Index

accommodation of coalition actors
of the bureaucracy, 144–45, 148
in coalitional presidentialism, 15–16, 26, 237
in democratic decline, 242, 243
in Indonesian presidentialism, 38
of legislators, 81–82, 237
of local government leadership, 172–75, 179
of the military, 23–24, 118–19
of Muslim organizations, 207–8, 210, 218–19, 223–24
of non-party actors, 180
of oligarchs, 195–96, 198, 203–4
of oppositional parties, 66–67
of the police, 129
in stability, 237, 239–41
accountability, 88, 100–101, 243
Aceh peace deal, 110–11
activism/activists
anti-corruption, in KSP, 47–48
anti-presidential, in the history of the presidency, 34
against civil service reform, 156–57
Muslim, 208–9, 210–11, 220–21
oligarchic sponsorship of, 198
and the police, 122, 134–35
repression of, and democratic decline, 243–44
See also mobilization
adjutants, military, 109
administrative operations of the presidency, 32–33, 43–48, 53–54, 109, 187, 189, 198
Africa, 20–21, 205, 234
agencies, security, 137–39, 244–45
See also military/civil-military relations; police
Ahmadiyah, 218
Airlangga Hartarto, 72, 188–89, 193–94, 196, 198
ambassadorial appointments, 85–86, 169
amendments, constitutional
in DPR power, 79
in limiting impeachments, 2, 12–13
in political parties’ power, 57
in presidential elections, 12–13
in presidential power, 40, 104, 213
in stability, 18, 227, 236–38
Amin, Ma’ruf, 56–57, 73–75, 209–10, 215, 216–17
Anggraeni, Diah, 155–57
anti-communism, 99–100, 114–17, 138–39
Anung, Pramono, 45–46
APEKSI (Association of Indonesian Municipality Governments), 156–57, 172–74, 177–79
Apindo (Indonesian Association of Entrepreneurs), 188–89
APKASI (Association of Indonesian District Governments), 172–74
appeasement, 24–25, 98–99, 100–101, 103–4, 118
appointments/appointment authority
in the 1945 constitution, 33–34
in building and sustaining coalitions, 230
and the bureaucracy, 142, 146–52, 155, 165–66
and the DPR, 82, 85–86
in hybrid transitional presidentialism, 12–13
and local governments, 162–63, 165–66, 167, 169, 173–74, 249n3
and the military, 99–100, 104–5, 111, 112–13, 114–15, 117–18, 248n5
and Muslim groups, 206, 212–13
and oligarchs, 191–92
and the police, 125, 126–28, 129, 132–33
in the powers of the president, 42–43
See also cabinets/cabinet appointments
APPSI (Association of Indonesian Provincial Governments), 172–73
Arismunandar, Wismoyo, 91
Asia
Asian Financial Crisis, 37
in comparative context, 233–34
impeachments in, 39–40
Indonesia as model of stability in, 2
presidentialism in, 8, 10–11
religion in politics of, 205
attorney general’s office, 167–69
authoritarianism, 6–7, 32–33, 117–18, 121, 122
autocracy and autocratic presidentialism
in the history of the presidency, 35–38
legacies of, in the constitution, 53
lessons from, in drive for stability, 239, 240–41
military in, 98, 100, 121
police in, 121
presidential centrality in potential of, 6–7
under Sukarno and Suharto, 11–12
See also illiberalism
autonomy
of the bureaucracy, 140–41, 158–59
of the legislature, 12–13, 78, 86
of local governments and regions, 161, 180–81
of the military, 98
of the police, 128
of the president, in the 1945 constitution, 33–34
of religious organizations, 213

Bakrie, Aburizal, 94–95, 184–85, 191, 198–202
Bakrie, Anindya, 188–89, 201–2
Bakrie, Ardi, 123
Bali, 170–71
Bali Bank scandal, 91–92
Bamus (Consultative Agency), 88–89
Bareskrim (Criminal Investigation Agency), 126–27, 130
Barton, Greg, 1
Basuki Madimuljono, 151
Batubara, Juliari, 178, 247n2
Bekasi, civil service conflict in, 144–46
BKN (National Civil Service Agency), 141, 143–44, 147, 155–56
See also bureaucracy/bureaucrats
BNP2TKI (National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers), 212–13
boarding schools, Islamic, 59, 206, 211–12, 213, 217–18
Boediono, 71–73, 156–57, 159
Bolivia, 22
See also Latin America
BPUPKI (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence), 33, 34
Brazil, 21–22, 245–46
See also Latin America
breadth of coalition actors
in coalition-building, 49, 50–51, 53–54
in comparative context, 21–22, 24
in democratic decline, 227–28, 242, 244
in Indonesian coalitional presidentialism, 4–5, 13–14, 18
legislators in, 78, 88, 90–91
military in, 99
oligarchs in, 192–93
post-2004 constitution in, 42–43
range of parties in, 59–60, 65–66, 69–70, 74–75
in stability, 226–28, 238–39, 241
See also coalition size
brokers, 58, 79, 88–96
Budget Agency (DPR), 80–81
budgets/fiscal power
in building and sustaining coalitions, 230–31
and the civil service, 148–49, 152, 160
and the legislature, 79–81, 87–89, 91, 94
and local governments, 162–64, 167, 169–71, 172, 180–81
military, 100–101, 107–8, 111–12, 117–18
and Muslim groups, 206, 211–12, 213, 217–18, 219
police, 122–23, 128–29, 132–33
presidential power over, 42–43, 64, 84–85, 170–71
in the presidential toolbox, 3–4
See also funding
bureaucracy/bureaucrats
and the 2014 Civil Service Law, 154–58
in administrative structure, 43–48
autonomy of, 140–41, 158–59
in the cabinet, 141, 142, 151–52, 158–59
as implementing arm of the executive, 140–41
and local governments, 142–43, 144–45, 151–52, 155, 165–66
power of, 142–46
in presidential coalitions, 4, 25, 150–54
presidential isolation from, 53–54
presidential power over, 146–50
reform of, 25, 141, 147–48, 149–50, 154–58, 159–60
bureaucratization of politics, 158–59
business sector, 188–90, 191–92, 196–97
See also oligarchs

cabinets/cabinet appointments
and the bureaucracy, 141, 142, 151–52, 158–59
in coalitional presidentialism, 10–11
in democratic decline, 244–45
and local governments, 161, 169, 173–74, 178–79
and the military, 24–25, 105–7, 109, 111, 117–18, 244–45
Muslim groups in, 212–13, 215–17, 223–24
non-party members of, 9–10, 21–22, 23–24, 50–52, 232–33
oligarchs in, 191–92, 194–95
police in, 121, 125, 127–28, 131, 132–33, 244–45
political parties in, 52, 56, 58–59, 64, 65–68
as presidential asset, 64, 85–86
in the presidential toolbox, 3–4
religious actors in, 26
reshuffling of, 1, 67–68
as reward or punishment, 230
technocrats in, 151–52, 193–94
See also appointments/appointment authority
Cabinet Secretariat, 45–46
campaigns, presidential
and democratic decline, 243–44
legislators in, 78
local governments in, 166, 174
military in, 115
Muslim groups in, 208–10, 213–14, 216, 219, 222–23
in mutual dependence, 237
oligarchs in, 185–86, 194–95, 197–200, 203
police in, 124, 128–29
political parties in, 55, 58–59, 61–62, 63, 71
Castillo, Pedro, 1–2, 21–22
center-periphery relations, 164, 180–81
See also centralization/decentralization; local governments and leaders
centrality
of the president, 6–7, 14–15, 32, 36–37, 38, 52–53
of presidential-party relations, 74
centralization/decentralization
of the civil service, 141, 143
and local governments, 161–62, 163–65, 167, 169–70, 171, 172–73, 174–75, 180–81
ceremonies/ceremonial events, 131–32
Chalid, Reza, 93–94
chaos prevention
in accommodation of radical Muslim groups, 218
bureaucracy in, 158
coalition-building in, 49–50
DPR in, 88, 94
local governments in, 180–81
military inclusion in, 99, 101
oligarchs in, 203
party inclusion in, 59–60
checks and balances, 241, 243
Chile, 20–21, 56
See also Latin America
Cirebon, civil service conflict in, 144–46
civil emergencies, 101–2
civil service. See bureaucracy/bureaucrats
Civil Service Law of 2014, 146, 148, 153–58, 159
clientelism, 88–89, 90, 91–92, 129
See also patronage
coalitional presidentialism
in comparative global context, 232–36
defined, 9–11, 24–27
in Indonesia, 11–18
and post-2004 presidents, 49–53
coalition size, 21, 49, 50, 232–33, 235–36
See also breadth of coalition actors
coattail effect, 63
See also popularity
coercion
of local governments, 162–63
of the military, 98–99
of Muslim groups, 215, 231–32
of oligarchs, 190–91
police powers of, 120, 122–25
as presidential tool, 231–32
of presidents by security forces, 138–39
in stability, 240–41
co-legislative power
in building and sustaining coalitions, 229
constitutional, 40–41, 42–43
and the DPR, 77, 79, 85
in interactions with Muslim groups, 213, 217–18
in power over local governments, 169–70
Commission XI (Budget Agency), 80–81
committees, DPR, 81–82, 88
communists/Communist Party. See anti-communism; PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)
compromises
in avoiding impeachment, 13–14
with the bureaucracy, 148, 153–54, 157
in democratic decline, 242
with the DPR, 42, 77, 86–87, 95–96
with local governments, 180
in local-presidential relations, 180
with the military, 113–14, 117, 138–39
with police, 138–39
in stability, 236–37
concessions
in coalitional presidentialism, 9–10
in coalition-building, 50
in democratic decline, 138–39, 242
to the DPR, 78, 82–83, 87–88, 95–96
for logging, in local power, 164–65
to the military, 24–25, 98, 99–100, 106–7, 112–13, 114–15, 117–19
to Muslim groups, 214, 221–22
to non-party coalition members, 230
to oligarchs, 25–26, 182, 185, 203–4
to the police, 122–23, 129, 137
to political parties, 58–59, 60–61
confidants of the president, 43–44, 46, 48, 109
conflict
2014 Civil Service Law in, 153–58
avoidance of, in coalitional presidentialism, 239–40
ethno-religious, and the military, 100–101
inter-institutional, 8–9, 70–74, 75, 144–45
intra-elite in coalitional presidentialism, 14–16
intra-party, presidents in outcome of, 56–57, 63–64
with local governments, 144–45, 179–80
military-police, 113–14
with Muslim groups, 207–8
with oligarchs, 194–95, 199–200
with police, 112–14, 116, 121–22
with political parties, 70–74, 75
regional, in military command structure, 102–3
religious, in integration of religious actors, 26
consensus, 6–7, 33–34, 64–65, 76–77, 241, 248n1
conservatism/conservative ideology
in the bureaucracy, 160
Islamic, 26, 205–6, 207–8, 219, 220–21, 222–23
in the military, 105, 110–11, 114–16
and the police, 121–22, 132–33, 135, 136, 138–39
religious, 205–6, 207–9, 219
constitution
of 1950 (UUDS 1950), 35–36
in coalitional presidentialism, 11–14, 27
DPR in, 33–34, 39–42, 79–83
in the history of the presidency, 33–38
and impeachments, 2, 39–40, 42–43, 227
local government in, 163–64, 167–71
the military in, 27, 98, 99–100, 104–8
and Muslim groups, 207–8, 213
political party powers in, 57, 59–60
in power over oligarchs, 189–93
in presidentialism, 6–7
presidential power in, 9, 32–33, 38–43, 104, 213
in stability, 18, 227, 236–38
Constitutional Court, 39–40, 82, 165
consultation forum, DPR, 87–88
cooperation
with the bureaucracy, 148, 150, 154, 158–59
with the legislature, 79, 83, 86–87, 93, 94–97
with local governments, 161, 162–63, 169–72, 180–81
with the military, 98–99, 100–101, 103–8, 111
with oligarchs, 184–85
with the police, 120, 126–27, 129, 138–39
in political culture and stability, 236–38, 240–41
corruption
in the civil service, 148–49
in the DPR, 90–95, 96
of DPR speaker Novanto, 91–95, 96
and legislative budgetary powers, 79–80
local-presidential relations in, 180–81
in military budgeting, 107
party coalitions in policy on, 74–75
in police power, 123–24
in in presidential power over local government, 167–69
in Widodo’s policy platform, 113–14
coups, 12, 36, 103–4, 118–19, 239–40
COVID-19 pandemic, 101–2, 149, 171–72, 173, 178–79, 222–23, 245–46, 249n4

DAK (Special Allocation Funds), 90, 170
DAU (General Allocation Fund), 164, 169–70
DBH (Revenue Sharing Fund), 170
decrees
emergency, 40–42
financial, and local governments, 170
MPR, 36–37, 40, 104, 105–6
on Muslim groups, 217–18
in power over the military, 104, 105–6
in power over the police, 127
rule by, 9–10, 41–42, 105–6, 148
on special powers in bureaucratic appointments, 147–48
democracies/democratization
bureaucracies in, 141
civil service under, 143
indexes of, 16–17, 23, 244
in local government power, 163–64
military in, 100–101
police in, 125
police skepticism of, 136
post-authoritarian, in the history of the presidency, 37–38
presidentialism in instability of, 1–2
public satisfaction with, 228–29
democratic decline
coalitional presidentialism in, 13–15, 16–18, 27, 227–28
in comparative context, 23–24
global, 245
local-presidential relations in, 180–81
military in, 99–100, 118–19, 244–45
oligarchs in, 203–4
police in, 244–45
security agencies in, 138–39
stabilizing of presidentialism in, 2–3, 5, 242–46
Tito and police politics in, 136
democratic presidentialism, 13, 52–53
dependence/interdependence
of the DPR, 33–34, 85
of local governments, 166
of the military, 107–8
of Muslim groups, 206, 211, 214, 216–17, 224
of oligarchs, 184–85, 189–90, 193–98, 202–3
of police, 122–23, 136–37
of political parties, 70, 74–75
in stability, 237
on state budgets, 230–31
disciplining
of the bureaucracy, 146, 150–51
of cabinets, 9
of the legislature, 81, 86
of the military, 104, 110, 117–18
of Muslim groups, 211–15, 217, 224
of oligarchs, 193, 200–202, 203–4
of parties, 67–69
of police, 127
See also punishment
dissent
by the DPR, 81–82, 83
police in preventing, 122, 134–35, 245–46
stifling of, in democratic decline, 245–46
divide-and-rule approach, 69, 224, 233–34, 235
Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro, 194
donations, political, 25–26, 186, 190–91, 193, 197–98, 203
DPD (Region’s Representative Council), 151–52
DPP (Council of Advisers to the President), 195–96
DPR (People’s Representative Council). See legislature
Dutch colonialism, 34–35, 52–53, 156, 163
Duterte, Rodrigo, 20–21, 205, 245–46
Dwipayana, Ari, 46

economy/economic stability
DPR budgetary power in, 79–80
and oligarchs, 182, 184–85, 188, 190, 192–93, 196
education, 206, 210, 211–12, 213, 217–18
Education, Ministry of, 212, 224
Effendi, Djohan, 1
Effendi, Sofian, 157
Effendi, Taufiq, 145, 154–55
Eko Prasodjo, 156–58
electability
of Bakrie, 199–200
in choice of running mate, 72–73
of civil servants, 145–46
Muslim groups in, 72–73, 219
in political party support, 234
in presidential power over Muslim groups, 213–14
in presidential power over oligarchs, 192
See also popularity
elections
bureaucracy in, 142–44, 145–46, 152
in constitutional power, 39, 40–41
in the history of the presidency, 33–34, 37–38
indicators of stability in, 19–21
legislative, personalization of, 82–83
local government, 163–64, 167, 173–74
local government support in, 170–71
in local power, 164–65
MPR in, 12–13, 39
Muslim groups in, 207–9
non-state actors in, 237
oligarchs in, 185–86, 192, 197–98, 202–4
political party power in, 56–57, 58–59, 60–63
in power over Muslim groups, 213–14
in power over oligarchs, 192–93
for the presidency, post-2004, 39
in presidentialism, 7–8
religion in, 205–6
vote buying in, and democratic decline, 17
See also re-election of presidents
elections, direct
in constitutional power, 39, 40–41
in the history of the presidency, 37–38
and local government, 163–64, 167, 173–74
and Muslim groups, 213–14
and oligarchs, 192
in presidentialism, 7–8
in stability, 237
Enembe, Lukas, 168–69
equilibrium, 52–53, 70–71, 74, 75, 86–87, 117, 241, 248n3
ethnic Chinese oligarchs, 188–89, 190–91
events, public, 88, 152–53
exceptionalism, Indonesian, 226–27
executive presidentialism, 11–12, 52–53

Fakhruloh, Zudan Arif, 153
Fauzi, Gamawan, 173–74
favors
in coalitional presidentialism, 3–4, 230–31
in coalition-building by police, 125, 128–29
in exchange for loyalty of security agencies, 138
in Indonesian coalitional presidentialism, 15–16
in local government power, 164–65
for Muslim organizations, 210–11, 223–24
as presidential asset, in party relations, 64
See also patronage; rewards
federalism, 34–35, 163
See also local governments and leaders
Final Assessors Team, 147–48, 150
Finance, Ministry of, 80–81, 170, 218
Firli Bahuri, 123–24, 132, 249n1
fiscal power. See budgets/fiscal power
floor-based coalitions, 10–11
Forkopimda (police local leadership forum), 124
FPI, 207–8, 214–15, 218, 219, 221–23, 231–32
See also Muslims/Muslim groups
France, 31
Freedom House index, 16
Freeport Indonesia, 93–94
funding
of the bureaucracy, 148–49, 158–59, 160
for development, in the case of Setya Novanto, 92–93
development funds, 92–93, 111–12, 206, 211–12
discretionary, for legislators, 84–85, 248n2
of local governments, 164, 170–71, 172–73
of Muslim schools, 206, 211–12, 213, 217–18
off-budget, by the military, 107–8, 111–12, 117–18
by oligarchs, 185–87, 197–98, 202–3, 239–40
of the police, 128–29
of political parties, 62–63, 64
of security agencies, in democratic decline, 244–45
See also budgets/fiscal power

Gatot Nurmantyo, 114–15, 116–17
GBHN (Broad Outlines of State Policy), 40
generals
appointment of, 104–5, 117–18, 248n4
leverage of, 100–101, 103–4
in managing the military, 106–8, 111, 112–13
and Widodo, 113–17
See also military/civil-military relations
Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party), 60–61, 63, 66–67
Gibran Rakabuming Raka, 196–97
Golkar (Functional Group Party)
and Bakrie, 199–201
DPR speakers from, 89–90
in the history of the presidency, 37
ministers of, in coalition-building, 52
New Order civil service in, 142–43
in presidential leverage in the DPR, 85–86
and Setya Novanto, 91–95
in stabilizing Yudhoyono’s coalition, 229–30
in Widodo’s coalition, 63–64
gotong royong (mutual assistance), 241
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu), 41–42, 79, 222
Government Regulations (PP), 41–42
governors
and bureaucrats, 144–45
management of coalitions with, 172–75
as “party,” 161, 172–73, 179–80
powers of, 163–64, 165, 166–67
presidential powers over, 167–69, 170–71
See also local governments and leaders
grassroots networks, 58, 162–63, 173, 178–79, 208–9
Guided Democracy regime, 36–37
Gunawan, Budi, 113–14, 121–22, 125, 126–28, 132, 138

Habibie, B. J., 13, 101, 104
Hadi Utomo, 110
Haiti, Badrodin, 114
Hanura (People’s Conscience Party), 61, 247n4
harmonization law of 2022, 169–70
Hartono, Bambang Dwi, 176–77
Hartono, Heru Budi, 247n2
Hasan, Bob, 194
Hatta, Mohammad, 35
Hatta Radjasa, 123
Hendrayudha, Dadang, 112
Hendropriyono, A. M., 113, 249n8
hierarchy, political and administrative, 45–46, 125, 126, 131, 165–66, 167
HIPMI (Indonesian Association of Young Entrepreneurs), 188–89, 196
Home Affairs, Ministry of, 131, 136–37, 143, 155–56, 165, 171–72, 173–74
HTI (Hizbut Tahrir), 214–15, 219, 220–22, 223
See also Muslims/Muslim groups
human rights abuses, 100–101, 111–12, 114–17

identity card scandal, 92–93, 95, 96–97
ideology, 14–15, 65–67, 117–18, 121–22, 132–33, 207
illiberalism, 16–17, 136, 226, 227–28, 243
See also autocracy and autocratic presidentialism; democratic decline
impeachments
compromises in avoiding, 13–14
danger of, in coalition-building, 49, 50, 227
in the history of the presidency, 37–38, 53–54
as indicator of stability, 19–21
and the legislature, 83, 89–91
military acquiescence to, 101
political parties in, 69, 70–71, 75
post-2004, 2, 39–40, 42–43, 227, 228–29, 232–33, 236–39
in presidential systems, 1–2
incentives
and the bureaucracy, 150–51, 153–54
constitutional, for broad coalitions, 42–43
financial, for Muslim groups, 217–18
and the legislature, 33–34, 78, 81, 95–96
and local governments, 161, 162–63, 164–65, 167–68
for military loyalty, 103–4, 106–8
for oligarchs, 190, 191–92, 193–94
for police support, 122, 129
size of party in, 235
for stability, 236–37
independence
of the bureaucracy, 140–41
in the history of the presidency, 33–35, 38
in Indonesian coalitional presidentialism, 11–12
of legislators, 82–83, 95–96
of local governments, 163, 165–66 (See also centralization/decentralization)
military in, 99–100
of the police, 127, 128
of the president, in coalition-building, 50
struggles for, in presidential centrality, 6–7
Independent Team for the Reform of the National Bureaucracy, 154
infrastructure
government-driven projects in, and oligarchs, 190
local, 162–63, 170–71
political, access of oligarchs to, 185–88, 195–96
political, militaries in, 98
interpenetration
of bureaucracy and politics, 141, 145–46, 158–59
of local and national government, 179
Isir, Jhonny Eidizon, 45
Iskandar, Muhaimin, 72
Islam. See Muslims/Muslim groups
Isman, Hayono, 91

Japan/Japanese military administration, 33–34
Java, 163–64
Jokowi. See Widodo, Joko
Justice and Human Rights, Ministry of, 63–64
Juwaini, Jazuli, 83

Kadin (Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Trade), 188–89, 196, 201–2
Kaesang Pangarep, 197
Kalla, Jusuf, 49–50, 71, 147
Kartasasmita, Agus Gumiwang, 95
Kartasasmita, Ginandjar, 194
Kasim, Ifdhal, 47–48
KASN (Civil Service Commission), 145, 155–56, 157–58, 165–66
Kenya, 20–21, 234
Khofifah Indar Parawansa, 174, 209, 216
KNPI (Indonesian Central National Committee), 34
Komarudin, Ade, 94–95
Korpri (Indonesian Civil Servants Corps), 25, 141, 143–44, 152–53, 155–56, 157
KPK (Corruption Eradication Agency)
and the bureaucracy, 148–49
and the DPR, 85, 95
and local governments, 167–69
and the police, 113–14, 123–24, 126–27, 132
and political parties, 74–75
Krisdayanti, 248n2
Kristiyanto, Hasto, 69–70
KSP (Office of the Staff of the President), 43, 46–48
Kurniawan, Taufik, 90

LAN (State Administration Institute), 154–55
Latin America, 8, 19–20, 21–22, 23, 56, 78, 232–34, 242
Law on Information and Electronic Transactions of 2008, 134–35
Law on the Responsibility for Budget Execution, 81
legislation/legislative process
inclusion of oligarchs in, 196
on Islamic boarding schools, 217–18
local government power in, 165
non-budgetary, DPR powers in, 81–82
party powers in, and presidential concessions, 58–59
in the post-2004 constitution, 40–43
as presidential tool over police, 127
in president-party relations, 64–65
See also co-legislative power
Legislative Agency of the DPR, 81–82
legislature
brokers in, 91–95
budgetary powers of, 79–81, 87–89, 91, 94
and cabinet appointments, 85–86, 95–96
in civil service reform, 154–55
in coalitional presidentialism, 10–11, 74–75
consensus building in functioning of, 77
and democratic decline, 243
discretionary funds for, 84–85, 248n2
in the history of the presidency, 36–38
in hybrid and transitional presidentialism, 12–13
independence of, 82–83, 95–96
individualization of, 78, 82–83
management of coalition with, 87–91
in military appointments, 105
and police, 125, 126–27
political weight of, in coalitions, 75–76
in the post-2004 constitution, 39–42
powers of, 79–83
in presidential elections, 33–34
in presidentialism, 6
presidential leverage over, 83–87
relations with, in the presidential toolbox, 3–4
strength of presidential party in, 21–22, 23–24
See also MPs (members of parliament); political parties
legitimacy
and democratic decline, 242–43
military support in, 103–4
and political parties, 59, 63–64
presidential, post-2004 constitution in, 39
religious, 182, 205–6, 209–10, 219, 237
leverage in coalitional relationships
with the bureaucracy, 142–50
constitutional powers as, 38–39, 40–41
with the DPR, 79–87, 229
with local governments, 162–71
with the military, 99–108, 117
with Muslim groups, 206, 207–15
with oligarchs, 185–93
with the police, 120, 122–29, 136–37
with political parties, 57–65, 233–34, 235
size of party in, 233–34, 235
LGBTI groups and citizens, 135
Liberal Democracy Index (V-Dem), 16–17, 23
licensing powers, 164–65, 169–70, 198–99, 221
Limpo, Syahrul Yasin, 172–73
Linz, Juan: “Perils of Presidentialism,” 1–2, 7–9
Liong, Lim Sioe, 193
Listyo Sigit Prabowo, 130, 136–37
lobbying/lobby groups, 55, 57, 143, 159, 172–73, 188–89
local governments and leaders
and the bureaucracy, 142–43, 144–45, 151–52, 155
in coalitional presidentialism, 161–62
in coalition-building, 50–52, 179–80
Coordinating Meetings of Local Government Heads and Deputy Heads, 172
and decentralization, 161–62, 163–65, 167, 169–70, 171, 172–73, 174–75, 180–81
military units in, 102–3
power of and over, 162–75, 249n3
presidential appointment authority over, 162–63, 165–66, 167, 169, 173–74, 249n3
Tri Rismaharini, 175–79
Luhut Pandjaitan, 46–47, 67–68, 111, 113, 116, 134–35, 148–49, 199–201
Lumentut, Vicky, 168

Mahfud MD, 72–74, 216–17
Mainwaring, Scott, 8
majorities, legislative, 6, 7–8, 9–10, 21–22, 49–50, 53–54, 96
Mallarangeng, Andi, 68
Mangkusubroto, Kuntoro, 47, 145
Masduki, Teten, 47, 222
mayors, 165–66, 167–69, 176–79
See also local governments and leaders
media sector, 84–85, 187–88, 189–90, 191, 197–98, 200–201, 243
Megawati Sukarnoputri
on consensus in political culture, 241
legislative obstruction by, 85
military appointments by, 105
and Muslim groups, 209
in the rise of Risma, 177–78
and Widodo, 50, 57–58, 69, 113–14
meta-cleavages, 10
military/civil-military relations
and the 1965 communist massacres, 113–17
anti-communist scares of, 138–39
and the cabinet, 24–25, 105–7, 109, 111, 117–18, 244–45
in coalitional presidentialism, 24–25, 27, 99, 239
in democracies, 98
in democratic decline, 99–100, 118–19, 244–45
in the history of the presidency, 36, 37, 53
management of, 108–13, 118–19, 129–30
as members of the legislature, 14–15
military-affiliated oligarchs and Bakrie, 199–200
off-budget funding of, 107–8, 111–12, 117–18
police subordination to, 121
power of, 99–104, 105, 108, 112–13, 114–15, 117–18
in presidential administration, 45
presidents as supreme commanders over, 99–100, 104–9, 114–15, 117
ties with Novanto, 92
toolbox in oversight of, 27
Military Secretariat, 45, 53–54, 105–6, 109–10, 129–30
minorities, religious, 207–8, 213–14, 218
minority presidents
in coalitional presidentialism, 3–4
coalition-building by, 9, 11, 49–50, 63–64, 233
in comparative context, 21–22
majority-building by, 95–96, 191
in presidentialism, 7–9
mobilization
anti-Purnama, 216–17, 219, 220, 221
of the bureaucracy, 141, 142–43, 144–45, 148, 152, 156–57
Islamist, 59, 73, 130–31, 231–32
against Islamists, 207–8
by local government, 162–63, 166
by nominating parties, 63
by oligarchs, 189
of police, 122–23, 136–37
of voters, 128–29, 166, 174, 208–9, 222–23
See also activism/activists
Moeldoko, 47–48, 106, 108–9, 248n3
Morales, Evo, 22
MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), 12–13, 33–34, 36–38, 39–40, 101–2, 104, 105–6, 228–29
MPs (members of parliament), 77–78, 82–83, 84–85, 87–91
See also legislature
mud volcano, 199
Muhammadiyah, 207–9, 210, 211, 212–14, 215–17, 219, 223–24
See also PAN (National Mandate Party)
multi-party systems
coalitional presidentialism in, 3–5, 9–11, 24
in comparative context, 233–34
post-election coalitions in, 95–96
presidentialism in, 7–8, 245
stability of, 1–2, 3–5, 228–29
Muslims/Muslim groups
accommodation of, 207–8, 210, 218–19, 223–24
in anti-communist human rights abuses, 115
cabinet representation of, 212–13, 215–17, 223–24
in coalitional presidentialism, 26
and democratic decline, 17
demonstrations by, in dangers of a military coup, 103
in the fight against Islamism, 220–23
in the history of the presidency, 53
increasing role of, 205–6
in interactions with presidents, 215–19
Islamic conservative fringe, 207–8, 210–11, 214, 215, 218–23, 224–25, 231, 242, 243–44
Islamic political parties, 59
piety in power of, 206
police in repression of radicalism, 130–31, 222–23
political role of, 207, 223–24
in post-2004 coalition-building, 50–52
power of, 207–11
presidential power over, 211–15
repression of, 26, 207–8, 215, 219, 222–23, 224–25, 231–32
See also NU (Nahdlatul Ulama); PKB (National Awakening Party); PPP (Unity Development Party); religion/religious groups
Muzadi, Hasyim, 224

Nadiem Makarim, 195, 210, 212
Nasdem (National Democrats Party), 61, 63, 167–69
National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), 80–81
nationalists, 34, 37, 105, 115
See also Golkar (Functional Group Party); PDI (Indonesian Democracy Party)
National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas), 116
natural resources sector, 189–90
negotiation/renegotiation with coalition partners
appointment powers in, 230
on the ban of HTI, 221–22
with the bureaucracy, 142–46, 149–58, 159–60
in coalition stability, 231
constitutional powers in, 9, 39
with the DPR, 78, 79–81, 84–91, 95–96
with Islamic groups, 224
with local governments, 161–62, 167, 169–70, 171–75
with the military, 108, 117–18
with Muslim groups, 206, 213–14, 219–20, 221–22, 224
with oligarchs, 182, 192–93, 200–202
with the police, 120, 129–33
with political parties, 57–65, 68–69, 70–74, 229–30
in stability, 231
of vested interests, in democratic decline, 245
new developmentalism, 17
New Order
bureaucracy in, 142–43
local governance in, 163–64
military in, 100, 111–12
oligarchs in, 193–94, 198–99
police in, 128, 133, 136–37
in rise of piety in Islamic power, 206
nominations/nomination powers
of the legislature, 85–86
of military commanders, 42–43, 99–100, 105–6, 110–11, 113–14
of police commanders, 42–43, 121–22, 125, 126–27, 130–31
of political parties, 55, 56–59, 61–62, 63, 65, 69–75
for vice-presidential candidates, 70–75, 200–201
non-party actors
in the cabinet, 9–10, 50–52, 111, 151–52, 191–92, 230, 232–33, 235–36
in coalitional presidentialism, 4–5, 13–15, 24–26, 27, 75–76, 226–27
in coalition-building, 49–50, 52, 53–54, 229
in democratic decline, 243
inclusion of, in comparative context, 18, 21–22, 23–24
and political parties, 55, 75–76
in presidential administration, 43–46
in stability, 236–37
See also bureaucracy/bureaucrats; military/civil-military relations; Muslims/Muslim groups; oligarchs; police
North Sulawesi, 170–71
Novanto, Setya, 79, 87–88, 91–95, 96, 203
NTT (East Nusa Tenggara), 170–71
NU (Nahdlatul Ulama)
cabinet representation of, 53, 215–17, 223–24
in the fight against Islamism, 220–23
financial incentives for cooperation of, 217–18
in the history of the presidency, 53
power of, 207–10
presidential power over, 211–15
and Widodo, 220–24
in Widodo’s choice of 2018 running mate, 72–73
See also Muslims/Muslim groups; PKB (National Awakening Party)
Nusron Wahid, 212–13

oligarchs
and the cabinet, 191–92, 194–95
defined, 182–84
in delivering favors, 230–31
in democratic decline, 203–4
as driver of coalitional presidentialism, 239–40
inclusion and limitations of, 196, 198–202
influence of, 25–26, 185–88, 194
management of coalitions with, 193–98
military officers’ relationships with, 107–8
political donations by, 25–26, 186, 190–91, 193, 197–98, 203
power of, 185–89
presidential tools in power over, 189–93
Omnibus Bill Task Force, 196
opinion surveys (LSI), 29
outsiders, political, 60–62, 234
See also non-party actors

Paloh, Surya, 195
PAN (National Mandate Party), 51–52, 56, 67–68, 215–16
See also Muhammadiyah; Muslims/Muslim groups
Pancasila ideology, 207, 211–12, 222–23
Papuan local government, 168–69
Paspampres (Presidential Guard), 109–10, 129–30
patronage
in budgets, 42, 79–81, 84, 87–88, 230–31
and the civil service, 145, 148–49, 155–56, 158–59, 160
in coalitional presidentialism, 9–10, 15–16
in democratic decline, 242
and the DPR, 79–81, 82, 87–92, 95–97
local government powers in, 164–65
in loyalty of security agencies, 138–39
and the military, 106, 107–8, 111–12, 117–18
and oligarchs, 185–86, 189
and police, 120, 127–28
and political parties, 64, 66–67
See also clientelism
Paulus, Lodewijk Freidrich, 63
PD (Democratic Party), 57–58, 60–61, 66, 86–87, 167–68, 169
PDI (Indonesian Democracy Party), 37
PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party—Struggle), 45–46, 50, 57–58, 69–70, 177–78, 229–30, 234
Perkasa, Andika, 107–8, 109–10, 113
personalist parties, 60–63, 234
Pertamina state oil company, 150–51
Peru, 19–20, 21–22, 232–33
See also Latin America
Philippines, 11, 14, 20–22, 205–6, 234–35, 245–46
piety, Muslim, 205–6, 207–8, 209–10, 219
PKB (National Awakening Party), 50, 52, 59, 223–24
See also Muslims/Muslim groups
PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), 36, 114–15
PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), 67–69, 81, 83
police
and the cabinet, 121, 125, 127–28, 131, 132–33, 244–45
in democratic decline, 244–45
managing coalitional role of, 129–33
and the military, 113–15, 121
politics of, 133–37, 138–39
powers of, 120, 122–25, 127–28, 136–37
presidential power over, 126–29
in presidential power over local government, 167–68
in repression of fringe Muslim groups, 130–31, 222–23
and Tito Karnavian, 121–22, 133–37
political parties
in accommodation of Islamic interests, 223–24
balancing, 59–60, 64–74, 75
benefits of broad coalitions with, 74–75
in the cabinet, 52, 56, 58–59, 64, 65–68
cartelization of, 8, 14–15, 243
as channel for civil servants in the cabinet, 151–52
in coalitional presidentialism, 9, 14–15, 232–34, 236
in democratic decline, 17
in executive nominations, 55, 56–59, 61–62, 63, 65, 69–75
in the history of the presidency, 34, 36
and the legislature, 21–22, 23–24, 82–83
local governors as, 172–73, 179–80
and oligarchs, 185–87, 195
in power play with presidents, 56–57, 70–74
powers of, 56–60
in pre-2004 instability, 228–29
presidential power and leverage over, 3–5, 60–65, 79–87, 229–30
in the rise of local leaders, 177–78, 179
size and strength of, 9, 14–15, 21–22, 232–34, 236
See also under name of party
politicization/depoliticization
of the bureaucracy, 25, 141, 143, 145–46, 158–59
of the police, 125, 126–27
popularity
of civil servants in elections, 145–46
electoral, of Islamic groups, 213–14
oligarchic media in sustaining, 187–88
in political party support, 56–57, 61–62, 234
of presidents, in power over oligarchs, 192–93
of Risma, 178–79
See also coattail effect; electability
popular vote, 6, 12–13, 39
populism/populists, 5, 176–77, 185, 233–34
post-authoritarian states, 13–14, 52–53, 140–41, 227–28, 242
PPP (Unity Development Party), 37, 63–64
See also Muslims/Muslim groups
Prabowo Subianto
as agent of coalitional presidentialism, 240
as defense minister, 248n5
and the military, 112
and Muslim groups, 214
and oligarchs, 197–98, 199–200, 202–3
as political outsider, 6–7
as populist oligarch, 185
Pramono Edhie Wibowo, 110
Pranowo, Ganjar, 167, 169–70
Prasetijono, Widi, 45, 109
Pratikno, 43–45
Presidential Decision 70/2002, 127
presidentialism
defined, 6–9
in Indonesian history, 11–13
Presidential Military Secretariat, 45
prosecutions, 19–21, 112
Puan Maharani, 89, 93, 95
punishment
of the bureaucracy, 150–51
loss of cabinet positions as, 230
of Muslim groups, 211–12, 222–23, 231–32
of oligarchs, 191, 198, 203
of political parties, 67–68
of presidents by parties, 69
in stability, 240–41
Purnama, Basuki Tjahaja, 59, 84, 150–51, 190–91

qualitative and quantitative analysis, 28–29
quasi-parliamentary period, 34–35, 52–53

“rainbow coalitions,” 11
Rais, Amien, 214
Razi, Fachrul, 217
reciprocity. See transactionalism
reconciliation initiative of 1965, 114–17
recruitment
civil service, 143, 155, 156
of military officers, 109–10
by Muslim groups, 220–21
of non-party actors, 22, 44
of religious actors, 26
of Risma, 176
of Thohir, 194–95
red lines. See vested interests
re-election of presidents
bureaucracy in, 150
in Indonesia, 13–14
local governments in, 168–69, 174
in measuring stability, 19–21
military in, 101
Muslim groups in, 208–9, 213, 214, 217
oligarchs in, 191, 196–97
police in, 131–32
political parties in, 57–58, 63, 71, 74
in post-2004 stability, 2, 227, 228–29
See also electability; elections
reform/reformist initiatives
in broad party coalitions, 70
bureaucratic, 25, 141, 147–48, 149–50, 154–58, 159–60
coalition size in likelihood of, 5
and democratic decline, 243–44
and local government, 162, 163–64
and the military, 100–101, 102–3, 104, 106–7, 116, 118–19, 137
and oligarchs, 202–3
of the Palace, 43–44
and the police, 132–33, 136, 137
and political parties, 56–57, 70–74
Regional Leadership Forum, 102–3
regional secretaries, 144–45, 167, 171
regions. See local governments and leaders
regulatory power/regulatory instruments
in appointment of senior police officers, 127
in banning HTI, 222
over local governments, 171–72
over the bureaucracy, 148, 153
in power over oligarchs, 189–90
of the president, post-2004, 41–42
in presidential power over Muslim groups, 213
Religion, Ministry of, 211–12, 217, 224
religion/religious groups, 17, 26, 205–6, 223–24, 240
See also Muslims/Muslim groups
representation, proportional, 9, 82–83
repression
in democratic decline, 243–44
in the history of the presidency, 38
of LGBTI groups and citizens, 135
by the military, 98
of Muslim groups, 26, 207–8, 215, 219, 222–23, 224–25, 231–32
New Order civil service in, 142–43
police in, 122, 130–31, 134–35, 222–23
rewards
appointments as, 45–46, 230
for the bureaucracy, 141, 149–50
for local governments, 169, 180
in managing DPR coalitions, 87–88
for the military, 24–25, 103–4, 106–7
for Muslim groups, 211–12, 213, 217–18
for oligarchs, 198–99, 204–5
for police, 125, 127–29, 136–37
for political parties, 56–59, 74
See also favors
Rinakit, Sukardi, 46
Rini Soemarno, 147–48
RIS (Federal Republic of Indonesia), 34–35
Rismaharini, Tri, 162–63, 175–79, 249n6
rivalries
in the bureaucracy, 156–57
of coalition actors, in democratic decline, 243
in coalitional stability, 229–30
in democratic decline, 243
inter-party, 63–64, 65–66, 229–30
intra-Islamic, 210–11, 214, 220–21, 224–25
in the legislature, 93, 94–95
military-police, 113–14, 128, 131, 137
Rizieq Shihab, 123, 130, 222–23
Robison, Richard, 15–16, 183, 192–93
Romahurmuziy, Muhammad (“Romy”), 72
running-mates
Muslim, 53, 208–10, 215, 216–17
oligarchs as, 185, 200–201
police preferences in, 132
political parties in choosing, 56, 70–74
Ryacudu, Ryamizard, 105, 110–11

Said, Sudirman, 93–94
Samad, Abraham, 132
sanctions. See disciplining
Sarundajang, Sinyo Harry, 169
Sastrosoenarto, Hartarto, 194
scandals, finance, 91–95
security forces, 4–5, 45, 129, 138–39
See also military/civil-military relations; police
Selvanus, Yulius, 112
semi-presidential systems, 7–8
separatists, Papuan, 135
Setgab (Joint Secretariat), 68–69
Shihab, Rizieq, 207
Simanjuntak, Maruli, 109
Siradj, Said Aqil, 222
Sirait, Maruarar, 50
Siti Nurbaya Bakar, 151–52
Sjahrir, Sutan, 34
social affairs, minister for, 178, 216
social control, 142–43
Soepomo, 33, 36–37
Soesatyo, Bambang, 95
sovereignty, 34–35
speakers, DPR, 88–90, 91–95
Sri Mulyani Indrawati, 199, 203
stability/instability
breadth of coalition actors in, 226–28, 238–39, 241
bureaucracies in, 141, 142, 160
coalitional presidentialism in, 3–5, 9–10, 27
comparative, 19–24, 232–33
and democratic decline, 2–3, 5, 242–46
DPR in, 78, 83, 88
in emerging democracies, 1–3
of hybrid and transitional presidentialism, 12–13
Indonesian constitution in, 18, 227, 236–38
local governments in, 161–62, 175, 180
management of Muslim groups in, 219
military in, 99–100, 101, 103–4
oligarchs in, 184–85, 188
police loyalty in, 129
political parties in, 14, 75
post-2004 drivers of, 236–41
“presidential toolbox in,” 3–5
security agencies in, 138
strategies in sustaining, 228–32
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 127–28, 147–48, 150–51, 190, 194–95, 212–13
State Secretariat, 43–45
States of Emergency, Law on, 101–2
Strategic Reserve, 109–10, 248n4
structure, institutional and political
of the bureaucracy, 43, 141, 143, 149–50, 153
in comparative context, 233
COVID-19 changes to, in democratic decline, 245–46
of the military, 103, 105–6, 109
New Order civil service in enforcing, 142–43
oligarchs as members of, 195–96
the Palace as, 43–48
physical, of presidential institutions, 48
role of presidents in, 32
in stability, 236–37
Subagyo, H. S., 113
Sudi Silalahi, 43–45
Suharto
and autocratic presidentialism, 11–12
and bureaucratic patronage, 156
in the history of the presidency, 36–37, 53
in local government power, 163–64
management of oligarchs by, 193–94
and the military, 100, 106–7, 108–9
and oligarchs, 188, 190–91, 196–97
and the rise of Muslim power, 207
in shaping expectations of the president, 32
Suhartono, 109–10
Sukarno
and autocratic presidentialism, 11–12
in the history of the presidency, 34–35, 52–53
military cabinet appointments by, 106–7
military power under, 100
and Muslim groups, 211–12
in shaping expectations of the president, 32
as symbol of unity, 52–53
Surabaya, 162–63, 176–79
Suryadi, Deddy, 109
Suswantono, Bambang, 109–10
Sutanto, 131
Sutarto, Endriartono, 105, 106, 110–11
Sutiyoso, 113
Syadzily, Ace Hasan, 73–74
Syafiuddin, Irianto MS, 175
Syuhud, Marsudi, 216

Tandjung, Akbar, 89–90, 183–84
Tanjung, Chairul, 192
Tanoesoedibjo, Hary, 187–88, 191–92, 197–98
technocrats, 22, 50–52, 71, 151–52, 193–94
territorial command structure, 102–4, 111–12, 118
terrorism, 121, 122–23, 222–23
theater, political, 88, 108–9
Thohari, Hajriyanto Y., 85–86
Thohir, Erick, 147, 195, 196–98
Tikal, Klemens, 170
Tito Karnavian, 121–22, 127–28, 131–32, 133–37, 171–72, 249n4
Tjahjanto, Hadi, 45, 117
toolbox, presidential, 3–5, 27, 60–65, 90–91, 224, 229–32
transactionalism
and the bureaucracy, 159
in coalition-building, 49–50
in the legislature, 89–90, 91, 95
and local governments, 170–71, 174–75, 180–81
and the military, 108, 111
and the oligarchs, 198

UKP4 (Presidential Working Unit for Development Monitoring and Control), 46–47, 145
unanimity, 96
unilateralism, 6, 9–10
United States, 31, 78, 205
Urbaningrum, Anas, 92–93
Utilization of the State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform, Ministry of, 143, 154

vested interests
acceptance of, in stability, 241
of the bureaucracy, 25, 140–41, 142, 148, 153, 158–59, 160
in democratic decline, 241, 242, 245
of the legislature, 84–85, 96–97
of local governments, 172–73
of the military, 23–24, 112–13, 118
of Muslim groups, 206, 219
of oligarchs, 186, 202, 203
of the police, 123–24, 137
in presidential-local relations, 174–75, 179–80
of security agencies, 138–39
veto actors, 15–16, 23–24, 38, 96–97
veto power
in balancing party coalitions, 64–65
in coalitional presidentialism, 15–16, 24, 229
in co-legislative authority, 40–41
in comparative context, 23–24
in democratic decline, 245
in the history of the presidency, 38
in the legislature, 96–97
of police, 125
of security agencies, 138–39
in stability, 231, 237
violence
anti-communist, 99–100, 114–17
against ethnic-Chinese oligarchs, 190–91
ethno-religious, 100–101, 122–23, 190–91
and the military, 100–101, 111–12, 114–17
against non-indigenous oligarchs, 190–91
and police, 120, 122–23
vote shares, 6, 39, 170–71, 174, 208–9, 224–25
voting
civil servants’ right to, 152
mobilization of, 128–29, 166, 174, 208–9, 222–23
police in, 124, 128–29
popular vote, 6, 12–13, 39
vote buying, 17
withholding of right to, 17

Wahid, Abdurrahman
1999 election of, 39
and the civil service, 144
hostile relationship with police, 129
impeachment of, 1–2, 37–38, 89–90, 101, 236–39
and the military, 101, 102–3
and Muslim groups, 213–14
on Muslim groups and the Ministry of Religion, 211–12
as transitional president, 12–13
Wanandi, Jusuf, 250n2
Wanandi, Sofjan, 189
Waseso, Budi, 126–28, 138
wealth
of bureaucrats, 145, 158–59
measuring, 184
of military officers, 107–8
of oligarchs, 182–83, 193–94
in personalized parties, 61, 63
of police officers, 135–36
Widjajanto, Andi, 46
Widjojo, Agus, 116
Widodo, Joko
administration of, 45–48
as agent of coalitional presidentialism, 13–14, 240
and the bureaucracy, 147–49, 150–51, 152–53
Cabinet Secretariat of, 45–46, 53–54
coalition-building by, 49, 50–52, 231–32
in comparative context, 234
in democratic decline, 99–100, 118–19, 242, 244
and the DPR, 84–85, 87–88, 94–96
impeachment of Wahid as influence on, 236–39
incorporation of religious actors by, 26
and the KPK law, 74–75, 85
and local governments, 162, 165, 166, 167–68, 170–71, 172–73, 177–78
and the military, 99–100, 108–10, 113–17, 118–19
as minority president, 75
and Muslim groups, 59, 208–10, 213–14, 216–18, 220–23, 224–25
and the NU, 53, 220–23
and oligarchs, 186, 188, 191, 192–93, 194–95, 196, 197–98, 200–204
and the Palace, 43–44
and the PDI-P, 60–61
and the police, 128–29, 131–32, 134–35
and political parties, 57–58, 63–65, 67–75, 86–87, 229–30, 234
and radical Islamic groups, 219, 220–23
on reestablishment of the GBHN, 40
reform of administrative structures by, 43–44
residence of, 48
and security agencies, 137
in shaping expectations of the president, 32
stability of rule by, 2
State Secretariat of, 43–45
Wirahadikusumah, Agus, 103
Wiranto, 101, 104, 107–8, 112, 196, 222

Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang
administration of, 45–47
as agent of coalitional presidentialism, 13–14
and the bureaucracy, 143–44, 154, 157–58, 159
Cabinet Secretariat of, 45–46
on civil-military relations in stability, 101
coalition-building by, 49–52
in comparative context, 234
in democratic decline, 242, 244
and the DPR, 79–80, 84–85, 95–96
impeachment of Wahid as influence on, 236–38
and local governments, 167–68, 173–74, 180
and the military, 105, 110
as minority president, 75
and Muslim groups, 208, 218, 224–25, 242
and oligarchs, 202–4
and the police, 128, 132
as political outsider, 6–7
and political parties, 57–60, 64–65, 67–69, 71–72, 75, 86–87, 229–30, 234
residence of, 48
State Secretariat of, 43–45

A volume in the series

Show the following:

Adjust appearance:

Notes

Index

Annotate