Notes
Introduction
1. See Hunt (2009).
2. ABLA is an acronym that stands for four different public housing projects that sat on adjacent land on the city’s near South Side: the Jane Addams Homes, the Robert Brooks Homes, Loomis Courts, and the Grace Abbott Homes.
3. This quote is on the home page of the Museum’s web-site: http://www.public housingmuseum.org/.
4. National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH) (1992, 2).
5. Quoted in Feldman and Stall (2004, 84). Beverley and Harris are hardly alone in their views of public housing. Typically, whenever asked by researchers, a significant number—sometimes half or more—of residents forcibly displaced by public housing demolition indicate a preference to stay in the community rather than move out. See also Goetz (2009), Gibson (2007), and Kleit and Manzo (2006).
6. HOPE VI is the sixth program in a series first created in the 1990 National Affordable Housing Act. HOPE stands for Homeownership Opportunities for People Everywhere.
7. This information is available at HUD’s website http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/systems/pic/sac/.
8. Dries (2009).
9. Pratt (2008).
10. “Shallow” and “deep” in this instance refer to the level of affordability achieved by a subsidy. Public housing is a deep subsidy because it provides affordability to extremely low income families (incomes less than 30% of the area median). Shallow subsidies are able to produce affordability only for those with relatively higher incomes, typically 50% to 80% of the area median.
11. Calthorpe (2009, 53–54).
12. Polikoff (2009, 77).
13. The same argument is made about ‘social housing’ in Europe. As Hall and Rowlands (2005, 47) argue, the large public housing estates of Europe “were planned, developed, and allocated during a socioeconomic paradigm that characterized the four decades following the Second World War, the basic tenets of which no longer apply.”
14. From the speech by Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the dedication of Techwood Homes, Atlanta. November 29, 1935. http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/FDRspeeches/FDRspeech35–2.htm.
15. It should be noted that FDR came late to the public housing bandwagon. Advocates for the program worked for years in the face of indifference from FDR and even opposition from some of his cabinet members. See Friedman (1968).
16. See Hunt (2009) for a description of this process in Chicago.
17. See, e.g., Vale (2002), Williams (2004).
18. Al Gore, quoted in Williams (2004, 238).
19. Comment made by Secretary of HUD Henry Cisneros about Chicago public housing, “Cisneros Urges Demolition of High-rise Projects” (1994).
20. Massey and Kanauaipuni (1993).
21. See, e.g., the description in Goering (2003) of the decision by HUD to focus the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) mobility program on poverty deconcentration instead of racial desegregation.
22. See Hall and Rowlands (2005) for the European parallel.
23. See, e.g., Skutch (2010) and Seidel (2010).
24. Brenner and Theodore (2002).
25. Williams (2004).
26. Regan (2001).
27. Glover (2009b, 152).
28. Emphasis in the original. Atlanta Housing Authority (2010), “About Us: Our President and CEO” http://www.atlantahousing.org/profile/index.cfm?fuseaction=ceo.
29. Glover (2009a).
30. Hackworth (2007, 51) and Wilen and Nayak (2006).
31. Vale (2000).
32. National Housing Law Project (2002).
33. Jones and Popke (2010, 125).
34. Bloom (2008).
35. Spence (1993).
36. See Tonrys (1995) and Gordon (1994).
37. Neil Smith (2002, 92).
38. See Hackworth (2007); Moore (2009); Hackworth and Smith (2001).
39. This argument is contained in Hackworth and Smith (2001).
40. Wyly and Hammel (1999). This phrase itself is a reversal of the one used by geographer Brian Berry (1985) who, in the 1980s, lamented the limited impact of urban redevelopment efforts, calling them mere islands of renewal amid seas of decay.
41. Newman (2002).
42. Reichl (1999).
43. “New Urbanists Urge Uncle Sam: ‘Don’t Abandon HOPE’.” Similarly, Margery Austin Turner of the Urban Institute argues that it simply “makes sense to think of public housing redevelopment as an essential ingredient of a larger revitalization.” Turner (2009, 181).
44. See, e.g., Boyd (2008).
45. Pfeiffer’s (2006) study focuses on Cabrini-Green on Chicago’s Near North Side and, in part, depicts a naming war between the developers of the new mixed-income developments who erected signposts and name plates advertising the new housing being built. Residents responded by spray-painting “Cabrini” onto buildings and signs in prominent areas.
46. See Moore (2009) on black gentrification.
47. As Wilson (2004, 773) argues, neoliberalism is “now anything but a brute economic and political imposition.”
48. These quotes, in order, are from Katz (2009, 17), Williams (2004, 238, quoting Al Gore), and Popkin, Gwiasda, et al. (2000).
49. Polikoff (2009, 77).
50. Jarvie (2008).
51. Calthorpe (2009, 61).
52. The coalescence of these policy streams led to the emergence of what Imbroscio (2008, 2010) calls the “dispersal consensus.”
53. Hackworth (2007, 183).
54. See, e.g., Frost (2010), Hackworth (2007), Seattle Displacement Coalition (http://www.zipcon.net/~jvf4119/#Activities%20and%20issues%20the%20Coalition), Goetz (2003), Cardinale (2007a), Hogarth 2007.
56. Pfeiffer (2006, 49) quotes a Chicago public housing resident as saying about the redevelopment of the Cabrini-Green project, “I’ve been here my whole life, I don’t want to leave, especially now, just as it’s cleaning up.”
1. The Quiet Successes and Loud Failures of Public Housing
1. Macek (2006).
2. Friedman (1968), Bloom (2008), Hunt (2009).
3. See Hunt (2009), especially chapter 1, for a fuller discussion of the uneasy alliance between the Progressives and the housing reformers in the campaign to create the public housing program in the United States.
4. Friedman (1968).
5. Gelfand (1976, 60).
6. See Friedman (1968, 119–20), and Wright (1981, 230).
7. Ouroussoff (2006).
8. Vale (2000) and Franck (1998).
9. Bailey, Milligan, and Persce (1996).
10. See, e.g., Vale (2002) and Fuerst (2005).
11. McCarthy (1987).
12. United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 78 F. 2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935).
13. Fisher (1959).
14. Fisher (1959), Friedman (1968).
15. Hunt (2009, 31).
16. Bloom (2008).
17. This quote is taken from an excerpt from the legislative hearings for the Housing Act of 1936, in Mitchell (1985, 247). Hunt (2009) argues that the impulse to keep public housing from competing with the private sector was the overriding cause of its problems.
18. Quoted in Keith (1973, 98).
19. Friedman (1968, 115).
20. This leaflet, from Lubbock, Texas, declares public housing to be socialism and urges voters to vote no on a public housing referendum, “unless you want Lubbock to sell its birthright for the Mess of Public Housing Potage.” Quoted in Baxandall and Ewen (2001, 94).
21. Davies (1966, 127); see also Wright (1981).
22. Gelfand (1976).
23. Quoted in Vale (2000, 239).
24. Weiss (1985).
25. Keith (1973, 99).
26. See Keith (1973), Friedman (1968), and Gelfand (1976).
27. Freedman (1969, 38).
28. Parson (2005).
29. Freedman (1969, 53).
30. Hunt (2009).
31. In contrast, Vale (2000) reports that in Boston, white politicians maneuvered to have public housing placed in their wards into the 1950s. This reflected the occupancy rules of the BHA at the time and the generally better construction and design characteristics of the earliest public housing in that city. This dynamic ended, of course, as the quality of the new projects declined and as occupancy shifted from white to black.
32. Goldstein and Yancey (1986).
33. Robinson (1994).
34. The black middle class also frequently resisted the placement of public housing in their communities. See, e.g., Hunt (2009).
35. Hunt (2009).
36. Radford (2000).
37. See, e.g., Vale (2000, 174).
38. Williams (2004, 97).
39. See Bloom (2008) and Hunt (2009) on how this affected the development strategies of local housing authorities, and the quality and nature of the projects they produced.
40. Friedman (1968, 113).
41. Lewis Mumford, quoted in Radford (2000, 113).
42. See Franck (1998) on the design advantages of superblocks, and Hunt (2009) on the cost-containment origins of the strategy.
43. Hunt (2009, 46).
44. Catherine Bauer, quoted in Biles (2000, 147).
45. Gentry (2009, 206).
46. Newman (1972).
47. Mandelker (1973).
48. Ibid.
49. Vale (2000, 337).
50. See Meehan (1979, 37).
51. Hunt (2009).
52. Biles (2000, 149).
53. Hunt (2009), see esp. chapter 6.
54. Vale (2000), Bloom (2008).
55. Vale (2000, 256). See also Williams (2004).
56. Williams (2004, 44).
57. Vale (2000).
58. Bloom (2008).
59. Vale (2000, 181).
60. Mandelker (1973)
61. Hunt (2009, 52).
62. Feldman and Stall (2004).
63. Williams (2004, 98).
64. Vale (2000, 270), Williams (2004), and Hartman (1964) quoted in Vale (2000, 281).
65. Bloom (2008).
66. Spence (1993).
67. Stegman (1991, 52).
68. Feldman and Stall (2004) and Epp (1998) reports public housing incomes averaging 16 percent of area medians by 1995.
69. See, e.g., Kolodny (1985).
70. Hunt (2009, 223).
71. Williams (2004, 67).
72. Simmons (1993a).
73. Simmons (1993b).
74. Bratt (1986). See also Vale (2000).
75. Landis and McClure (2010, 332).
76. Hartman and Carr (1969) as cited in Bratt (1986, 346).
77. Connerly (1986).
78. Schill (1993).
79. Struyk (1980, 136).
80. Williams (2004, 145).
82. Henderson (1995).
83. Ibid., 42.
84. Friedman (1968, 142).
85. Montgomery and Bristol (1987).
86. Ibid.
87. Macek (2006, 167).
88. McCarthy (1987).
89. Dries (2010a).
90. Currie and Yelowitz (2000).
91. Gibson (2007, 17)
92. Stockard (1998, 245).
93. Stegman (1991, 51).
94. Cuomo (1999).
95. Ibid.
96. Rabushka and Weissert (1977), quoted in Bratt (1986).
97. Feldman and Stall (2004).
98. Venkatesh (2000).
99. See, e.g., Kleit and Manzo (2006), Gibson (2007), Vale (1997).
100. Bratt (1986, 344).
101. Connerly (1986).
102. Quoted in Bratt (1986, 343).
103. Popkin, Gwiasda, et al. (2000, 189).
104. See, e.g., Salisbury (1958).
105. Bauer (1957).
106. This is the argument of Eugene Meehan (1979).
107. See, e.g., ibid.
108. Hunt’s (2009) argument is that the political fear of opposition based on cost led administrators at the federal level to stress cost containment in construction to such an extent that it produced inferior project designs, ultimately leading to the deterioration and decline of projects; see esp. 44–47.
2. Dismantling Public Housing
1. Gutzmann (2004).
2. Pratt (2008).
3. National Housing Law Project (NHLP) (1990).
4. Codified as §1437(p) of 42. U.S.C. entitled “Demolition and Disposition of Public Housing.”
5. NHLP (1990).
6. Schill (1993, 500, n. 23).
7. The Public Housing Management Assessment Program (PHMAP) is a system created by HUD in accordance with the National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) of 1990. The system is intended to provide an objective means of measuring the performance of local public housing authorities. The specific indicators of performance are spelled out in the NAHA and include vacancy rates, unexpended modernization funds, rents collection rates, energy consumption, average length of time required to rerent vacant units, percentage of work orders outstanding, percentage of units failing annual inspection, tenants’ accounts receivable, operating reserves, and balance of operating expenses to operating income and subsidies. Source: chapters 1 and 6 of the PHMAP handbook, at http://hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/handbooks/pihh/74605/index.cfm.
8. NHLP (1990).
9. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 628 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1985).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 11.
12. NHLP (1990, 72–73).
13. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 8.
14. H.R. Conference Report No. 426, 100th Congress, First Session, 1987.
15. Concerned Tenants Association of Father Panik Village v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316 (D.C. Conn. 1988).
16. Concerned Tenants Association, 318.
17. NHLP (1990, 43).
18. Tillman v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, No. 88–0311 (W.D. Pa. filed Feb. 17, 1988), in Krislov (1988). See also Clearinghouse Review 173 (1988, 22).
19. Dessin v. City of Fort Myers, 783 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Fla.1990). This is the only case since the congressional amendments of 1987 to disallow a suit on the basis of a de facto demolition claim. The court, despite the well-known legislative history of the 1987 amendment, found the congressional language ambiguous and not expressly granting tenants a right to sue. The decision in the case remains an aberration.
20. Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
21. Boles v. Kemp, No. 92–056 CV-W-9 (W.D. Mo.) filed July 7, 1992.
22. Levin and Levin (2007).
23. Gomez v. El Paso Housing Authority, 805 F. Supp. 1363 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
24. Powell (1995).
25. Velez v. Chester Housing Authority, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Housing Authority and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 780 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
26. NHLP (1990).
27. Ibid., 49, in the case of Newark, New Jersey.
28. Ibid., 79.
29. NHLP (1990).
30. Ibid., 79.
31. Konkoly (2008).
32. Tuttle (2008).
33. Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F. 3d 351 (5th Cir. 2009).
34. Massey and Kanaiaupuni (1993).
35. Cisneros (1995) and Hartman (1995).
36. Hartman (1995).
37. Goering (2003).
38. In 1990, the National Affordable Housing Act included a series of HOPE (Homeowner for People Everywhere) programs that reflected HUD Secretary Jack Kemp’s focus on ownership and public housing reform. The program that became HOPE VI was added to the series during the 1992 congressional session in order to “encourage the [Bush] administration’s acceptance” of it. See Katz (2009, 25).
39. All of these quotes are from the Commission report (NCSDPH 1992, 2).
40. NCSDPH (1992, 2).
41. Ibid., 2.
42. The first quote is from page 3 of the Commission report (ibid.) the second is from page 5.
43. NCSDPH (1992).
44. Ibid., 17, emphasis added.
45. Ibid., 87.
46. Ibid., 85.
47. U.S. HUD (2002b), Popkin et al. (2004), Wexler (2001).
48. These categories were developed by the NCSDPH, whose recommendations led to the HOPE VI program.
49. See Zhang and Weismann (2006).
50. U.S. GAO (2002).
51. From a memo by Baron to HUD officials, quoted in Baron (2009, 31).
52. Cisneros (2009, 6); emphasis added.
53. Quoted in Jones and Popke (2010, 118).
54. Smith (2006a).
55. Fosburg, Popkin, and Locke (1996).
56. U.S. GAO (2003).
57. Fischer (2006).
58. Ibid.
59. “Asset management” is a management approach that stresses the viability of individual projects, eliminating cross-subsidization of projects within agencies. This approach and the formula for supporting “well-run” public housing are contained in the so-called Harvard Cost Study (Harvard University GSD, 2009), which provided the basis for the HUD policy changes.
60. Miller (2007), Brown (2006), Fischer (2006), Silva (2008), and Burt (2008).
61. See, e.g., Andreatta (2010).
62. Olivio (2010).
63. The record of demolitions and removals from HUD public housing inventory come from HUD, including information on the means by which units were removed (either sale or demolition) and the date of removal for all public housing in the United States through the middle of 2007 (Freedom of Information Act Request, FOIA Control Number FI-459986, response from HUD dated September 18, 2008). For a small number of cases in a small number of cities, the HUD data did not distinguish between demolition and “disposition” (sale of the unit). There were sixty-three cases of this, accounting for 5,489 units, or 4.5 percent of the database total. In these cases, I distributed the units evenly between demolition and disposition.
64. The sample of large cities was chosen by creating a list of the 150 most populous cities in the United States according to the 1990 census and then again by the 2000 census. These steps produced a list of 169 cities in total. Several of these places, however, are not central cities and have no history of involvement in the public housing program. The analysis that follows focuses only on the 137 central cities on the list. The data for this analysis were compiled from several sources. The record of demolitions and removals from HUD public housing inventory come from HUD (see note 64 above). Information on public housing in these cities was gathered from HUD’s online database of assisted housing (HUD, A Picture of Subsidized Households—1996, http://www.huduser.org/ datasets/assthsg/statedata96/index.htm). Information on the citywide characteristics of public housing was gathered for 1996, the earliest date available from this source. These data were supplemented by information from the 1990 census on housing, population, and economic characteristics of the city, FBI data on crime rates, and public finance data from the Census of Governments available through the “State of the Cities Data System” (http://socds.huduser.org/index.html).
65. “Poisson” regression techniques are appropriate when the dependent variable is a count, that is, a variable that cannot have a negative value—in this case the number of public housing units demolished in a given city.
66. See, e.g., Wyly and Hamel (1999), Smith (2006a), and Bennett and Reed (1999).
67. Powell (1995).
68. Reichl (1999).
69. Hackworth (2007) and others have suggested that public housing demolition is reminiscent of urban renewal for its role in downtown or near-downtown revitalization. Urban renewal was used by cities to physically clear the way for greater capital accumulation in cities. Friedland (1980), for example, found that urban renewal activity was related to downtown economic change and growth. The greatest reductions in public housing might be occurring in those cities that are most rapidly adapting to postindustrial economic environments. Wyly and Hamel (1999) identify HOPE VI redevelopment activity as central to contemporary patterns of gentrification in many cities. They argue that HOPE VI plans in cities with “vibrant housing market” activity incorporate new, mixed-income designs aimed at leveraging class transformations taking place nearby.
70. Newman (2004), Wyly and Hammel (1999).
3. Demolition in Chicago, New Orleans, and Atlanta
1. Hunt (2009, 230).
2. Ibid.
3. Studies documenting CHA’s misdeeds and the extreme conditions of Chicago public housing are almost too numerous to count, but include Meyerson and Banfield’s (1955) account of the early years of the program, and more recent updates by Hirsch (1998) and Hunt (2009), Popkin, Gwiasda, et al.’s (2000) study of the gang war and violence in CHA properties, and Venkatesh’s (2000) ethnographic account of life in the Robert Taylor Homes.
4. Quoted in Hunt (2009, 261).
5. Quoted in Smith (2006b).
6. Business and Professional People for the Public Interest (2009, 12).
7. Hunt (2009).
8. Ibid.
9. Biles (2000, 149).
10. Remarks of Jack Markowski, commissioner of the Chicago Department of Housing, 1999 to 2007, at the symposium for “The Plan for Transformation at 10” held at the University of Illinois at Chicago, December 10–11, 2009 (personal notes of the author). These remarks were echoed at the same event by Doug Guthrie, a former CHA official, who talked about the “complete disconnect between CHA and other city departments.” Former HUD secretary Henry Cisneros, at the same event, noted that PHAs were often the backwaters of city administration; posts were handed out as patronage and then ignored.
11. Kotlowitz (1992). See also Popkin, Gwiasda, et al. (2000).
12. A federal district court in Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority, 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill., 1994) suspended Lane’s crime sweeps as a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless searches.
13. Popkin, Gwiasda, et al. (2000).
14. Schill (1997).
15. Henry Horner Mother’s Guild v. CHA, 824 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
16. Hunt (2009, 277). This scene is reminiscent of Boston’s Mayor Kevin White who in 1980 reacted to news of the Boston Housing Authority being put into receivership by saying, “that’s all right. If they want it, they can have it.” Quoted in Vale (2000, 348).
17. Smith (2006b) and Hunt (2009).
18. Smith (2006b).
19. Ibid. Prior to the announcement of the Plan for Transformation, the City of Chicago had received ten HOPE VI grants (including demolition-only grants) for six separate public housing sites (Cabrini-Green, Henry Horner Homes, ABLA, Robert Taylor Homes, Madden/Wells, and Washington Park). This activity was folded into the Plan and included as part of the Plan’s goals.
21. The exact number of buildings and units to be demolished and the targeted number of replacement units have varied over time as redevelopment plans at individual sites have changed and as the PFT as a whole has evolved.
22. Wright (2006, 141).
23. Public remarks by Jack Markowski at “The Plan for Transformation at 10: The Symposium,” December 10, 2009 (author’s notes from the event).
24. Halasz (2008).
25. Wright et al. (1997).
26. Fisher (2003) and Illinois Assisted Housing Action Research Project (IHARP) (n.d.).
27. Fisher (2003).
28. Wallace v. Chicago Housing Authority, 298 F. Supp. 2d 710 (N.D. Ill. 2004). The independent monitor’s report is Sullivan (2004).
29. IHARP (n.d.).
30. Lowenstein (2008).
31. Boyd (2008).
32. See ibid., Patillo (2007), and Hyra (2008).
33. See, e.g., Zielenbach (2003) and Turbov and Piper (2005).
34. Popkin, Rich, et al. (2012).
35. A similar process has been documented for Louisville, Kentucky. The Park-Duvalle HOPE VI project produced a significant reduction in crime in the neighborhood that encompasses the redevelopment. However, crime hot spots reemerged shortly after the redevelopment in other public housing developments across the city (see Suresh 2000).
36. Halasz (2008).
37. Ibid.
38. Rogal and Turner (2004).
39. Bloom (2008, 215).
40. Feldman and Stall (2004).
41. Smith (2006b, 109–10).
42. Wright (2006).
43. There had always been some tension between CPPH and the formal means of resident involvement in CHA management, the Local Advisory Committee (LAC) and CAC process. Resident representatives on LAC and CAC may have felt that CPPH was ignoring the established channels by which residents provided feedback and input to CHA activities. They may have felt that the leaders of CPPH were attempting to build rival constituencies. CPPH leaders attempted to minimize those tensions as much as possible, but the undeniable reality is that by its mere existence, CPPH was questioning the leadership of LAC and CAC representatives. See Wright (2006).
44. At the CHA’s celebratory ten-year anniversary symposium for the Plan for Transformation, CAC member and CHA board member Myra King called for the moratorium. CHA officials in attendance did not respond to the call, nor was it mentioned in press reports of the event.
45. Ouroussoff (2006).
46. Mahoney (1990).
47. Ibid., 1280.
48. Reichl (1999).
49. Smith and Keller (1983).
50. NHLP (1990).
51. U.S. GAO (1996).
52. Reichl (1999, 172).
53. Ibid.
55. NHLP (1990).
56. Arena (2012).
57. Ibid.
58. Washington et al. (n.d.).
59. Advancement Project (n.d.). Fair market rents define which private-sector apartments are eligible for occupancy with a housing choice voucher. If the FMR is too low there aren’t enough rental units available for voucher holders to lease up.
60. Filosa and Russell (2005).
61. Ibid.
62. Pyles (2009, 109).
63. Cass and Whoriskey (2006).
64. Ibid.
65. Pyles (2009).
66. Jervis (2007).
67. Weaver (2007).
68. “Pelosi, Reid Ask Bush to Halt Demolition” (2007).
69. Wilbert (2007).
70. Filosa (2007a).
71. Filosa (2007b).
72. Filosa (2007a).
73. Hernandez (2008).
74. Foster (2008).
75. Associated Press (2011).
76. Cohen (2010).
77. See the account in Brinkley (2006).
78. See Seicshnaydre (2007) and Ratner (2008).
79. The Preston quote is from Filosa (2008).
80. Reckdahl (2009).
81. Reed and Steinberg (2006).
82. Brooks (2005).
83. Testimony of Yusef Freeman of McCormack Baron Salazar, before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity Field Hearing, August 21, 2009, New Orleans, Louisiana. financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/freeman.pdf.
84. Reckdahl (2008).
85. Reckdahl (2011).
86. Quoted in Keating and Flores (2000, 277).
87. Newman (2002).
88. Keating and Flores (2000, 277).
89. State of the Cities Data Systems, http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/socds.html.
90. Newman (2002).
91. Quoted in Keating and Flores (2000, 289).
92. Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (2007).
93. Both quotes are taken from the website blog of Renee Glover, August 17, 2009. ahalessonslearned.blogspot.com/2009_08_01_archive.html.
94. “Federal Government Gives Approval for Demolition.” Atlanta Housing Authority, News Release, July 3, 2008. http://www.atlantahousing.org/pressroom/index.cfm? Fuseaction=pressreleases_full&ID=24 Emphasis added.
95. Keating and Flores (2000).
96. Stirgus (2008).
98. Newman (2002, 16).
99. Newman (2002).
100. Dries (2010b).
101. Newman (2002, 16).
102. Ibid., 17.
103. Oakley, Ruel, Reid, and Sims (2010).
104. Springston (2007).
105. Rich et al. (2010).
106. Testimony of Renee Glover before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee for Housing and Community Opportunity, April 29, 2003, page 2. archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/042903rg.pdf.
107. Oakley, Ruel, and Wilson (n.d.).
108. Springston and Cardinale (2007).
109. Cardinale (2007a).
110. Cardinale (2007b).
111. Cardinale (2008).
112. Brown (2009, 16).
113. Massey and Denton (2003, 57).
114. Meyer (2000).
115. See Meyerson and Banfield (1955) and Hirsch (1998) for an early history of the city of Chicago’s placement of public housing.
4. “Negro Removal” Revisited
1. Oakes and Pelton (1999).
2. Anderson (1964).
3. Mohl (2000).
4. Hunt (2009).
5. See Williams (2004) for an example of this dynamic in Baltimore, Maryland.
6. I estimate the racial impact of displacement by looking at the racial breakdown of public housing units prior to their demolition. HUD’s Picture of Subsidized Households database (at http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/assthsg.html) provides the racial breakdown of public housing residents for the years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2000. In general, I use the dataset that corresponds to the year prior to the demolition of a given project. Thus, for projects demolished in 1997, the 1996 database provides information on the resident mix in the project. No resident information is available for projects demolished prior to 1997. For all projects demolished after 2000 I use the most recently available database, the 2000 version.
7. In cases of partial demolition (e.g., a project with three high-rise towers in which only one is demolished), I assume that the racial breakdown of tenants in the demolished building is identical to that of the overall public housing development.
8. The first year of the analysis is because 1996 is the first year for which data on the racial occupancy of individual projects is available through the HUD database. For some cities in some years, no racial occupancy data are reported for any units.
9. The number of residents displaced is estimated by multiplying the average household size in each project by the number of occupied units.
10. This difference is statistically significant at p < .05.
11. This is a reasonable assumption, given that HOPE VI initially was limited to the largest and most troubled PHAs. Critics of the program have also argued that it has overreached its initial objective to redevelop the worst 6 percent of the public housing stock.
12. For this analysis the dependent variable is dichotomous, and I employ a fixed-effects logistic regression technique to assess the importance of various characteristics of the project for its ultimate status in 2007, either demolished or still standing. See the appendix for details.
13. NCSDPH (1992).
14. Olivio (2010).
15. See Weiss (1985).
16. Winslow (2010).
5. The Fate of Displaced Persons and Families
1. Goetz (2010a).
2. The quotes used in this chapter come from interviews with Harbor View residents conducted between August 2004 and January 2006.
3. Varady and Walker’s (2000) study of vouchering out is an exception to that, although the families displaced had been living in public housing.
4. Goetz (2009).
5. McCraven (1996).
6. These figures come from respondents to a survey taken two years after relocation. Twenty-two percent of residents indicated that they had wanted to move prior to the redevelopment, 55 percent said they did not want to move, and 23 percent said they were unsure.
7. Hilson Jr. (1995).
8. Fried (1963).
9. Fried and Bleicher (1961).
10. Fried (1963, 167).
11. Jones (2009).
12. Gans (1962, 309).
13. Fullilove (2005).
14. Ibid., 10.
15. Venkatech’s description of social ties in the Robert Taylor Homes is an example. See also, Keene, Padilla, and Geronimus (2010).
16. Kleit and Manzo (2006); Manzo, Kleit, and Couch (2008); and Gibson (2007).
17. Trudeau (2006) makes this argument for families moved out of public housing in Buffalo who generally relocated nearby. See also Reed (2006).
18. Curley (2010a, 47).
19. Keene and Geronimus (2011).
20. Curley (2009).
21. This was written on a questionnaire given to former residents of Harbor View by the author.
22. Duluth Housing Authority (2002), attachment A, page 1, and attachment C, pages 42 and 43.
23. Fonger (2010).
24. “City Plans to Demolish Prospect Plaza Housing Complex in Brooklyn” (2010).
25. Weisel and Meagher (1996, 23).
26. Keene, Padilla, and Geronimus (2010, 278).
27. Dang (1996). See also Hilson Jr. (1995) quoting another resident saying, “I think it’s not that bad living here, definitely not so bad where it’s got to be torn down.”
28. Wright (2006).
29. Feldman and Stall (2004). See also Pfeiffer (2006) on the belief of some Chicago residents that relocation would lead to homelessness.
30. Goetz (2003, 164).
31. Keating and Flores (2000).
33. Keating and Flores (2000) argue that the residents of Techwood in Atlanta were told of homeownership options that were feasible for only a small number. The quote is from Lohr (2009).
34. Buron (2004).
35. Marquis and Ghosh (2008).
36. Engdahl (2009, 134).
37. Jones and Popke (2010, 126). The percentage varies from development to development, however. Curley (2010b) reports that almost half of the Maverick Gardens residents returned to the completed redevelopment.
38. Kohn (2003).
39. Olivo (2006).
40. See, e.g., Oakley, Reid, and Ruel (2011). See also Rich et al. (2010) and Harris et al. (2011).
41. See Comey (2007), Goetz (2003, 2010b), Gibson (2007), Clampet-Lundquist (2004), Varady and Walker (2000), Fisher (2003), Trudeau (2006).
42. See Comey (2007), Goetz (2003, 2010b), Johnson-Hart (2007), Gibson (2007), Clampet-Lundquist (2004), Varady and Walker (2000), Fisher (2003), Trudeau (2006), Robinson (2004). Overall, only 14 percent of relocatees in the five Urban Institute HOPE VI Panel Study cities moved outside of the central city.
43. Fisher (2003); see also Kataria and Johnson (2004).
44. Goetz (2003).
45. Trudeau (2006).
46. Kingsley et al. (2003).
47. An average of over five miles in Chicago; see Reed (2006).
48. Kleit and Galvez (2011, 400).
49. Stephens (2009).
50. Vogt (2009).
51. See Lowenstein (2008) and Patillo (2007).
52. Carson (1995).
53. This is one of the most consistent findings from all of the HOPE VI and public housing transformation literature; see, e.g., Curley (2010b), Buron et al. (2002), Clampet-Lundquist (2004), Fisher (2003), Goetz (2003, 2010b), Kingsley et al. (2003), Popkin et al. (2004), Fraser et al. (2005), Trudeau (2006), Boston (2005).
54. Kingsley et al. (2003).
55. See, e.g., Clampet-Lundquist (2004), Goetz (2010b).
56. Buron et al. (2002), Fraser et al. (2005), Boston (2005), Goetz (2003, 2010b), Clampet-Lundquist (2004).
57. Buron et al. (2002), Comey (2007).
58. See, for example, Goetz (2003).
59. Goetz (2003) finds that the subsequent moves of displaced families tended to be to neighborhoods with higher (and growing) poverty rates and higher (and growing) levels of racial segregation. Rich et al. (2010) find that the proportion of former residents living within a two-mile radius of the original McDaniel Glenn public housing site in Atlanta increased over time.
60. Comey (2007) finds that residents who have moved multiple times since being displaced by HOPE VI actually reduce their exposure to high poverty neighborhoods slightly.
61. Oakley and Burchfield (2009, 605). These findings echo the earlier work of Fisher (2003). Fisher reports only “slight improvements” in census-tract racial diversity among Chicago public housing relocates. Varady and Walker (2000) report the same for tenants vouchered out of HUD projects in four cities. Buron et al. (2002) find only modest improvements in levels of racial segregation in receiving tracts for HOPE VI relocatees in the Panel Study sites.
62. Kingsley et al. (2003).
63. In a baseline study of households at a soon-to-be demolished HOPE VI site near Seattle, Manzo, Kleit, and Couch (2005, 20) found that residents expressed concerns about being accepted by neighbors in unfamiliar, white neighborhoods.
64. Harris et al. (2011, 21).
65. See Pendall (2000) on limits to the geographic distribution of vouchers.
66. Turner (1998), Smith (2002).
67. Manzo, Kleit, and Couch (2005).
68. Turner (1998), Goetz (2003), Smith (2002).
69. Popkin, Gwiasda, et al. (2000).
70. Respondents were asked whether the move from Harbor View was good or bad overall for the respondent and his or her family. The possible responses to this question were “very good for us,” “mostly good for us,” “both good and bad,” “mostly bad,” and “very bad for us.” Descriptive analysis shows that the response most frequently selected was “both good and bad,” which was selected by almost 46 percent of respondents. Slightly over 37 percent of respondents indicated that the move was either “very good” or “mostly good,” while 9.5 percent indicated that the move was “mostly bad” and 7.6 percent indicated that the move was “very bad.”
71. Levy and Woolley (2007) find no employment or earnings increases across all of the Urban Institute Panel Study sites for residents who were moved out of their old public housing projects due to HOPE VI redevelopment. Goetz (2002, 2010b) found no employment increases among public housing residents forced to moved in Minneapolis, or among HOPE VI relocatees in Duluth. Clampet-Lundquist (2004) found the same in Philadelphia, as did Curley (2010b) for Boston.
72. The lack of any effect on economic self-sufficiency is repeated for all forms of dispersal (see Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007; Turney et al. 2006; Levy and Woolley 2007; Clampet-Lundquist 2004; Goetz 2002, 2010b; U.S. HUD 2004; Vigdor 2007). Across all five MTO cities, Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007, 99) “found no significant evidence of treatment effects on earnings, welfare participation, or amount of government assistance after an average of five years since random assignment.” Mobility seems not to be effective in increasing employment rates among low-income families in other contexts as well. Vigdor (2007) found that Hurricane Katrina displacees from New Orleans showed no employment, earnings, or income increases from their forced displacement, either.
73. HUD’s own evaluation of the Welfare to Work Voucher program documented a negative impact on employment, an effect the evaluators attributed to the disruption caused by moving (U.S. HUD 2004).
74. Levy and Woolley (2007) point to the significant health problems (both physical and mental) of relocatees as the main barrier.
75. Various researchers have investigated the reasons for the lack of positive impact. Barret, Geisel, and Johnston (2006) found transportation and child care to be barriers to employment. Clampet-Lundquist (2004) suggests that the purported social capital benefits of dispersal, the argument that low-income families would benefit from a more diverse social network and one that is more integrated into the productive economy, simply do not occur. Individuals who had relied on friends or other local connections to gain employment when they lived in the pre-HOPE VI public housing development, did not report using the same techniques after moving to new neighborhoods. Involuntary displacement seems to have actually undermined the social capital strategies of the low-income families in her study. Other factors include the influence of family factors (Oreopoulos 2003) and racial and ethnic discrimination in the job market (Carlson and Theodore 1997; Immergluck 1998).
76. Levy and Woolley (2007, 1). Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007, 108) come to the same conclusion about MTO, a voluntary program that involves people who actively desire to move: “Housing mobility by itself does not appear to be an effective anti-poverty strategy, at least over a five-year horizon.”
77. In Fort Worth, for example, Barrett, Geisel, and Johnston (2006) found that two-thirds of relocatees worry about having enough money for food, a large increase over predisplacement levels, and one-half reported fear of eviction due to their economic insecurity. Three out of five HOPE VI relocatees in the Urban Institute’s Panel Study with vouchers reported difficulties paying rent or utilities within the previous year (Popkin 2006, 82). In Portland, one-third of HOPE VI displacees reported hardship making their rent payments and 60 percent reported difficulties paying for utilities (Gibson 2007). For many relocatees, utilities are a new expense and therefore a source of economic hardship. See also Curley (2010b).
78. Studies consistently show that families that move out of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty report benefits of increased sense of safety (see Popkin and Cove 2007; Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007; Petit 2004; Gibson 2007; Goetz 2003, 2010b; Curley 2010b). The improved sense of safety is not universal; Gibson (2007) reports that 30 percent of displaced households in Portland’s Columbia Villa HOPE VI project thought their new neighborhoods were safer while 18 percent felt they were less safe in their new neighborhoods.
79. Popkin and Cove (2007).
80. Rogal and Turner (2004). See also Jones (2009).
81. Clampet-Lundquist (2010).
82. Popkin and Cove (2007).
83. There is more evidence on this question from studies of voluntary relocation through the MTO program. Unfortunately, the evidence from MTO provides little support for the dispersal argument. Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) found no improvements for asthma, hypertension, physical limitations, or in general health among experimental group members five years after the program began. The only physical benefit that showed up among MTO movers was a reduction in obesity among experimental group members. Adults reported several mental health benefits from moving as did female youth. But the benefits experienced by female youth were matched by adverse effects on male youth. Clampet-Lundquist et al. (2006) find that among MTO movers, girls showed fewer high-risk behaviors than those in the control group, though there was no such effect among boys.
84. Popkin (2006).
85. Manjarrez, Popkin, and Guernsey (2007) for the findings on adult health, and Gallagher and Bajaj (2007) for the findings on children.
86. Keene and Padilla (2010).
87. Gallagher and Bajaj (2007) report no major changes in school engagement for children in five HOPE VI sites across the country. Jacob (2004) finds that children in households relocated due to HOPE VI-like public housing redevelopment in Chicago show no educational improvements relative to control group members on a range of academic achievement measures. Again, the news is no better for the MTO program (see, e.g., Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007). In fact, Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) found no significant effects on math or reading test scores, school behavior problems, or levels of engagement for any age grouping among MTO children aged six to twenty in 2002. This despite the fact that families in the experimental group moved to neighborhoods with “substantially less” poverty and they sent their children to higher-quality schools. The authors conclude that school achievement benefits from improved neighborhood environments “if they exist, are small” (686).
89. See Popkin (2006). For example, most Duluth respondents report a high level of satisfaction with most aspects of their housing; 73 percent were satisfied with the size of their housing unit (23 percent were dissatisfied), 92 percent were satisfied with the cost (and 6 percent dissatisfied), 72 percent were satisfied with the quality of their Harbor View apartment (22 percent dissatisfied). Residents were more likely to express satisfaction with the cost of the Harbor View apartments (92%) than with the quality (72%). Overall, 81 percent expressed satisfaction with their general housing situation. Interestingly, 68 percent of household heads were satisfied with the safety of the neighborhood, although this item registered the highest levels of dissatisfaction as well (28%). Eighty-eight percent were satisfied with the convenience of health care facilities, 68 percent were satisfied with the grocery stores in the neighborhood, and 68 percent were satisfied with the proximity of friends. When asked to give an overall assessment of the neighborhood, three-quarters of respondents said they were very satisfied or somewhat satisfied, while only 15 percent said they were dissatisfied. Most residents (65%) felt that they had moved to homes and neighborhoods to their liking, while 22 percent of respondents did not. Sixty-seven percent of the former residents stated that they had moved into the kind of home that they wanted.
90. Buron et al. (2002), Popkin et al. (2004, 30), Comey (2007). Brooks et al. (2005) find a similar outcome for HOPE VI relocatees in Atlanta, with families using Housing Choice Vouchers reporting higher levels of satisfaction. Goetz (2003) found that both voluntarily and involuntarily displaced residents of public housing in Minneapolis were more satisfied with the quality of their new housing than comparison groups. Satisfaction was greater among families who moved voluntarily.
91. Goetz (2003).
92. Manzo, Kleit, and Couch (2005).
93. Barrett, Geisel, and Johnston (2006) for Fort Worth, Texas. See similar findings from Seattle (Kleit and Manzo 2006); Minneapolis (Goetz 2003); Boston (Curley 2008); Philadelphia (Clampet-Lundquist 2010); and Tampa (Greenbaum et al. 2008).
94. Clampet-Lundquist (2004, 57), based on interviews with forty-one displaced Philadelphia HOPE VI families conducted two years after relocation
95. Clampet-Lundquist (2007).
96. See Joseph, Chaskin, and Webber (2007).
97. See Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997), Clark (2002), and Curley (2010a) for examples. There seems to be little in the record of forced displacement (or even in cases of voluntary displacement such as MTO) to suggest that relocated low-income families will fulfill the expectations of the dispersal model and form relationships with their (presumably higher-income) neighbors, thereby building “bridging” social capital critical to finding employment opportunities.
98. In a study of displaced families in Minneapolis, parents reported that their children were more socially isolated in their new neighborhoods (Goetz 2003), a finding repeated in the five-city HOPE VI Panel Study (Gallagher and Bajaj 2007). Petit (2004) finds no direct effects of moving on the social interactions of MTO families in Los Angeles. In fact, in findings that mirror those from HOPE VI, Petit finds that younger children are less socially connected in their new communities, and there are no differences for teenagers. Qualitative interviews suggest that financial hardships experienced by families who moved to low-poverty neighborhoods had a negative impact on the social connections of younger children.
99. Kleit and Manzo (2006) and Vale (1997). Families with greater place attachment in turn show fewer beneficial outcomes from relocation. Varady and Walker (2000) also note that residents in several older HUD projects were not pleased to have to move out when the conversion of subsidies to Housing Choice Vouchers resulted in their displacement.
100. Gibson (2007). The story is also told in the documentary Imagining Home, Hare in the Gate Productions, http://www.hareinthegate.com.
101. Goetz (2010b).
102. The evidence of the Duluth residents indicates that the likelihood of reporting positive outcomes in one area, such as a reduction in the fear of crime, is not associated with other positive outcomes (Goetz 2010b). The Urban Institute’s Panel Study shows just this lack of correlation between a reduced fear of crime and employment gains. See Popkin and Cove (2007).
103. See Goetz, Skobba, and Yuen (2010).
104. Fauth (2004, 33).
105. Popkin et al. (2004).
106. Hartman (1964).
107. Goetz (2003). This is a major difference between HOPE VI and the voluntary mobility programs such as MTO and the Gautreaux program in Chicago. In the mobility programs, participants must move to neighborhoods below program-set thresholds for poverty or nonwhite population. In HOPE VI, displaced families move without such restrictions.
108. On the other hand, in Gautreaux and MTO, where participants must move away from such neighborhoods, families have had significant difficulties successfully leasing units. The dispersal impacts of voluntary programs are limited by the prevailing spatial distribution of fair market rents, the willingness of landlords to participate in the programs, and the difficulty of using housing vouchers in tight housing markets (see Ladd and Ludwig 1997). Fewer than half of the MTO experimental group members across the five cities were able to lease units (Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007). In the Gautreaux program fewer than one-third of families were able to lease (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000).
109. Buron et al. (2002), Clampet-Lundquist (2004), and Trudeau (2006).
110. Fauth (2004), Clampet-Lundquist (2007), and Levy and Wooley (2007)
111. See Goetz and Chapple (2010) and Teitz and Chapple (1998).
112. Ellen and Turner (1997), Galster (2007), and Teitz and Chapple (1998).
113. Goetz (2010b) and Buron and Patrabansh (2008)
114. See Galster, Quercia, and Cortez (2000).
115. As Venkatesh and Celimli (2004) note, “nostalgia may be a factor, but the social supports they spent years, if not decades, building up are not easy to cast aside.”
116. Edin and Lein (1997), Kelly (1994), Portes (1994).
117. Chapple (2001), Gilbert (1998), Hanson and Pratt (1995).
118. See Gibson (2007), Clampet-Lundquist (2004, 2007), and Kleit (2001, 2002). In Buffalo, families displaced from public housing actually chose to live in other segregated neighborhoods because of their support systems and space-time constraints in negotiating work and family obligations (Trudeau 2006).
119. Popkin and Cove (2007), Gibson (2007), Goetz (2003).
120. Ladd and Ludwig (1997), emphasis in the original.
6. Effects and Prospects in Revitalized Communities
1. Clemetson (2002).
2. Ibid.
3. Epp (1998).
4. Dries (2010b).
5. Harris et al. (2011).
6. Turner (2009, 176).
7. Engdahl (2009).
8. Fenton and Daemmrich (2005). Castells (2010) found varying outcomes across Baltimore projects. The Heritage Crossing project, which replaced Murphy Homes, has not had a positive impact on the surrounding community, in part because of its physical isolation. But Broadway Terrace, which replaced Broadway Homes, has triggered price increases in the surrounding housing stock.
9. Wyly and Hammel (1999). See also Turner (2009) for the importance of more expansive public sector revitalization efforts accompanying public housing redevelopment.
10. Bair and Fitzgerald (2005).
11. University Partnership for Community and Economic Development (n.d.). See also Cloud and Roll (2011) for evidence of property value impact in Denver.
12. Castells (2010).
13. Zielenbach and Voith (2010).
14. U.S. General Accounting Office (2003).
15. Zielenbach (2003).
16. See also Zielenbach and Voith (2010), in which a decrease in crime is documented for three of four HOPE VI sites studied. Further, the University Partnership for Community and Economic Development’s study of the Belmont Heights Estates (a HOPE VI redevelopment in Tampa, Florida) showed a decrease in crime in the neighborhood that exceeded the citywide reduction.
17. Turbov and Piper (2005).
18. Holin et al. (2003).
19. See Cloud and Roll (2011) and Cahill, Lowry, and Downey (2011).
20. Kingsley, Abravanel, et al. (2003, 33) and Turner (2009, 173).
21. U.S. HUD (2002b).
22. Ibid., 49.
23. Ibid., 6.
24. Heavens (2010).
25. Kingsley, Abravanel, et al. (2003, 37).
26. McGhee (2004).
27. Bagert (2002).
28. Fosburg, Popkin, and Locke (1996).
29. Eigelbach (2011).
30. Bennett and Reed (1999), Hyra (2008), and Patillo (2007).
31. Newman (2002).
32. Harvard Law Review (2003); see also Bennett and Reed (1999).
33. Bagart (2002), U.S. HUD (2002b).
34. U.S. HUD (2002b, 39).
35. Zielenbach (2002).
36. U.S. GAO (2003).
37. U.S. HUD (2002b, 36).
38. Wyly and Hammel (1999).
39. The analysis is based on the author’s assembled data on HOPE VI redevelopment projects. Information on project characteristics was obtained from various sources, including HUD and local housing authorities. Address information was obtained from HUD and verified through direct observation, online sources, and from local housing authorities. The projects were geocoded and census data from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses were collected for the areas surrounding the projects. A HOPE VI project is defined as the full set of redevelopment-related activities that take place at spatially separate public housing developments. A single HOPE VI project may receive multiple HOPE VI grants (and several do). Different public housing developments that share physical space are deemed to be a single project for the purposes of this analysis. So, for example, the ABLA projects in Chicago are four separate public housing developments, with thirty-six hundred apartments in a single contiguous location on the city’s Near West Side. For this study, ABLA, which received eight separate HOPE VI grants, is considered a single project. In this study, “neighborhood” is defined as all the census block groups whose centroid is within a half-mile radius of the HOPE VI project address. These trapezoidal areas were truncated wherever significant manmade or natural boundaries occurred, such as rivers or major highways. Once the relevant block groups were identified, the Geolytics Neighborhood Census database was used to collect social, physical, and economic characteristics for the neighborhoods in 1990 and 2000. The Geolytics database standardizes census boundaries across the two census years, allowing for comparison of identical spatial areas.
40. See Patillo (2007), Hyra (2008), Boyd (2008), Moore (2009), and Weber (2002).
41. Hyra (2008) and Patillo (2007).
42. Hyra (2008, 130).
43. Patillo (2007, 207–8) quotes one public housing resident’s reaction to the opposition of black middle class residents on Chicago’s South Side to rebuilding public housing in the neighborhood: “It hurted me so bad because I never would think that our own people would feel that way. You know you look for different races to feel that way but not your own people. I’ve never seen anything like it before in my life, not amongst our own people anyway. It was horrible. And I took my daughter with me because I told her, I said, ‘I want you to understand and see for yourself exactly how your own people will treat you when it comes to certain things.’ And I told her, I say, ‘especially when they feel that they are above you.’ ”
44. Jargowsky (1996).
45. Because I wish to detect the degree of neighborhood change that is induced by public housing redevelopment I control for changes taking place more broadly within the city. Thus, I look at the degree of neighborhood change relative to changes taking place at the city level. I measure displacement as a decline in the neighborhood of a given population (poverty households and the African American population) at a rate greater than is occurring in the city at large. A simple measure of the relative change in the African American population, for example, is computed as follows: (CB2K-CB90)-(NB2K-NB90), where CB2K=percentage of citywide population that is black in 2000; CB90=percentage of citywide population that is black in 1990; NB2K=percentage of neighborhood population that is black in 2000, and NB90=percentage of neighborhood population that is black in 1990. This produces a difference-in-difference score in which a positive value indicates greater decline in the black population at the neighborhood level than was experienced at the citywide scale.
46. The data are shown only for those projects that moved to relocation during the 1990s. The distribution of projects along these two dimensions is similar for projects that progressed as far as demolition in the 1990s.
7. Conclusion
1. The HOPE VI experience in the United States also provides support for Roisman’s (2001) argument that a policy focus on economic desegregation is unlikely to produce a significant degree of racial desegregation.
2. See Engdahl (2009, 135) describing Louisville losing track of hundreds in the Cotter and Lang redevelopment, and Keating (2000) describing Atlanta and Techwood.
3. Hardiman et al. (2010).
4. Ibid., 5.
5. Overton (2010).
6. 6. Schneider and Joyner (2010).
7. Horner (2011).
8. NCSDPH (1992, 2).
9. Ibid., 3.
10. Ibid., 16.
11. Glover (2009b, 146).
12. Vale (2000).
13. Popkin et al. (2000).
14. Venkatesh (2000), Williams (2004), Feldman and Stall (2004).
15. Glover (2009a).
16. Stacy Seischnaydre makes a similar argument in the context of post-Katrina New Orleans, suggesting that the public housing transformation movement has presented “a false dichotomy that would have us choose between affordable housing supplied on a segregated basis or none at all…. In other words, this fallacy would require us to choose either to reopen public housing exactly as it existed before the storm …or adopt a redevelopment agenda that would result in drastic reductions in the number of affordable housing units available to low-income people” Seischnaydre (2007, 1268).
17. See Ouroussoff’s (2006) architectural defense of Iberville.
18. Vale (2000).
19. Wilen and Nayak (2006).
20. Castaneda (2010).
21. Davis (2010).
22. Poverty and Race Research Action Council (2008).
23. Emphasis added. Cisneros (2009, 13).