1. Gregory T. Chin and Kevin P. Gallagher, “Coordinated Credit Spaces: The Globalization of Chinese Development Finance,” Development and Change 50, no. 1 (January 2019): 245–274.

2. Interview, former policy bank official, 10 November 2016, Beijing.

3. In the Chinese language, there are two different terms for “development finance”—fazhan rongzi, a direct translation of the English term, and kaifaxing jinrong, a term created by the CDB. The latter, sometimes translated as “development-oriented finance,” refers to the kind of finance that uses market mechanisms to support the state’s development objectives. See chapter 1 and 2 for more details.

4. See, for example, William Diamond, Development Banks (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957); Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962); Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion, “Development Banking,” Journal of Development Economics 58, no. 1 (February 1999): 83–100; Delio E. Gianturco, Export Credit Agencies: The Unsung Giants of International Trade and Finance (Westport, CT: Quorumbooks, 2001); Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Rita M. Rodriguez, The Exim Bank in the 21st Century: A New Approach? (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, 2001); Stephany Griffith-Jones and José Antonio Ocampo, The Future of National Development Banks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Jiajun Xu, Régis Marodon, Xinshun Ru, Xiaomeng Ren, and Xinyue Wu, “What are Public Development Banks and Development Financing Institutions? Qualification Criteria, Stylized Facts and Development Trends.” China Economic Quarterly International 1, no. 4 (December 2021): 271–294; Daniel Mertens, Matthias Thiemann, and Peter Volberding, The Reinvention of Development Banking in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

5. For research that compares Chinese finance with global private capital, see, for instance, Ching Kwan Lee, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017); Stephen B. Kaplan, Globalizing Patient Capital: The Political Economy of Chinese Finance in the Americas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021). For research that compares Chinese finance with Western foreign assistance, see, for instance, Deborah Bräutigam, “Aid ‘with Chinese Characteristics’: Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC Aid Regime,” Journal of International Development 23, no. 5 (July 2011): 752–764; Gregory Chin and Fahimul Quadir, “Introduction: Rising States, Rising Donors and the Global Aid Regime,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 4 (2012): 493–506.

6. See, for instance, Kai Schulzi, “Sri Lanka, Struggling with Debt, Hands a Major Port to China,” New York Times, 12 December 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html; Christopher Balding, “Venezuela’s Road to Disaster Is Littered with Chinese Cash,” Foreign Policy, 6 June 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/06/venezuelas-road-to-disaster-is-littered-with-chinese-cash/.

7. Some of the most commonly used datasets tracking China’s overseas development finance include Boston University’s Global China Databases (https://www.bu.edu/gdp/research/databases/global-china-databases/) and AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset (https://china.aiddata.org/).

8. Nicholas R. Lardy, The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China? (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2019); Wendy Leutert, “The Political Mobility of China’s Central State-Owned Enterprise Leaders,” China Quarterly 233 (March 2018): 1–21; Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, “Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm,” Georgetown Law Journal 103 (2015): 665–722; Chen Li and Muyang Chen, “National Champions, Reforms, and Industrial Policy in China,” in The Oxford Handbook of Industrial Policy, ed. Arkebe Oqubay, Christopher Cramer, Ha-Joon Chang, and Richard Kozul-Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

9. William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); Audrye Wong, “China’s Economic Statecraft under Xi Jinping,” Revolution or Evolution? Xi Jinping and the Future of China’s Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 22, 2019).

10. For instance, see Schulzi, “Sri Lanka.” Also see Archived Trump White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy toward China,” The Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, 4 October 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/; White House, “Remarks by President Biden in Meeting on the Build Back Better World Initiative,” Scottish Event Campus, Glasgow, Scotland, 2 November 2021.

11. Min Ye, “Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 119 (2019): 696–711; Yuen Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); Xiao Ma, Localized Bargaining: The Political Economy of China’s High-Speed Railway Program (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).

12. Yingyao Wang, “The Rise of the ‘Shareholding State’: Financialization of Economic Management in China,” Socio-Economic Review 13, no. 3 (September 2015): 603–625; Lee Jones and Yizheng Zou, “Rethinking the Role of State-Owned Enterprises in China’s Rise,” New Political Economy 22, no. 6 (2017): 743–760; Meg Rithmire, “Varieties of Outward Chinese Capital: Domestic Politics Status and Globalization of Chinese Firms,” Harvard Business School Working Paper, 2019.

13. Kaplan, Globalizing Patient Capital, 14.

14. Lee, The Specter of Global China, 33.

15. Tobias ten Brink, “Paradoxes of Prosperity in China’s New Capitalism,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 42, no. 4 (2013): 17–44; Christopher A. McNally, “Refurbishing State Capitalism: A Policy Analysis of Efforts to Rebalance China’s Political Economy,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 42, no. 4 (2013): 45–71; Matt Ferchen, “Whose China Model Is It Anyway? The Contentious Search for Consensus,” Review of International Political Economy 20, no. 2 (2013): 390–420; Andreas Nölke et al., “Domestic Structures, Foreign Economic Policies and Global Economic Order: Implications from the Rise of Large Emerging Economies,” European Journal of International Relations 21, no. 3 (2015): 538–567; Julian Y. Gruin, “The Social Order of Chinese Capitalism: Socio-Economic Uncertainty, Communist Party Rule and Economic Development, 1990–2000,” Economy and Society 45, no. 1 (2016): 24–50; Roselyn Hsueh, “State Capitalism, Chinese-Style: Strategic Value of Sectors, Sectoral Characteristics, and Globalization,” Governance 29, no. 1 (January 2016): 85–102; Yongnian Zheng and Yanjie Huang, Market in State: The Political Economy of Domination in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

16. Shaofeng Chen, “Marketization and China’s Energy Security,” Policy and Society 27, no. 3 (2009): 249–260; Chih-shian Liou, “Rent-Seeking at Home, Capturing Market Share Abroad: The Domestic Determinants of the Transnationalization of China State Construction Engineering Corporation,” World Development 54, (February 2014): 220–231; Chen Li, “Holding ‘China Inc.’ Together: The CCP and the Rise of China’s Yangqi,” China Quarterly 228 (December 2016): 927–949.

17. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian, “China’s Financial System: Past, Present, and Future” (March 28, 2007); Wang, “The Rise of the ‘Shareholding State’ ”; Hao Chen and Meg Rithmire, “The Rise of the Investor State: State Capital in the Chinese Economy,” Studies in Comparative International Development 55 (2020): 257–277.

18. See, for example, Steven K. Vogel, Marketcraft: How Governments Make Markets Work (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

19. Iain Hardie, “How Much Can Governments Borrow? Financialization and Emerging Markets Government Borrowing Capacity,” Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 2 (2011): 141–167; Sarah L. Quinn, American Bonds: How Credit Markets Shaped a Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019); Michael Schwan, Christine Trampusch, and Florian Fastenrath, “Financialization of, Not by the State. Exploring Changes in the Management of Public Debt and Assets across Europe,” Review of International Political Economy 28, no. 4 (2021): 820–842.

20. United Nations, “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development,” UN General Assembly Resolution 69/313, July 2015.

21. Daniel F. Runde, Romina Bandura, and Owen Murphy, Strategic Directions for the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC): Supporting Development and National Security (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019); Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Marian L. Lawson, BUILD Act: Frequently Asked Questions about the New U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, CRS Report R45461 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,2019).

22. Michael R. Adamson, “ ‘Must We Overlook All Impairment of Our Interests?’ Debating the Foreign Aid Role of the Export-Import Bank, 1934–41,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 4 (2005): 589–623; Eric Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

23. David C. Engerman, The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

24. Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences,” International Organization 38, no. 1 (1984): 1–40; Kiyoshi Kojima, “The ‘Flying Geese’ Model of Asian Economic Development: Origin, Theoretical Extensions, and Regional Policy Implications,” Journal of Asian Economics 11, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 375–401.

25. Engerman, The Price of Aid; Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura, “A Looming Entry Barrier: Japan’s Production Networks in Asia,” NBR Analysis 8, no. 1 (1997).

26. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.

27. Stephan Haggard, Developmental States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); T. J. Pempel, A Region of Regimes: Prosperity and Plunder in the Asia-Pacific (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021).

28. Maurice Wright, Japan’s Fiscal Crisis: The Ministry of Finance and the Politics of Public Spending, 1975–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Gene Park, Spending without Taxation: FILP and the Politics of Public Finance in Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

29. Japan Development Bank is the predecessor of the Development Bank of Japan. The Export-Import Bank of Japan is the predecessor of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

30. Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

31. Alice Amsden, The Rise of “the Rest”: Challenges to The West from Late-Industrializing Economies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

32. John B. Knight, “China as a Developmental State,” World Economy 37, no. 10 (October 2014): 1335–1347.

33. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry is now the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.

34. Saori N. Katada and Jessica Liao, “China and Japan in Pursuit of Infrastructure Development Leadership: Competition or Convergence?” Global Governance 26, no. 3 (2020): 449–472; Muyang Chen, “China–Japan Development Finance Competition and the Revival of Mercantilism,” Development Policy Review 39, no. 5 (September 2021): 811–828.

35. Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 461–477; Arthur R. Kroeber, “Developmental Dreams: Policy and Reality in China’s Economic Reforms,” in Beyond the Middle Kingdom Comparative Perspectives on China’s Capitalist Transformation, ed. Scott Kennedy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Kristen Hopewell, “Power Transitions and Global Trade Governance: The Impact of a Rising China on The Export Credit Regime,” Regulation and Governance 15, no. 3 (July 2021): 634–652; Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978–2020 (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2021).

36. G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (January 2018): 7–23; David A. Lake, Lisa L. Martin, and Thomas Risse, “Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization,” International Organization 75, no. 2 (2021): 225–257.

37. Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014); Kristen Hopewell, Clash of Powers: U.S.–China Rivalry in Global Trade Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

38. Akhtar and Lawson, BUILD Act; Runde, Bandura, and Murphy, Strategic Directions for the United States International Development Finance Corporation.

39. William C. Pacatte, Competing to Win a Coalition Approach to Countering the BRI (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019); White House, “Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership,” 12 June 2021.

40. Christopher A. McNally, “Chaotic Mélange: Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Statism in the Age of Sino-Capitalism,” Review of International Political Economy 27, no. 2 (2020): 281–301; Nana de Graaff, Tobias ten Brink, and Inderjeet Parmar, “China’s Rise in a Liberal World Order in Transition–Introduction to the FORUM,” Review of International Political Economy 27, no. 2 (2020): 191–207.

41. Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Rise and International Regimes: Does China Seek to Overthrow Global Norms?” in China in the Era of Xi Jinping, ed. Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge Bekkevold (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 165–195; Alastair Iain Johnston, “China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing’s International Relations,” International Security 44, no. 2 (2019): 9–60.

42. Regarding development finance, see Nathan, “China’s Rise and International Regimes”; Johnston, “China in a World of Orders”; P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, “International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries,” Review of Economics and Statistics 43, no. 2 (1961): 107–138; Emma Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation: Contributions from Gift Theory,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers New Series 37, no. 2 (2012): 256–272. For trade finance issues, see Andrew M. Moravcsik, “Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement,” International Organization 43, no. 1 (1989): 173–205; Steven Hall, “Managing Tied Aid Competition: Domestic Politics, Credible Threats, and the Helsinki Disciplines,” Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 5 (December 2011): 646–672.

43. Bräutigam, “Aid ‘with Chinese Characteristics’ ”; Barbara Stallings and Eun Mee Kim, “Japan, Korea, and China: Styles of ODA in East Asia,” in Japan’s Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda, ed. Hiroshi Kato, John Page, and Yasutami Shimomura (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 120–134; Justin Yifu Lin and Yan Wang, Going beyond Aid: Development Cooperation for Structural Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Emma Mawdsley, “The ‘Southernisation’ of Development?” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 59, no. 2 (August 2018): 173–185.

44. Hopewell, “Power Transitions”; Export-Import Bank of the United States, Report to the U.S. Congress on Global Export Credit Competition (Washington, DC: EXIM, 2021).

45. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982):185–205.

46. Muyang Chen, “Infrastructure Finance, Late Development, and China’s Reshaping of International Credit Governance,” European Journal of International Relations 27, no. 3 (2021): 830–857.

47. Moravcsik, “Disciplining Trade Finance”; Hall, “Managing Tied Aid Competition.”

48. Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

49. David Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

50. Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006).

51. Fumio Hoshi, “A Japanese Perspective,” in The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century: A New Approach? ed. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Rita M. Rodriguez (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, 2001), 235–242.

52. Chen, “China–Japan Development Finance Competition.”

53. Emma Mawdsley et al., “Exporting Stimulus and ‘Shared Prosperity’: Reinventing Foreign Aid for a Retroliberal Era,” Development Policy Review 36, no. S1 (March 2018): O25–O43.

54. Blended Finance Taskforce, Better Finance, Better World (London: Business & Sustainable Development Commission, 2018). https://www.blendedfinance.earth/better-finance-better-world.

55. Myriam Dahman Saidi and Christina Wolf, “Recalibrating Development Co-Operation: How Can African Countries Benefit from Emerging Partners?” OECD Development Centre Working Paper No. 302, 2011; Machiko Nissanke and Marie Söderberg, “The Changing Landscape in Aid Relations in Africa: Can China’s Engagement Make a Difference to African Development?” UI Papers No. 2011/2, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2011.

56. Mawdsley, “The ‘Southernisation’ of Development?”

57. Daniela Gabor, “The Wall Street Consensus,” Development and Change 52, no. 3 (2021): 429–459.

1. Ammar A. Malik et al., Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 13,427 Chinese Development Projects (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, 2021).

2. Rebecca Ray and Blake Alexander Simmons, “Tracking China’s Overseas Development Finance,” Boston University Global Development Policy Center, 7 December 2020.

3. “China Invests $124bn in Belt and Road Global Trade Project,” BBC, 14 May 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39912671.

4. Norimitsu Onishi, “China Pledges $60 Billion to Aid Africa’s Development,” New York Times, 4 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/world/africa/china-pledges-60-billion-to-aid-africas-development.html; Jenni Marsh, “China’s President Xi Pledges Another $60 Billion for Africa,” CNN, 4 September 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/03/asia/focac-china-africa-development-intl/index.html.

5. Megha Rajagopalan, “China’s Xi Woos Latin America with $250 Billion Investments,” Reuters, 8 January 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-latam/chinas-xi-woos-latin-america-with-250-billion-investments-idUSKBN0KH06Q20150108.

6. Ministry of Finance, Central Level General Public Budget Expenditure, various years, http://yss.mof.gov.cn/caizhengshuju/.

7. Kitano Naohiro and Miyabayashi Yumiko, “Estimating China’s Foreign Aid: 2019–2020 Preliminary Figures,” JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, 2020.

8. Zhongguo jinrong nianjian [Almanac of China’s finance and banking] (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 2004–2014).

9. Ray and Simmons, “Tracking China’s Overseas Development Finance.”

10. “Zai kaifangzhong chengzhang—gaige kaifang 30nian yinhangye fasheng lishi jubian [Growing through opening up—The banking industry has undergone great historical changes in the 30 years of reform and opening up],” Central People’s Government of the PRC, 2 November 2008, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-11/02/content_1138174.htm.

11. David Feliba and Rehan Ahmad, “The World’s 100 Largest Banks, 2021,” S&P Global Market Intelligence, 23 April 2021, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/research/the-worlds-100-largest-banks-2021.

12. State Council, “Guowuyuan fuzongli jian zhongguo renmin yinhang hangzhang Zhu Rongji 1993nian 7yue 7ri zai quanguo jinrong gongzuo huiyi shang de zongjie jianghua” [Zhu Rongji, vice prime minister of the State Council and Governor of the People’s Bank of China, made a concluding speech at the National Financial Work Conference on July 7, 1993], in Zhongguo jinrong nianjian [Almanac of China’s finance and banking] (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 1994), 18–22.

13. Jiajun Xu, Kedi Wang, and Xinshun Ru, Funding Sources of National Development Banks, NSE Development Financing Research Report No. 3 (Beijing: Institute of New Structural Economics, 2021).

14. Maurice Wright, Japan’s Fiscal Crisis: The Ministry of Finance and the Politics of Public Spending, 1975–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Gene Park, Spending without Taxation: FILP and the Politics of Public Finance in Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

15. Before 2001, the Trust Fund Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of Japan directly coordinated FILP funds. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Japan began to liberalize FILP, curbing direct capital flow from postal savings to FILP agencies. Now FILP issues bonds to raise funds instead of using savings directly. For more details, see Park, Spending without Taxation. The Japanese practice referred to in this chapter is the pre-liberalization FILP, because when China’s policymakers examined FILP in the 1990s, the institution had not been liberalized.

16. KfW, “Law concerning Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau,” 19 June 2020.

17. KfW, KfW Financial Report 2020 (Frankfurt: KfW Group, 2021), 70.

18. Interview, a CDB official, December 17, 2015, phone.

19. The National Administration of Financial Regulation was formed in 2023 on the basis of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, which was established in 2018 by a merger of the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission.

20. Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, China’s Superbank: Debt, Oil and Influence: How China Development Bank Is Rewriting the Rules of Finance (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 69.

21. China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd., “Overview of China’s Bond Market,” various years. https://www.chinabond.com.cn/yjfx/yjfx_zzfx/zzfx_nb/?level=3.

22. China Development Bank Policy Analysis Office, Kaifaxing jinrong reci [Buzzwords in development-oriented finance]. (Beijing: People’s Daily Press, 2016), 155. Between 2016 and 2020, the CDB did not issue onshore foreign-currency bonds. In June 2021, the bank revitalized issuance of onshore foreign-currency bonds and issued $2 billion bonds; see “Guokaihang faxing 20yi jingnei meiyuanzhai” [CDB issued 2 billion U.S. dollar onshore bonds], People’s Daily Online, 3 June 2021, http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0603/c1004-32121827.html.

23. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi (1994–2012) [The history of China Development Bank (1994–2012)]. (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 2013), 34, 342.

24. “Guokaihang zai guoji shichang chenggong faxing 30yi meiyuan dengzhi shuangbizhong zhaiquan” [CDB issued US$3 billion equivalent dual-currency bonds on the international market], China Development Bank, 20 October 2020, http://www.cdb.com.cn/xwzx/khdt/202010/t20201020_7849.html.

25. China Development Bank, China Development Bank Annual Report, 2015–2020.

26. “Zhongguo guokaihang qunian fafang penggai daikuan 7509yiyuan, jinnian zengzhi 9500yiyuan yishang” [China’s CDB issued 750.9 billion yuan of shantytown-reform loans last year, which increased to more than 950 billion yuan this year], Reuters, 2 February 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/idCNKCS0VB042?edition-redirect=ca.

27. “Chairman’s Review,” China Development Bank Annual Report, 2016, 9. The CDB does not disclose its overseas loan disbursement volume annually. “On-balance sheet foreign-currency loans” and “loans supporting countries along the Belt and Road” are approximations of the banks’ overseas loan disbursements.

28. The CDB as well as China Exim disclose very little information with regard to their sources of foreign currency, except for their bond issuance, which is public information. In 2015, China’s State Administration of Foreign Reserve injected $45 billion to the CDB and $48 billion to China Exim to increase the banks’ registered capital, but it remains unclear whether and how the banks use such foreign currency for overseas lending. Interviews with policy bankers indicated that the banks have borrowed from China’s foreign reserve, but the amounts and terms remain confidential.

29. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi [The history of China Development Bank], 33.

30. Interview, CDB official, 3 November 2016, Beijing.

31. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi [The history], 31–32.

32. Zhongguo jinrong nianjian [Almanac of China’s finance and banking]. (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 1987).

33. Zhongguo jinrong nianjian [Almanac of China’s finance and banking]. (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 1995).

34. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi [The history], 33–34.

35. Zhongguo jinrong nianjian [Almanac of China’s finance and banking] (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 1998).

36. Liu Zhenying, Ding Jianming, and Shi Mingshen, “Quanguo jinrong gongzuo huiyi zai jing zhaokai” [The National Financial Work Conference was held in Beijing], People’s Daily, 21 November 1997, http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/item/ldhd/Jiangzm/1998/huiyi/hy0003.html.

37. David M. Bachman, Chen Yun and the Chinese Political System (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985), iix.

38. For more details on how the CDB restructured its lending mechanisms, see chapter 2.

39. Sun Longxin. Shouwang zeren: gongheguo tonglingren de qingjie [Holding responsibility: Peers of the republic] (Beijing: Enterprise Management Publishing House, 2009), 226–227.

40. Chen Yuan, Zhengfu yu shichang zhijian: kaifaxing jinrong de zhongguo tansuo [Between government and market: China’s exploration of development-oriented finance]. (Beijing: CITIC Publishing Group, 2012), 120.

41. Gao Jian, “Gaojian: wo suo jingli de zhongguo zhaiquan shichang de lishi” [Gaojian: The history of China’s debt capital market that I experienced], Financial News, 30 August 2017, https://www.financialnews.com.cn/ll/sx/201708/t20170830_123718.html.

42. Gao Jian, Zhongguo guozhai shichang de fazhan daolu [The developmental path of China’s government bonds]. (Beijing: Party School of the Central Committee of CPC Press, 1995), 107.

43. Gao Jian, Zhongguo zhaiquan ziben shichang [Debt capital market in China]. (Beijing: Economic Science Press, 2009), 107; Sun Longxin, Shouwang Zeren [Holding responsibility], 238.

44. China’s Interbank Bond Market was established in 1997.

45. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi [The history], 99.

46. China Banking Regulatory Commission, “Shangye yinhang ziben chongzulv guanli banfa” [Measures for the administration of capital adequacy of commercial banks], 2004, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/303.html.

47. Chapter 2 describes these other practices in more detail.

48. Wu Yushan, Kaifaxing jinrong chuangshiji [Genesis of development-oriented finance]. (Beijing: CITIC Press Group, 2018), 182.

49. Wen Jiabao, “Quanmian shenhua jinrong gaige, cujin jinrongye chixu jiankang anquan fazhan” [Comprehensively deepening financial reform, advancing continued healthy and safe development of the financial industry], 2007, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2007/content_571399.htm.

50. Yang Chun, “Guokaihang shangyehua: chonggou yinhang jingzheng shengtai” [Commercialization of China Development Bank: Restructuring the ecosystem of interbank competition], Business Times, 10 January 2008, http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/bank/bank_hydt/20080110/19284391187.shtml; Lao Jiadi, “Guokaihang shangyehua gaige qinianzhiyang” [CDB’s seven-year commercialization], China Economic Weekly, 19 August 2014, http://paper.people.com.cn/zgjjzk/html/2014-08/18/content_1467189.htm.

51. Wu Yushan, Kaifaxing jinrong chuangshiji [Genesis of development-oriented finance], 184.

52. Central People’s Government of the PRC, “Yinjianhui youguan fuzeren jiu guojia kaifa yinhang zhuanzhi dajizhewen” [CBRC officials hold press conference on the transition of China Development Bank], 2008, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-12/23/content_1185268.htm.

53. “Yinjianhui mingque guokaihang zhaixin fengxian quanzhong changqiweiling” [CBRC assures that China Development Bank holds long-term zero-risk weighting], China Development Bank, 18 June 2015, http://www.cdb.com.cn/xwzx/khdt/201512/t20151210_658.html.

54. Interview, Hans Reich, former KfW president, 22 November 2016, phone.

55. China Development Bank, Yinhang shi [The history], 347–348.

56. Fu Yu, “Huhuaibang banniankao: lancun zongdongyuan” [Huhuaibang’s half-year examination: Increasing savings], CDB Kairong Cultural Tourism Investment Fund, 2014, http://www.cdbutf.com/news/newsinfo.aspx?id=169.

57. China Development Bank Annual Report, 2020.

58. Fu Yu, “Huhuaibang banniankao” [Huhuaibang’s half-year examination].”

59. Fu Yu, “Huhuaibang banniankao” [Huhuaibang’s half-year examination].”

1. Interview, 5 September 2017, Beijing.

2. The State Planning Commission became the National Development and Reform Commission in 2003.

3. The State Council, “Guowuyuan pizhun guojia jiwei, guojia jianwei, caizhengbu guanyu jiben jianshe touzi shixing daikuan banfa baogao de tongzhi” [The state council’s announcement on the approval of the report by the state planning commission, the national construction commission, and the ministry of finance on measures for providing loans for basic construction investment], 28 August 1979, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/14/content_5147754.htm.

4. Dong Zhikai, “You ‘bo-gai-dai’ dao ‘zhai-zhuan-gu’—jingji zhuanxing Zhong qiye tourongzi fangshi de bianqian (1978–2015)” [From ‘Bo-gai-dai’ to ‘Zhai-zhuan-gu’—Evolutions of enterprises’ investment mechanism in economic transition (1978–2015)], Researches in Chinese Economic History 3 (2016): 5–15.

5. The State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa touzi guanli tizhi jinqi gaige fang’an de tongzhi” [The state council’s announcement on printing and distributing the recent reform plan of the investment management system], 16 July 1988, http://www.gov.cn/xxgk/pub/govpublic/mrlm/201109/t20110901_64040.html.

6. The National People’s Congress of the PRC, “Zhonghua renming gongheguo gongsifa” [Company law of the People’s Republic of China], 2006, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2014-03/21/content_1867695.htm.

7. Guo Dapeng, “Guotou qianshi jinsheng—zhongguo zuida guoyou touzi konggu gongsi jiedu” [SDIC’s past and present: An interpretation of China’s largest state-owned investment holding company], China SOE, 10 December 2006, https://www.sdic.com.cn/cn/zxzx/mtbd/gtbd/webinfo/2006/12/1189112401579139.htm.

8. The State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu zujian guojia kaifa yinhang de tongzhi” [The state council’s announcement on the establishment of the China Development Bank], in Zhongguo jinrong nianjian [Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking] (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 1995).

9. The State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu zujian guojia kaifa yinhang de tongzhi” [The state council’s announcement on the establishment of the China development bank].

10. The State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu zujian guojia kaifa yinhang de tongzhi” [The state council’s announcement on the establishment of the China development bank].

11. China Development Bank Policy Analysis Office, Kaifaxing jinrong reci [Buzzwords in development-oriented finance]. (Beijing: People’s Daily Press, 2016), 126.

12. Liu Zhenying, Ding Jianming, and Shi Mingshen, “Quanguo jinrong gonguzo huiyi zai jing zhaokai” [The national financial work conference was held in Beijing], People’s Daily, 21 November 1997, http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/item/ldhd/Jiangzm/1998/huiyi/hy0003.html.

13. For more details on how the CDB restructured its funding mechanisms, see chapter 1.

14. Chen Yuan, Zhengfu yu shichang zhijian: kaifaxing jinrong de zhongguo tansuo [Between government and market: China’s exploration of development-oriented finance]. (Beijing: CITIC Publishing Group, 2012), 133; Hu Shuli, Kang Weiping, and Chen Huiying, “Zhuan fang Chenyuan” [An interview with Chen Yuan], Caijing, 5 March 2004, https://magazine.caixin.com/2004-03-05/100089521.html?p0#page4.

15. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi (1994–2012) [The history of China Development Bank (1994–2012)]. (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 2013), 189–190.

16. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi [The history], 7.

17. “Guojia kaifay yinhang daikuan weiyuanhui gongzuo zhidu” [CDB loan committee’s working mechanism], China Development Bank, 15 January 2000, http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=14935.

18. Xu Qiyuan, “Guojia kaifa yinhang: ziwo chongsu he tuidong jinrong tixi de chongsu” [CDB: born bankrupt, born shaper], Development Finance Research 4 (2017): 15–27.

19. Chen, Zhengfu yu shichang zhijian [Between government and market], 8.

20. John D. Finnerty, Project Financing: Asset-Based Financial Engineering (Hoboken NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 1996).

21. Jiajun Xu, Kedi Wang, and Xinshun Ru, Funding Sources of National Development Banks, NSE Development Financing Research Report No.3. Beijing: Institute of New Structural Economics, 2021.

22. Richard Miller Bird and Christine P. W. Wong, “China’s Fiscal System: A Work in Progress,” Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 07-11 (October 2005).

23. Bird and Wong, “China’s Fiscal System.”

24. The 1994 law is dubbed the Old Budget Law; China’s new Budget Law enacted in 2015 allowed local governments to hold debts directly.

25. Zhao Rui, “Dakun daikuan wenti yanjiu” [A study of bundled loans]. (PhD diss., Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2009).

26. China Development Bank Policy Analysis Office, Kaifaxing jinrong reci [Buzzwords], 117–119.

27. Zhu Yu, “Anhui Wuhu Hongding Shangren Neimu Diaocha” [An investigation on red-hat businessmen in Wuhu, Anhui], People’s Daily, 22 February 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/1026/2354223.html.

28. “Wuhu ‘hongding shangren’ qiancang xiqian he quanli duifu” [Wuhu’s ‘red-hat businessmen’ conducted money laundering and rent-seeking], Nan Feng Chuang, 13 April 2004, http://www.huaxia.com/gd/rdjj/00194179.html.

29. China Investment Bank (CIB) was a state-owned bank established in 1981 after China resumed its seat at the World Bank. The main objective of establishing the CIB was to borrow foreign capital from international financial institutions and conduct investment banking. CIB was dissolved in 1998 and merged into other financial agencies.

30. There are four provincial-level municipalities in China—Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. They are under the direct administration of the central government.

31. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi [The history], 158–159; Shi Hanghua, ed., Chengshi jichu sheshi jianshe tourongzi lilun yu shijian chuangxin [Innovation in the theory and practice of investment and financing in urban infrastructure]. (Tianjin: Nankai University Press, 2016), 101.

32. Urban Development Investment Corporations (UDICs) in Chongqing, China (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2010, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/863961468261896062/The-urban-development-investment-corporations-UDICs-in-Chongqing-China.

33. Hong Ru, “Government Credit, a Double-Edged Sword: Evidence from the China Development Bank,” Journal of Finance 73, no. 1 (February 2018): 275–316. Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing are not included in the list of cities.

34. “Yunnan liyong shouhouhuizu fangshi panhuo 70yi gaosu gonglu jianshe zijin” [Yunnan used sale and leaseback to revitalize 7 billion yuan of highway construction funds], Zhongguo zulin lianmeng, 2 January 2015, http://www.zgzllm.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=544&id=1715; Cheng Yan and Wang Weihai, “Shouhou huizu zai gaosu gonglu rongzi zhong de yunyong fenxi” [An analysis on the application of sale and leaseback in expressway financing], Highway [Gonglu] 6 (2013): 140–142.

35. CDB Leasing Annual Reports, various years.

36. “Yintuan daikuan hezuo gongyue” [Agreement on syndicated loan cooperation], China Banking Association, 9 March 2010, https://www.china-cba.net/Index/showw/catid/161/id/5008.

37. Interview, loan manager at a state-owned commercial bank, 15 December 2016, phone.

38. Interview, a CDB loan manager, 11 December 2016, a province in southeast China.

39. China Development Bank, China Development Bank Annual Report, 2019, 56; “Jobs at China Development Bank,” China Development Bank, accessed 9 September 2023, http://job.cdb.com.cn/job.html#navbar.

40. The only exceptions are four subsidiary branches in Yili, Kashi, Sanya, and Xiong’an.

41. CDB loans disbursed in foreign currency are not calculated here since they finance projects overseas.

42. See, for example, Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 9–10 (2005): 1743–1762.

43. Interview, CDB loan manager, 18 December 2016, phone.

44. Interview, CDB loan manager, 7 December 2016, a province in southeast China.

45. Chen Yuan, “Kaifaxing jinrong yu zhongguo de chengshi fazhan” [Development-oriented finance and urbanization development in China], Jingji yanjiu [Economic Research Journal] 7 (2010): 4–14.

46. For more research in this aspect, see, for example, Lynette H. Ong, “State-Led Urbanization in China: Skyscrapers, Land Revenue and ‘Concentrated Villages,’ ” China Quarterly 217 (2014): 162–179; Meg Elizabeth Rithmire, “Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy: Institutional Complementarities and Macroeconomic Management,” Politics & Society 45, no. 1 (2017): 123–153; Jie Chen and Fulong Wu, “Housing and Land Financialization under the State Ownership of Land in China,” Land Use Policy 112 (2022).

47. “Guojia kaifa yinhang yu Huawei qianshu 300yi meiyuan zhanlue hezuoxieyi” [China Development Bank and Huawei signed a $30 billion strategic cooperation agreement], Central People’s Government of the PRC, 23 September 2009, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-09/23/content_1423891.htm.

48. China Development Bank, Guojia kaifa yinhang shi [The history], 289.

49. Interview, CDB loan manger, 21 October 2016, Beijing.

50. See, for example, David Barboza, “Chinese City Has Many Buildings, but Few People,” New York Times, 19 October 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/business/global/20ghost.html.

51. “E’erduosi shadizaocheng” [Ordos builds a city from sand], Yicai Daily, 13 April 2010, https://www.yicai.com/news/336567.html.

52. “E’erduosi shadizaocheng” [Ordos builds a city from sand].

53. Li Yajuan, “Kangbashi bianju” [Kangbashi change], China Youth Daily, 25 May 25, 2016, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2016-05/25/nw.D110000zgqnb_20160525_1–08.htm.

54. “Guanyu dushanxian sanduxian youguan lishiyiliu wenti zhenggai gongzuo de qingkuang tongbao” [A report on rectifying historical issues in Sandu, Dushan county], People’s Daily, 16 July 2020, http://gz.people.com.cn/n2/2020/0716/c194827-34162430.html.

55. Hou Ke, “Mangmu zhengji juzhai chongdong xia de bianwei jingguan” [Impulse of blind borrowing for political achievements results in a distorted situation], Xinhuanet, 19 September 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-09/19/c_1126513228.htm.

56. “Jieju: dushan budu” [Solution: Dushan is not alone], Xiakedao, 15 July 2020, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/TOLp8aS3jwjgUiIkzwQfbg.

57. Wade Shepard, “An Update on China’s Largest Ghost City: What Ordos Kangbashi Is Like Today,” Forbes, 19 April 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/04/19/an-update-on-chinas-largest-ghost-city-what-ordos-kangbashi-is-like-today/#1ae7a0bb2327.

58. Bundled loans that were already issued were not affected by this regulatory document. China Banking Regulatory Commission, Jiaqiang hongguan tiaokong, zhengdun he guifan gelei dakun daikuan de tongzhi [Notification on strengthening macroeconomic governance and disciplining various forms of bundled loans], 25 April 2006, cbrc.gov.cn/govView_855CBC93438745D9910F4412E4C21556.html.

59. China Development Bank Policy Analysis Office, Kaifaxing jinrong reci [Buzzwords], 114.

60. China Development Bank Policy Analysis Office, Kaifaxing jinrong reci [Buzzwords], 127.

61. See China Development Bank, “China Development Bank Capital Corporation Limited,” accessed 10 September 2023, https://111.203.217.51/ywgl/zhjryw/gkjryxzrgs/.

62. China Banking Regulatory Commission, Zhongguo yinjianhui bangongting guanyu jinyibu zuohao ruandaikuan qingli gongzuo de tongzhi [Notification from the general office of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on further cleaning up soft loans], 9 November 2010, https://www.pkulaw.com/chl/43d4763a2f9d7820bdfb.html.

63. China Development Bank Policy Analysis Office, Kaifaxing jinrong reci [Buzzwords], 127.

64. Sun Ming, “Wu buwei jinji jiaoting dakun daikuan, jinyibu jiaqiang hongguan tiaokong” [Five ministries ban bundled loans urgently, strengthening macroeconomic governance], 21st Century Business Herald, 11 May 2006, http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060511/09562558887.shtml.

65. Central People’s Government of the PRC, Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang difangzhengfu rongzipingtai gongsi guanli youguanwenti de tongzhi [The State Council’s notification on strengthening regulation of local government financial vehicles], 13 June 2010, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-06/13/content_1627195.htm;

Central People’s Government of the PRC, Guanyu Guanche guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang difangzhengfu rongzipngtai gongsi guanli youguanwenti de tongzhixiangguanshixiang de tongzhi [About Implementing the State Council’s Notification on Strengthening Regulation on Local Government Financial Vehicles], 19 August 2010, https://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-08/19/content_1683624.htm.

66. China’s government documents are numbered. This document was numbered State Council No. 43 of year 2014.

67. The State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang difang zhengfuxing zhaiwu guanli de yijian” [Opinions of the State Council on strengthening the management of local government debts], 21 September 2014, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-10/02/content_9111.htm.

68. Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Civil Affairs, and State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Zhengfu goumai fuwu guanli banfa (zanxing) [Measures for government procurement of services (tentative)], 15 December 2014, http://www.mof.gov.cn/mofhome/zonghesi/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/201501/t20150104_1175300.html.

69. State Council Information Office of People’s Republic of China, Caizhengbu jiu yinfa zhizhi difang yi zhengfu goumai fuwu mingyi weifa weigui rongzi de ‘tongzhi’ dawen [Press conference on ministry of finance’s issuance of notification on disciplining government procurement of services], 2 June 2017, http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxwfbh/xwfbh/czb/Document/1554250/1554250.htm.

70. “What Are Public Private Partnerships?” World Bank Group, 9 December 2022, https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/what-are-public-private-partnerships.

71. Ministry of Finance, Caizhengbu guanyu tuiguang yunyong zhengfu he shehui ziben hezuo moshi youguan wenti de tongzhi [Ministry of Finance’s announcement on issues related to the promotion and practice of cooperation between government and social capital], 23 September 2014, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-05/25/content_5076557.htm.

72. Ministry of Finance, “Guanyu guifan zhengfu he shehui ziben hezuo (PPP) zonghe xinxi pingtai xiangmuku guanli de tongzhi” [Notification on regulating the management of the project database of government and social capital cooperation (PPP)], 2017, http://czt.gd.gov.cn/attachment/0/1/1673/179837.pdf.

73. Wen Xiu, Zhang Yuzhe, and Zheng Fei, “Weiyue kaishile?” [The default has begun?], Caixin, 27 June 2011, https://magazine.caixin.com/2011-06-25/100272955.html.

74. Zhang Yuzhe and Zheng Fei, “Yuntou weiyue shijian chongji zhaishi” [Default of the Yunnan Investment hits the bond market], Caixin, 18 July 2011, https://magazine.caixin.com/2011-07-16/100280220.html.

75. Ministry of Finance, 2014nian difang zhengfu zhaiquan zifa zihuan shidian banfa [A trial on self-issuance and self-repayment of local government bonds in 2014], 19 May 2014, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-05/22/content_2684397.htm.

76. China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd, 2014nian zhaiquan shichang tongji fenxi baogao [Bond market statistical analysis report 2014], 1 January 2015, https://www.chinabond.com.cn/yjfx/yjfx_zzfx/zzfx_nb/202307/t20230716_852999909.html; China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd, 2015nian zhaiquan shichang tongji fenxi baogao [Bond market statistical analysis report 2015], 4 January 2016, https://www.chinabond.com.cn/yjfx/yjfx_zzfx/zzfx_nb/202307/t20230716_853007566.html.

77. China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd., Zhongguo Zhaiquan Shichang Gailan [Overview of China’s bond market], 2019, https://www.chinabond.com.cn/yjfx/yjfx_zzfx/zzfx_nb/202307/t20230716_853058726.html.

78. China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd., Zhongguo Zhaiquan Shichang Gailan [Overview of China’s bond market].

79. The State Council, “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu baochi jichu sheshi lingyu bu duanban lidu de zhidao yijian” [The general office of the State Council’s guidelines on making up shortcoming in infrastructure sector], 31 October 2018, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-10/31/content_5336177.htm.

80. Cheng Siwei and Yu Hairong, “Shanxi jiaokong huazhai Zhengyi” [Controversy of debt recovery of Shanxi Transportation Holdings], Caixin, 23 September 2019, http://weekly.caixin.com/2019-09-21/101464641.html.

1. China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Woguo “zouchuqu” zhanlue de xingcheng [The emergence of China’s ‘going global’ strategy], January 2007, http://oldwww.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel_1276/2007/0327/30814/content_30814.htm.

2. See, for example, Alice Amsden, The Rise of “the Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Meredith Jung-En Woo-Cumings, The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Mireya Solís, Banking on Multinationals: Public Credit and the Export of Japanese Sunset Industries (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Stephan Haggard, Developmental States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

3. William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

4. To understand how such a narrative has evolved, see, for example, Deborah Brautigam, “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Rise of a Meme,” Area Development and Policy 5, no. 1 (2020): 1–14.

5. Muyang Chen, “Infrastructure Finance, Late Development, and China’s Reshaping of International Credit Governance,” European Journal of International Relations 27, no. 3 (2021): 830–857.

6. The Chinese government has released its white paper on foreign assistance or international development cooperation three times, in 2011, 2014, and 2021.

7. For a comprehensive analysis and calculation of China’s foreign assistance, see Naohiro Kitano and Yumiko Miyabayashi, “Estimating China’s Foreign Aid: 2019–2020 Preliminary Figures,” JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, 2020.

8. China’s State Council Information Office, China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era, 10 January 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/nglish/2021-01/10/c_139655400.htm.

9. China’s State Council Information Office, Zhongguo de duiwai yuanzhu [China’s Foreign Aid], 10 July 2011, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2011-04/21/content_2615780.htm.

10. Yu Zirong, Zhongguo tese duiwai yuanzhu moshi jiqi chuangxin fazhan de bijiao yanjiu [A comparative study on foreign aid with chinese characteristics and its innovation and development]. (Beijing: China Commerce and Trade Press, 2019), 264–269.

11. Ministry of Commerce, Duiwai yuanzhu xiangmu shishi qiye zige rending banfa (shixing) [Measures for determining the qualification for enterprises implementing foreign aid projects (trial)], 29 October 2015, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/fgsjk/201510/20151002649877.shtml; China International Development Cooperation Agency, Duiwai yuanzhu xiangmu zixun fuwu danwei zige rending banfa [Measures for determining the qualification of consulting service providers of foreign aid projects], 30 October, 2020, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-11/05/content_5557603.htm.

12. Ping Wang, “The Chinese View: Reflection of the Long-Term Experiences of Aid Receiving and Giving,” in A Study of China’s Foreign Aid: An Asian Perspective, ed. Yasutami Shimomura and Hideo Ohashi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 125–144; Barbara Stallings and Eun Mee Kim, “Japan, Korea, and China: Styles of ODA in East Asia,” in Japan’s Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda, ed. Yasutami Shimomura, John Page and Hiroshi Kato (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 120–134; Saori N. Katada and Jessica Liao, “China and Japan in Pursuit of Infrastructure Development Leadership: Competition or Convergence?” Global Governance 26, no. 3 (2020): 449–472.

13. “Guowuyuan renmian guojia gongzuo renyuan” [The State Council appoints public servants], Ministry of Human Resources and Social Securities, 8 April 2018, http://www.mohrss.gov.cn//xxgk2020/fdzdgknr/bnrsgl/rsrm/202104/t20210408_412385.html.

14. Muyang Chen, “Beyond Donation: China’s Policy Banks and the Reshaping of Development Finance,” Studies in Comparative International Development 55 (2020): 442.

15. In 2015, the state injected $48 billion into the CDB and $45 billion into the China Exim from the foreign currency reserve, as will be described later in this chapter. This increased the banks’ registered capital and allowed them to issue more loans denominated in U.S. dollars. There is suspicion that the policy banks might be using such foreign currency to issue cheap dollar loans, but the policy banks have not confirmed this.

16. Interview, expatriate manager at a Chinese state-owned construction company, 30 October 2016, phone.

17. Zarmina Ali, “The World’s 100 Largest Banks, 2020,” S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2020, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/the-world-s-100-largest-banks-2020-57854079. The Agricultural Bank of China is a state-owned commercial bank whereas the Agricultural Development Bank of China is a policy bank.

18. For more details regarding how the Big Four were established and collaborate/compete with policy banks on domestic projects, see chapters 1 and 2.

19. Anna Gelpern et al., “How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments,” Center for Global Development (CGD) Working Paper No. 573 (March 2021).

20. Interview, former CDB employee, 1 March 2018, phone.

21. Guo Shuchen, “68.8 yiyuan guoji yintuan daikuan, zhuli xiangyu jituan yinni xiangmu” [6.88 billion yuan of international syndicated loans help Xiangyu Group’s Indonesia Project], Xiamen Evening News, 24 December 2019, http://epaper.xmnn.cn/xmwb/20191224/201912/t20191224_5335737.htm.

22. “Zhengcexing baoxian zhichi minqi zuodazuoqiang” [Policy-oriented insurance supports private enterprises to become bigger and stronger], The State Council of the PRC, 20 March 2019, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-03/20/content_5375248.htm.

23. The official website of China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation details its various products and services, see “Chanpin fuwu” [Products and services], https://www.sinosure.com.cn/ywjs/index.shtml.

24. Interview, loan manager at a Chinese commercial bank, 13 October 2021, phone.

25. Scott L. Kastner and Margaret M. Pearson, “Exploring the Parameters of China’s Economic Influence,” Studies in Comparative International Development 56 (2021): 18–44.

26. Min Ye, “Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 119 (2019): 696–711; Jones Lee and Jinghan Zeng, “Understanding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Beyond ‘Grand Strategy’ to a State Transformation Analysis,” Third World Quarterly 40, no. 8 (2019): 1415–1439.

27. National Development and Reform Commission, Qiye jingwai touzi guanli banfa [Measures for administering the overseas investment of enterprises], 26 December 2017, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/201712/t20171226_960849.html.

28. Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Duiwai chengbao gongcheng xiangmu toubiao (yibiao) guanli banfa [Measures for administering the bidding (bid negotiation) of overseas contracting], 2017, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/swfg/swfgbi/201112/20111207878964.shtml.

29. Chen, “Beyond Donation,” 441.

30. Jiang Wei, “Yinni gaotie zhongri zhengduozhan” [The China-Japan war on Indonesia high-speed railway], Caijing, 22 October 2015, https://news.caijingmobile.com/article/detail/216409?source_id=40.

31. National Development and Reform Commission, “Yawan gaotie kaigong” [Construction of the Jakarta-Bandung highspeed railway began], 21 January 2016, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzggw/wld/lnx/lddt/201601/t20160121_1167708.html?code=&state=123.

32. Zheng Liankai, “Dongnanya diqu shoutiao gaotie! Zhong yinni hejian yawan gaotie jinri kaitong yunxing” [First high-speed railway in Southeast Asia! China-Indonesia jointly built Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway opens for operation today], China Central Television News, 7 September 2023, https://news.cctv.com/2023/09/07/ARTImneYpGLsiKsp3V2qeEzO230907.shtml.

33. Power Construction Corporation of China, “Yawanzhikun: xiangmu zhengdi weihe ruci jiannan” [The challenge of Jakarta-Bandung highspeed railway: Why is land acquisition so difficult?], 8 July 2019, https://www.powerchina.cn/art/2019/7/8/art_7459_601311.html.

34. See for example: Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle; Kent E. Calder, “Elites in an Equalizing Role: Ex-Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in the Japanese Government-Business Relationship,” Comparative Politics 21, no. 4 (1989): 379–403.

35. Atsushi Kusano, Kaitai: Kokusai kyouryoku ginnkou no Seijigaku [Dissolution: The politics of JBIC] (Tokyo: Touyou Keizai Shinpou, 2006).

36. The roles of the board of directors are stated in official documents. See China Banking Regulatory Commission, Guojia kaifa yinhang jiandu guanli banfa [Measures for supervising and administering the China Development Bank], 15 November 2017, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5260809.htm; China Banking Regulatory Commission, Zhongguo jinchukou yinhang jiandu guanli banfa [Measures for supervising and administering the Export-Import Bank of China], 15 November 2017, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5264999.htm.

37. “Dongshihui” [Board of directors], China Development Bank, http://www.cdb.com.cn/gykh/gszl/dsh/.

38. Interview, policy bank official, Beijing, 22 April 2021, phone.

39. China Banking Regulatory Commission, Guojia kaifa yinhang jiandu guanli banfa [Measures for supervising and administering the China Development Bank]; China Banking Regulatory Commission, Zhongguo jinchukou yinhang jiandu guanli banfa [Measures for supervising and administering the Export-Import Bank of China].

40. See, for example, Shaofeng Chen, “Marketization and China’s Energy Security,” Policy and Society 27, no. 3 (2009): 249–260; Chih-shian Liou, “Rent-Seeking at Home, Capturing Market Share Abroad: The Domestic Determinants of the Transnationalization of China State Construction Engineering Corporation,” World Development 54 (February 2014): 220–231; Chen Li, “Holding ‘China Inc.’ Together: The CCP and the Rise of China’s Yangqi,” China Quarterly 228 (2016): 927–949; Hao Chen and Meg Rithmire, “The Rise of the Investor State: State Capital in the Chinese Economy,” Studies in Comparative International Development 55 (2020): 257–277; Zhiting Chen and Geoffrey C. Chen, “The Changing Political Economy of Central State-Owned Oil Companies in China,” Pacific Review 34, no. 3 (2021): 379–404.

41. Yingyao Wang, “The Rise of the “Shareholding State”: Financialization of Economic Management in China,” Socio-Economic Review 13, no. 3 (July 2015): 603.

42. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange is a public organ administered by the People’s Bank of China.

43. China Development Bank Annual Report, 2019; Export-Import Bank of China Annual Report, 2019.

44. Zhongguo jinrong nianjian [Almanac of China’s finance and banking]. (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 1995).

45. In 2007, the CDB was planning to transform from a development bank to a commercial bank and be listed on China’s stock exchange market. To prepare for this transition, the bank restructured its ownership to become more akin to China’s state-owned commercial banks.

46. Zhang Yu, “ ‘Xiaoshi de guokaihang” [The “disappearing” CDB], 9 January 2019, https://finance.sina.cn/bond/zsyj/2019-01-09/detail-ihqhqcis4521745.d.html?vt=4&cid=76633.

47. Zhongguo jinrong nianjian [Almanac of China’s finance and banking] 1995, 2001.

48. The State Council, “Guojia waihui chubei wancheng xiang guokaihang he jinchukou yinahng zhuzi heji 930yi meiyuan” [The state’s foreign exchange reserve has injected a total of US$93 billion to the CDB and the export-import bank], 18 August 2015, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-08/18/content_2915104.htm.

49. Wang, “The Rise of the ‘Shareholding State,’ ” 616.

50. Shanghai Decent Investment Group, “Qingshan zai yinni” [Tsingshan in Indonesia], 2 November 2018, http://www.decent-china.com/index.php/index/news_detail/index?cid=23&id=480.

51. Interview, Huang Weifeng, board chair, Decent Investment, 19 December 2016, Shanghai.

52. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Xijinping zai yindunixiya guohui de yanjiang (quanwen)” [Xi Jinping’s speech at the Indonesian parliament (full text)], 3 October 2013, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/t1084354.shtml.

53. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “President Xi Jinping and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia Attend the Indonesia-China Business Luncheon, Encouraging Entrepreneurs of the Two Countries to Join Hands Creating Better Future for China-Indonesia Economic and Trade Cooperation,” 3 October 2013, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwynmlxycx21apec_665682/t1085027.shtml; Huang Weifeng, “Qingshan yinni yuanqu kaifa de shijian yu sikao” [Practice and reflection on the development of Tsingshan industrial parks in Indonesia], Shanghai Decent Investment Group, 5 May 2018, http://www.decent-china.com/index.php/index/news_detail/index?cid=18&id=73.

54. Presentation by Wang Haijun at the ASEAN Marketing Summit 2017, Jakarta, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XB9hos_APq8.

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56. Interview, Huang Weifeng.

57. Brahma Chellaney, “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy,” Project Syndicate, 23 January 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01; Kai Schulzi, “Sri Lanka, Struggling with Debt, Hands a Major Port to China,” New York Times, 12 December 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html.

58. Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire, “The Chinese ‘Debt Trap’ Is a Myth,” The Atlantic, 6 February 2021.

59. Jonathan E. Hillman, “Game of Loans: How China Bought Hambantota,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 April 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/game-loans-how-china-bought-hambantota.

60. Meg Rithmire and Yihao Li, “Chinese Infrastructure Investments in Sri Lanka: A Pearl or a Teardrop on the Belt and Road?” Harvard Business School Case 719–046, January 2019 (rev. July 2019).

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62. “Sililanka jianzheng huanqiu haiwai chengzhang” [Sri Lanka witnessed the overseas development of Huanqiu], Xinhua News, 28 October 2014, http://www.cssn.cn/glx/glx_glsb/201410/t20141028_1378616.shtml.

63. Central Government of the PRC, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu he sililanka minzhu shehuizhuyi gongheguo zhengfu lianhegongbao [Joint communiqué between the government of the People’s Republic of China and the government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka], 2005, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2005/content_64190.htm; State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration, “Zhongguo huanqiu gongsi qianshu sililanka hanbantuota jiayousheshi ji guanqu xiangmu liangjie beiwanglu” [China Huanqiu signed a memorandum of understanding on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota refueling facility and tank farm project], 8 April 2005, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588124/c4102776/content.html.

64. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Zhongguo jinchukou yinahng gongzuo xiaozu kaocha sililanka nanbu hanbantuotagang xiangmu” [China exim working group visits the Hambantota project in Southern Sri Lanka], 27 May 2005, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676884/1206x2_676904/t430987.shtml.

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66. Koh King Kee, “Did China Get Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port?,” China Focus, 30 July 2018; “Sri Lankan Expert Says Interest Rate of Chinese Loan for Port Project Appropriate,” People’s Daily, 4 June 2015, http://en.people.cn/business/n/2015/0604/c90778-8902216.html.

67. Brautigam and Rithmire, “The Chinese ‘Debt Trap’ Is a Myth.”

68. Rithmire and Li, “Chinese Infrastructure Investments in Sri Lanka.”

69. Central People’s Government of the PRC, “Zhongguo tigong daikuan jianshe de sililanka hanbantuotegang zhengshi kaigong” [The China-financed Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka officially started construction], 1 November 2007, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-11/01/content_792267.htm.

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71. See, for example, Gerald Ollivier, Jitendra Sondhi, and Nanyan Zhou, High-Speed Railways in China: A Look at Construction Costs (English). China Transport Topics No. 9 (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2014); Martha Lawrence, Richard Bullock, and Ziming Liu, China’s High-Speed Rail Development: International Development in Focus (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2019); Ching Kwan Lee, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 110.

72. Wang Jixian, “Zhuizong ‘yidaiyilu shi zhaiwu xianjing celue’ de gean—hanbantuotagang de fazhan” [Tracing a case study of ‘Belt and Road Initiative as debt trap’—the development of the Hambantota Port], Belt and Road Hong Kong Centre, 11 November 2019.

73. China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, “Xuyu pilu jiaoyi” [Transactions subject to disclosure], 25 July 2017, http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2017-12/20171208063257869.pdf.

74. Brautigam and Rithmire, “The Chinese ‘Debt Trap’ Is a Myth”; Wang, “Zhuizong ‘yidaiyilu shi zhaiwu xianjing celue’ de gean” [Tracing a case study of ‘Belt and Road Initiative as debt trap’]; Kevin Acker, Deborah Brautigam, and Yufan Huang, “Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics,” Working Paper No. 2020/39, 2020.

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79. Jeffrey Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 370; Timothy Geithner et al., Assessing Public Sector Borrowing Collateralized on Future Flow Receivables (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003); International Development Association and International Monetary Fund, “Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers,” 23 January 2020; Suhas Laxman Ketkar and Dilip Ratha, “Development Financing during a Crisis: Securitization of Future Receivables,” World Bank Economic Policy and Prospects Group, April 2001.

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82. Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 46.

83. See, for example, Erika Downs, Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank’s Cross-Border Energy Deals, John L. Thornton, China Center Monograph Series (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2011); Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, China’s Superbank: Debt, Oil and Influence: How China Development Bank Is Rewriting the Rules of Finance (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2013); Brautigam and Gallagher, “Bartering Globalization”; Stephen B. Kaplan and Michael Penfold, China–Venezuela Economic Relations: Hedging Venezuelan Bets with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, 2019).

84. Chen, “Beyond Donation,” 455.

85. Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, “Guokaihang yi daikuan huanziyuan, ‘zouchuqu’ shixianle duoying” [CDB’s ‘loan for resource’ and ‘going out’ have achieved win-win outcomes], People’s Daily (reprint), 8 September 2009, http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ywzn/xgzx/zlyj/201511/20151101181945.shtml.

86. Alexandra Ulmer and Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela’s Deteriorating Oil Quality Riles Major Refiners,” Reuters, 19 October 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-insight/venezuelas-deteriorating-oil-quality-riles-major-refiners-idUSKBN1CN2EO.

87. Tracy Rucinski, “China’s Sinopec Sues Venezuela in Sign of Fraying Relations,” Reuters, 7 December 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sinopec-pdvsa-lawsuit/chinas-sinopec-sues-venezuela-in-sign-of-fraying-relations-idUSKBN1E100S.

88. Interview, expatriate employee of a Chinese state-owned enterprise, 15 November 2016, phone.

89. María Antonieta Segovia, “The Chinese Train Derailed on Venezuela’s Plains,” Dialogo Chino, 3 March 2021, https://dialogochino.net/en/infrastructure/40823-the-chinese-train-derailed-on-venezuelas-plains/.

90. “China-Latin America Finance Database,” The Dialogue, accessed 10 September 2023, https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/; Margaret Myers and Kevin Gallagher, “Cautious Capital: Chinese Development Finance in LAC, 2018,” The Dialogue and Boston University Global Development Policy Center, February 2019.

91. Kaplan and Penfold, China–Venezuela Economic Relations, 3.

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2. Kimberly A. Reed, “Future Directions of the Export-Import Bank of the United States: Neutralizing China and Advancing the United States Comparative Leadership in the World,” remarks delivered at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 31 July 2020.

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18. Sinosure’s annual reports do not use the same measurement consistently. It is therefore challenging to show longitudinal changes of a longer time period.

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25. When established in 1951, the name of the bank was Japan Development Bank (nihon kaihatsu ginko). The bank was renamed as the Development Bank of Japan (nihon seisaku toshi ginko) in 1999.

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34. See Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (December 1988): 379–396. Keohane sees formal international organizations as purposive institutions with explicit rules, specific assignments of roles to individuals and groups, and the capacity for action. See also Sarah Babb and Nitsan Chorev, “International Organizations: Loose and Tight Coupling in the Development Regime,” Studies in Comparative and International Development 51, no. 1 (2016): 81–102. Babb and Chorev illustrate several means through which international organizations have shaped the international aid regime.

35. See, for example, Jiejin Zhu, “Is the AIIB a China-Controlled Bank? China’s Evolving Multilateralism in Three Dimensions (3D),” Global Policy 10, no. 4 (November 2019): 653–659; Wei Liang, “China’s Institutional Statecraft under Xi Jinping: Has the AIIB Served China’s Interest?” Journal of Contemporary China 30, no. 128 (2021): 283–298; Jing Qian, James Raymond Vreeland, and Jianzhi Zhao, “The Impact of China’s AIIB on the World Bank,” International Organizations (2023).

36. David C. Engerman, The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

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39. Tomohisa Hattori, “Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid,” Review of International Political Economy 8, no. 4 (2001): 633–660; William Easterly, “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 23–48; Emma Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation: Contributions from Gift Theory,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers New Series 37, no. 2 (2012): 256–272.

40. Izumi Ohno, “An Overview: Diversity and Complementarity in Development Efforts,” in Eastern and Western Ideas for African Growth: Diversity and Complementarity in Development Aid, ed. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno (London: Routledge, 2013), 1–29; Barbara Stallings and Eun Mee Kim, “Japan, Korea, and China: Styles of ODA in East Asia,” in Japan’s Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda, ed. Hiroshi Kato, John Page, and Yasutami Shimomura (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 120–134.

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53. Trade finance involves cross-border private investments in addition to official export credits. Thus, the international trade regime is broader in scope than the international export credit regime.

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61. Embassy of the PRC in the United States of America, “Guanyu jiaqiang zhongmei jingji guanxi de lianhe qingkuang shuoming” [Joint fact sheet on strengthening U.S.-China economic relations], 14 February 2012, http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/zgyw/glyw/t905041.htm.

62. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Joint Statement on the Temporary Suspension of the Technical Negotiations in the International Working Group on Export Credits,” 19 November 2020.

63. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “China and Transformational Exports Program.”

64. “Zhongri zhengduo yinni gaotie zuizhongzhan jinri daxiang” [China and Japan’s final competition on the Indonesia high speed railway project starts today], Tengxun Caijing, 1 September 2020, http://finance.qq.com/cross/20150901/5OSn869v.html.

65. Anna Gelpern et al., “How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments,” Center for Global Development (CGD) Working Paper No. 573, March 2021, 34.

66. Matthias Schlegl, Christoph Trebesch, and Mark Wright, “Sovereign Debt Repayments: Evidence on Seniority,” VoxEU, 11 August 2015, https://voxeu.org/article/sovereign-debt-repayments-evidence-seniority.

67. Utku Kirklar, “World Bank Negative Pledge and Project Financings,” Latham & Watkins, 14 December 2016, https://www.latham.london/2016/12/world-bank-negative-pledge-and-project-financings/; Memorandum to the Executive Directors: Review of IBRD’s Negative Pledge Policy with Respect to Debt and Debt Service Reduction Operations (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 1990.

68. Kevin Acker, Deborah Brautigam, and Yufan Huang, “Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics,” Working Paper No. 2020/39 (2020).

69. Yu Ye, “How to Assess China’s Participation in the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative,” East Asia Forum, 7 October 2020.

70. “Jinchuko yinhang dangweishuji, dongshizhang huxiaolian chuxi 2021 bo-ao yazhou luntan xiangguan huodong” [Hu Xiaolian, secretary of the party committee and chairman of the Export-Import Bank of China, attended the relevant activities of the 2021 Boao Asia Forum], Export-Import Bank of China, 20 April 2020, http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/info/news/202104/t20210420_30419.html.

71. Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 60.

72. Lex Rieffel, “Normalizing China’s Relations with the Paris Club, 2021,” Stimson Center, 30 April 2021.

73. Gong Cheng, Javier Díaz-Cassoub, and Aitor Ercea, “Official Debt Restructurings and Development,” World Development 111 (November 2018): 81–195.

74. Ross P. Buckley, “Turning Loans into Bonds: Lesson for East Asia from the Latin America Brady Plan,” Journal of Restructuring Finance 1, no. 1 (2004): 185–200.

75. Jiajun Xu and Richard Carey, “Post-2015 Global Governance of Official Development Finance: Harnessing the Renaissance of Public Entrepreneurship,” Journal of International Development 27, no. 6 (August 2015): 856–880.

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77. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, “USD 500 Million Urgent Financial Assistance Extended to Sri Lanka by China,” 19 March 2020, http://lk.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202003/t20200319_1374674.htm.

78. Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, “Sililanka zhengfu zhongguo guojia kaifa yinhang qianshu 20yiyuan renminbi shouxin xieyi” [Sri Lankan government and China Development Bank signed a RMB 2 billion credit agreement], 18 August 2021, http://lk.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/202108/20210803189611.shtml.

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1. The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund underwent multiple restructurings throughout the postwar decades and was incorporated into the Japan International Cooperation Agency, now Japan’s official aid agency. Atsushi Kusano, Kaitai: Kokusai kyouryoku ginnkou no Seijigaku [Dissolution: The Politics of JBIC] (Tokyo: Touyou Keizai Shinpou, 2006).

2. Yasutami Shimomura, “The Japanese View: With Particular Reference to the Shared Cognition Model in Asia,” in A Study of China’s Foreign Aid: An Asian Perspective, ed. Yasutami Shimomura and Hideo Ohashi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 145–168.

3. Muyang Chen, “China–Japan Development Finance Competition and the Revival of Mercantilism,” Development Policy Review 39, no. 5 (2021): 811–828.

4. David Arase, “Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA,” Pacific Affairs 67, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 171–199; Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura, “A Looming Entry Barrier: Japan’s Production Networks in Asia,” NBR Analysis 8, no. 1 (1997); Mireya Solis, “The Politics of Self-Restraint: FDI Subsidies and Japanese Mercantilism,” World Economy 26, no. 2 (2003): 153–180.

5. Fumio Hoshi, “A Japanese Perspective,” in The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century: A New Approach? ed. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Rita M. Rodriguez (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, 2001), 235–242.

6. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Rita M. Rodriguez, The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century: A New Approach? (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, 2001).

7. To rival China’s rise, the United States has flipped its attitude toward the use of state-supported export credits in the 2020s. See chapter 4.

8. Kristen Hopewell, “When Market Fundamentalism and Industrial Policy Collide: The Tea Party and the U.S. Export–Import Bank,” Review of International Political Economy 24, no. 4 (2017): 569–598.

9. Ammar A. Malik et al., Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 13,427 Chinese Development Projects (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, 2021).

10. Yu Rui and Liu Yulong, “Sidahang gezhanshenshou, duoyuanhua fuwu yidaiyilu jianshe [The Four Major Banks Show Their Skills and Diversified Services for the Supporting the Belt and Road],” Xinhua News, 24 April 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/money/zgyhydyl/newslist.htm.

11. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 2020 Annual Report, 27 March 2021, 62, https://www.icbc-ltd.com/page/721852240255287307.html.

12. Interview, loan manager of a state-owned commercial bank, 13 October 2021, phone.

13. “Bian Jiajun: toujianying yitihua xia de ‘kunju, hezuo, chuangxin’ ” [Bian Jiajun: ‘Challenges, cooperation, and innovation’ of the integration of investment, construction, and operation], International Infrastructure Investment and Construction Forum, 30 June 2016, http://www.iiicf.org/7iiicfformguests/2775.jhtml.

14. Zheng Qingting, “Zhongguo duiwai chengbao gongcheng hangye zhubu qiwen, houyiqing shidai guanzhu sanda zhongdian lingyu” [China’s foreign contracting engineering industry has gradually stabilized, focusing on three key areas in the post-pandemic era], 21st Century Business Herald, 3 April 2021, https://m.21jingji.com/article/20210403/b50542c229510c244e32359e81137de6_zaker.html.

15. China International Development Cooperation Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, Duiwai yuanzhu guanli banfa [Measures for the Administration of Foreign Aid], 31 August 2021, http://www.cidca.gov.cn/2021-08/31/c_1211351312.htm.

16. Zhou Xiaochuan, “Shiyiwu qijian de jinrong tizhi gaige” [Reform of the financial system in the eleventh five-year plan period], Xuexi Shibao 1 (14 November 2005).

17. Su Manli, “Quanguo jinrong gongzuo huiyi 19ri zhaokai, huiyi sanda yiti zhanwang” [The National Financial Work Conference was held on the 19th, three major issues of the conference to be explored], CCTV.com, 19 January 2007, http://news.cctv.com/financial/20070119/100333.shtml.

18. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “KfW General,” 11 March 2009.

19. Interview, official at the Japan International Cooperation Agency, 31 July 2019, Tokyo.

20. Wu Yushan, Kaifaxing jinrong chuangshiji [Genesis of development-oriented finance]. (Beijing: CITIC Press Group, 2018), 180.

21. See, for instance, Chen Yuan, Zhengfu yu shichang zhijian: kaifaxing jinrong de zhongguo tansuo [Between government and market: China’s exploration of development-oriented finance]. (Beijing: CITIC Publishing Group, 2012).

22. Wu Yushan, Kaifaxing jinrong chuangshiji [Genesis of development-oriented finance], 182.

23. Central People’s Government of the PRC, Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding [The decision of the CPC central committee on several major issues concerning the comprehensive deepening of reform], 15 November 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm.

24. Jiang Lin and Liu Zheng, “Zhengcexing yinhang gaige sanda liangdian: tiaodingwei, huafanwei, kongfengxian” [Three highlights of policy bank reform: Repositioning banks, regulating business scopes, and controlling risks], Central People’s Government of the PRC, 12 April 2015, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-04/12/content_2845385.htm.

25. Chen Guojing, “Zhengcexing yinhang yinglai ziben yueshu shidai” [Policy banks ushered in an era of capital constraints], Central People’s Government of the PRC, 13 April 2015, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-04/13/content_2845630.htm.

26. For instance, see Ricardo Gottschalk, Lavinia B. Castro, and Jiajun Xu, “Should National Development Banks be Subject to Basel III?” Review of Political Economy 34, no. 2 (2022): 249–267.

27. You Xi and Qu Yanli, “Zhengcexing jinrong zaidingwei—zhuanfang zhongguo renminyinhang hangzhang Zhou Xiaochuan” [Repositioning policy-oriented finance: An interview with Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China], Caijing, 20 August 2015, http://yuanchuang.caijing.com.cn/2015/0820/3950786.shtml.

28. Emma Mawdsley et al., “Exporting Stimulus and ‘Shared Prosperity’: Reinventing Foreign Aid for a Retroliberal Era,” Development Policy Review 36, no. S1 (March 2018): O25–O43; Daniel Mertens, Matthias Thiemann, and Peter Volberding, The Reinvention of Development Banking in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021); Peter Volberding, Leveraging Financial Markets for Development: How KfW Revolutionized Development Finance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

29. You Xi and Qu Yanli, “Zhengcexing jinrong zaidingwei” [Repositioning policy-oriented finance].

30. China Banking Regulatory Commission, Guojia kaifa yinhang jiandu guanli banfa [Measures for supervising and administering the China Development Bank], 15 November 2017, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5260809.htm; China Banking Regulatory Commission, Zhongguo jinchukou yinhang jiandu guanli banfa [Measures for supervising and administering the Export-Import Bank of China], 15 November 2017, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5264999.htm; China Banking Regulatory Commission, Nongye fazhan yinhang jiandu guanli banfa [Measures for supervising and administering the Agricultural Development Bank of China], 15 November 2017, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5265000.htm.

31. Zhang Yuze, “Zhengcexing yinhang fenzhang gaige qiu tupo” [The reform on policy banks’ account separation seeks a breakthrough], Caixin Weekly, 9 August 2021, https://weekly.caixin.com/2021-08-07/101752236.html?p0#page2.

32. Export-Import Bank of China, Liangyou daikuan de juti banli chengxu shi shenme [What are the specific procedures for obtaining Liangyou loans?], accessed 10 September 2022, http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/services/infoserves/interflow/index_2.html.

33. It is common that commercial banks finance commercially promising infrastructure projects through project finance. IJGlobal (https://www.ijglobal.com/) tracks leading financial institutions of project finance.

34. Sun Muning, “Malaixiya zongli najibu: xuanze zhongguo jiushi xuanze yu younengli de guojia hezuo” [Malaysian prime minister Najib: To choose China is to choose to cooperate with countries with capability], People’s Daily, 8 March 2017, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0308/c1002-29132395.html.

35. C. K. Tan, “Malaysia Plans to Fund 55 Billion Ringgit Rail Project via China EXIM Bank Loan, Sukuk-PM Najib,” Nikkei Asia, 9 August 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Nikkei-Markets/Malaysia-Plans-To-Fund-55-Billion-Ringgit-Rail-Project-Via-China-EXIM-Bank-Loan-Sukuk-PM-Najib; Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri, “Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: How Recipient Countries Shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Chatham House Research Paper, August 2020.

36. Geoff de Freitas, “BRI-Backed Malaysia Rail Link Back on Track after Funding Agreement,” Belt and Road, 7 January 2020.

37. The State Council of the PRC, “Xi Jinping zongshuji chuxi “yidaiyilu” jianshe zuotanhui ceji” [Party secretary Xi Jinping attends belt and road symposium], 21 November 2021, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-11/21/content_5652298.htm.

38. Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, China’s Superbank: Debt, Oil and Influence: How China Development Bank Is Rewriting the Rules of Finance (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

39. Sanderson and Forsythe, China’s Superbank, 180.

40. Zhang Yuzhe, Ji Tianqi, and Huang Rong, “Hu Huabang Xianluo” [The fall of Hu Huaibang], Caixin Weekly, 5 August 2019, https://weekly.caixin.com/2019-08-03/101446988.html?p0#page2.

41. Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection of the Communist Party of China, “Dianshi zhuantipian ‘ling rongren’ diyiji ‘bufu shisiyi’ ” [The first episode of the TV special ‘Zero Tolerance’: Living up to the 1.4 billion], China Central Television, 15 January 2022, http://v.ccdi.gov.cn/2022/01/15/VIDErGsvUPqBqx1MTWx5GoVD220115.shtml.

42. Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection of the Communist Party of China, “Dianshi zhuantipian ‘ling rongren’ diyiji ‘bufu shisiyi’ ” [The first episode of the TV special ‘Zero Tolerance’: Living up to the 1.4 billion].

1. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “Xi Jinping Attends and Delivers an Important Speech at the Global Health Summit,” 21 May 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202105/t20210522_9133147.html.

2. The State Council of the PRC, “Xi Hosts High-level Dialogue on Global Development,” 25 June 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202206/25/content_WS62b66b86c6d02e533532cb83.html.

3. Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, “Statement by President Xi Jinping at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 21 September 2021, http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zt/20210921/202109/t20210922_10410004.htm.