that after the Brigade of Gurkhas moved its headquarters from Hong Kong to the United Kingdom, Gurkhas who were discharged either on or after 1 July 1997 would “therefore have had more opportunity to develop close physical ties with the United Kingdom.”30 This constitutes another perspective through which to unpack where home may be and how it is determined once the bounds of legality change, in addition to my earlier discussions relating to feelings of belonging that my interlocutors have shared. Not only did such changes alter where home and its location were, they also extended these discretionary arrangements to other family members of Gurkha retirees. While original settlement arrangements had initially been applicable only for former Gurkhas, their wives, and their offspring below the age of eighteen, the discretionary arrangements had later been expanded to include widows of ex-Gurkhas. In certain cases, such arrangements extended to their children who were above the age of eighteen.31 The 2009 policy was later reviewed by the Home Office between 2014 and 2015, as it had then considered case law as well as evidence which were provided to the All Party Parliamentary Group on Gurkha Welfare. Arising from this review, discretionary arrangements that were promulgated in 2009 were further calibrated. Adult children of ex-Gurkhas were thereafter allowed the right to settle in the United Kingdom, depending on particular circumstances. This policy was only made applicable for applicants either on or after 5 January 2015, and only available to those applicants who were outside of the United Kingdom. As for those adult children of ex-Gurkhas who were already in the United Kingdom, they were expected to exit the United Kingdom and then to put up an application via this policy from overseas.32
Forms and Features of Legal Bracketing
In order to address and attend to the above contexts in which laws and immigration policies shift over time with regard to Gurkha rights as a whole, I interrogate the different components and logics of bracketed belonging that I flesh out hereunder based on my analysis of legal documents. With this backdrop, we are then able to further comprehend the mobility, aspirations of, and legal resources to be made available to Gurkhas and their families over time. Bracketed belonging in legal terms and discourses comprise a range of different dynamics in relation to arguments and responses submitted pertaining to rights and access. These different aspects and contours of bracketed belonging understood in relation to a range of social actors and legal processes attest to the conceptual elasticity of bracketed belonging.
Overall, belonging and its bracketed shifts bring to the fore such legal criteria of belonging, which include but are not limited to affective ties and connections, contributions and sacrifices made, and cultural familiarity. These form among many other attributes, the crux of what it means to belong, including its accompanying resources and politics. Shifts in bracketed belonging thereby also indicate two other related issues. First, that sociolegal structures and policies that govern rights to settlement, citizenship, pension issues and claims form structural components of prescribing belonging through governance. Second, such shifts also point toward the malleability and flexibility of how criteria to belong may change, depending on existing as well as renewed structures of governance. What is significant here, however, is how affective and affiliative ties to different countries can seemingly be pronounced in legal documents (cf. Maunaguru 2019; Navaro-Yashin 2007) in favor of denying rights, or likewise in favor of acceding to rights requests. Such affective and affiliative dimensions are drawn from cases involving Gurkha adult children who appealed for rights to settle in the United Kingdom, which I discuss below. These cases are useful in elucidating how the Gurkha family unit is bracketed not only through UK laws, but in concert with other international bodies and their regulations such as the ECHR.33
Bracketing Gurkha-Nepal Belonging
There are two ways to consider how bracketing Gurkhas to Nepal transpire in the legal arena. The first is that where assertions of belonging are connected to claims to rights and resources, it should also be said that belonging is accompanied by obligations. The second has to do with how such bracketing sheds light on the idea of deservedness by birth and nationality. I first trace obligations to the 1947 Tripartite Agreement (TPA) that arose after Indian independence and where both the British and the Indians were keen on retaining Gurkha service (Gurkhas were recruited and trained in British India territory). Trilateral agreements included consent for establishing Gurkha units both in the British and the Indian Army. These three parties also agreed on a few further points. The Maharajah of Nepal would agree to his subjects serving with the British Army as long as they were not deployed to fight against Hindus. Furthermore, the Gurkhas would be able to be withdrawn at any time if Nepal was involved in any war so that they could be recalled to defend its territory. It is for this reason that the “Government of Nepal regards retention of Nepalese nationality while its troops serve in the Brigade of Gurkhas as of considerable importance.”34
The recruitment and enlistment of Gurkhas were allowed to take place in India until recruiting stations were established in Nepal, which did not happen until 1952. Gurkha salaries and terms of recruitment were to be equivalent to rates of the Indian Army. These were put in place so as to not allow the British Army any unfair advantage in enlisting the Gurkhas on more favorable terms and thus undermine the Indians. This set of agreements and consensus reflect how belonging vis-à-vis the TPA and to Nepal for the Gurkhas are closely associated with the Gurkhas’ obligation to Nepal even while they serve in the British Army. A key component of the TPA notes:
Gurkhas would serve in the British Army in a dedicated Brigade reflecting the Nepali language, culture and educational standards. This was not a Brigade in the conventional sense of a deployment of various regiments and military units in a formation headed by a Brigadier, but a specialist Gurkha unit reflecting these unique arrangements and the continuing links to Gurkha culture.35
The above is a clearly stated and official endorsement that institutionally brackets the Gurkhas’ belonging to Nepal in the interest of the country, even as they serve a foreign sovereign.
There are further ways through which bracketing Gurkhas to Nepal are talked about beyond obligations. These surface in relation to tradition, culture, heritage, and family life. Defense lawyers acting on behalf of the British MOD—in a case in which seven ex-Gurkhas alleged that they were subject to both institutionalized and systemic discrimination on the grounds of their race and/or nationality—noted why bracketing Gurkhas to Nepal was pivotal.36 Following the enclosed brackets where Gurkhas are to be recruited from and retired in Nepal, defense lawyers reminded the court that Gurkhas “are Nepalese citizens and continue to be so during their period of service to the Crown.”37 Upon their retirement, they “will return to Nepal and resume their place in Nepalese society.”38 These brackets form the basis on which Gurkhas are then expected to be able to carry out their service with the British Army, without any issues in “maintaining their distinct Nepalese identity and safeguarding their cultural, religious and ethnic heritage.”39 I previously discussed similar institutional bracketing of Gurkhas to Nepal as exacted through, for example, celebrating Nepalese festivals among the Gurkhas in Hong Kong and Singapore. Such cultural bracketing is thereby meant to sustain the cohesion and cultural homogeneity of the Gurkha community vis-à-vis Nepal (Uesugi 2019a), not unlike what these lawyers have indicated as well.
In congruity with citizenry and cultural bracketing, another way to maintain these brackets relates to the long leave per three years for which Gurkhas are eligible. In this case, the minister of state for defence Mr. Soames had stated in court, “The present entitlement of Gurkha soldiers to long leave every three years will remain. This recognises the continuing importance we attach to keeping the Gurkha soldier in touch with his home culture and roots.”40 Following from bracketing Gurkhas to their roots, Mr. Soames then said that the initial long leave period of six months would be reduced by a month as communications have improved over time.41 In addition to bracketing that is rationalized through obligations, citizenship, and culture, the next dimension of such bracketing has to do with protecting the national interests of Nepal. The Nepalese government was “happy to permit them [Gurkhas] to be recruited into a foreign army, provided that they are not treated as mercenaries and the interests of their home country are protected.”42 It follows that “Gurkhas must not be allowed to drain Nepal of talent. They remain Nepalese citizens and will return there upon retirement. Hence the continued importance in 2003 of making special arrangements to maintain their distinctive religious, cultural and ethnic heritage.”43
The maintenance of Nepali heritage and tradition also extends to how family life in Nepal is perceived to be organized by those outside of it. By this I am referring to suppositions about the gender division of labor and family life while the Gurkha husband or father is overseas during active service with the forces. With reference to a 1997 review of the Gurkhas’ TACOS, a press release statement mentioned how that review had to take into account “the need for Gurkhas to maintain close cultural and family links with Nepal” alongside the “modern circumstances of the Brigade.”44 The assumption that follows this reads: “Gurkhas would wish to be accompanied for lengthy periods because there was a long established tradition in Nepal’s rural economy that the wives of Gurkha soldiers would remain in Nepal to look after the family property while their husbands served abroad and remitted money home.”45 For the next generation, that is, the Gurkhas’ children, an accompanying assumption is articulated as follows: “Any children of the family would remain with their mothers in Nepal and be educated there. That factor is of some importance, given that their adult lives will be spent in Nepal.”46 Assumptions about family life subsequently becomes a point of contention when the issue of Gurkha adult children’s rights to settlement in the United Kingdom is broached in the eyes of the law, and as I shall attend to below. In sum, the brackets that we see here essentially have to do with circumscribing Gurkhas to Nepal through such avenues of culture, tradition, legality, and family life—determined in order to bracket their belonging to Nepal and not to the United Kingdom. As an intended outcome, then, this approach places the Gurkhas and their families at the edge of belonging to the United Kingdom, in spite of their long service to the British.
Resisting Brackets of Belonging
Although I have by now made clear the contemporaneous practices of inclusion and exclusion where the acts of bracketing are concerned, I should also point out that bracketing belonging has been critiqued, if not resisted. Such resistance or push back further demonstrates how different social actors interpret inclusionary and exclusionary practices of bracketing in contrastive ways. In Limbu and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Entry Clearance Officer [2008], the lawyer for Gurkha claimants of rights to settle pointed out that the MOD has adopted a fairly stringent and rigid position.47 This was in terms of what the TPA has set out or what the Nepalese government expects of its citizens even as they serve as Gurkha troops. He said:
I cannot fail to note the apparently reliable testimony of a former Colonel of the Brigade and others that Gurkhas were to be prevented by application of military discipline from marrying Chinese women when they were stationed in Hong Kong, or from leaving behind dependants who might have a right of residence in such places on redeployment or discharge. The opportunity to preserve cultural links with Nepal may certainly have been a historic assumption of the TPA but it is not for the Army to force cultural purity down the throats of Gurkhas irrespective of their wishes. Within the broad confines of the special arrangements that gave rise to the Brigade including the need to preserve Nepalese nationality during service with it, there is plenty of room for the dignity and autonomy of the individual to make informed choices.48
Clearly, even if bracketed belonging to Nepal is encapsulated in the TPA, legal resistance is staged in the form of questioning whether indeed the Army holds the right to insist on “cultural purity” in ways that dislodges an individual’s autonomy of choice and action when it comes to where one attaches one’s sense of belonging. Either way, the larger implication of these relate back to the politics of belonging as I have discussed earlier. This is where the stakes involved, be it one being bracketed inclusively or exclusively out of a society, illustrate how both contexts are accompanied by consequences that relate to the determining of rights to settling in a country and other entitlements.
The following statement denotes unequivocally as to what would be at stake:
Far from wanting to be transported back to Nepal at public expense where opportunities for employment may be limited, these veterans who remained comparatively young men with long working lives ahead of them wanted to be given permission to remain in the United Kingdom, and in due course be able to apply for British citizenship.49
Such unequivocation thus explains why brackets that preclude access to rights such as settlement in the United Kingdom have been questioned given the attendant consequences of further job opportunities. This is clearly of importance since Gurkhas usually retire in their early thirties if not forties, and thus a longer road lies ahead for further gainful employment, as well as the access to citizenship.
Deservedness by Birth and Nationality
While I have demonstrated how the imposition of Gurkha-Nepal belonging has taken place through legal avenues, not all actors are always in agreement with such imposition, hence my preceding discussion on resistance. That said, I now return to another point on this imposition by focusing on the issue of one’s birth and nationality. As a corollary to the obligations that Gurkhas are expected to fulfill to Nepal, bracketed belonging in legal terms does not allow overlaps in nationality, rights, and access to settlement. This is unlike bracketed belonging as experienced or practiced by interlocutors in the domains of the everyday, and the affective where they have shared with me, for instance, that they feel coexisting feelings of belonging to more than one country. The outright rejection of overlaps in nationality is exemplified in the following statement:
But the position of the ex British soldier and the ex Gurkha soldier on retirement is not analogous. While there will be a few exceptions, the former will have been born in the United Kingdom and will expect to retire in the United Kingdom. He may choose to retire to a more or less expensive country, but in that respect he would be no different from any other United Kingdom pensioner. By contrast, the Gurkha, born in Nepal and a citizen of Nepal, will retire to Nepal. It would be wholly irrational to fail to have regard to the very different circumstances that exist in Nepal and Great Britain when making provision for pensions on retirement.50
The assumed country of retirement, traced to one’s nationality, was thus the justification provided to rationalize why the Gurkhas and British soldiers ought not to be treated as analogous. Having said this, it is also apposite to point out, on the one hand, that nationality as deservedness or as a basis for differential treatment might have appeared as disadvantageous for the Gurkhas. On the other hand, nationality is also upended as advantageous in terms of recruitment, pension, and leave matters. The solicitor, Mr. R. Singh, acting on behalf of the MOD as defendant against claims made by Gurkhas for reviewing pension arrangements noted:
The Gurkha Brigade can only exist in its present form if the Ministry of Defence applies a policy of recruitment that discriminates against all nationalities other than Nepalese. Discrimination on grounds of nationality is the founding principle indeed the raison d’être of the Gurkha Brigade. Those in the Brigade are also the beneficiaries of treatment denied to others in the British Army which discriminates against those others on grounds of nationality. Obvious examples are the ability to retire after fifteen years with an immediate pension and extended paid leave in Nepal.51
The above statement may be interpreted as a case of positive discrimination that is approbatory of Gurkhas and their Nepalese nationality, as compared to other nationalities for which enlistment into the brigade and access to these accompanying TACOS are not made available to such others.
Deservedness based on nationality can thus take on these two forms of either discrimination (from the point of view of Gurkha claimants who canvass for equitable pension arrangements) or advantage (in terms of how only Nepalese can be recruited and benefit from the attendant TACOS). In either form, tracing access and rights to one’s nationality, and bracketing these as simultaneously discriminatory or favorable, highlights how belonging and the stakes involved become politicized and made apropos in the legal domain. Mr. Singh furthers his argument:
So it is that the challenge before the Court, in conformity with those that have come before, proceeds from the premise that any benefit accruing to the Gurkhas from their different treatment (including the very existence of the Brigade) should be secure, but perceived disadvantages should be remedied. The claimants appear to regard discrimination on grounds of nationality as justified when it provides benefits but not when it gives rise to disadvantage. It is difficult to see why that should be so, when all of the differences, whether now of only historical interest or those continuing to have effect, flow from the unique position of the Gurkha Brigade in the British Army born of its long history of different and special treatment.52
As shown in the above statement, it is clear that the exercise of bracketed belonging based on nationality avails itself as twofold. This depends on which vantage point one claims in arguing on this basis. The trope of Gurkhas claimants is that of discrimination based on their Nepalese nationality. For defendants who exercise rejection of the Gurkhas’ claims, the trope utilized, albeit still based on the factor of nationality, has to do with positive discrimination that has been argued to work advantageously for the Gurkhas. Such an interpretation adds not only to my position that belonging and not-belonging dovetail. Bracketed belonging and, in this case, traced to nationality, comes with both inclusionary and exclusionary mechanisms. These are contingent on which position is being taken up in the legal process. As said above, it can be approached as a matter of “disadvantage” or “benefits.”
Bracketing Gurkha-UK Connections
If the acts of bracketing Gurkhas to Nepal as deliberated on in the previous section place these migrant warriors in close proximity—both literally and figuratively—with Nepal, the same domains of interest can be identified in terms of how Gurkha-UK connections are established through itemizing the different forms of belonging to the United Kingdom. To begin with, while new immigration rules (IR) for Gurkha veterans were enacted in October 2004 in support of their rights to settlement in the United Kingdom, there were also veterans who were denied entry to settle as they were not discharged after 1 July 1997 as per the requirement of rule 276F (ii).53 In order to table appeals to reverse such denial in the court, efforts have been made by claimants and their solicitors in working through the different aspects through which belonging to the United Kingdom is argued, this time, with reference to policy discretion. In Limbu and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Entry Clearance Officer and Entry Officer, reference was made to the Diplomatic Service Procedures (DSP): Entry Clearance Volume 1 General Instructions in outlining chapter 29.4, which laid out terms for discretionary considerations. Such considerations were meant as a response to settlement applicants who do not meet the requirements of the October 2004 new IR. The chapter contains the following provision: “Discretion may be exercised to waive these requirements [of 2004] in cases where there are strong reasons why settlement in the United Kingdom is appropriate.”54 It is instructive to quote at length the following factors that discretionary consideration covers in Chapter 29.4:
- Strength of ties with the UK—have they spent a significant amount of time living in the UK, such as a three year tour of duty pre-discharge or three years living in the UK after discharge?
- Do they have any close family living in the UK? What proportion of their close family are in the UK as opposed to living in Nepal?
- Do they have children being educated in the UK?
- Do they have a chronic/long-term medical condition where treatment in the UK would significantly improve quality of life?
- If one or more factors listed above are present, ECOs may exercise discretion and grant entry clearance for settlement in the UK.
- Close family means immediate family, such as brothers, sisters, children, parents or grandparents.
- The requirements for an applicant to have completed at least four years service as a Gurkha with the British Army and to have been discharged on completion of their engagement should not be waived.55
The above factors clearly serve as brackets of belonging for Gurkhas to the United Kingdom. These factors are codified as a set of indicators that provide the basis for an exercise of discretion for claims to settlement in the United Kingdom. Such a basis covers the range from one’s demonstrated connection to the United Kingdom (based on years of service), close familial relations not extending beyond their grandparents’ generation as an indicator of the need to reside in the United Kingdom, to their own children having received education, and indications of a need for health support and/or treatment that would wield significant impact on one’s quality of life. These factors together illustrate how possible indicators of the Gurkha-UK links and thereby rights to belong may be taken into account for legal provision of settlement for select veterans that would in turn circumvent IR rules updated in 2004.
What is interesting is the comparison between the list of factors for discretion laid out above, with what other factors that claimants themselves raise, in order to argue for rights to settling in the United Kingdom. In other words, while the components of Chapter 29.4 are legal items that are utilized to measure or gauge the strength of belonging for Gurkhas to the United Kingdom, the Gurkhas themselves have also drawn up their own list of criteria. For them, their own list serves as a key barometer to support their claims to entry and settlement as their way of bracketing belonging and thereby rights, to the United Kingdom. This other list of factors includes being wounded in action and being the recipient of awards for bravery, among other things—which all point toward risking one’s life and sacrificing one’s safety for the crown.56 The assumption here, for these claimants, is that such sacrifice ought to translate into belonging and thus rights to entry and settlement in the United Kingdom.
Juxtaposing these two sets of factors as (consideration of) indicators of the Gurkhas’ belonging and rights to settlement in the United Kingdom therefore pertinently indicate that different social actors, including individuals, the state, and the law, are all involved in the exercise of bracketing belonging. Such bracketing is either exacted to the United Kingdom or Nepal—by adhering to a list of practices and criteria, or what has been termed as “qualifying conditions.”57 Where claimants may mount their own set of conditions, these conditions need first to be legally accepted before any provision of rights or claims may be considered and/or processed. To put it clearly, “Gurkhas were never able to claim indefinite residence in the United Kingdom on the basis of their military service however long and gallant it may have been.”58 Such qualifying conditions then arise as ambivalent areas that the law may not sufficiently be able to admit or quantify as criteria for granting ex-Gurkhas settlement in the United Kingdom. For example, while it was suggested that four years or more of service in the Brigade of Gurkhas prior to July 1997 “could not be sufficient to justify the favourable exercise of discretion”59 for settlement in the United Kingdom, the court further inquired if (a) service amounting to a decade in the Brigade prior to 1997 would suffice; (b) injuries incurred during active service within these years of service would count; (c) Gurkha service in the Falklands was relevant; and (d) decorations for gallant service including the Victoria Cross would constitute a sufficient and relevant factor.60 We are subsequently told in this case that the example of the Victoria Cross was not one of abstraction. The court heard that a Hon Lt. Pun was awarded this highest honor for war-time gallantry; a highest accolade that a sovereign can bestow. While he was initially refused admission, his case was subsequently personally reviewed by the Secretary of State, through which Hon Lt. Pun was then admitted for settlement.61
Despite the case of the Hon Lt. Pun, it remains unclear as to whether the above identified factors that cover the range from years of service to distinctions in battle would justifiably substantiate the “discretionary grant of settlement.”62 It was also pointed out that the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) would not have been able to determine the issue that was not in accordance with IR, with reference to the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002. It would be “impossible for an Immigration Judge to determine whether the decision had been in accordance with the law where the ‘law’ was so unclear as to permit conflicting decisions … in accordance with the policy by either granting or refusing entry clearance in an identical case.”63 These legal dilemmas clearly exemplify how identifying brackets of belonging in this case of right to settlement enrolls a number of factors and structural actors including the AIT, IR vis-à-vis qualifying conditions, or criteria before the right to settlement may be legally meted out. Quandaries such as these require striking a “delicate balance between rigidity and flexibility” in order to form “such sensitive policies.”64 Further clarifications of what constitute qualifying conditions or criteria for arguing rights to belonging and hence resources are forwarded as follows: “If factors such as ten years service are to be recognised as weighty along with injury in service, decorations for bravery, service in the Falklands conflict or similar matters, this should be identified by further specific examples so the parameters of the qualifying class can be identified” (my emphasis).65 The “parameters of the qualifying class” here are representative of the very criteria that outline renewed brackets of belonging as aspired to or intended as legitimizing factors. In turn, these factors would translate into rights and entitlements—like those that the ex-Gurkhas are arguing for. However, brackets of belonging, as they are to be determined by the law and other social actors, do not change or are admitted easily. As recognized in the court, the “elements of a rational future policy” are yet to be ascertained. Therefore, a “fresh look seems particularly appropriate in the light of the evidence about the attitude of the Government of Nepal.”66 The “fresh look” here points to careful legal considerations for new brackets of belonging, which would be in alignment with the Nepalese government’s stance. This has been recorded as never having “expressed opposition to retrospective settlement of Gurkhas in 2004 or before.”67 If these newer brackets of belonging are to be legally passed, then it might be said that the “honouring of a historic debt” in recognition of the Gurkhas’ contributions to the United Kingdom would be realized.68
Paying such a debt may also be interpreted in terms of what would qualify as exemplary of British national belonging. Ware (2010), for example, has talked about how such national belonging may be contingent on the patriotism of the soldier: “With a strong national identity the traditional rules are clear: one must be ready to kill and die for one’s country, or give up one’s children, in exchange for protection from the state” (2010, 323). Seen in this way, then, raising newer conditions would also shed light on the transactional aspects of negotiating belonging between ex-Gurkhas and the UK government. In principle, the transactional or reciprocal optics put forward via these conditions has to do with how if Gurkhas have sacrificed and fought gallantly for the crown, they should in turn be privileged with belonging and thereby rights in this military-transactional relationship. Those who have served the interests of empires have in certain instances been led to an expectation of reciprocity contingent on their service and loyalty; examples being the Nepalese Gurkhas as well as Surinamese from former Dutch Guyana who acquired Netherlands citizenship (Cohen 2022). The question lies in how this transactional relationship is going to be negotiated legally given the stakes involved for both parties. For migrant warriors such as the Gurkhas, the right to citizenship and abode may mean a better livelihood and more economic opportunities when compared to that lacking in Nepal. As for those who are older, the option to migrate to the United Kingdom would mean better living conditions and facilities relative to Nepal. For the British government, the conferment of citizenship unto the Gurkhas would imply a recalibration of patterns of resource distribution (cf. Uesugi 2019a). Deservingness to belong (Blachnicka-Ciacek et al. 2021) thereby includes the transactional and the reciprocal in the legal negotiation of belonging and rights.
Overall, if newer qualifying conditions or criteria would be legally accepted into brackets of belonging, then such new brackets or parameters of belonging would ipso facto translate into rights that the Gurkhas are championing for. The processes of arguing and pushing for legal bracketing to belonging by that means also unveil and bring to the fore what is at stake if such brackets are not expanded or rethought in terms of policy and the law. Amounting to an observation that “the legality of discretionary policies … seem in part internally contradictory” and where it is vital that “ECOs [Entry Clearance Officer] know precisely what discretion is being afforded to them, and for the AIT to know when the ECOs are acting in accordance with the law and when they are not,”69 this goes to show the politics of belonging not only in the sense of what is at stake. More pertinently, legal structures in connection with immigration policies need to in concert determine where the brackets of belonging may be found and instituted in the case of the Gurkhas. In the words of Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrat leader who had supported ex-Gurkhas for the right of abode in the United Kingdom: “If someone is prepared to die for this country, they must be allowed to live in it.”70 In other words, national belonging and national identity also have to take into consideration, if and how armed forces such as the Gurkhas ought to be rewarded and respected in return or exchange for their sacrifice if not risk-taking (Qureshi and Zeitlyn 2013)—these considerations forming the gist of public opinion on Gurkha veterans’ rights to abode and other issues.71
When Brackets of Belonging Shift
Brackets of belonging can shift owing to immigrant policy changes that allow Gurkhas and their families to reside in the United Kingdom. This however does not automatically translate into further rights as well, as seen in Gurung and others v The Secretary of State for Defence [2008].72 In this particular case, Gurkhas who were claimants had complained that the new pension transfer arrangements that were enacted in 2007 were “irrational, and discriminate against them by comparison with other Gurkhas on the grounds of age.”73 This was taken to contradict their rights based on Article 14 ECHR as well as Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR.74 Specifically, and to demonstrate how shifted brackets may not necessarily lead to the provision of rights where pensions are concerned vis-à-vis living in the United Kingdom, it was stated that although an option was created for the Gurkhas to retire after having served four years in the Brigade, they do not “lose their Nepalese citizenship on doing so and can return there at any age if they wish.”75 Furthermore, that “does not mean that there was an obligation or intention to provide a pension which would enable retirement to take place to the UK, still less to do so in any way which avoided the need to find another source of income.”76 Where the GOTT is concerned, it was stated as well that there was “no internal contradiction in the GOTT, or a giving with one hand but a taking away with another.”77 It was clearly indicated that the “aim of the GOTT was not to allow the Gurkha to retire in the United Kingdom on an Immediate Pension at thirty-three years old free from further labour, nor to allow other servicemen now to do so under the AFPS.”78 It was subsequently proclaimed that the Gurkha claimants had misinterpreted the GOTT of having the “aim … to enable Gurkhas to ‘retire’ in the UK, at some unstated age.”79 These examples revolving around the GOTT therefore point toward how brackets that shift can still mean that access to further pension amounts in order to retire in the United Kingdom continues to be foreclosed.
Another issue regarding the GOTT has to do with citizenship ties. The court returned to the 1997 Hong Kong handover moment where the United Kingdom had by then become the new home base for the Gurkhas. Therefore, the “HMFIR change which also affected qualifying dependents, and changes to MAS would all strengthen [the Gurkhas’] ties to the UK, and weaken those to Nepal.” In these contexts, legal discourse has it that “ties of citizenship and other ties remain.”80 This assertion of Nepalese citizenship, despite all the various changes listed, importantly implies that irrespective of shifts in policy related to MAS or ILR, Gurkhas remain as Nepalis by citizenship, and are not British citizens. Even in the presence of shifts in bracketing (in this case, greater Gurkha affinity felt for the United Kingdom through all the policy and political changes), it does not necessarily translate into further or equivalent rights as compared to UK citizens. Similarly, even if Gurkhas were to be granted rights to settling in the United Kingdom, this is not automatically pegged to betterment in terms of pension issues:
If Gurkha veterans are to be allowed to come in as a matter of discretion because of evidence of compelling links through very long or very gallant service, that does not mean that their pensions based on historic terms of service must be uplifted. Perhaps they will choose to remain where they are and their money may go further.81
In this instance, there are many items and issues that Gurkha veterans have raised over the years and based on their argument that they belong (in terms of contributions, service and sacrifice to the crown). Their claims as put forward in the UK courts may be interpreted as well as attempts in pushing the needle toward their rights to recognition and others, labeled in court as a “moral debt” or “historic debt” owed to them by the United Kingdom.82 Even if not all of these issues may achieve legal success, or if such debts are not repaid in a manner of speaking, the very acts of registering their claims and appeals through the institution of the law and in line with immigration policies show how the brackets of belonging are made malleable. Such bracketing thereby shifts according to broader sociolegal structures and modes of boundary governance.
Redrawing brackets of Gurkha belonging to the United Kingdom by those in favor vis-à-vis the fulfillment of military service and sacrifice does not necessarily mean that Gurkha soldiers and British soldiers are thus to be regarded as analogous.83 In a nutshell, the key inquiry here, when brackets shift, is captured in the following statement: “What the Government of Nepal wanted and indeed has obtained is that during service in the Brigade of Gurkhas, the soldiers remained Nepalese citizens and the links of allegiance to Nepal were not broken. The issue before the court is how should they be treated after they served?” (emphasis in original).84 When these brackets shift due to larger immigration policies later on, such as that enacted from 2004 with regard to the eligibility of Gurkha veterans and their families for settlement and citizenship, this becomes a turning point. Newer brackets of belonging delineated arising from sacrifice and contributions of these Gurkhas and their families would mean that rights to settlement and citizenship are now made available to them. In January 2005, the secretary of state for defence announced a review of the Gurkha TACOS:
Gurkhas have spent an increasing proportion of their time in UK since withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997, and successive amendments to the conditions under which they serve have recognised their changing role, status and personal aspirations. The most recent of these was their inclusion in the new HM forces immigration rule, which took effect from 25 October 2004. This has potentially far-reaching effects on the way we recruit and manage the brigade and care for its serving members, families and veterans. In addition, some public criticism and unease continues about the remaining differences between Gurkhas’ terms and conditions and those of the wider Army. We are, therefore, anxious to ensure that such differences are absolutely justifiable as well as fully understood and accepted by our Gurkha soldiers and want to ensure that the MOD’s position, both legally and morally, is beyond reproach.85 (my emphases)
The above statement clearly reflects how brackets of belonging have begun to shift in parallel with amendments to the Gurkhas’ TACOS after 1997. The shift is registered first from the point of view of Gurkhas, where their role, status, and personal aspirations have altered and more importantly, have been duly recognized. The UK government, and the MOD in particular, have also had to rethink their perspective on how the Brigade of Gurkhas was now to be managed. Increasingly, such governance both in terms of the military and migration policymaking now extends to not only Gurkhas in active service, but those who have retired, including their families. This nod toward the wider Gurkha diaspora thereby manifest how these different actors form part and parcel of the processes of shifting brackets. It is their varied interests and aspirations that will be affected as a result of changes in legislation and immigration policies.
Following the above statement of the Secretary of State, the MOD in December 2006 later published the outcome of the wider TACOS review. Given the newer context whereby changes were made both to the IR and to Married Accompanied Service (MAS), the MOD review team noted that such changes were accompanied by further amendments to the “traditional assumption that British Gurkhas would retire in Nepal.” Moreover, the future ahead now points toward a scenario where “Gurkhas could be expected to increasingly to regard the United Kingdom, rather than Nepal, as their family base.” Said in a different manner, Gurkhas, prior to 1 July 1997, were “not in an analogous position to the rest of the British Army.” This is because they were mainly based overseas, primarily in Hong Kong and elsewhere. Thus they “had little or no opportunity to develop the close physical ties needed to satisfy the immigration regulations.” Such a situation was then altered after 1 July when the Gurkhas became UK based.86 This statement is telling for two reasons. The first is how 1 July becomes the defining and precise moment of change in bracketing, for which Gurkhas before and after this important date are assumed to lean on either Asia or the United Kingdom as home respectively.87 The second and more crucial reason has to do with how an exemplification of “close physical ties” form a paramount factor or key criterion in order for Gurkhas to “satisfy immigration regulations.” Demonstrating these ties could thereby facilitate rights to residence in the United Kingdom.
Additionally, it was also becoming clearer to the MOD that “the remaining differences between Gurkha terms and conditions of service and those applied to the rest of the Army were increasingly open to legal challenge.”88 There is at this point both immigratory and legal recognition of the Gurkhas and their families, owing to new brackets of belonging that can now be translated into these rights. When the UK prime minister noted that the Gurkhas have “served this country with great skill, courage and dignity… . They have made an enormous contribution not just to our armed forces but to the life of this country and it is important their commitment and sacrifice is recognised,”89 the home secretary David Blunkett added:
Throughout their history, the men of the Gurkha Brigade have shown unquestioning loyalty to the Queen and the people of the United Kingdom … I am very keen to ensure that we recognise their role in the history of our country and the part they have played in protecting us. This is why we have put together the best possible package to enable discharged Gurkhas to apply for settlement and citizenship. I hope that the decision I have made today will make our gratitude clear.90
While I have earlier indicated that qualifying conditions (not unlike those pronounced above) as put forward by Gurkha claimants did not shift brackets of belonging, these conditions are in this particular instance now admitted into brackets of belonging as denoted by the prime minister and the home secretary. Such rights to discharge in the United Kingdom and access to citizenship are encapsulated as follows:
Since April 2007 discharge has been able to take place in the United Kingdom… . Gurkhas can now also count military service anywhere in the world towards the period of qualifying residence deemed to be in the United Kingdom, for the purposes of naturalisation, although citizenship can only be granted once they have left the Brigade of Gurkhas. These changes were made without objection from the Government of Nepal, just as earlier they had no objection to indefinite leave to remain being granted to Gurkhas.91
Given changing regulations that were promulgated since April 2007, rules and thereby brackets of belonging have shifted and thus renewed criteria or qualifying conditions for naturalization and citizenship, as well as location of discharge, differing from the previous context of Nepal. These changes would, in Laksamba et al.’s (2013) view, reflect the temporal character of inequality and fairness. For Laksamba and his coauthors, it is not only a matter of dealing with the past, but that “righting things for the present and future should take precedence” (2013, 58). Changes such as these therefore reflect not only the mutable nature of bracketed belonging. They highlight the very temporal transience of brackets that (would continue to) alter in close relation with wider shifts in the legal and immigratory domains of governance. In sum, it can be argued that if brackets of belonging are intimately associated with attendant rights and resources in the case of the Gurkhas, then it remains exigent for brackets of belonging to exist interdependently and compatibly with law and policy in the context of the United Kingdom.
Bracketing Family Life for the Gurkhas
Aside from sociolegal bracketing stipulated between the United Kingdom and Nepal, UK policies and immigration rules have also been meted out in regard to bracketing the family unit for Gurkhas and their adult children. The discussion in this section therefore extends my earlier analysis of how bhanja and bhanji relate to where home is and their sense of belonging in a different manner; now illuminating both affective ties as well as legal and practical considerations where rights to settlement in the United Kingdom are concerned. Arising from the October 2004 IR that permitted Gurkha soldiers with at least four years of service and who had retired from the British Army either on or after 1 July 1997 the grant of settlement in the United Kingdom, the Diplomatic Service Procedures (DSP) was issued at the same time. The DSP Chapter 29 provided a set of operational instructions to Entry Clearance Officers and also outlined policy guidelines with regard to Gurkha dependents who were over the age of eighteen.92 Although Chapter 29 ceased effect as of February 2009, a further policy, SET 12, was published based on the same set of terms. The key points to bear in mind from para 29.14 of the DSP are as follows:93
It is not the intention to split a family unit solely because the dependant is 18 years of age or over. Applications for settlement from dependants who are 18 years of age or over will be considered and discretion to grant settlement outside the rules may be exercised in individual cases. Dependants over the age of 18 need to make separate individual applications and pay the appropriate fee. In assessing whether the settlement in the UK is appropriate the ECO should consider the following factors:
- one parent or a relative of the applicant is present and settled; or being admitted for, or being granted, settlement in the UK under the HM Forces Rule;
- the applicant has previously been granted limited leave as a dependant of a member of HM Forces;
- the applicant has been, and wishes to continue, pursuing a full-time course of studies in the UK;
- refusal of the application would mean that the applicant would be living alone outside the UK and is financially dependent on the parent or relative present and settled; or being granted settlement in the UK under the HM Forces Rule;
- the applicant would find it very difficult to function because of illness or disability without the help and support of their parent or close relative in the UK.
If one or more of the factors listed above are present, the ECO may exercise discretion to grant entry clearance for settlement in the UK.94
The above guidelines, subject to discretion and therefore which are “not necessarily determinative,”95 form brackets of family belonging that thereby ought to translate into the right to settlement in the United Kingdom for adult children of the Gurkhas. Bracketing the family unit is not so much just about kin relations. It is rather about permitting Gurkha families settlement in the United Kingdom adjudicated on a needs basis and arising from forms of demonstrable dependency as justification. Only when these criteria are deemed to have sufficiently been met are adult children granted settlement rights. The standout point about such family policymaking lies in how affective and emotional aspects of familial relations become recruited as one of the key criteria for determining if a particular child therefore holds the right to settlement. In principle, this right to settlement in the United Kingdom has been announced by the UK government below:
The government had made it clear that it wished to acknowledge the role played by the Gurkhas in the history of the UK and had expressed the intention of putting together the best possible package to enable discharged Gurkhas to apply for settlement and citizenship. These statements were made with the Military Covenant in mind and the policy was designed to ensure that ex-Gurkha soldiers would be able to enjoy their right to remain in the UK with their family members including dependants over the age of 18.96
Court cases that I have analyzed pertaining to Gurkha adult children and their claim if not follow-up appeal for the right to settlement in the United Kingdom reflect how the DSP was contested and argued in two salient ways. The first has to do with terms of the difference between IR and policies. The second pertains to how a family unit is to be conceived, with ramifications for rights of settlement and dependency. It should also be noted that the purpose of the DSP is “not to facilitate the settlement in the UK of adult dependant children” and that it “recognises that such children may be granted leave to enter under rule 317(i)(f) and if article 8 requires it.” Adult children are therefore “not granted leave to enter unless there are exceptional circumstances.”97
Where the difference between IR and policies is concerned, it has been stressed in Entry Clearance Officer v UR and others [2010] and Entry Clearance Officer v KG [2011] that IR have been elevated to a status that may be read as akin to the law. Therefore, IR “must be construed more strictly than was the case in the past.”98 In contrast, policies are “by their nature”99 “meant to be applied flexibly” and thus mean that there is some room for the “sensible exercise of discretion.”100 This would mean that the wording in policies do not have to be “construed with all the strictness of a statute.”101 Such definitional contrast between IR and policies have been invoked in cases where adult children of Gurkha have filed claims and follow-up appeals in pursuit of their right to settlement in the United Kingdom. I raise two examples here. The first is taken from Entry Clearance Officer v UR and others [2010], which comprises three conjoined cases.102 There were three appellants who had put up appeals against an ECO who had refused their 2009 applications as overage dependent children of a retired Gurkha who was granted the ILR in 2006. The ECO acted on the basis of these three appellants who were actually not living alone. They were siblings who were living together in Nepal. This contradicted how the ECO had interpreted the DSP fourth bullet point about applicants who ought “to be living alone outside the UK.” Immigrant Judge Gillespie who presided this case allowed the appeals and for entry clearance to be granted. This was given that the appellants were indeed “living alone outside the UK,” even if they were technically living together in Nepal. Specifically, the three of them were living in a house that was rented by their father, and in which they shared with three other male cousins. A favorable exercise of discretion was adopted by Gillespie to support the appeals.
Another important point of contention raised in this case example had to do with another of the criteria in order for Gurkha children to obtain the rights to settlement in the United Kingdom. This had to do with an “unusual degree of emotional dependency” between adult children and their Gurkha parent that had to be established before the former could be granted permission to “settle with a parent in this [United Kingdom] country.”103 Such emotional dependency as a key point was the one that led to the rejection of Roshan Ghising’s appeal for settlement—the case that I outlined at the outset. Ghising’s appeal was turned down as he was not able to demonstrate deep (enough) emotional ties with his parents. Besides, Roshan Ghising had also made evident that he was able to live independently and was able to support himself.104 For the three appellants here then, it was argued against them that financial dependency would not suffice as a condition to allow their settlement in the United Kingdom, for they would have to demonstrate emotional dependency as well. Senior Immigration Judge McKee who presided over this appeal case of the ECO arrived at a decision to accept the ECO’s position. He passed his judgment for the three appellants to apply again to the ECO in order for a “fresh decision to be made” regarding their application for residence rights in the United Kingdom.105
The second case example that I raise here to exemplify the legal contention of terminology between IR and policies relates to that of Entry Clearance Officer v KG [2011].106 Fairly similar to the above case where the three appellants were technically not living alone outside of the United Kingdom given that they shared their house in Nepal with other relatives, the present case also saw the appellant, a Miss KG who was living at her father’s house. Moreover, the house was shared with her uncle and his children. In her situation then, she did not meet the criterion listed in the fourth bullet point concerning living alone. If so, she could then have been categorized as a “stranded sibling” in need of support—which is deemed to be something to eschew based on this fourth bullet point. In other words, Miss KG had both “support and companionship” from her uncle and cousins.107 Borrowing from a separate case, the issue of living alone had also been debated as such. The “fact that there may be two siblings in Nepal did not change the fact that both of them would be separated from their family members in the UK; they would remain stranded dependants as much as a single stranded dependant.”108
That said however, this case proceeded with further illustration of evidence and from oral testimonies provided by both Miss KG and her father. The evidence collectively denoted both emotional and financial dependency of the former on the latter and other family members. Miss KG is said to suffer from mental retardation and chronic seizure disorder. Through the copious bundles of medical prescriptions and doctors’ notes accumulated over the years, it was confirmed that there is a “continuous need for medication.”109 Furthermore, not only did Miss KG rely on her uncle in Nepal, she was also supported financially by her father. He had continuously sent “generous remittances” to Nepal “amounting to £1,000 a year for her upkeep and for her medication.”110 Judge McKee who had also presided over this case, noted that Miss KG’s father had first wanted to “establish himself in this country” and to be gainfully employed before arranging for Miss KG to be brought over to the United Kingdom. On the basis of these evidences, McKee noted that “there is family life between the appellant and her parent, going beyond the normal emotional ties … and that the refusal of entry clearance interferes with that family life in a manner sufficiently grave to engage the operation of Article 8.”111 Article 8 of the ECHR—which was invoked in Miss KG’s case—has to do with the situation where if “human rights are argued, they should be determined in advance of any argument based on discretion: if the claimant’s human rights entitle him to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, any discretionary power to allow him to do so is otiose.”112 The core premise of Article 8 concerns the right to both one’s private and family life, as well as home and correspondence. In the case of Miss KG, McKee had argued that “her mental state renders her dependent on her parents in a way that a normal adult would not be.”113 Contingent on having met the criteria of the DSP, and along with Article 8 of the ECHR, McKee allowed Miss KG’s appeal for entry clearance into the United Kingdom.
The above two cases are illustrative of how the bracketing of a family unit transpires in order for adult Gurkha children to be awarded the right to join their Gurkha parents in the United Kingdom to live there. Not only do we learn about the conditions or criteria for how such settlement claims and/or appeals are to be made on the basis of residential arrangements (living alone), financial and emotional ties and dependency, as well as ability (health), the notional tussle of terminology between IR and policies further complicates the matter.114 Such a tussle sheds light on how such familial belonging and its contours may be resisted, debated, and interpreted in different manners in court that hold import in the consequences of residence for Gurkha adult children and their families in the United Kingdom. The complexity of what a family unit and family life entails is aptly encapsulated in Lord Bingham’s speech.115 His 2007 speech featured at a House of Lords hearing that also intertwined with the core values that Article 8 exists in order to protect:
Human beings are social animals. They depend on others. Their family, or extended family, is the group on which many people most heavily depend, socially, emotionally and often financially. There comes a point at which, for some, prolonged and unavoidable separation from this groups seriously inhibits their ability to live full and fulfilling lives. Matters such as age, health and vulnerability of the applicant, the closeness and previous history of the family, the applicant’s dependence on the financial and emotional support of the family, the prevailing cultural conditions in the country of origin and many other factors may all be relevant.116
There is ostensibly a balance point to be mediated if not achieved in weighing both the universality of human rights (as encapsulated in Article 8 for example) as well as the particularity of cultural norms (as reflected in Nepalese customs, for example).117 Adopting cognizance of the particular—and in this case Nepalese customs—also reflect importantly on the sustained transnational links that continue to formulate Gurkha/Nepalese identities in the UK process of the legal bracketing of family units and familial lives.
Taken from a broader viewpoint then, this process reiterates a concomitant bracketing that is taking place between Gurkha families residing in the United Kingdom, with Nepal, as a part of legal processes that determine if they (Gurkha adult children) are to be awarded the rights to settlement in the United Kingdom as a family. At the level of the individual, Roshan Ghising’s case (albeit rejected) included a demonstration of his close connection to the United Kingdom based on the following circumstances—he had arrived in the United Kingdom in 2007 from Nepal to study. By the end of 2010 he had completed two courses in Business Management at colleges in London. At the time of his hearing, he had enrolled since January 2012 for an MBA course at the University of East London, which was to conclude in June 2013. Finally, he has “founded a life here [United Kingdom] … and has friends and a social network,” and where he has also passed both the requisite English test as well as the Life in the UK test, on top of his driving test.118 In view of the above complexity and entanglements of various factors, then, bracketed belonging in terms of family units interweave both the sociolegal as well as the affective and emotional. It reveals at the same time the porosity not only of definitions of familial belonging, but those relating to policies such as the DSP where the exercise of discretion is concerned. While the law and immigratory rules and policies delineate how familial belonging ought to be verified, this process also determines where home and family life may be for Gurkha veterans and their families. In the process, there is continuity through legal provision that permits Gurkha diasporic presences across different parts of the United Kingdom as I shall further illuminate below.
To Strike and to Petition
Between July and August 2021, Gurkha veterans and widows staged a thirteen-day hunger strike against the British government in order to demand for equal pensions. A petition was launched with the following statement and signed by 108,290 people:119
We are demanding that the government treats Gurkhas fairly and pays them the same pension as other British veterans of the same rank and service. Many Gurkhas joined the Queen’s Gurkha Army believing their pension would sustain them and their families but sadly this has not been the case. Gurkhas served the crown and British yet many Gurkhas and their widows live in poverty in the UK and their relatives are forced into modern slavery in countries like Saudi Arabia. We shouldn’t treat our heroes like this. So we are demanding all Gurkha veterans are paid an equal pension to other British veterans. That includes veterans from pre-1997.120
Three members of the Gurkha Satyagraha—a group which represents Gurkha veterans—took to staging a hunger protest outside 10 Downing Street.121 In support of these protestors, about a hundred people also participated in a march.122 Spokesperson for the Gurkhas, Yam Gurung stated, “The government must listen. We have done so much. Why are they treating us like illegitimate children? We have done so much for them. We don’t want anybody to die here. Not a single one. We are human beings. I want to ask Boris Johnson, what is your interpretation of human rights? Tell the world. Tell the Gurkhas.”123 Gurkha Satyagraha had earlier in May 2021 written to Prime Minister Boris Johnson, calling for the formation of a bilateral committee comprising the Nepalese and British government. The purpose was to initiate a dialogue to discuss the issue of equal pensions for ex-Gurkhas. This initiative followed on the heels of the March 2018 “Report of the Technical Committee on Gurkha Veterans.”124 The committee was established in order to “provide a platform to explore options for a long term sustainable solution to grievances which some members of the Gurkha veteran community continue to hold.”125 This committee had provided a forum for which the respective positions of the Gurkha veteran community, and both the governments of Nepal and the United Kingdom were heard with regard to five “major areas of grievance.” These areas include (1) pension; (2) state pension; (3) redundancy package; (4) medical support in Nepal; and (5) other facilities.126 In the end, the committee’s report recorded standpoints, discussions, and requests without resolution. As indicated, the report was to “provide a baseline” for both the governments of Nepal and the United Kingdom to consider if each of the matters raised warranted further deliberation and through what means or measures.127
Since the 2018 publication of this joint technical report, Gurkha Satyagraha noted that there had been no progress in advancing deliberations on the matters raised.128 It had therefore asked for another committee to be established. This is so that a basis for dialogue between the two governments can be provided in order to address the demands laid out by the British ex-Gurkha veterans. If these demands were not addressed, three leaders from the group would go on a hunger strike from 1 July 2021 (Thurley 2021b). Following written assurance from the Nepalese government that it would take this up with the UK government, the group then postponed their hunger strike till 21 July. On the next day, Gurkhas had launched a relay hunger strike. One protestor was to hold the strike each day, that was to span thirteen days in all. On 7 August 2021, two former Gurkhas—Gyanraj Rai and Dhan Gurung—and one Gurkha widow, Pushpa Rana Ghale, launched a hunger strike (Thurley 2021b). The thirteen-day strike ended after the UK government agreed to further talks, and also stated that the MOD would establish a bilateral committee to discuss Gurkha veterans’ welfare issues. On 8 September 2021, Leo Docherty, the minister for defence for people and veterans announced that a bilateral committee attending to Gurkha welfare issues would be set up, and which would discuss such matters in December 2021. Gurkha Satyagraha then noted, together with the Nepali ambassador, that they looked forward to talks to conclude by February 2022. Recommendations were then to be taken from both the British and the Nepali sides to be implemented two months later by 1 April 2022 (Thurley 2021b).
In June 2022, the British Gurkha Army Ex-Servicemen’s Organization and BGAESO Singapore Gurkhas Department jointly submitted a sixteen-point memorandum (via the British ambassador to Nepal) to then British prime minister Boris Johnson.129 The memorandum was meant to seek redress for “longstanding discrimination and disparities BGAESO Singapore Gurkhas Department has been facing.”130 This is a memorandum endorsed by the president of GAESO, Padam Bahadur Gurung, which raises questions related to human rights and the need for justice pertaining to the Gurkhas, including the issues of citizenship, pay, and compensation. I present extracts from the memorandum in order to illustrate the discourses that reflect interpretations of inequitable treatment:
The tragedy that we have been experiencing for the past two hundred years of our association with the British Military Services is a painful chapter. We are international citizens if our sacrifice is truly recognized. But we are homeless, our service unrecognized and our status inferior. In conclusion, we are neither Nepali citizens nor British; rather we have been devoid of our natural rights.131
The young Gurkhas, from remote Nepali settlements, who were enjoying truly unique lifestyle, were recruited in British military services, trained in British lifestyle and returned back to their homeland after fifteen or twenty years at service. Their sons and daughters, grown in British lifestyle at their early age, could hardly adopt their native culture. This caused internal migration to the nearby towns detaching themselves from their native villages. The salary and pension provided by British government is neither adequate to cover their expenses on health and education nor food and clothing. Inherited properties were sold. They lacked options and opportunities in this miserable condition. For this, the Gurkhas, upon retirement, are forced to roving in third countries for second career. Their children not only ignore the guardianship of their mothers, rather are falling into the ill habits of drug addiction and anti-social behaviours. They can neither be characterized as Nepali or British but have been changed into people without homeland.132
Overall, the memorandum pushed for equal pay as well as “perks for Gurkhas serving in Singapore.”133 It indicates that both British and Singapore Gurkhas were recruited under similar terms and conditions, as well as performing similar duties. Therefore, the Singapore Gurkhas ought to receive equal pay and pensions and/or that they should be remunerated using the same pay code as their Singapore police counterparts along with comparable perks and benefits.
Apart from GAESO, which established organizational support over time in order to enact a Gurkha Justice movement (Laksamba 2012, 108), there are other similar organizations that have been formed as well to champion for justice for the Gurkhas. They include the Nepal Ex-Servicemen’s Association (NESA), the Nepal Ex-Servicemen Organization (NESO), as well as the Gurkha Study and Research Centre, which was later renamed the United British Gurkhas Nepal (UBGN), and then further renamed as the United British Gurkha Ex-Servicemen’s Association (UBGEA) (Laksamba 2012, 110). Other organizations were later formed, and which also championed for equal rights and pension similar to the above organizations. They comprise the British Gurkha Welfare Society (BGWS) and the British Council of Gurkhas (BCG). Processes of legal bracketing which I discuss here, may therefore be juxtaposed with these ongoing campaigns that raise causes and the demand of rights for ex-Gurkhas as organizational responses. In sum, the campaign for Gurkha justice at different levels began in 1990 through the efforts of the GAESO, BGWS, UBGEA, BGAESO, NESA, and BCG (Laksamba 2012, 113) in seeking redress for the Gurkhas in terms of both payment and treatment.
Parliamentary Advocacy for the Gurkhas
There was a follow-up parliamentary debate that took place on 22 November 2021, for the petition that was raised alongside the hunger strike. It is interesting to observe how the Gurkhas have been discussed by different members of the UK Parliament at this 104-minute debate. This is in addition to the two above quotations of this chapter cited from Cadbury and Monaghan—members who were also present at that debate. There are four interconnected tropes that I identify from the various speeches put forward by different members of Parliament (MPs) at this November sitting. They are (1) war heroism and commemoration; (2) individual biographies of ex-Gurkhas; (3) national and communal pride for Gurkhas in the United Kingdom and Nepal; and (4) deservedness of respect and tribute paying. Not unlike earlier sections where I discussed how bracketing and its shifts and permutations transpire in the legal arena, similar approaches toward bracketing the Gurkhas’ belonging to the United Kingdom are adopted by these MPs. By deploying brief narrative examples that represent these four tropes, MPs themselves are actually bracketing these veterans’ belonging to the United Kingdom, and therefore deservedness of equality and fair treatment by the UK government. These tropes, I argue, provide justificatory evidence and framing for these members to seek such equitable rights. This would include inclusionary policies and socioeconomic access for Gurkhas and their families given their varied conformity to such conditions of good migrant behavior (cf. Hackl 2022).
Where the first trope of war heroism and commemoration is concerned, MPs have in various ways recounted the incontestable risks, sacrifices, and loyalty of the Gurkhas in the many theaters of war that the United Kingdom had engaged in in the past and present as a record of history. For example, many spoke about how the Gurkhas served as a pivotal group who fought in both world wars, and in places including the Falklands, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to name a few countries and conflicts in warfare history. Given such military involvement over the more than two centuries of service with the British Army, the Gurkhas have therefore been extolled as a steadfast source of “service and sacrifice.” This was expressed by, among others, Stephen Morgan, MP for Portsmouth South:
To set the debate in its proper context, I will remind the Chamber of the contribution that Gurkhas have made to the British armed forces. Gurkhas have served in Her Majesty’s armed forces for more than 200 years, from the earliest recruits to the East India Company through two world wars, during which more than 238,000 enlisted in the brigade, to the Falklands, the Gulf wars and multiple tours of Afghanistan. They have made an outstanding contribution to the UK through centuries of service and sacrifice. They are rightly held in high esteem by the British Army itself and by the wider British public.134
From the recognition of service and sacrifice that the Gurkhas have continuously provided to the crown, comes the following narrative of the UK government having a “moral duty” to accord equal respect and treatment for these veterans.135 Such duty is also connected to debts owed to these Gurkha veterans, as many other MPs have noted.
MP of Glasgow East, David Linden, for instance made it his point to emphasize that an “enormous debt of gratitude” is owed to “the people who have chosen to serve and sacrifice so much.” Despite the fact that “Gurkhas and UK personnel served alongside one another, made the same sacrifices and certainly took the same risks” as attested to by the above recount of history, the British Government seems “set on undermining and dismissing the sacrifice that many have made.” Thus, it “remains a massive stain on global Britain’s brand that so many pensioners, particularly those who served this country, anguish in pension poverty overseas.”136 Consonant with the point on war heroism and the debt that the United Kingdom owes to the Gurkhas, Matt Rodda, MP for Reading East, talked about honor and gallantry as he paid his tribute to them:
I would like to spend a few moments paying tribute to the Gurkhas. They have given long and loyal service to this country, and it is worth mentioning some of the military history in a brief form. They were vital in world war one. That is less well known than their service in world war two, in which they played a crucial role in the defence of India. And they have taken part in many recent conflicts, defending this country and our interests overseas. Those include, obviously, the Falklands, Afghanistan and many others in between. We owe a debt of honour to these brave soldiers, and I hope that the Minister, who I obviously know is a gallant gentleman, will respond in an appropriate way.137
Alluding to or invoking heroic war pasts is not only a matter of setting the context of the Gurkhas’ deep and sustained involvement in empire and colonialism from the outset. It is also a case of raising the past as a moral resource in order to put forward claims in the present-day context (cf. Laubenthal and Schumacher 2020). In doing so, war narratives translate into moral narratives of recognition and debt accrual.
The individual biographies of ex-Gurkhas, including their varied contributions to public service, community building, and to the local economy, is also a recurrent theme that constitutes my second trope. We learn from Ruth Cadbury, MP who represents half of the borough of Hounslow, about the large Gurkha community who live and work there: “We are proud not only of their loyal service to our country, including in the fight against fascism in world war two, but of their years of service locally in civic life, through their work with charities and through the many small businesses that play a huge role in our local economy.”138 To place a face to such civic and economic contributions, Cadbury raised the example of Councilor Bishnu Gurung, mayor of Hounslow (2021–22) who had previously contributed as a Gurkha Staff Sergeant. Not only had Bishnu Gurung served a good nineteen years in the British Army, he was also awarded a long service medal and a good conduct award. Upon his retirement from the armed forces, he then settled down to live and work in Hounslow. He is presently a full-time London bus driver as well as the chairman of the Gurkha Nepalese Community Hounslow. In gist, said Cadbury, he is “such a good reminder that a Gurkha’s service does not end when they retire.”139
Similarly, Maria Miller, MP for Basingstoke, recognized the Nepalese community there as “an incredible asset to the town.” In her speech, Miller paid tribute to Mr. Om Gurung, chair of the Basingstoke Nepalese Community, and Mrs. Poonam Gurung who formerly headed the Non-Resident Nepali Association UK. Miller also lauded Captain Pancha Rai, who not only fought in the Falklands previously, but is “one of seven people who opened our Gurkha Grocery Shop in the centre of town.”140 MP for Brecon and Radnorshire, Fay Jones, spoke of the Gurkha community in her constituency:
The Gurkha soldiers I have met in my constituency tell me that they love living in Wales, that they have a strong connection and that it very much reminds them of life back at home in Nepal. Those in my constituency are valued members of the community, with many volunteering with the Brecon Beacons national park and many heavily involved in hospitality.141
The invocation of “home,” drawn from Nepal to Wales for the Gurkhas, together with the varied contributions of Gurkhas in volunteer work and in hospitality are expressions of how socially and civically entrenched these migrants are. Not only are these varied forms of participation underscored as their deep involvement with and connections to these domains of community life, their culinary and combat skills are also attested to. Khusiman Gurung runs a New Gurkha Inn located in Talgarth for which Jones “highly recommend[s] its curry”; Jones also juxtaposed him with many others who are serving as “active soldiers who work at the Infantry Battle School in Brecon.”142
Contributions that Gurkhas and other Nepalese migrants bring to different parts of the United Kingdom continue to feature in MPs’ advocative speeches. In Reading, Gurkha and other Nepalese people total nearly three thousand people. Apart from the ex-Gurkhas, Reading is also inhabited by “some highly skilled migrants from Nepal,” many of whom “live on relatively modest incomes.” Together, these Nepalese and Gurkha migrants are found in “crucial local public services,” including the NHS, Royal Berkshire Hospital, Reading bus drivers, as well as many other forms of public service and local businesses. Rodda declared that “we are proud to have many small local businesses linked to the Gurkha community.” In particular, Rodda delivered a “special tribute” to former Gurkha, Warrant Officer Gyanraj Rai. He had played a pivotal role in the Gurkha pension campaign and hunger strike. Having participated in two hunger strikes in the last decade, Gyanraj Rai has been depicted by Rodda as “the most gallant gentleman” who had “conducted himself with the utmost gallantry and dignity in this very difficult period,” “suffering greatly” when “he was outside No. 10 Downing Street for a number of days” together with the other hunger strikers.143 Rodda then concluded his speech by registering council support for these veterans by way of imploring the UK government to follow suit. Pointing out how local communities such as those in Reading have supported “our British Gurkhas,” Rodda listed a range of support from the Reading Borough Council. They include prioritizing veterans on the council house waiting list, support for them from charities, and help for elderly veterans and their families to learn English, among other forms of communal activities. In sum, there appears to be “huge support and appetite for continuing” these forms of support that are meant to help “people to integrate into society in this country.”144
Clearly, in the area of Reading at least, such avenues of support enfold Gurkhas and their families into British society. This is so that they may be “integrated,” as Rodda indicated. He also hoped that “the Government will now hear this plea” in support of the Gurkha community to investigate further and to commence a dialogue with the Nepalese Government and the veterans themselves. The likes of model or exemplary migrant warriors and Nepalese people, including Bishnu Gurung, Om Gurung, Poonam Gurung, Pancha Rai, Khusiman Gurung, and Gyanraj Rai, are all taken as deserving figures given their substantial contributions to and immersion in the many facets of British social life. Not only have they contributed to various services, their kin and families have also received endorsements, support, and recognition for their Gurkha past and present, something that MPs are now imploring for the UK government to also recognize and give due credit accordingly.
The third trope has to do with both communal and national pride for Nepal and for the United Kingdom. It represents another if not more abstract level of recognizing and officially paying tribute to these Gurkha retirees, including their family members. MP for Aldershot and the minister for defence people and veterans Leo Docherty painted a statistical picture of Gurkha veterans and widows. In doing so, he thereby indicated the “scale of the [pension] issue” in parliament. Docherty noted that 20,681 Gurkha veterans have been receiving the 1948 GPS, out of which 7,382 are widows. For him, these figures reflect the “magnificent scale of the record of service of the Gurkhas,” and to which he added that some “13 Victoria Crosses were won by native Gurkhas.”145 With this context, Docherty stated:
I am very proud of the deep local connection that I have with the Brigade of Gurkhas in my borough of Aldershot. We are very pleased to be the home of the Queen’s Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment. Many thousands of Gurkhas have settled and now make their home in Aldershot, Farnborough and the borough of Rushmoor, following 2009 changes in status of settlement. This represents a hugely successful integration and settlement.146 (my emphases)
Continuing from the above statement, Docherty further singled out three Gurkha councilors and placed on record his thanks to Jib Belbase, Nem Thapa, and Prabesh KC. He praised them for their “tenacity, civic pride and energy”—in also following from the second trope on foregrounding individual, laudable figures. He then pronounced, out of these tributary and prideful endorsements: “We are fiercely proud of our Gurkha community in the borough of Rushmoor.”147
In tandem with Docherty’s approach, Jonathan Gullis, MP for Stoke-on-Trent North, also spoke unequivocally about not only the Gurkhas but all armed forces veterans “in the highest possible regard.”148 In mentioning some slices of his family history where his great-great-uncle and grandfather had served in the armed forces, Gullis then underlined the importance of dedicated and sustained efforts to also “secure better protection for memorials to our glorious dead.”149 Using this as his backdrop, Gullis further made connections of such public and official recognition of veterans—both present and departed—by extending such a position to the Gurkhas. He said:
First of all, let me say that I know how highly regarded the Gurkhas are and have been for over 200 years. Their service to the British Crown, both here and overseas, has been marked by excellence and sacrifice. As Roy said to my team earlier, they are some of the most loyal soldiers this country has ever had, and have served on the frontlines of every war that the UK has fought in for the past 200 years. Prince Harry famously served alongside them during his 2007–8 tour of Afghanistan, and commented that “when you know you are with the Gurkhas … there’s no safer place to be.” That record of excellence and heroism goes somewhat under the radar, so I thank Joanna Lumley and campaigners like her for bringing the Gurkhas into the limelight.150
In the extract above, not only had Gullis placed the Gurkhas on a pedestal, he had also mentioned them alongside well-known British figures such as Prince Harry and Joanna Lumley. He had consciously related the Gurkhas to them by way of further endorsing and spotlighting these veterans so that they are not “somewhat under the radar.” Before broaching the topic of pensions, Gullis concluded his lauding of the Gurkhas by announcing that their “distinguished service is a source of immense pride in both the United Kingdom and Nepal.”151 Clearly, the above statements, while reminding us that Gurkhas come from Nepal, nevertheless form a source of pride for both countries. This recognition also evinces the deep historical ties and connections that Nepal and the United Kingdom together share, thereby indicating the exigent need to resolve pension inequities based on such close linkages borne out of history, pride, and respect. Docherty had made it clear that the Gurkhas have now settled in such places as Aldershot, Farnborough, and the borough of Rushmoor in the thousands. The spread of Gurkhas living across such locales for him pertinently represented “a hugely successful integration and settlement” in the United Kingdom. Gullis similarly articulated the same sentiment. On behalf of the Gurkhas, he called the United Kingdom “their country”:
The Gurkhas have served our country—their country—and they have kept me, my daughter and the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke safe. It is only right and fair that people who are willing to put their lives on the line for the United Kingdom’s safety get the respect that they deserve… . We have a fantastic Gurkhas veterans community across the United Kingdom. (my emphasis)152
Such official recognition of the Gurkhas’ contributions and service to the United Kingdom, expressed through affective positions of respect and pride, form tributary brackets of belonging in underlining how the Gurkhas are a part of the British. Since this is now their country, they therefore ought not to be regarded as foreigners. As Monaghan put it: “It is high time that the UK Government treated non-UK-born veterans and those born in the United Kingdom the same way.”153 In other words, emplacing the Gurkhas in British society where they now live, carries them over the edge of not-belonging, into the brackets of belonging to the United Kingdom.
The fourth and final trope is an extension of the third. Here, the deservedness of fair treatment and respect is instrumental in recognizing and acknowledging the manifold sacrifices that Gurkhas have made for the crown. To begin with, Gullis proclaimed, “We have to ensure that if someone is willing to put their life on the line, they are protected and respected. Ultimately, they are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice; potentially, these are fathers and mothers willing to never see their children and loved ones again. I cannot imagine the bravery that that takes.”154 Gullis further fronted the magnitude of the Gurkhas’ bravery and readiness to sacrifice where he reminded parliament that these veterans have “always [been] on the frontline, always the first in and, in many cases, always the last out.” For Gullis, this “shows what a tremendous group of individuals they are and what they are willing to do.”155 Although I have earlier through legal documents of court hearings indicated that deservedness through nationality is exclusive and holds no room for any overlaps, the same point was treated differently in the parliamentary debate of November 2021. If anything, the difference of nationality as a point becomes moot in this context. This is advanced in view of the immense sacrifices that Gurkhas have been noted to have brought to the United Kingdom. Monaghan provided clear differentiated treatment bestowed on the basis of those from overseas, such as the Gurkhas. She exclaimed:
Fair status is not granted to personnel from overseas. An individual with a wife and two children would have to pay £10,000 to try to bring their partner and children here. There are also instances of individuals being refused NHS treatment… . We must respect and honour their service. If the Government are serious about their commitment to veterans—all veterans, regardless of their place of birth—we must see pension equality, a waiver of immigration fees and a serious approach to veterans’ affairs. That is literally a no-brainer.156
The issue here is not so much about deservedness by nationality, but rather by contribution and readiness to sacrifice. The principle of empire (Cohen 2022) which I discussed above remains resonant herewith. Being ready to sacrifice denotes the Gurkhas’ loyalty to and bravery for the crown. In return, “fair status” as Monaghan put it, ought to be installed. This is clearly the case since deservedness of respect in this manner has already been earned by the Gurkhas; something that also follows from the first trope.
Not only have the Gurkhas earned such respect, their families by extension are also part of the picture where fair treatment is concerned. For Jim Shannon, MP for Strangford, courage formed a key theme in his speech. Having said that he felt “greatly humbled” to actually be in the presence of the Gurkhas when he met them while doing the armed forces parliamentary scheme, Shannon emphasized their “tremendous courage and bravery” which easily “surpasses and equals that of many others across this great nation.”157 Mentioning that one of the Gurkhas who had participated in the hunger strike received only £47 (approximately US$60) a month upon retirement in comparison with his British counterparts who took home £600 (approximately US$758), Shannon then launched into a series of rhetorical queries in parliament:
At what stage will we decide to do the right thing by those brave men and their families? It is not just about the soldiers; it is about their families as well. They deserve the pension. They have honoured us. They have delivered and they deserve to have it. How many petitions will it take? How many protests? How many demonstrations? How many hunger strikes? There have already been too many.158
As the Gurkhas “have delivered,” all they are asking for is “parity, equity and fairness,” in Shannon’s words. Calling the “same benefits, pensions and welfare” as a “debt that is owed” to Gurkha families, Shannon then further reiterated how the Gurkha community ought to be regarded as analogous to the British. He announced that he is “proud to stand, along with others, with the Gurkhas” because “they have stood for freedom and democracy under the banner of our monarchy, and of our Queen, and before that our King.”159 This statement serves as a poignant example that carries allegiance as pledged both by the British as well as the Gurkhas, thereby making these two groups equivalent under the eyes of the UK government. In the end, Shannon called for “delivery for the Gurkhas” in equal measure with what others get:
Gurkhas and their families still live in poverty, despite believing that fighting for our Government, our country and our Queen would mean security for their families. What we deliver for the Gurkha soldiers, we must also deliver for the families. They deserve nothing less. The message from this place, as we have all said, must be that we will settle for nothing less on their behalf. We want for the Gurkhas what other soldiers have—nothing less, nothing more.160
By the end of the parliamentary debate, Gullis closed the session by proclaiming it as a “fantastic debate.” More important, Gullis underscored that “it is clear that we all respect the Gurkhas and want to see them well looked after.”161
Collective and assenting voices of these MPs who have together spoken in a concerted quest for and support of equal and fair treatment to the Gurkhas and their families represent their strategic acts of bracketing Gurkha families’ belonging to the United Kingdom. For the Gurkha community in different parts of the United Kingdom have contributed not only to the theaters of war in the past, but in the present-day context of community contribution, development, and sociality. Through these past and present domains of contributions, Gurkhas and their families have therefore been seen as valued, good, and deserving migrants who by extension ought to “deserve nothing less.”162 Such endorsement of and support for Gurkha veterans and their loved ones reflect the familiar if not classic trope of the construction of good migrants in the wider migration literature on belonging and deservedness (see for example, Hackl 2022; Ratzmann 2021; Sivis 2022). Issues to do with who rightly belongs to a community of solidarity, and thereby connected to the social distribution of state resources (Ratzmann 2021), are routinely raised, as shown by the UK parliamentary debate of November 2021, for example. As Ware (2009, 59) similarly describes the Gurkhas in the context of the Gurkha Justice Campaign, “Far from being another category of unwanted immigrants seeking to cash in on their tenuous connections to the UK, the retired Nepalese soldiers and their dependants were cast as deserving entrants to the national collective.” Gurkha veterans are essentially made tangible, legitimate, and worthy as migrants. This in turn enable justification for proper treatment to be meted out accordingly, with an extended reach to their families as well.
The four tropes are therefore demonstrated expressions of deservedness that provide the rationale and substantiation for taking Gurkha pension and other matters seriously, as advocated by the different MPs. This is given especially that the Gurkhas have now crossed the threshold from foreign warriors from the outset, to living in the midst of British citizens. They have essentially formed and continue to form a part of life in the United Kingdom as a veteran community. In essence, MPs vouched for how the Gurkhas and their families have attained cultural and communal integration, of which such evidence presented in parliamentary discourse could be more weighty than legal policies toward determining subjective belonging (cf. Simonsen 2016). On 31 March 2022, the MOD and Gurkha Brigade Association announced that revisions to the GPS, the Gurkha Service Pension, the Gurkha Disability Pension, and the Gurkha Family Pension would be accomplished as of 1 April 2022. These revisions saw a 7.11 percent increase in pension amounts in view of mounting standards of living in Nepal.163
The Legal Politics of Bracketing Belonging
Where belonging may be felt, experienced, desirable, or aspirational, it also needs to be adjudicated on, allowed, or approved within the bounds of particular legal-political, sociocultural, and temporal conditions and contexts. It is only when these contexts and conditions shift or alter that parameters of belonging and not-belonging concomitantly transform as well. These shifts and transformations occur differently for Gurkhas, wives, and children, but also that of nation-states, their legal apparatus, and immigration policies. Together, the broader backcloth of empire and postcolonialism in the case of Gurkhas and their families affect and forge the facets, forms, and flexibility of what it means to belong or not-belong.
Legal bracketing implies both acts of inclusion and exclusion as it confronts issues of recognition and equality of treatment. Inclusionary bracketing would mean that criteria for belonging have been met. One would thus be included for rights and resources. The legal recognition and formulation of belonging, arising from the admission of such newer qualifying conditions is thereby accompanied by the legal provision of rights as I have discussed above. By the same token, then, exclusionary bracketing would therefore mean that such criteria or qualifying conditions have been legally rejected. One is thereby excluded from rights and resources. Claimants are left outside of the brackets of belonging. In other words, legal bracketing can either block or facilitate belonging and subsequently claims to rights. Similar to affective and aspirational practices of belonging, legal belonging and not-belonging are contemporaneous. My close reading of legal and other texts in this chapter and how bracketed belonging transpires therefore showcase and scrutinize the ways through which inclusionary and exclusionary mechanisms come into play. These mechanisms are closely connected to rights and access to provisions or a change in the TACOS. When such mechanisms come to the fore, this therefore also invites resistance to or rejection of bracketing, pointing to the stakes involved. These various stakes comprise what is to be gained as well as what is to be lost in the process of legal negotiation and contestation.
As brackets or edges of belonging shift, renew, or transform over time, the figure of the Gurkha soldier is also impacted, if not latently so. Not only does his public persona change from that of “patriotic hero” to “poor working-class victim” (Qureshi and Zeitlyn 2013, 113) in the broader contexts of income and pension issues in relation to his service to the British Army, he has also traversed, where allowed, from that of soldier to citizen. Bracketing strategies as seen in the legal arena or in the UK Parliament debate as previously discussed also reflect how the contours of belonging are illuminated. Gurkhas and their families have had to demonstrate particular efforts, achievements, and action (cf. Hackl 2022) before they are sociolegally recognized as deserving actors. Evident among these parliamentary narratives and the four tropes are legal, affective, social, and communal contributions as identified from Gurkhas both in their active service and postservice milieus. These different forms of contributing to British society thus render Gurkhas and their families as worthy or deserving recipients of abode. They also include access to uplifted sociolegal and economic provisions in the UK context. MPs were essentially delineating and pronouncing brackets of belonging based on the four tropes. In the process, they have together also underlined the rationale for inclusionary rather than exclusionary responses and policymaking from the UK government. By mapping out the different forms of how legal bracketing are mounted, challenged, reconsidered or renewed, I have not only expanded empirical conditions of how bracketed belonging transpires in law and policy, but also add pertinently toward expanding the analytical girth of belonging as a concept in this book. I have done this by foregrounding the legal and political drawing and redrawing of boundaries (i.e., brackets) between deserving individuals and nondeserving ones in relation to the wider landscape of nation-state policy and demographic governance structures. My analysis therefore widens the theoretical radius of how belonging is approached in legislative and bracketed terms.