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“Index” in “The Coalitions Presidents Make”
Index
- accommodation of coalition actors
- of the bureaucracy, 144–45, 148
- in coalitional presidentialism, 15–16, 26, 237
- in democratic decline, 242, 243
- in Indonesian presidentialism, 38
- of legislators, 81–82, 237
- of local government leadership, 172–75, 179
- of the military, 23–24, 118–19
- of Muslim organizations, 207–8, 210, 218–19, 223–24
- of non-party actors, 180
- of oligarchs, 195–96, 198, 203–4
- of oppositional parties, 66–67
- of the police, 129
- in stability, 237, 239–41
- accountability, 88, 100–101, 243
- Aceh peace deal, 110–11
- activism/activists
- anti-corruption, in KSP, 47–48
- anti-presidential, in the history of the presidency, 34
- against civil service reform, 156–57
- Muslim, 208–9, 210–11, 220–21
- oligarchic sponsorship of, 198
- and the police, 122, 134–35
- repression of, and democratic decline, 243–44
- See also mobilization
- adjutants, military, 109
- administrative operations of the presidency, 32–33, 43–48, 53–54, 109, 187, 189, 198
- Africa, 20–21, 205, 234
- agencies, security, 137–39, 244–45
- See also military/civil-military relations; police
- Ahmadiyah, 218
- Airlangga Hartarto, 72, 188–89, 193–94, 196, 198
- ambassadorial appointments, 85–86, 169
- amendments, constitutional
- in DPR power, 79
- in limiting impeachments, 2, 12–13
- in political parties’ power, 57
- in presidential elections, 12–13
- in presidential power, 40, 104, 213
- in stability, 18, 227, 236–38
- Amin, Ma’ruf, 56–57, 73–75, 209–10, 215, 216–17
- Anggraeni, Diah, 155–57
- anti-communism, 99–100, 114–17, 138–39
- Anung, Pramono, 45–46
- APEKSI (Association of Indonesian Municipality Governments), 156–57, 172–74, 177–79
- Apindo (Indonesian Association of Entrepreneurs), 188–89
- APKASI (Association of Indonesian District Governments), 172–74
- appeasement, 24–25, 98–99, 100–101, 103–4, 118
- appointments/appointment authority
- in the 1945 constitution, 33–34
- in building and sustaining coalitions, 230
- and the bureaucracy, 142, 146–52, 155, 165–66
- and the DPR, 82, 85–86
- in hybrid transitional presidentialism, 12–13
- and local governments, 162–63, 165–66, 167, 169, 173–74, 249n3
- and the military, 99–100, 104–5, 111, 112–13, 114–15, 117–18, 248n5
- and Muslim groups, 206, 212–13
- and oligarchs, 191–92
- and the police, 125, 126–28, 129, 132–33
- in the powers of the president, 42–43
- See also cabinets/cabinet appointments
- APPSI (Association of Indonesian Provincial Governments), 172–73
- Arismunandar, Wismoyo, 91
- Asia
- Asian Financial Crisis, 37
- in comparative context, 233–34
- impeachments in, 39–40
- Indonesia as model of stability in, 2
- presidentialism in, 8, 10–11
- religion in politics of, 205
- attorney general’s office, 167–69
- authoritarianism, 6–7, 32–33, 117–18, 121, 122
- autocracy and autocratic presidentialism
- in the history of the presidency, 35–38
- legacies of, in the constitution, 53
- lessons from, in drive for stability, 239, 240–41
- military in, 98, 100, 121
- police in, 121
- presidential centrality in potential of, 6–7
- under Sukarno and Suharto, 11–12
- See also illiberalism
- autonomy
- of the bureaucracy, 140–41, 158–59
- of the legislature, 12–13, 78, 86
- of local governments and regions, 161, 180–81
- of the military, 98
- of the police, 128
- of the president, in the 1945 constitution, 33–34
- of religious organizations, 213
- Bakrie, Aburizal, 94–95, 184–85, 191, 198–202
- Bakrie, Anindya, 188–89, 201–2
- Bakrie, Ardi, 123
- Bali, 170–71
- Bali Bank scandal, 91–92
- Bamus (Consultative Agency), 88–89
- Bareskrim (Criminal Investigation Agency), 126–27, 130
- Barton, Greg, 1
- Basuki Madimuljono, 151
- Batubara, Juliari, 178, 247n2
- Bekasi, civil service conflict in, 144–46
- BKN (National Civil Service Agency), 141, 143–44, 147, 155–56
- See also bureaucracy/bureaucrats
- BNP2TKI (National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers), 212–13
- boarding schools, Islamic, 59, 206, 211–12, 213, 217–18
- Boediono, 71–73, 156–57, 159
- Bolivia, 22
- See also Latin America
- BPUPKI (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence), 33, 34
- Brazil, 21–22, 245–46
- See also Latin America
- breadth of coalition actors
- in coalition-building, 49, 50–51, 53–54
- in comparative context, 21–22, 24
- in democratic decline, 227–28, 242, 244
- in Indonesian coalitional presidentialism, 4–5, 13–14, 18
- legislators in, 78, 88, 90–91
- military in, 99
- oligarchs in, 192–93
- post-2004 constitution in, 42–43
- range of parties in, 59–60, 65–66, 69–70, 74–75
- in stability, 226–28, 238–39, 241
- See also coalition size
- brokers, 58, 79, 88–96
- Budget Agency (DPR), 80–81
- budgets/fiscal power
- in building and sustaining coalitions, 230–31
- and the civil service, 148–49, 152, 160
- and the legislature, 79–81, 87–89, 91, 94
- and local governments, 162–64, 167, 169–71, 172, 180–81
- military, 100–101, 107–8, 111–12, 117–18
- and Muslim groups, 206, 211–12, 213, 217–18, 219
- police, 122–23, 128–29, 132–33
- presidential power over, 42–43, 64, 84–85, 170–71
- in the presidential toolbox, 3–4
- See also funding
- bureaucracy/bureaucrats
- and the 2014 Civil Service Law, 154–58
- in administrative structure, 43–48
- autonomy of, 140–41, 158–59
- in the cabinet, 141, 142, 151–52, 158–59
- as implementing arm of the executive, 140–41
- and local governments, 142–43, 144–45, 151–52, 155, 165–66
- power of, 142–46
- in presidential coalitions, 4, 25, 150–54
- presidential isolation from, 53–54
- presidential power over, 146–50
- reform of, 25, 141, 147–48, 149–50, 154–58, 159–60
- bureaucratization of politics, 158–59
- business sector, 188–90, 191–92, 196–97
- See also oligarchs
- cabinets/cabinet appointments
- and the bureaucracy, 141, 142, 151–52, 158–59
- in coalitional presidentialism, 10–11
- in democratic decline, 244–45
- and local governments, 161, 169, 173–74, 178–79
- and the military, 24–25, 105–7, 109, 111, 117–18, 244–45
- Muslim groups in, 212–13, 215–17, 223–24
- non-party members of, 9–10, 21–22, 23–24, 50–52, 232–33
- oligarchs in, 191–92, 194–95
- police in, 121, 125, 127–28, 131, 132–33, 244–45
- political parties in, 52, 56, 58–59, 64, 65–68
- as presidential asset, 64, 85–86
- in the presidential toolbox, 3–4
- religious actors in, 26
- reshuffling of, 1, 67–68
- as reward or punishment, 230
- technocrats in, 151–52, 193–94
- See also appointments/appointment authority
- Cabinet Secretariat, 45–46
- campaigns, presidential
- and democratic decline, 243–44
- legislators in, 78
- local governments in, 166, 174
- military in, 115
- Muslim groups in, 208–10, 213–14, 216, 219, 222–23
- in mutual dependence, 237
- oligarchs in, 185–86, 194–95, 197–200, 203
- police in, 124, 128–29
- political parties in, 55, 58–59, 61–62, 63, 71
- Castillo, Pedro, 1–2, 21–22
- center-periphery relations, 164, 180–81
- See also centralization/decentralization; local governments and leaders
- centrality
- of the president, 6–7, 14–15, 32, 36–37, 38, 52–53
- of presidential-party relations, 74
- centralization/decentralization
- of the civil service, 141, 143
- and local governments, 161–62, 163–65, 167, 169–70, 171, 172–73, 174–75, 180–81
- ceremonies/ceremonial events, 131–32
- Chalid, Reza, 93–94
- chaos prevention
- in accommodation of radical Muslim groups, 218
- bureaucracy in, 158
- coalition-building in, 49–50
- DPR in, 88, 94
- local governments in, 180–81
- military inclusion in, 99, 101
- oligarchs in, 203
- party inclusion in, 59–60
- checks and balances, 241, 243
- Chile, 20–21, 56
- See also Latin America
- Cirebon, civil service conflict in, 144–46
- civil emergencies, 101–2
- civil service. See bureaucracy/bureaucrats
- Civil Service Law of 2014, 146, 148, 153–58, 159
- clientelism, 88–89, 90, 91–92, 129
- See also patronage
- coalitional presidentialism
- in comparative global context, 232–36
- defined, 9–11, 24–27
- in Indonesia, 11–18
- and post-2004 presidents, 49–53
- coalition size, 21, 49, 50, 232–33, 235–36
- See also breadth of coalition actors
- coattail effect, 63
- See also popularity
- coercion
- of local governments, 162–63
- of the military, 98–99
- of Muslim groups, 215, 231–32
- of oligarchs, 190–91
- police powers of, 120, 122–25
- as presidential tool, 231–32
- of presidents by security forces, 138–39
- in stability, 240–41
- co-legislative power
- in building and sustaining coalitions, 229
- constitutional, 40–41, 42–43
- and the DPR, 77, 79, 85
- in interactions with Muslim groups, 213, 217–18
- in power over local governments, 169–70
- Commission XI (Budget Agency), 80–81
- committees, DPR, 81–82, 88
- communists/Communist Party. See anti-communism; PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)
- compromises
- in avoiding impeachment, 13–14
- with the bureaucracy, 148, 153–54, 157
- in democratic decline, 242
- with the DPR, 42, 77, 86–87, 95–96
- with local governments, 180
- in local-presidential relations, 180
- with the military, 113–14, 117, 138–39
- with police, 138–39
- in stability, 236–37
- concessions
- in coalitional presidentialism, 9–10
- in coalition-building, 50
- in democratic decline, 138–39, 242
- to the DPR, 78, 82–83, 87–88, 95–96
- for logging, in local power, 164–65
- to the military, 24–25, 98, 99–100, 106–7, 112–13, 114–15, 117–19
- to Muslim groups, 214, 221–22
- to non-party coalition members, 230
- to oligarchs, 25–26, 182, 185, 203–4
- to the police, 122–23, 129, 137
- to political parties, 58–59, 60–61
- confidants of the president, 43–44, 46, 48, 109
- conflict
- 2014 Civil Service Law in, 153–58
- avoidance of, in coalitional presidentialism, 239–40
- ethno-religious, and the military, 100–101
- inter-institutional, 8–9, 70–74, 75, 144–45
- intra-elite in coalitional presidentialism, 14–16
- intra-party, presidents in outcome of, 56–57, 63–64
- with local governments, 144–45, 179–80
- military-police, 113–14
- with Muslim groups, 207–8
- with oligarchs, 194–95, 199–200
- with police, 112–14, 116, 121–22
- with political parties, 70–74, 75
- regional, in military command structure, 102–3
- religious, in integration of religious actors, 26
- consensus, 6–7, 33–34, 64–65, 76–77, 241, 248n1
- conservatism/conservative ideology
- in the bureaucracy, 160
- Islamic, 26, 205–6, 207–8, 219, 220–21, 222–23
- in the military, 105, 110–11, 114–16
- and the police, 121–22, 132–33, 135, 136, 138–39
- religious, 205–6, 207–9, 219
- constitution
- of 1950 (UUDS 1950), 35–36
- in coalitional presidentialism, 11–14, 27
- DPR in, 33–34, 39–42, 79–83
- in the history of the presidency, 33–38
- and impeachments, 2, 39–40, 42–43, 227
- local government in, 163–64, 167–71
- the military in, 27, 98, 99–100, 104–8
- and Muslim groups, 207–8, 213
- political party powers in, 57, 59–60
- in power over oligarchs, 189–93
- in presidentialism, 6–7
- presidential power in, 9, 32–33, 38–43, 104, 213
- in stability, 18, 227, 236–38
- Constitutional Court, 39–40, 82, 165
- consultation forum, DPR, 87–88
- cooperation
- with the bureaucracy, 148, 150, 154, 158–59
- with the legislature, 79, 83, 86–87, 93, 94–97
- with local governments, 161, 162–63, 169–72, 180–81
- with the military, 98–99, 100–101, 103–8, 111
- with oligarchs, 184–85
- with the police, 120, 126–27, 129, 138–39
- in political culture and stability, 236–38, 240–41
- corruption
- in the civil service, 148–49
- in the DPR, 90–95, 96
- of DPR speaker Novanto, 91–95, 96
- and legislative budgetary powers, 79–80
- local-presidential relations in, 180–81
- in military budgeting, 107
- party coalitions in policy on, 74–75
- in police power, 123–24
- in in presidential power over local government, 167–69
- in Widodo’s policy platform, 113–14
- coups, 12, 36, 103–4, 118–19, 239–40
- COVID-19 pandemic, 101–2, 149, 171–72, 173, 178–79, 222–23, 245–46, 249n4
- DAK (Special Allocation Funds), 90, 170
- DAU (General Allocation Fund), 164, 169–70
- DBH (Revenue Sharing Fund), 170
- decrees
- emergency, 40–42
- financial, and local governments, 170
- MPR, 36–37, 40, 104, 105–6
- on Muslim groups, 217–18
- in power over the military, 104, 105–6
- in power over the police, 127
- rule by, 9–10, 41–42, 105–6, 148
- on special powers in bureaucratic appointments, 147–48
- democracies/democratization
- bureaucracies in, 141
- civil service under, 143
- indexes of, 16–17, 23, 244
- in local government power, 163–64
- military in, 100–101
- police in, 125
- police skepticism of, 136
- post-authoritarian, in the history of the presidency, 37–38
- presidentialism in instability of, 1–2
- public satisfaction with, 228–29
- democratic decline
- coalitional presidentialism in, 13–15, 16–18, 27, 227–28
- in comparative context, 23–24
- global, 245
- local-presidential relations in, 180–81
- military in, 99–100, 118–19, 244–45
- oligarchs in, 203–4
- police in, 244–45
- security agencies in, 138–39
- stabilizing of presidentialism in, 2–3, 5, 242–46
- Tito and police politics in, 136
- democratic presidentialism, 13, 52–53
- dependence/interdependence
- of the DPR, 33–34, 85
- of local governments, 166
- of the military, 107–8
- of Muslim groups, 206, 211, 214, 216–17, 224
- of oligarchs, 184–85, 189–90, 193–98, 202–3
- of police, 122–23, 136–37
- of political parties, 70, 74–75
- in stability, 237
- on state budgets, 230–31
- disciplining
- of the bureaucracy, 146, 150–51
- of cabinets, 9
- of the legislature, 81, 86
- of the military, 104, 110, 117–18
- of Muslim groups, 211–15, 217, 224
- of oligarchs, 193, 200–202, 203–4
- of parties, 67–69
- of police, 127
- See also punishment
- dissent
- by the DPR, 81–82, 83
- police in preventing, 122, 134–35, 245–46
- stifling of, in democratic decline, 245–46
- divide-and-rule approach, 69, 224, 233–34, 235
- Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro, 194
- donations, political, 25–26, 186, 190–91, 193, 197–98, 203
- DPD (Region’s Representative Council), 151–52
- DPP (Council of Advisers to the President), 195–96
- DPR (People’s Representative Council). See legislature
- Dutch colonialism, 34–35, 52–53, 156, 163
- Duterte, Rodrigo, 20–21, 205, 245–46
- Dwipayana, Ari, 46
- economy/economic stability
- DPR budgetary power in, 79–80
- and oligarchs, 182, 184–85, 188, 190, 192–93, 196
- education, 206, 210, 211–12, 213, 217–18
- Education, Ministry of, 212, 224
- Effendi, Djohan, 1
- Effendi, Sofian, 157
- Effendi, Taufiq, 145, 154–55
- Eko Prasodjo, 156–58
- electability
- of Bakrie, 199–200
- in choice of running mate, 72–73
- of civil servants, 145–46
- Muslim groups in, 72–73, 219
- in political party support, 234
- in presidential power over Muslim groups, 213–14
- in presidential power over oligarchs, 192
- See also popularity
- elections
- bureaucracy in, 142–44, 145–46, 152
- in constitutional power, 39, 40–41
- in the history of the presidency, 33–34, 37–38
- indicators of stability in, 19–21
- legislative, personalization of, 82–83
- local government, 163–64, 167, 173–74
- local government support in, 170–71
- in local power, 164–65
- MPR in, 12–13, 39
- Muslim groups in, 207–9
- non-state actors in, 237
- oligarchs in, 185–86, 192, 197–98, 202–4
- political party power in, 56–57, 58–59, 60–63
- in power over Muslim groups, 213–14
- in power over oligarchs, 192–93
- for the presidency, post-2004, 39
- in presidentialism, 7–8
- religion in, 205–6
- vote buying in, and democratic decline, 17
- See also re-election of presidents
- elections, direct
- in constitutional power, 39, 40–41
- in the history of the presidency, 37–38
- and local government, 163–64, 167, 173–74
- and Muslim groups, 213–14
- and oligarchs, 192
- in presidentialism, 7–8
- in stability, 237
- Enembe, Lukas, 168–69
- equilibrium, 52–53, 70–71, 74, 75, 86–87, 117, 241, 248n3
- ethnic Chinese oligarchs, 188–89, 190–91
- events, public, 88, 152–53
- exceptionalism, Indonesian, 226–27
- executive presidentialism, 11–12, 52–53
- Fakhruloh, Zudan Arif, 153
- Fauzi, Gamawan, 173–74
- favors
- in coalitional presidentialism, 3–4, 230–31
- in coalition-building by police, 125, 128–29
- in exchange for loyalty of security agencies, 138
- in Indonesian coalitional presidentialism, 15–16
- in local government power, 164–65
- for Muslim organizations, 210–11, 223–24
- as presidential asset, in party relations, 64
- See also patronage; rewards
- federalism, 34–35, 163
- See also local governments and leaders
- Final Assessors Team, 147–48, 150
- Finance, Ministry of, 80–81, 170, 218
- Firli Bahuri, 123–24, 132, 249n1
- fiscal power. See budgets/fiscal power
- floor-based coalitions, 10–11
- Forkopimda (police local leadership forum), 124
- FPI, 207–8, 214–15, 218, 219, 221–23, 231–32
- See also Muslims/Muslim groups
- France, 31
- Freedom House index, 16
- Freeport Indonesia, 93–94
- funding
- of the bureaucracy, 148–49, 158–59, 160
- for development, in the case of Setya Novanto, 92–93
- development funds, 92–93, 111–12, 206, 211–12
- discretionary, for legislators, 84–85, 248n2
- of local governments, 164, 170–71, 172–73
- of Muslim schools, 206, 211–12, 213, 217–18
- off-budget, by the military, 107–8, 111–12, 117–18
- by oligarchs, 185–87, 197–98, 202–3, 239–40
- of the police, 128–29
- of political parties, 62–63, 64
- of security agencies, in democratic decline, 244–45
- See also budgets/fiscal power
- Gatot Nurmantyo, 114–15, 116–17
- GBHN (Broad Outlines of State Policy), 40
- generals
- appointment of, 104–5, 117–18, 248n4
- leverage of, 100–101, 103–4
- in managing the military, 106–8, 111, 112–13
- and Widodo, 113–17
- See also military/civil-military relations
- Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party), 60–61, 63, 66–67
- Gibran Rakabuming Raka, 196–97
- Golkar (Functional Group Party)
- and Bakrie, 199–201
- DPR speakers from, 89–90
- in the history of the presidency, 37
- ministers of, in coalition-building, 52
- New Order civil service in, 142–43
- in presidential leverage in the DPR, 85–86
- and Setya Novanto, 91–95
- in stabilizing Yudhoyono’s coalition, 229–30
- in Widodo’s coalition, 63–64
- gotong royong (mutual assistance), 241
- Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu), 41–42, 79, 222
- Government Regulations (PP), 41–42
- governors
- and bureaucrats, 144–45
- management of coalitions with, 172–75
- as “party,” 161, 172–73, 179–80
- powers of, 163–64, 165, 166–67
- presidential powers over, 167–69, 170–71
- See also local governments and leaders
- grassroots networks, 58, 162–63, 173, 178–79, 208–9
- Guided Democracy regime, 36–37
- Gunawan, Budi, 113–14, 121–22, 125, 126–28, 132, 138
- Habibie, B. J., 13, 101, 104
- Hadi Utomo, 110
- Haiti, Badrodin, 114
- Hanura (People’s Conscience Party), 61, 247n4
- harmonization law of 2022, 169–70
- Hartono, Bambang Dwi, 176–77
- Hartono, Heru Budi, 247n2
- Hasan, Bob, 194
- Hatta, Mohammad, 35
- Hatta Radjasa, 123
- Hendrayudha, Dadang, 112
- Hendropriyono, A. M., 113, 249n8
- hierarchy, political and administrative, 45–46, 125, 126, 131, 165–66, 167
- HIPMI (Indonesian Association of Young Entrepreneurs), 188–89, 196
- Home Affairs, Ministry of, 131, 136–37, 143, 155–56, 165, 171–72, 173–74
- HTI (Hizbut Tahrir), 214–15, 219, 220–22, 223
- See also Muslims/Muslim groups
- human rights abuses, 100–101, 111–12, 114–17
- identity card scandal, 92–93, 95, 96–97
- ideology, 14–15, 65–67, 117–18, 121–22, 132–33, 207
- illiberalism, 16–17, 136, 226, 227–28, 243
- See also autocracy and autocratic presidentialism; democratic decline
- impeachments
- compromises in avoiding, 13–14
- danger of, in coalition-building, 49, 50, 227
- in the history of the presidency, 37–38, 53–54
- as indicator of stability, 19–21
- and the legislature, 83, 89–91
- military acquiescence to, 101
- political parties in, 69, 70–71, 75
- post-2004, 2, 39–40, 42–43, 227, 228–29, 232–33, 236–39
- in presidential systems, 1–2
- incentives
- and the bureaucracy, 150–51, 153–54
- constitutional, for broad coalitions, 42–43
- financial, for Muslim groups, 217–18
- and the legislature, 33–34, 78, 81, 95–96
- and local governments, 161, 162–63, 164–65, 167–68
- for military loyalty, 103–4, 106–8
- for oligarchs, 190, 191–92, 193–94
- for police support, 122, 129
- size of party in, 235
- for stability, 236–37
- independence
- of the bureaucracy, 140–41
- in the history of the presidency, 33–35, 38
- in Indonesian coalitional presidentialism, 11–12
- of legislators, 82–83, 95–96
- of local governments, 163, 165–66 (See also centralization/decentralization)
- military in, 99–100
- of the police, 127, 128
- of the president, in coalition-building, 50
- struggles for, in presidential centrality, 6–7
- Independent Team for the Reform of the National Bureaucracy, 154
- infrastructure
- government-driven projects in, and oligarchs, 190
- local, 162–63, 170–71
- political, access of oligarchs to, 185–88, 195–96
- political, militaries in, 98
- interpenetration
- of bureaucracy and politics, 141, 145–46, 158–59
- of local and national government, 179
- Isir, Jhonny Eidizon, 45
- Iskandar, Muhaimin, 72
- Islam. See Muslims/Muslim groups
- Isman, Hayono, 91
- Japan/Japanese military administration, 33–34
- Java, 163–64
- Jokowi. See Widodo, Joko
- Justice and Human Rights, Ministry of, 63–64
- Juwaini, Jazuli, 83
- Kadin (Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Trade), 188–89, 196, 201–2
- Kaesang Pangarep, 197
- Kalla, Jusuf, 49–50, 71, 147
- Kartasasmita, Agus Gumiwang, 95
- Kartasasmita, Ginandjar, 194
- Kasim, Ifdhal, 47–48
- KASN (Civil Service Commission), 145, 155–56, 157–58, 165–66
- Kenya, 20–21, 234
- Khofifah Indar Parawansa, 174, 209, 216
- KNPI (Indonesian Central National Committee), 34
- Komarudin, Ade, 94–95
- Korpri (Indonesian Civil Servants Corps), 25, 141, 143–44, 152–53, 155–56, 157
- KPK (Corruption Eradication Agency)
- and the bureaucracy, 148–49
- and the DPR, 85, 95
- and local governments, 167–69
- and the police, 113–14, 123–24, 126–27, 132
- and political parties, 74–75
- Krisdayanti, 248n2
- Kristiyanto, Hasto, 69–70
- KSP (Office of the Staff of the President), 43, 46–48
- Kurniawan, Taufik, 90
- LAN (State Administration Institute), 154–55
- Latin America, 8, 19–20, 21–22, 23, 56, 78, 232–34, 242
- Law on Information and Electronic Transactions of 2008, 134–35
- Law on the Responsibility for Budget Execution, 81
- legislation/legislative process
- inclusion of oligarchs in, 196
- on Islamic boarding schools, 217–18
- local government power in, 165
- non-budgetary, DPR powers in, 81–82
- party powers in, and presidential concessions, 58–59
- in the post-2004 constitution, 40–43
- as presidential tool over police, 127
- in president-party relations, 64–65
- See also co-legislative power
- Legislative Agency of the DPR, 81–82
- legislature
- brokers in, 91–95
- budgetary powers of, 79–81, 87–89, 91, 94
- and cabinet appointments, 85–86, 95–96
- in civil service reform, 154–55
- in coalitional presidentialism, 10–11, 74–75
- consensus building in functioning of, 77
- and democratic decline, 243
- discretionary funds for, 84–85, 248n2
- in the history of the presidency, 36–38
- in hybrid and transitional presidentialism, 12–13
- independence of, 82–83, 95–96
- individualization of, 78, 82–83
- management of coalition with, 87–91
- in military appointments, 105
- and police, 125, 126–27
- political weight of, in coalitions, 75–76
- in the post-2004 constitution, 39–42
- powers of, 79–83
- in presidential elections, 33–34
- in presidentialism, 6
- presidential leverage over, 83–87
- relations with, in the presidential toolbox, 3–4
- strength of presidential party in, 21–22, 23–24
- See also MPs (members of parliament); political parties
- legitimacy
- and democratic decline, 242–43
- military support in, 103–4
- and political parties, 59, 63–64
- presidential, post-2004 constitution in, 39
- religious, 182, 205–6, 209–10, 219, 237
- leverage in coalitional relationships
- with the bureaucracy, 142–50
- constitutional powers as, 38–39, 40–41
- with the DPR, 79–87, 229
- with local governments, 162–71
- with the military, 99–108, 117
- with Muslim groups, 206, 207–15
- with oligarchs, 185–93
- with the police, 120, 122–29, 136–37
- with political parties, 57–65, 233–34, 235
- size of party in, 233–34, 235
- LGBTI groups and citizens, 135
- Liberal Democracy Index (V-Dem), 16–17, 23
- licensing powers, 164–65, 169–70, 198–99, 221
- Limpo, Syahrul Yasin, 172–73
- Linz, Juan: “Perils of Presidentialism,” 1–2, 7–9
- Liong, Lim Sioe, 193
- Listyo Sigit Prabowo, 130, 136–37
- lobbying/lobby groups, 55, 57, 143, 159, 172–73, 188–89
- local governments and leaders
- and the bureaucracy, 142–43, 144–45, 151–52, 155
- in coalitional presidentialism, 161–62
- in coalition-building, 50–52, 179–80
- Coordinating Meetings of Local Government Heads and Deputy Heads, 172
- and decentralization, 161–62, 163–65, 167, 169–70, 171, 172–73, 174–75, 180–81
- military units in, 102–3
- power of and over, 162–75, 249n3
- presidential appointment authority over, 162–63, 165–66, 167, 169, 173–74, 249n3
- Tri Rismaharini, 175–79
- Luhut Pandjaitan, 46–47, 67–68, 111, 113, 116, 134–35, 148–49, 199–201
- Lumentut, Vicky, 168
- Mahfud MD, 72–74, 216–17
- Mainwaring, Scott, 8
- majorities, legislative, 6, 7–8, 9–10, 21–22, 49–50, 53–54, 96
- Mallarangeng, Andi, 68
- Mangkusubroto, Kuntoro, 47, 145
- Masduki, Teten, 47, 222
- mayors, 165–66, 167–69, 176–79
- See also local governments and leaders
- media sector, 84–85, 187–88, 189–90, 191, 197–98, 200–201, 243
- Megawati Sukarnoputri
- on consensus in political culture, 241
- legislative obstruction by, 85
- military appointments by, 105
- and Muslim groups, 209
- in the rise of Risma, 177–78
- and Widodo, 50, 57–58, 69, 113–14
- meta-cleavages, 10
- military/civil-military relations
- and the 1965 communist massacres, 113–17
- anti-communist scares of, 138–39
- and the cabinet, 24–25, 105–7, 109, 111, 117–18, 244–45
- in coalitional presidentialism, 24–25, 27, 99, 239
- in democracies, 98
- in democratic decline, 99–100, 118–19, 244–45
- in the history of the presidency, 36, 37, 53
- management of, 108–13, 118–19, 129–30
- as members of the legislature, 14–15
- military-affiliated oligarchs and Bakrie, 199–200
- off-budget funding of, 107–8, 111–12, 117–18
- police subordination to, 121
- power of, 99–104, 105, 108, 112–13, 114–15, 117–18
- in presidential administration, 45
- presidents as supreme commanders over, 99–100, 104–9, 114–15, 117
- ties with Novanto, 92
- toolbox in oversight of, 27
- Military Secretariat, 45, 53–54, 105–6, 109–10, 129–30
- minorities, religious, 207–8, 213–14, 218
- minority presidents
- in coalitional presidentialism, 3–4
- coalition-building by, 9, 11, 49–50, 63–64, 233
- in comparative context, 21–22
- majority-building by, 95–96, 191
- in presidentialism, 7–9
- mobilization
- anti-Purnama, 216–17, 219, 220, 221
- of the bureaucracy, 141, 142–43, 144–45, 148, 152, 156–57
- Islamist, 59, 73, 130–31, 231–32
- against Islamists, 207–8
- by local government, 162–63, 166
- by nominating parties, 63
- by oligarchs, 189
- of police, 122–23, 136–37
- of voters, 128–29, 166, 174, 208–9, 222–23
- See also activism/activists
- Moeldoko, 47–48, 106, 108–9, 248n3
- Morales, Evo, 22
- MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), 12–13, 33–34, 36–38, 39–40, 101–2, 104, 105–6, 228–29
- MPs (members of parliament), 77–78, 82–83, 84–85, 87–91
- See also legislature
- mud volcano, 199
- Muhammadiyah, 207–9, 210, 211, 212–14, 215–17, 219, 223–24
- See also PAN (National Mandate Party)
- multi-party systems
- coalitional presidentialism in, 3–5, 9–11, 24
- in comparative context, 233–34
- post-election coalitions in, 95–96
- presidentialism in, 7–8, 245
- stability of, 1–2, 3–5, 228–29
- Muslims/Muslim groups
- accommodation of, 207–8, 210, 218–19, 223–24
- in anti-communist human rights abuses, 115
- cabinet representation of, 212–13, 215–17, 223–24
- in coalitional presidentialism, 26
- and democratic decline, 17
- demonstrations by, in dangers of a military coup, 103
- in the fight against Islamism, 220–23
- in the history of the presidency, 53
- increasing role of, 205–6
- in interactions with presidents, 215–19
- Islamic conservative fringe, 207–8, 210–11, 214, 215, 218–23, 224–25, 231, 242, 243–44
- Islamic political parties, 59
- piety in power of, 206
- police in repression of radicalism, 130–31, 222–23
- political role of, 207, 223–24
- in post-2004 coalition-building, 50–52
- power of, 207–11
- presidential power over, 211–15
- repression of, 26, 207–8, 215, 219, 222–23, 224–25, 231–32
- See also NU (Nahdlatul Ulama); PKB (National Awakening Party); PPP (Unity Development Party); religion/religious groups
- Muzadi, Hasyim, 224
- Nadiem Makarim, 195, 210, 212
- Nasdem (National Democrats Party), 61, 63, 167–69
- National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), 80–81
- nationalists, 34, 37, 105, 115
- See also Golkar (Functional Group Party); PDI (Indonesian Democracy Party)
- National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas), 116
- natural resources sector, 189–90
- negotiation/renegotiation with coalition partners
- appointment powers in, 230
- on the ban of HTI, 221–22
- with the bureaucracy, 142–46, 149–58, 159–60
- in coalition stability, 231
- constitutional powers in, 9, 39
- with the DPR, 78, 79–81, 84–91, 95–96
- with Islamic groups, 224
- with local governments, 161–62, 167, 169–70, 171–75
- with the military, 108, 117–18
- with Muslim groups, 206, 213–14, 219–20, 221–22, 224
- with oligarchs, 182, 192–93, 200–202
- with the police, 120, 129–33
- with political parties, 57–65, 68–69, 70–74, 229–30
- in stability, 231
- of vested interests, in democratic decline, 245
- new developmentalism, 17
- New Order
- bureaucracy in, 142–43
- local governance in, 163–64
- military in, 100, 111–12
- oligarchs in, 193–94, 198–99
- police in, 128, 133, 136–37
- in rise of piety in Islamic power, 206
- nominations/nomination powers
- of the legislature, 85–86
- of military commanders, 42–43, 99–100, 105–6, 110–11, 113–14
- of police commanders, 42–43, 121–22, 125, 126–27, 130–31
- of political parties, 55, 56–59, 61–62, 63, 65, 69–75
- for vice-presidential candidates, 70–75, 200–201
- non-party actors
- in the cabinet, 9–10, 50–52, 111, 151–52, 191–92, 230, 232–33, 235–36
- in coalitional presidentialism, 4–5, 13–15, 24–26, 27, 75–76, 226–27
- in coalition-building, 49–50, 52, 53–54, 229
- in democratic decline, 243
- inclusion of, in comparative context, 18, 21–22, 23–24
- and political parties, 55, 75–76
- in presidential administration, 43–46
- in stability, 236–37
- See also bureaucracy/bureaucrats; military/civil-military relations; Muslims/Muslim groups; oligarchs; police
- North Sulawesi, 170–71
- Novanto, Setya, 79, 87–88, 91–95, 96, 203
- NTT (East Nusa Tenggara), 170–71
- NU (Nahdlatul Ulama)
- cabinet representation of, 53, 215–17, 223–24
- in the fight against Islamism, 220–23
- financial incentives for cooperation of, 217–18
- in the history of the presidency, 53
- power of, 207–10
- presidential power over, 211–15
- and Widodo, 220–24
- in Widodo’s choice of 2018 running mate, 72–73
- See also Muslims/Muslim groups; PKB (National Awakening Party)
- Nusron Wahid, 212–13
- oligarchs
- and the cabinet, 191–92, 194–95
- defined, 182–84
- in delivering favors, 230–31
- in democratic decline, 203–4
- as driver of coalitional presidentialism, 239–40
- inclusion and limitations of, 196, 198–202
- influence of, 25–26, 185–88, 194
- management of coalitions with, 193–98
- military officers’ relationships with, 107–8
- political donations by, 25–26, 186, 190–91, 193, 197–98, 203
- power of, 185–89
- presidential tools in power over, 189–93
- Omnibus Bill Task Force, 196
- opinion surveys (LSI), 29
- outsiders, political, 60–62, 234
- See also non-party actors
- Paloh, Surya, 195
- PAN (National Mandate Party), 51–52, 56, 67–68, 215–16
- See also Muhammadiyah; Muslims/Muslim groups
- Pancasila ideology, 207, 211–12, 222–23
- Papuan local government, 168–69
- Paspampres (Presidential Guard), 109–10, 129–30
- patronage
- in budgets, 42, 79–81, 84, 87–88, 230–31
- and the civil service, 145, 148–49, 155–56, 158–59, 160
- in coalitional presidentialism, 9–10, 15–16
- in democratic decline, 242
- and the DPR, 79–81, 82, 87–92, 95–97
- local government powers in, 164–65
- in loyalty of security agencies, 138–39
- and the military, 106, 107–8, 111–12, 117–18
- and oligarchs, 185–86, 189
- and police, 120, 127–28
- and political parties, 64, 66–67
- See also clientelism
- Paulus, Lodewijk Freidrich, 63
- PD (Democratic Party), 57–58, 60–61, 66, 86–87, 167–68, 169
- PDI (Indonesian Democracy Party), 37
- PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party—Struggle), 45–46, 50, 57–58, 69–70, 177–78, 229–30, 234
- Perkasa, Andika, 107–8, 109–10, 113
- personalist parties, 60–63, 234
- Pertamina state oil company, 150–51
- Peru, 19–20, 21–22, 232–33
- See also Latin America
- Philippines, 11, 14, 20–22, 205–6, 234–35, 245–46
- piety, Muslim, 205–6, 207–8, 209–10, 219
- PKB (National Awakening Party), 50, 52, 59, 223–24
- See also Muslims/Muslim groups
- PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), 36, 114–15
- PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), 67–69, 81, 83
- police
- and the cabinet, 121, 125, 127–28, 131, 132–33, 244–45
- in democratic decline, 244–45
- managing coalitional role of, 129–33
- and the military, 113–15, 121
- politics of, 133–37, 138–39
- powers of, 120, 122–25, 127–28, 136–37
- presidential power over, 126–29
- in presidential power over local government, 167–68
- in repression of fringe Muslim groups, 130–31, 222–23
- and Tito Karnavian, 121–22, 133–37
- political parties
- in accommodation of Islamic interests, 223–24
- balancing, 59–60, 64–74, 75
- benefits of broad coalitions with, 74–75
- in the cabinet, 52, 56, 58–59, 64, 65–68
- cartelization of, 8, 14–15, 243
- as channel for civil servants in the cabinet, 151–52
- in coalitional presidentialism, 9, 14–15, 232–34, 236
- in democratic decline, 17
- in executive nominations, 55, 56–59, 61–62, 63, 65, 69–75
- in the history of the presidency, 34, 36
- and the legislature, 21–22, 23–24, 82–83
- local governors as, 172–73, 179–80
- and oligarchs, 185–87, 195
- in power play with presidents, 56–57, 70–74
- powers of, 56–60
- in pre-2004 instability, 228–29
- presidential power and leverage over, 3–5, 60–65, 79–87, 229–30
- in the rise of local leaders, 177–78, 179
- size and strength of, 9, 14–15, 21–22, 232–34, 236
- See also under name of party
- politicization/depoliticization
- of the bureaucracy, 25, 141, 143, 145–46, 158–59
- of the police, 125, 126–27
- popularity
- of civil servants in elections, 145–46
- electoral, of Islamic groups, 213–14
- oligarchic media in sustaining, 187–88
- in political party support, 56–57, 61–62, 234
- of presidents, in power over oligarchs, 192–93
- of Risma, 178–79
- See also coattail effect; electability
- popular vote, 6, 12–13, 39
- populism/populists, 5, 176–77, 185, 233–34
- post-authoritarian states, 13–14, 52–53, 140–41, 227–28, 242
- PPP (Unity Development Party), 37, 63–64
- See also Muslims/Muslim groups
- Prabowo Subianto
- as agent of coalitional presidentialism, 240
- as defense minister, 248n5
- and the military, 112
- and Muslim groups, 214
- and oligarchs, 197–98, 199–200, 202–3
- as political outsider, 6–7
- as populist oligarch, 185
- Pramono Edhie Wibowo, 110
- Pranowo, Ganjar, 167, 169–70
- Prasetijono, Widi, 45, 109
- Pratikno, 43–45
- Presidential Decision 70/2002, 127
- presidentialism
- defined, 6–9
- in Indonesian history, 11–13
- Presidential Military Secretariat, 45
- prosecutions, 19–21, 112
- Puan Maharani, 89, 93, 95
- punishment
- of the bureaucracy, 150–51
- loss of cabinet positions as, 230
- of Muslim groups, 211–12, 222–23, 231–32
- of oligarchs, 191, 198, 203
- of political parties, 67–68
- of presidents by parties, 69
- in stability, 240–41
- Purnama, Basuki Tjahaja, 59, 84, 150–51, 190–91
- “rainbow coalitions,” 11
- Rais, Amien, 214
- Razi, Fachrul, 217
- reciprocity. See transactionalism
- reconciliation initiative of 1965, 114–17
- recruitment
- civil service, 143, 155, 156
- of military officers, 109–10
- by Muslim groups, 220–21
- of non-party actors, 22, 44
- of religious actors, 26
- of Risma, 176
- of Thohir, 194–95
- red lines. See vested interests
- re-election of presidents
- bureaucracy in, 150
- in Indonesia, 13–14
- local governments in, 168–69, 174
- in measuring stability, 19–21
- military in, 101
- Muslim groups in, 208–9, 213, 214, 217
- oligarchs in, 191, 196–97
- police in, 131–32
- political parties in, 57–58, 63, 71, 74
- in post-2004 stability, 2, 227, 228–29
- See also electability; elections
- reform/reformist initiatives
- in broad party coalitions, 70
- bureaucratic, 25, 141, 147–48, 149–50, 154–58, 159–60
- coalition size in likelihood of, 5
- and democratic decline, 243–44
- and local government, 162, 163–64
- and the military, 100–101, 102–3, 104, 106–7, 116, 118–19, 137
- and oligarchs, 202–3
- of the Palace, 43–44
- and the police, 132–33, 136, 137
- and political parties, 56–57, 70–74
- Regional Leadership Forum, 102–3
- regional secretaries, 144–45, 167, 171
- regions. See local governments and leaders
- regulatory power/regulatory instruments
- in appointment of senior police officers, 127
- in banning HTI, 222
- over local governments, 171–72
- over the bureaucracy, 148, 153
- in power over oligarchs, 189–90
- of the president, post-2004, 41–42
- in presidential power over Muslim groups, 213
- Religion, Ministry of, 211–12, 217, 224
- religion/religious groups, 17, 26, 205–6, 223–24, 240
- See also Muslims/Muslim groups
- representation, proportional, 9, 82–83
- repression
- in democratic decline, 243–44
- in the history of the presidency, 38
- of LGBTI groups and citizens, 135
- by the military, 98
- of Muslim groups, 26, 207–8, 215, 219, 222–23, 224–25, 231–32
- New Order civil service in, 142–43
- police in, 122, 130–31, 134–35, 222–23
- rewards
- appointments as, 45–46, 230
- for the bureaucracy, 141, 149–50
- for local governments, 169, 180
- in managing DPR coalitions, 87–88
- for the military, 24–25, 103–4, 106–7
- for Muslim groups, 211–12, 213, 217–18
- for oligarchs, 198–99, 204–5
- for police, 125, 127–29, 136–37
- for political parties, 56–59, 74
- See also favors
- Rinakit, Sukardi, 46
- Rini Soemarno, 147–48
- RIS (Federal Republic of Indonesia), 34–35
- Rismaharini, Tri, 162–63, 175–79, 249n6
- rivalries
- in the bureaucracy, 156–57
- of coalition actors, in democratic decline, 243
- in coalitional stability, 229–30
- in democratic decline, 243
- inter-party, 63–64, 65–66, 229–30
- intra-Islamic, 210–11, 214, 220–21, 224–25
- in the legislature, 93, 94–95
- military-police, 113–14, 128, 131, 137
- Rizieq Shihab, 123, 130, 222–23
- Robison, Richard, 15–16, 183, 192–93
- Romahurmuziy, Muhammad (“Romy”), 72
- running-mates
- Muslim, 53, 208–10, 215, 216–17
- oligarchs as, 185, 200–201
- police preferences in, 132
- political parties in choosing, 56, 70–74
- Ryacudu, Ryamizard, 105, 110–11
- Said, Sudirman, 93–94
- Samad, Abraham, 132
- sanctions. See disciplining
- Sarundajang, Sinyo Harry, 169
- Sastrosoenarto, Hartarto, 194
- scandals, finance, 91–95
- security forces, 4–5, 45, 129, 138–39
- See also military/civil-military relations; police
- Selvanus, Yulius, 112
- semi-presidential systems, 7–8
- separatists, Papuan, 135
- Setgab (Joint Secretariat), 68–69
- Shihab, Rizieq, 207
- Simanjuntak, Maruli, 109
- Siradj, Said Aqil, 222
- Sirait, Maruarar, 50
- Siti Nurbaya Bakar, 151–52
- Sjahrir, Sutan, 34
- social affairs, minister for, 178, 216
- social control, 142–43
- Soepomo, 33, 36–37
- Soesatyo, Bambang, 95
- sovereignty, 34–35
- speakers, DPR, 88–90, 91–95
- Sri Mulyani Indrawati, 199, 203
- stability/instability
- breadth of coalition actors in, 226–28, 238–39, 241
- bureaucracies in, 141, 142, 160
- coalitional presidentialism in, 3–5, 9–10, 27
- comparative, 19–24, 232–33
- and democratic decline, 2–3, 5, 242–46
- DPR in, 78, 83, 88
- in emerging democracies, 1–3
- of hybrid and transitional presidentialism, 12–13
- Indonesian constitution in, 18, 227, 236–38
- local governments in, 161–62, 175, 180
- management of Muslim groups in, 219
- military in, 99–100, 101, 103–4
- oligarchs in, 184–85, 188
- police loyalty in, 129
- political parties in, 14, 75
- post-2004 drivers of, 236–41
- “presidential toolbox in,” 3–5
- security agencies in, 138
- strategies in sustaining, 228–32
- state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 127–28, 147–48, 150–51, 190, 194–95, 212–13
- State Secretariat, 43–45
- States of Emergency, Law on, 101–2
- Strategic Reserve, 109–10, 248n4
- structure, institutional and political
- of the bureaucracy, 43, 141, 143, 149–50, 153
- in comparative context, 233
- COVID-19 changes to, in democratic decline, 245–46
- of the military, 103, 105–6, 109
- New Order civil service in enforcing, 142–43
- oligarchs as members of, 195–96
- the Palace as, 43–48
- physical, of presidential institutions, 48
- role of presidents in, 32
- in stability, 236–37
- Subagyo, H. S., 113
- Sudi Silalahi, 43–45
- Suharto
- and autocratic presidentialism, 11–12
- and bureaucratic patronage, 156
- in the history of the presidency, 36–37, 53
- in local government power, 163–64
- management of oligarchs by, 193–94
- and the military, 100, 106–7, 108–9
- and oligarchs, 188, 190–91, 196–97
- and the rise of Muslim power, 207
- in shaping expectations of the president, 32
- Suhartono, 109–10
- Sukarno
- and autocratic presidentialism, 11–12
- in the history of the presidency, 34–35, 52–53
- military cabinet appointments by, 106–7
- military power under, 100
- and Muslim groups, 211–12
- in shaping expectations of the president, 32
- as symbol of unity, 52–53
- Surabaya, 162–63, 176–79
- Suryadi, Deddy, 109
- Suswantono, Bambang, 109–10
- Sutanto, 131
- Sutarto, Endriartono, 105, 106, 110–11
- Sutiyoso, 113
- Syadzily, Ace Hasan, 73–74
- Syafiuddin, Irianto MS, 175
- Syuhud, Marsudi, 216
- Tandjung, Akbar, 89–90, 183–84
- Tanjung, Chairul, 192
- Tanoesoedibjo, Hary, 187–88, 191–92, 197–98
- technocrats, 22, 50–52, 71, 151–52, 193–94
- territorial command structure, 102–4, 111–12, 118
- terrorism, 121, 122–23, 222–23
- theater, political, 88, 108–9
- Thohari, Hajriyanto Y., 85–86
- Thohir, Erick, 147, 195, 196–98
- Tikal, Klemens, 170
- Tito Karnavian, 121–22, 127–28, 131–32, 133–37, 171–72, 249n4
- Tjahjanto, Hadi, 45, 117
- toolbox, presidential, 3–5, 27, 60–65, 90–91, 224, 229–32
- transactionalism
- and the bureaucracy, 159
- in coalition-building, 49–50
- in the legislature, 89–90, 91, 95
- and local governments, 170–71, 174–75, 180–81
- and the military, 108, 111
- and the oligarchs, 198
- vested interests
- acceptance of, in stability, 241
- of the bureaucracy, 25, 140–41, 142, 148, 153, 158–59, 160
- in democratic decline, 241, 242, 245
- of the legislature, 84–85, 96–97
- of local governments, 172–73
- of the military, 23–24, 112–13, 118
- of Muslim groups, 206, 219
- of oligarchs, 186, 202, 203
- of the police, 123–24, 137
- in presidential-local relations, 174–75, 179–80
- of security agencies, 138–39
- veto actors, 15–16, 23–24, 38, 96–97
- veto power
- in balancing party coalitions, 64–65
- in coalitional presidentialism, 15–16, 24, 229
- in co-legislative authority, 40–41
- in comparative context, 23–24
- in democratic decline, 245
- in the history of the presidency, 38
- in the legislature, 96–97
- of police, 125
- of security agencies, 138–39
- in stability, 231, 237
- violence
- anti-communist, 99–100, 114–17
- against ethnic-Chinese oligarchs, 190–91
- ethno-religious, 100–101, 122–23, 190–91
- and the military, 100–101, 111–12, 114–17
- against non-indigenous oligarchs, 190–91
- and police, 120, 122–23
- vote shares, 6, 39, 170–71, 174, 208–9, 224–25
- voting
- civil servants’ right to, 152
- mobilization of, 128–29, 166, 174, 208–9, 222–23
- police in, 124, 128–29
- popular vote, 6, 12–13, 39
- vote buying, 17
- withholding of right to, 17
- Wahid, Abdurrahman
- 1999 election of, 39
- and the civil service, 144
- hostile relationship with police, 129
- impeachment of, 1–2, 37–38, 89–90, 101, 236–39
- and the military, 101, 102–3
- and Muslim groups, 213–14
- on Muslim groups and the Ministry of Religion, 211–12
- as transitional president, 12–13
- Wanandi, Jusuf, 250n2
- Wanandi, Sofjan, 189
- Waseso, Budi, 126–28, 138
- wealth
- of bureaucrats, 145, 158–59
- measuring, 184
- of military officers, 107–8
- of oligarchs, 182–83, 193–94
- in personalized parties, 61, 63
- of police officers, 135–36
- Widjajanto, Andi, 46
- Widjojo, Agus, 116
- Widodo, Joko
- administration of, 45–48
- as agent of coalitional presidentialism, 13–14, 240
- and the bureaucracy, 147–49, 150–51, 152–53
- Cabinet Secretariat of, 45–46, 53–54
- coalition-building by, 49, 50–52, 231–32
- in comparative context, 234
- in democratic decline, 99–100, 118–19, 242, 244
- and the DPR, 84–85, 87–88, 94–96
- impeachment of Wahid as influence on, 236–39
- incorporation of religious actors by, 26
- and the KPK law, 74–75, 85
- and local governments, 162, 165, 166, 167–68, 170–71, 172–73, 177–78
- and the military, 99–100, 108–10, 113–17, 118–19
- as minority president, 75
- and Muslim groups, 59, 208–10, 213–14, 216–18, 220–23, 224–25
- and the NU, 53, 220–23
- and oligarchs, 186, 188, 191, 192–93, 194–95, 196, 197–98, 200–204
- and the Palace, 43–44
- and the PDI-P, 60–61
- and the police, 128–29, 131–32, 134–35
- and political parties, 57–58, 63–65, 67–75, 86–87, 229–30, 234
- and radical Islamic groups, 219, 220–23
- on reestablishment of the GBHN, 40
- reform of administrative structures by, 43–44
- residence of, 48
- and security agencies, 137
- in shaping expectations of the president, 32
- stability of rule by, 2
- State Secretariat of, 43–45
- Wirahadikusumah, Agus, 103
- Wiranto, 101, 104, 107–8, 112, 196, 222
- Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang
- administration of, 45–47
- as agent of coalitional presidentialism, 13–14
- and the bureaucracy, 143–44, 154, 157–58, 159
- Cabinet Secretariat of, 45–46
- on civil-military relations in stability, 101
- coalition-building by, 49–52
- in comparative context, 234
- in democratic decline, 242, 244
- and the DPR, 79–80, 84–85, 95–96
- impeachment of Wahid as influence on, 236–38
- and local governments, 167–68, 173–74, 180
- and the military, 105, 110
- as minority president, 75
- and Muslim groups, 208, 218, 224–25, 242
- and oligarchs, 202–4
- and the police, 128, 132
- as political outsider, 6–7
- and political parties, 57–60, 64–65, 67–69, 71–72, 75, 86–87, 229–30, 234
- residence of, 48
- State Secretariat of, 43–45
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